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VOLUME 4

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The DEATH of SOCRATES.

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THE

ANCIENT HISTORY

OF THE

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EGYPTIANS,
CARTHAGINIANS,
ASSYRIANS,
BABYLONIANS,
MEDES AND PERSIANS,
MACEDONIANS,
AND
GRECIANS.

BY MR. ROLLIN,

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TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

IN TEN VOLUMES.

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THE

BOOK THE EIGHTH.

THE

ANCIENT HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CHAP. I.

THIS chapter contains thirteen years of the Peloponnesian war, to the nineteenth inclusively.

SECT. I. *The very short Reigns of Xerxes II. and Sogdianus. They are succeeded by Darius Nothus. He puts a stop to the Insurrection of Egypt, and that of Media. He bestows on Cyrus, his youngest Son, the supreme Command of all Asia Minor.*

[a] ARTAXERXES died about the beginning of the forty-ninth year of his reign. Xerxes, who succeeded him, was the only son which the queen his wife brought him: but he had seventeen others by his concubines, among whom was Sogdianus, (who is called Secondianus by Ctesias) Ochus and Arsites. [b] Sogdianus, in concert with Pharnacias, one of Xerxes's eunuchs, came insidiously, one festival day, to the new king, who, after drinking too immoderately, was retired to his chamber, in order to give the fumes of the wine he had drank time to evaporate; where he killed him without any difficulty, after he had reigned but forty-five days; and was declared king in his stead.

[a] A. M. 3579. Ant. J. C. 425. Ctes. c. xlvii—li. Diod. l. xii. p. 115.
[b] A. M. 3580. Ant. J. C. 424.

He was ſcarce on the throne, but he put to death Bagorazus, the moſt faithful of all his father's eunuchs. It was he who had been appointed to ſuperintend the interment of Artaxerxes, and of the queen, Xerxes's mother, who died the ſame day with her royal conſort. After having depoſited the two bodies in the mauſoleum where the kings of Perſia were interred, he found, at his return, Sogdianus on the throne, who did not receive him favourably, upon account of ſome difference with him in the lifetime of his father. But the new king did not ſtop here: not long after he took an opportunity to quarrel with him, on ſome trifling circumſtance relating to the obſequies of his father, and cauſed him to be ſtoned.

By theſe two murders, that of his brother Xerxes and of Bagorazus, he became the horror of the army and nobility, ſo that he did not think himſelf ſafe on a throne, to which he had forced his way by ſuch horrid murders. He ſuſpected that his brothers harboured the like deſign; and Ochus, to whom his father had left the government of Hyrcania, was the chief object of his ſuſpicion. Accordingly he ſent for him, with the intention of getting him murdered as ſoon as he arrived. However Ochus, who ſaw through his deſign, delayed coming upon various pretences; which he continued till he advanced at the head of a ſtrong army, which he openly declared he would employ to revenge the death of his brother Xerxes. This declaration brought over to him a great number of the nobility, and ſeveral governors of the provinces, they being juſtly diſſatisfied at Sogdianus's cruelty and ill conduct. They put the tiara on Ochus's head, and proclaimed him king. Sogdianus ſeeing himſelf abandoned in this manner, was as mean and cowardly in the ſlight defence he made to maintain his crown, as he had before been unjuſt and barbarous in uſurping it. Contrary to the advice of his beſt friends, and the wiſeſt perſons who ſtill adhered to him, he concluded a treaty with his brother, who getting him into his hands, cauſ-

ed

ed him to be thrown into aſhes, where he died a cruel death. [c] This was a kind of puniſhment peculiar to the Perſians, and exerciſed only on great criminals. One of the largeſt towers was filled to a certain height with aſhes. The criminal was then thrown headlong from the top of the tower into them; after which the aſhes were, by a wheel, turned perpetually round him, till he was ſuffocated. Thus this wicked prince loſt his life and empire, which he enjoyed ſix months and fifteen days.

[d] Ochus, by the death of Sogdianus, now ſaw himſelf poſſeſſed of the empire. As ſoon as he was well ſettled in it, he changed his name from Oehus to that of Darius. To diſtinguiſh him, hiſtorians add the epithet Nothus, ſignifying baſtard. He reigned nineteen years.

Arſites, ſeeing in what manner Sogdianus had ſupplanted Xerxes, and had himſelf been dethroned by Ochus, meditated to ſerve the latter in the ſame manner. Though he was his brother by the father's as well as the mother's ſide, he openly revolted againſt him, and was aſſiſted in it by Artyphius, ſon of Megabyzus. Ochus, whom hereafter we ſhall always eall Darius, ſent Artaſyrus, one of his generals, againſt Artyphius; and himſelf, at the head of another army, marched againſt Arſites. Artyphius, with the Grecian troops in his pay, defeated twice the general ſent againſt him. But, engaging a third time, the Greeks were corrupted, and he himſelf was beat, and forced to ſurrender, upon his being flattered with hopes that a pardon would be granted him. The king would have had him put to death, but was diverted from that reſolution by queen Paryſatis, Darius's ſiſter and queen. She alſo was the daughter of Artaxerxes, but not by the ſame mother as Darius: ſhe was an intriguing artful woman, and the king her huſband was governed by her on moſt occaſions. The counſel ſhe now gave was perfidious to the laſt degree.

[c] Val. Max. l ix. c. 2. 2 Maccab. c. xiii. l. iii.
[d] A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 423.

She adviſed him to exerciſe his clemency towards Artyphius, and ſhow him kind uſage, in order that his brother might hope, when he heard of his treating a rebellious ſervant with ſo much generoſity, that he himſelf ſhould meet, at leaſt, with as mild treatment, and thereby be prompted to lay down his arms. She added, that when once he ſhould have ſeized that prince, he might diſpoſe of him and Artyphius as he pleaſed. Darius followed her counſel, which proved ſucceſsful. Arſites being informed of the gentle uſage which Artyphius met with, concluded that, as he was the king's brother, he ſhould conſequently meet with ſtill more indulgent treatment; and with this hope he concluded a treaty, and ſurrendered himſelf. Darius was very much inclined to ſave his life: but Paryſatis, by inculcating to him, that he ought to puniſh this rebel to ſecure himſelf, at laſt prevailed with him to put his brother to death, and accordingly he was ſuffocated in aſhes with Artyphius. However, Darius had a violent ſtruggle with himſelf, before he could give orders for this ſacrifice; having a very tender affection for his brother. He afterwards put ſome other perſons to death, which executions did not procure him the tranquillity he had expected from them; for his reign was afterward diſturbed with ſuch violent commotions, that he enjoyed but little repoſe.

[c] One of the moſt dangerous commotions was occaſioned by the rebellion of Piſuthnes, who, being governor of Lydia, wanted to throw off his allegiance to the Perſian empire, and make himſelf king in his province. What flattered him with the hopes of ſucceeding in this attempt, was his having raiſed a conſiderable body of Grecian troops, under the command of Lycon the Athenian. Darius ſent Tiſſaphernes againſt this rebel, and gave him, with a conſiderable army, the commiſſion of governor of Lydia, of which he was to diſpoſſeſs Piſuthnes. Tiſſaphernes, who was an artful man, and capable of acting in all characters, found

[c] A. M. 3590. Ant. J. C. 414. Cteſ. c. li.

means

means of tampering with the Greeks under Pisuthnes; and, by dint of presents and promises, brought over the troops with their general to his party. Pisuthnes, who, by this desertion, was unable to carry on his designs, surrendered, upon his being flattered with the hopes of obtaining his pardon; but the instant he was brought before the king, he was sentenced to be suffocated in ashes, and accordingly met with the same fate as the rest of the rebels. But his death did not put an end to all troubles; [f] for Amorges his son, with the remainder of his army, still opposed Tissaphernes; and for two years laid waste the maritime provinces of Asia Minor, till he at last was taken by the Greeks of Peloponnesus, in Iasus, a city of Ionia, and delivered up by the inhabitants to Tissaphernes, who put him to death.

[g] Darius was involved in fresh troubles by one of his eunuchs. This kind of officers had, for many years, ingrossed all power, in the court of Persia; and we shall find by the sequel of this history, that they always governed absolutely in it. [h] We may know their character, and the danger to which they expose princes, by the picture which Diocletian, after he had resigned the empire, and reduced himself to a private station of life, drew of freemen, who had gained the like ascendant over the Roman emperors. "Four or five persons," says he, "who are closely united, and resolutely determined to impose on a prince, may do it very easily. They never show things to him but in such a light as they are sure will please. They conceal whatever would contribute to enlighten him: and as they only besiege him continually, he cannot be informed of any thing but through their canal, and does nothing but what they think fit to suggest to him. Hence it is, that he bestows employments on those he ought to exclude from them; and, on the other side, removes from offices such persons as are most worthy of filling them.

[f] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 554—567, 568. [g] Ctes. c. lii.
[h] Vopis. in vit. Aurelian, Imper.

In

In a word, the beſt prince is often ſold by theſe men, though he be ever ſo vigilant, and even ſuſpicious of them." *Quid multa? Ut Diocletianus ipſe dicebat, bonus, cautus, optimus venditur imperator.*

In this manner was Darius's court governed. Three eunuchs had uſurped all power in it; * an infallible mark that a government is bad, and the prince of little merit. But one of thoſe three eunuchs, whoſe name was Artoxares, preſided over, and governed the reſt. He had found Darius's weak ſide, by which he inſinuated himſelf into his confidence. He had ſtudied all his paſſions, to know how to indulge them, and govern his prince by their means. He plunged him continually in pleaſures and amuſements, to engroſs his whole authority to himſelf. In fine, under the name and protection of queen Paryſatis, to whoſe will and pleaſure he was the moſt devoted of ſlaves, he diſpoſed of all the affairs of the empire, and nothing was tranſacted but by his orders. Intoxicated by the ſupreme authority which the favour of his ſovereign gave him, he reſolved to make himſelf king, inſtead of being prime miniſter; and accordingly formed a deſign to get Darius out of the way, and afterwards aſcend the throne. However, his plot being diſcovered, he was ſeized and delivered up to Paryſatis, who put him to a moſt ignominious and cruel death.

[i] But the greateſt misfortune which happened in Darius's reign was the revolt of the Egyptians. This terrible blow fell out the ſame year with Piſuthnes's rebellion. But Darius could not reduce Egypt as he had done that rebel. [k] The Egyptians, weary of the Perſian government, flocked from all parts to Amyrtæus of Sais, who at laſt was come out of the fens where he had defended himſelf from the ſuppreſſion of the revolt of Inarus. The Perſians were driven out, and Amyrtæus proclaimed king of Egypt, where he reigned ſix years.

[i] Euſeb. in Chron. [k] Thucyd. l. i. p. 72, 73.

* *Scis præcipuum eſſe indicium non magni principis, magnos libertos.* PLIN. ad Trajan.

After

After having eſtabliſhed himſelf ſecurely on the throne, and entirely expelled the Perſians out of Egypt, he prepared to purſue them as far as Phœnicia, and had already concerted meaſures with the Arabians, to attack them in that country. News of this being brought the king of Perſia, he recalled the fleet which he had promiſed the Lacedæmonians, to employ it in the defence of his own dominions.

Whilſt Darius was carrying on the war in Egypt and Arabia, the Medes rebelled; however they were defeated and reduced to their allegiance by force of arms. To puniſh them for this revolt, their yoke (till then eaſy enough) was made heavier: a fate that rebellious ſubjects always experience, when the government, which they endeavoured to throw off, gains the upper hand.

[l] Darius's arms ſeem to have had the like ſucceſs againſt the Egyptians. Amyrtæus dying after he had reigned ſix years (he poſſibly was killed in a battle) Herodotus obſerves, it was by the aſſiſtance of the Perſians that Pauſiris, his ſon, ſucceeded him in the throne. To effect this, they muſt either have been maſters of Egypt, or their party the ſtrongeſt in that kingdom.

[m] After having cruſhed the rebels in Media, and reſtored the affairs of Egypt to their former ſituation, Darius gave Cyrus, the youngeſt of his ſons, the ſupreme command of all the provinces of Aſia Minor: an important commiſſion, by which he commanded all the provincial governors in that part of the empire.

I thought it neceſſary to anticipate times, and draw together the facts which relate to the kings of Perſia; to prevent my being often obliged to interrupt the hiſtory of the Greeks, to which I now return.

[l] Herod. l. iii. c. 15. [m] A. M. 3597. Ant. J. C. 407.

SECT.

SECT. II. *The Athenians make themſelves Maſters of the Iſland of Cythera. Expeditions of Braſidas into Thrace. He takes Amphipolis. Thucydides, the Hiſtorian, is baniſhed. A Battle is fought near Delium, where the Athenians are defeated.*

THE EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE three or four campaigns, which followed the reduction of the ſmall iſland of Sphacteria, were diſtinguiſhed by very conſiderable events.

[n] The Athenians under Nicas took the little iſland of Cythera, ſituated on the coaſt of Lacedæmonia, near cape Malea, and from thence they infeſted the whole country.

[o] Braſidas, on the other ſide, marched towards Thrace. The Lacedæmonians were induced by more than one motive to undertake this expedition; imagining they ſhould oblige the Athenians, who had fallen upon them in their country, to divide their forces. The inhabitants of it invited them thither, and offered to pay the army. In fine, they were extremely glad to embrace that opportunity to rid themſelves of the Helots, whom they expected to riſe in rebellion, from the taking of Pylus. They had already made away with two thouſand of them in a moſt horrid manner. Upon the ſpecious pretence of rewarding merit even in ſlaves, but, in reality, to get rid of a body of men, whoſe courage they dreaded, they cauſed proclamation to be made, that ſuch of the Helots as had done the greateſt ſervice to the ſtate, in the laſt campaigns, ſhould enter their names in the public regiſters, in order for their being made free. Accordingly two thouſand gave in their names. They were carried in proceſſion through the temples, with chaplets of flowers on their heads, as if they were really to be ſet at liberty. After this ceremony they all diſappeared, and were never heard of more. We have here an inſtance in what manner an

[n] A. M. 3580. Ant. J. C. 424. Thucyd. l. iv. p. 286.
[o] Ibid. p. 304, 311. Diod. l. xii p. 117, 118.

umbrageous

umbrageous policy and power, when filled with jealouſy and diſtruſt, excite men to the commiſſion of the blackeſt crimes, without ſcrupling to make even religion itſelf, and the authority of the gods, ſubſervient to their dark deſigns.

They therefore ſent ſeven hundred Helots with Braſidas, whom they had appointed to head this enterpriſe. This general brought over ſeveral cities either by force or intelligence, and ſtill more by his wiſdom and moderation. The chief of theſe were Acanthus and Stagyra, which were two colonies from Andros. [p] He alſo marched afterwards towards Amphipolis, an Athenian colony, on the river Strymon. The inhabitants immediately diſpatched a meſſenger to * Thucydides the Athenian general, who was then in Thaſus, a little iſland of the Ægæan ſea, half a day's journey from Amphipolis. He inſtantly ſet ſail with ſeven ſhips that were near him, to ſecure the place before Braſidas could ſeize it; or, at worſt, to get into Eion, which lay very near Amphipolis. Braſidas, who was afraid of Thucydides, from his great credit in all that country, where he was poſſeſſed of ſome gold mines, made all the diſpatch imaginable to get thither before him; and offered ſuch advantageous conditions to the beſieged, who did not expect ſuccours ſo ſoon, that they ſurrendered. Thucydides arrived the ſame evening at Eion; and had he failed to come that day, Braſidas would have taken poſſeſſion of it the next morning by day break. Although Thucydides had made all imaginable diſpatch, the Athenians however charged him with being the cauſe of the taking of Amphipolis, and accordingly baniſhed him.

The Athenians were greatly afflicted at the loſs of that city, as well becauſe they drew great revenues from it, and timber to build their ſhips, as becauſe it was a kind of gate for entering Thrace. They were afraid that all their allies in that neighbourhood would revolt; eſpecially as Braſidas diſcovered great modera-

[p] Thucyd. l. iv. p. 320—324.

* The ſame who wrote the hiſtory of the Peloponneſian war.

tion

tion and juſtice, and continually gave out, that he came with no other view but to free the country. He declared to the ſeveral nations that, at his leaving Sparta, he had taken an oath, in preſence of the magiſtrates, to leave all thoſe the enjoyment of their liberties who would conclude an alliance with him; and that he ought to be conſidered as the moſt abandoned of men, ſhould he employ oaths to enſnare their credulity. "For," according to Braſidas, "a fraud cloaked with a ſpecious pretence, reflects infinitely greater diſhonour on perſons in high ſtations, than open violence; becauſe the latter is the effect of the power which fortune has put into our hands; and the former is founded wholly on perfidy, which is the peſt of ſociety. Now I," ſaid he, "ſhould do a great diſſervice to my country, beſides diſhonouring it eternally, if, by procuring it ſome ſlight advantages, I ſhould ruin the reputation it enjoys, of being juſt and faithful to its promiſes; which renders it much more powerful than all its forces united together, becauſe it acquires it the eſteem and confidence of other ſtates." Upon ſuch noble and equitable principles as theſe Braſidas always formed his conduct; believing, that the ſtrongeſt bulwark of a nation is juſtice, moderation, integrity, and the firm perſuaſion which their neighbours and allies entertain, that they are not ſo baſe as to harbour a deſign to uſurp their dominions, or deprive them of their liberty. By this conduct he brought over a great number of the enemy's allies.

[q] The Athenians, under the command of Demoſthenes and Hippocrates, had entered Bœotia, expecting that ſeveral cities would join them the moment they ſhould appear. The Thebans marched out to meet them near Delium. A conſiderable engagement enſued, in which the Athenians were defeated and put to flight. [r] Socrates was in this battle; and Laches, who accompanied that great man in it, gives the following teſtimony of him in Plato; that had the reſt of the army

[q] Thucyd. l. iv. p. 311—319.
[r] Plat. in Lach. p. 181. In conviv. p. 221. Plut. in Alcib. p. 195.

behaved

behaved as gallantly as Socrates, the Athenians would not have ſuſtained ſo great a loſs before Delium. He was borne away by the crowds who fled, and was on foot; Alcibiades, who was on horſeback, when he ſaw him, rode up to him, and did not ſtir from him, but defended him with the utmoſt bravery from the enemy who were purſuing him.

After the battle, the victors beſieged the city. Among other engines employed by them to batter it, they uſed one of a very extraordinary kind. This was a long piece of timber, cut into two parts, and afterwards made hollow and joined again, ſo that its ſhape reſembled very much that of a flute. At one of the ends was fixed a long iron tube, to which a cauldron hung; ſo that by blowing a large pair of bellows at the other end of the piece of timber, the wind being carried from thence into the tube, lighted a great fire, with pitch and brimſtone, that lay in the cauldron. This engine being carried on carts as far as the rampart, to that part where it was lined with ſtakes and faſcines, threw out ſo great a flame, that the rampart being immediately abandoned and the paliſades burnt, the city was eaſily taken.

SECT. III. *A twelve Month's Truce is agreed upon between the two States. Cleon and Braſidas die. A Treaty of Peace for fifty Years concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.*

NINTH, TENTH, AND ELEVENTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

THE loſſes and advantages on both ſides were pretty equal; and the two nations began to grow weary of a war, which put them to great expence, and did not procure them any real advantage. A truce for a year was therefore concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. The former reſolved on it, in order to check the progreſs of Braſidas's conqueſts; to ſe-

[1] A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 423. Thucyd. l. iv. p. 328—333 Diod. l. xii. p. 120.

cure

cure their cities and fortreſſes, and afterwards to conclude a general peace, in caſe they judged it would be of advantage to them. The latter were induced to it, in order that, by the ſweets of repoſe, peace might become deſirable to their enemy; and to get out of their hands ſuch of their citizens as the Athenians had taken priſoners in the iſland of Sphacteria; and which they could never expect to do, if Braſidas extended his conqueſts farther. The news of this accommodation ſenſibly afflicted Braſidas, as it ſtopped him in the midſt of his career, and diſconcerted all his projects. He could not even prevail with himſelf to abandon the city of Scione, which he had taken two days before, but without knowing that a truce was concluded. He went ſtill farther; and did not ſcruple to take Mende, a little city not far from Scione, that ſurrendered to him as the former had done, which was a direct violation of the treaty: but Braſidas pretended he had other infractions to object to the Athenians.

It will naturally be ſuppoſed, that they were far from being pleaſed with this conduct of Braſidas. Cleon, in all public aſſemblies, was for ever inflaming the minds of the Athenians, and blowing up the fire of war. [t] His great ſucceſs in the expedition of Sphacteria had raiſed his credit infinitely with the people: he now was grown inſupportably proud, and his audaciouſneſs was not to be reſtrained. He had a vehement, impetuous, and furious kind of eloquence, which prevailed over the minds of his auditors, not ſo much by the ſtrength of his arguments as by the boldneſs and fire of his ſtyle and utterance. It was Cleon who firſt ſet the example of bawling in aſſemblies, where the greateſt decorum and moderation had till then been obſerved; of throwing his robe behind him, to give him the more liberty to diſplay his arms; of ſtriking his thigh; and of running up and down the roſtra whilſt he was making his ſpeech. In a word, he firſt introduced among the orators, and all thoſe who were in public employments an ungovernable licentiouſneſs, and a contempt of decency;

[t] Plut in vit. Niciæ, p. 528.

a licen-

a licentiouſneſs and contempt which ſoon introduced terrible irregularities and confuſion in public affairs.

[u] Thus two men, each on his own ſide, oppoſed the tranquillity of Greece, and raiſed, but in a very different way, an invincible obſtacle to its peace. Theſe were Cleon and Braſidas. The former, becauſe the war ſcreened his vices and malverſations; and the latter, becauſe it added a new luſtre to his virtues. And indeed it gave Cleon an opportunity of committing enormous oppreſſions, and Braſidas of performing great and noble actions. But their death, which happened about the ſame time, made way for a new accommodation.

[x] The Athenians had appointed Cleon to command the troops which were to oppoſe Braſidas, and reduce thoſe cities that had revolted from their allegiance. The Athenians were ſolicitous for none of them ſo much as Amphipolis; and Braſidas threw himſelf into that city, in order to defend it. Cleon had written to Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, and to the king of the Odomantes, to furniſh him with as many troops as poſſible, and with the utmoſt expedition. He waited for them, and had reſolved not to march immediately towards the enemy: but finding his ſoldiers, who had followed him involuntarily and with regret, grow weary of continuing ſo long inactive, and begin to compare his cowardice and inexperience with the ability and valour of Braſidas, he could no longer bear their contempt and murmurs: and imagining himſelf a great captain by his taking Sphacteria, he now fancied the ſame good fortune would attend him at Amphipolis. He therefore approached it, as he ſaid, to take a view of the place, and till ſuch time as all his forces ſhould be come up; not that he thought he wanted them for carrying that city, or that he doubted, in any manner, his ſucceſs (for he was perſuaded that no one would dare to oppoſe him) but only to enable him to inveſt the place on all ſides, and afterwards to take it by ſtorm. Accordingly he encamped before Amphipolis; when viewing very lei-

[u] Plut. in vit. Niciæ, p. 528. [x] A. M. 3582. Ant. J. C. 422. Thucyd. l. iii. p. 343—351. Diod. l. xii. p. 121, 122.

ſurely

ſurely its ſituation, he fondly ſuppoſed that it would be in his power to retire whenever he pleaſed, without drawing the ſword; for not a man came out or appeared on the walls; and all the gates of the city were kept ſhut, ſo that Cleon began to repent his not having brought the engines, imagining that he wanted only theſe to make himſelf maſter of the city. Braſidas, who was perfectly well acquainted with Cleon's diſpoſition and character, ſtudiouſly affected an air of fear and reſerve, to increaſe his temerity and the good opinion he had of himſelf: beſides, he knew that Cleon had brought with him the flower of the Athenian forces, and the choiceſt troops of Lemnos and of Imbrus. Accordingly Cleon, deſpiſing an enemy who did not dare to appear before him, but ſhut himſelf up, in a cowardly manner, in the city, went boldly from place to place, without precaution or obſerving any diſcipline among his ſoldiers. Braſidas, whoſe intention was to attack him on a ſudden before all his forces ſhould be come up, thought this the critical juncture. He had concerted proper meaſures, and given the orders neceſſary. Accordingly he made a ſudden ſally on the Athenians, which ſurpriſed and diſconcerted them exceedingly. Immediately the left wing drew off from the main body and fled. Braſidas then turned the whole force of his arms againſt the right wing, which gave him a warm reception. Here he was wounded and diſabled, upon which his ſoldiers carried him off, unperceived by the Athenians. As for Cleon, not having reſolved to fight, he fled, and was killed by a ſoldier, who happened to meet him. The troops he commanded defended themſelves for ſome time, and ſuſtained two or three attacks without giving ground, but at laſt they were univerſally broke and routed. Braſidas was then carried into the city, where he ſurvived his victory but a few moments.

The whole army being returned from the purſuit, ſtripped the dead, and afterwards ſet up a trophy. After which all the allies under arms ſolemnized the funeral obſequies of Braſidas, in a public manner; and the inhabitants of Amphipolis celebrated funeral honours

every year to his memory, as to a hero, with games, combats, and sacrifices. They considered him as their founder; and to secure this title the better to him, they demolished all the monuments of him* who had really been so; so that they might not appear to owe their establishment to an Athenian, and at the same time make their court to the Lacedæmonians, on whom they depended wholly for their security. The Athenians, after having carried off, with the consent of the victors, their dead, returned to Athens, during which the Lacedæmonians settled the affairs of Amphipolis.

[y] A saying is ascribed to the mother of Brasidas, which strongly intimates the Spartan character. As some persons were applauding, in her presence, the fine qualities and exalted actions of her son, and declared him superior to all other generals: "You are mistaken," says she, "my son was a valiant man, but Sparta has many citizens braver than he." A mother's generosity, in thus preferring the glory of the state to that of her son, was admired, and did not go unrewarded; for the Ephori paid her public honours.

[z] After this last engagement, in which the two persons who were the greatest obstacles to their peace, lost their lives, both nations seemed more inclined to an accommodation, and the war was suspended in a manner on both sides. The Athenians, from the loss of the battles of Delium and Amphipolis, which had very much brought down their haughtiness, were undeceived with regard to the opinion they had hitherto entertained of their own strength, which had made them refuse the advantageous offers of their enemies. Besides, they were afraid of the revolt of their allies, who being discouraged by their losses, might thereby be induced to abandon them, as several had already done. These reflections made them strongly repent their not having concluded a treaty, after the advantages they had gained at Pylus. The Lacedæmonians, on the other side, no longer flattered themselves with the hopes of being

[y] Diod. l. xii. p. 122. [z] Thucyd. l. v. p. 351—354.

* Agnon the Athenian.

able

able to ruin the Athenians by laying waſte their country; and were beſides dejected and terrified by their loſs in the iſland, the greateſt they had ever ſuſtained. They alſo conſidered, that their country was depopulated by the garriſon of Pylus and Cythera; that their ſlaves deſerted; and they had reaſon to dread a more conſiderable revolt; and that as the truce they had concluded with the inhabitants of Argos was near expiring, they had reaſon to be apprehenſive of being abandoned by ſome of their allies of Peloponneſus, as they accordingly were. Theſe ſeveral motives, enforced by the deſire they had of recovering the priſoners, the greateſt part of whom were the moſt conſiderable citizens of Sparta, made them deſire a pace.

Thoſe who were moſt ſolicitous for having it concluded, and whoſe intereſt it was chiefly to wiſh it, were the chiefs of the two ſtates. *viz.* Pliſtonax, king of Lacedæmonia, and Nicias, general of the Athenians. The former was lately returned from baniſhment, to which he had been ſentenced, on account of his being ſuſpected to have received a bribe, in order to draw off his troops from the Athenian territories; and to this precipitate retreat was aſcribed ſeveral misfortunes which followed after it. He alſo was charged with having corrupted, by gifts, the prieſteſs of Delphos, who had commanded the Spartans, in the name of the god, to recal him from his exile. Pliſtonax was therefore deſirous of peace, in order to put an end to the reproaches, which, on account of the perpetual calamities of the war, were daily revived. As for Nicias, the moſt fortunate general of his age, he was afraid leſt ſome unhappy accident ſhould eclipſe his glory; and he wiſhed to enjoy the fruits of peace in eaſe and tranquillity, and that his country might poſſeſs the ſame happineſs.

[a] Both ſtates began by agreeing to a ſuſpenſion of arms for twelve months, during which, being every day together, and taſting the ſweets of ſecurity and repoſe, and the pleaſure of correſponding with their friends and with foreigners, they grew paſſionately de-

[a] Thucyd. l. v. p. 354. Plut. in Nic. p. 528, 529.

sirous of leading an easy, undisturbed life, remote from the alarms of war, and the horrors of blood and slaughter. They heard, with the utmost demonstrations of joy, the choruses of their tragedies sing, "May spiders henceforward weave their cobwebs on our lances and shields!" And they remembered, with pleasure, him who said, "Those who sleep in the arms of peace, do not start from it at the sound of the trumpet; and nothing interrupts their slumbers but the peaceful crowing of the cock."

[b]The whole winter was spent in conferences and interviews, in which each party proposed their rights and pretensions. At last, a peace was concluded and ratified for fifty years; one of the chief articles of which was, that they should reciprocally restore the prisoners on each side. This treaty was concluded ten years and some days from the first declaration of the war. The Bœotians and Corinthians were exceedingly disgusted at it, and for that reason used their utmost endeavours to excite fresh troubles. [c]But Nicias persuaded the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to give the last hand to this peace, by concluding an alliance offensive and defensive, which would render them more formidable to those who should desire to break with them, and more assured with regard to each other. The Athenians, in consequence of this treaty, at last restored the prisoners they had taken in the island of Sphacteria.

SECT. IV. *Alcibiades begins to appear. His Character. He opposes Nicias in every Thing, and breaks the Treaty he had concluded. The Banishment of Hyperbolus puts an End to the Ostracism.*

TWELFTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

[d]ALCIBIADES began now to advance himself in the state, and appear in the public assemblies. Socrates had attached himself to him for many years,

[b] A. M. 3583. Ant. J. C. 421. Diod. l. xiii. p. 122.
[c] Thucyd. l. v. p. 358, 359. [d] Plut. in Alcib. p. 192, 194.

and adorned his mind with a great variety of the nobleſt erudition.

The ſtrict intimacy between Alcibiades and Socrates is one of the moſt remarkable circumſtances in his life. This philoſopher, obſerving excellent natural qualities in him, which were greatly heightened by the beauty of his perſon, beſtowed incredible pains in cultivating ſo valuable a plant, leſt, being neglected, it ſhould wither as it grew, and abſolutely degenerate. And indeed Alcibiades was expoſed to numberleſs dangers: the greatneſs of his extraction, his vaſt riches, the authority of his family, the credit of his guardians, his perſonal talents, his exquiſite beauty, and, ſtill more than theſe, the flattery and complaiſance of all who approached him. One would have concluded, ſays Plutarch, that fortune had ſurrounded and inveſted him with all theſe pretended advantages as with ſo many ramparts and bulwarks, to render him inacceſſible and invulnerable to all the darts of philoſophy; thoſe ſalutary darts which ſtrike to the very heart, and leave in it the ſtrongeſt incitements to virtue and ſolid glory. But thoſe very obſtacles redoubled the zeal of Socrates.

Notwithſtanding the ſtrong endeavours that were uſed to divert this young Athenian from a correſpondence which alone was capable of ſecuring him from ſo many ſnares, he devoted himſelf entirely to it. As he had abundance of wit, he was fully ſenſible of Socrates's extraordinary merit; and could not reſiſt the charms of his ſweetly-inſinuating eloquence, which, at that time, had a greater aſcendant over him than the allurements of pleaſure. He was ſo zealous a diſciple of that great maſter, that he followed him wherever he went, took the utmoſt delight in his converſation, was extremely well pleaſed with his principles, received his inſtructions, and even his reprimands, with wonderful docility, and would be ſo moved with his diſcourſes, as even to ſhed tears and abhor himſelf; ſo weighty was the force of truth in the mouth of Socrates, and in ſo ugly and odious a light did he expoſe the vices to which Alcibiades abandoned himſelf.

Alcibiades, in thoſe moments when he liſtened to Socrates, differed ſo much from himſelf, that he appeared quite another man. However, his headſtrong, fiery temper, and his natural fondneſs for pleaſure, which was heightened and inflamed by the diſcourſes and advice of young people, ſoon plunged him into his former irregularities, and tore him, as it were, from his maſter, who was obliged to run after him as after a ſlave who had eſcaped. This viciſſitude of flights and returns of virtuous reſolutions, and relapſes into vice, continued a long time; but ſtill Socrates was not diſguſted by his levity, and always flattered himſelf with the hope of bringing him back to his duty. And hence certainly aroſe the ſtrong mixture of good and evil which always appeared in his conduct; the inſtructions which his maſter had given him, ſometimes prevailing; and, at other times, the fire of his paſſions hurrying him, in a manner, againſt his own will, into things of a quite oppoſite nature.

This intimacy, which continued as long as they lived, did not paſs uncenſured. But ſome perſons* of great learning pretend, that theſe cenſures and ſuſpicions, when duly examined, quite diſappear; and that they ought to be conſidered as the effect of the malice of the enemies of both. Plato, in one of his dialogues, gives us a converſation between Socrates and Alcibiades, by which the genius and character of the latter may be known, who henceforward will have a very great ſhare in the affairs of the republic of Athens. I ſhall make a very ſhort extract from it in this place, which I hope will not diſpleaſe my readers.

[c] In this dialogue, Socrates is introduced converſing with Alcibiades, who, at that time, was under the guardianſhip of Pericles. He was then very young, and had been educated like the reſt of the Athenians; that is, he had been taught polite literature, and to play on inſtruments, and had practiſed wreſtling and other bodily

[c] Plut. in Alcib. I.

* Abbé Fraguier juſtifies Socrates in one of his diſſertations. *Mem. of the Academy of Belles Lettres*, Tom. iv. p. 372.

exercises. It does not appear that Pericles had hitherto taken much pains in Alcibiades's education, (a fault too common in the greatest men) since he had put him under the tutorage of Zopyrus, a Thracian, a man far advanced in years, and who, of all Pericles's slaves, both from his turn of mind and age, was the least qualified to educate this young Athenian. And indeed Socrates told Alcibiades, that should he compare him with the youths of Lacedæmonia, who displayed a spirit of valour, a greatness of soul, a strong desire of glory, a love of labour, attended with gentleness, modesty, temperance, and a perfect obedience to the laws and discipline of Sparta, he would seem a mere child to them. Nevertheless, his high birth, his riches, the great families he was related to, and the authority of his guardian, all these things had conspired to make him exceedingly vain and haughty. He was full of esteem for himself, and of contempt for all others. He was preparing to enter upon the administration of the public affairs, and promised himself no less than to eclipse entirely the glory of Pericles, and to attack the king of Persia even upon his throne. Socrates seeing him going to mount the rostra, in order to give the people some advice relating to the public affairs, demonstrates to him, by various questions, and by Alcibiades's answers, that he is quite ignorant of the affairs about which he is going to speak, as he had never studied them himself, nor been informed in them by others. After making Alcibiades confess this, he paints, in the strongest colours, the absurdity of his conduct, and makes him fully sensible of it. What, says Socrates, would Amestris (the mother of Artaxerxes, who then reigned in Persia) say, were she to hear, that there is a man now in Athens meditating war against her son, and even intends to dethrone him? She doubtless would suppose him to be some veteran general, a man of intrepid courage, of great wisdom, and the most consummate experience; that he is able to raise a mighty army, and march it wherever he pleases; and, at the same time, that he has long before taken the proper measures for putting so vast a design in

execution. But were she to hear that there are none of these circumstances, and that the person in question is not twenty years old; that he is utterly ignorant of public affairs; has not the least knowledge of war, and no credit with the citizens or allies; would it be possible for her to refrain from laughing at the folly and extravagance of such an enterprise? This nevertheless, says Socrates, (directing himself to Alcibiades) is your picture; and unhappily resembles most of those who thrust themselves into the public employments. Socrates however excepts Pericles on this occasion; his solid merit and exalted reputation being acquired by his close study, during a long course of years, of every thing capable of forming his mind, and of qualifying him for public employments. Alcibiades could not deny that this was his case; he was ashamed of his conduct, and blushing to see himself so void of merit, he asks how he must act for the attainment of it. Socrates, being unwilling to discourage his pupil, tells him, that as he is so young, these evils might be remedied, and afterwards continually gave him the wisest counsels. He had entire leisure to improve from them; as upwards of twenty years passed between this conversation, and his engaging in public affairs.

Alcibiades was of a convertible genius, that would take any impression which the difference of times and circumstances might require, still veering either to good or evil, with the same facility and ardour; and shifting almost in an instant from one extreme to its opposite, so that people applied to him what Homer observes of the land of Egypt, [e] "That it produces a great number of very excellent medicinal drugs, and, at the same time, as many poisons." [f] It might be said of Alcibiades, that he was not one single man, but (if so bold an expression might be used) a compound of several men; either serious or gay; austere or affable; an imperious master, or a grovelling slave; a friend to virtue and the virtuous, or abandoned to vice and vicious men; ca-

[e] *Quemvis hominem secum attulit ad nos.* JUVENAL.

pable

pable of ſupporting the moſt painful fatigues and toils, or inſatiably deſirous of voluptuous delights.

[g] His irregularities and diſſolute conduct were become the talk of the whole city; and Alcibiades would very willingly have put a ſtop to theſe reports, but without changing his courſe of life, as appears from a ſaying of his. He had a very handſome dog, of a prodigious ſize, which had coſt him threeſcore and ten minæ*, or three thouſand five hundred French livres. By this we find that a fondneſs for dogs was of great antiquity. Alcibiades cauſed his tail, which was the greateſt beauty he had about him, to be cut off. His friends cenſured him very much on that account, and ſaid, that the whole city blamed him very much for ſpoiling the beauty of ſo handſome a creature. "This is the very thing I want," replied Alcibiades with a ſmile. "I would have the Athenians diſcourſe about what I have done to my dog, that they may not entertain themſelves with ſaying worſe things of me."

[h] Among the various paſſions that were diſcovered in him, the ſtrongeſt and moſt prevailing was a haughty turn of mind, which would force all things to ſubmit to it, and could not bear a ſuperior, or even an equal. Although his birth and uncommon talents ſmoothed the way to his attaining the higheſt employments in the republic; there was nothing however to which he was ſo fond of owing the credit and authority he wanted to gain over the people, as to the force of his eloquence, and the perſuaſive grace of his orations. To this his intimacy with Socrates might be of great ſervice.

[i] Alcibiades, with ſuch a caſt of mind as we have here deſcribed, was not born for repoſe, and had ſet every engine at work to traverſe the treaty lately concluded between the two ſtates; but not ſucceeding in his attempt, he endeavoured to prevent its taking effect. He was diſguſted at the Lacedæmonians, becauſe they di-

[g] Plut. in Alcib. p. 195 Plut. in Alcib. p. 195, 196. Thucyd. l v. p. 368—378.

[h] Το φιλονεικον και το φιλοπρωτον.

[i] A. M. 3584. Ant. J. C. 420. Plut. in Alcib. p. 197, 198.

* About 160l. ſterling. The Attic mina was worth a hundred drachmas, and the drachma ten pence, French money.

rected

rected themselves only to Nicias, of whom they had a very high opinion; and, on the contrary, seemed to take no manner of notice of him, though his ancestors had enjoyed the rights of hospitality among them.

The first thing he did to infringe the peace was this; having been informed that the people of Argos only wanted an opportunity to break with the Spartans, whom they equally hated and feared, he flattered them secretly with the hopes that the Athenians would succour them; by suggesting to them that they were ready to break a peace which was no way advantageous to them.

And indeed the Lacedæmonians were not very careful to observe the several conditions of it religiously, having concluded an alliance with the Bœotians, in direct opposition to the design and tenor of the treaty; and having surrendered up the fort of Panacton to the Athenians, not fortified and in the condition it was in at the concluding of the treaty, as they had stipulated to do, but quite dismantled. Alcibiades, observing the Athenians to be extremely exasperated at this breach of faith, did his utmost to widen the difference; and taking this opportunity to embarrass Nicias, he made him odious to the people, by causing them to entertain a suspicion of his being too strongly attached to the Lacedæmonians; and by charging him with crimes which were not altogether improbable, though they were absolutely false.

This new attack quite disconcerted Nicias; but happily for him there arrived, at that very instant, ambassadors from Lacedæmonia, who were invested with full powers to put an end to all the divisions. Being introduced into the council or senate, they set forth their complaints, and made their demands, which every one of the members thought very just and reasonable. The people were to give them audience the next day. Alcibiades, who was afraid they would succeed with them, used his utmost endeavours to engage the ambassadors in a conference with him. He represented to them, that the council always behaved with the utmost moderation and humanity to those who addressed them; but that

that the people were haughty and extravagant in their pretenſions; that ſhould the ambaſſadors mention full powers, they (the people) would not fail to take advantage of this circumſtance, and oblige them to agree to whatever they ſhould take it into their heads to aſk. He concluded with aſſuring them, that he would aſſiſt them with all his credit, in order to get Pylus reſtored to them; to prevent the alliance with the people of Argos, and to get that with them renewed: and he confirmed all theſe promiſes with an oath. The ambaſſadors were extremely well pleaſed with this conference, and greatly admired the profound policy and vaſt abilities of Alcibiades, whom they looked upon as an extraordinary man; and, indeed, they were not miſtaken in their conjecture.

On the morrow, the people being aſſembled, the ambaſſadors were introduced. Alcibiades aſked them, in the mildeſt terms, the ſubject of their embaſſy, and the purport of the powers with which they were inveſted. They immediately anſwered, that they were come to propoſe an accommodation, but were not impowered to conclude any thing. Theſe words were no ſooner ſpoke, but Alcibiades exclaims againſt them; declares them to be treacherous knaves; calls upon the council as witneſs to the ſpeech they had made the night before; and deſires the people not to believe or hear men who ſo imprudently advanced falſehoods, and ſpoke and prevaricated ſo unaccountably, as to ſay one thing one day, and the very reverſe the next.

Words could never expreſs the ſurpriſe and confuſion with which the ambaſſadors were ſeized, who, gazing wildly on one another, could not believe either their eyes or ears. Nicias, who did not know the treacherous ſtratagem of Alcibiades, could not conceive the motive of this change, and tortured his brain to no purpoſe to find out the reaſon of it The people were that moment going to ſend for the ambaſſadors of Argos, in order to conclude the league with them; when a great earthquake came to the aſſiſtance of Nicias, and broke up the aſſembly. It was with the utmoſt difficulty he prevailed

vailed so far, in that of next day, as to have a stop put to the proceedings, till such time as ambassadors should be sent to Lacedæmon. Nicias was appointed to head them; but they returned without having done the least good. The Athenians then repented very much their having delivered up, at his persuasion, the prisoners they had taken in the island, and who were related to the greatest families in Sparta. However, though the people were highly exasperated at Nicias, they did not proceed to any excesses against him, but only appointed Alcibiades their general; made a league with the inhabitants of Matinea and Elis, who had quitted the party of the Lacedæmonians, in which the Argives were included, and sent troops to Pylus, to lay waste Laconia. In this manner they again involved themselves in the war which they were so lately desirous of avoiding.

[k] Plutarch, after relating the intrigue of Alcibiades, adds: "No one can approve the methods he employed to succeed in his design; however, it was a master-stroke, to disunite and shake almost every part of Peloponnesus in this manner, and raise up, in one day, so many enemies against the Lacedæmonians." In my opinion, this is too soft a censure of so knavish and perfidious an action, which, how successful soever it might have been, was, notwithstanding, horrid in itself, and of a nature never to be sufficiently detested.

[l] There was in Athens a citizen, Hyperbolus by name, a very wicked man, whom the comic poets generally made the object of their raillery and invectives. He was hardened in evil, and become insensible to infamy, by renouncing all sentiments of honour, which could only be the effect of a soul abandoned entirely to vice. Hyperbolus was not agreeable to any one; and yet the people made use of him to humble those in high stations, and involve them in difficulties. Two citizens, Nicias and Alcibiades, engrossed, at that time, all the authority in Athens. The dissolute life of the latter shocked the Athenians, who besides dreaded his auda-

[k] In Alcib. p. 198.

[l] Plut. in Alcib. p. 196, 197. In Nic. p. 530, 531.

city and haughtineſs. On the other ſide, Nicias, by always oppoſing, without the leaſt reſerve, their unjuſt deſires; and by obliging them to take the moſt uſeful meaſures, was become very odious to them. One would have imagined, that as the people were thus alienated from both, they would not have failed to put the oſtraciſm in force againſt one of them. Of the two parties which prevailed at that time in the city, one which conſiſted of the young men who were eager for war, the other of the old men who were deſirous of peace; the former endeavoured to procure the baniſhment of Nicias, and the latter of Alcibiades. Hyperbolus, whoſe only merit was in impudence, in hopes of ſucceeding whichſoever of them ſhould be removed, declared openly againſt them, and was eternally exaſperating the people againſt both. However, the two factions being afterwards reconciled, he himſelf was baniſhed by (and put an end to) the oſtraciſm, which ſeemed to have been demeaned, in being employed againſt a man of ſo baſe a character; for hitherto there was a kind of honour and dignity annexed to this puniſhment. Hyperbolus was therefore the laſt who was ſentenced by the oſtraciſm; as Hipparchus, a near relation of Piſiſtratus the tyrant, had been the firſt.

SECT. V. *Alcibiades engages the Athenians in the War of Sicily.*

SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEETH YEARS OF THE WAR.

I PASS over ſeveral inconſiderable events, to haſten to the relation of that of the greateſt importance, the expedition of the Athenians into Sicily, to which they were eſpecially excited by Alcibiades. This is the ſixteenth year of the Peloponneſian war.

[n] Alcibiades had gained a ſurpriſing aſcendant over the minds of the people, though they were perfectly well acquainted with his character. For his great qua-

[m] A. M. 3588. Ant. J. C. 416. Thucyd. l. viii. p. 350—409.
[n] Plut. in Alcib. p. 198—200. In Nic. p. 531.

lities

lities were united with ſtill greater vices, which he did not take the leaſt pains to conceal. He paſſed his life in ſuch an exceſs of luxury and voluptuouſneſs, as was a ſcandal to that city. Nothing was ſeen in his houſe but feſtivals, rejoicings, and parties of pleaſure and debeauchery. He ſhowed very little regard to the cuſtoms of his country, and leſs to religion and the gods. All perſons of ſenſe and judgment, beſides the ſtrong averſion they had for his irregularities, dreaded exceedingly the conſequences of his audacity, profuſion, and utter contempt of the laws, which they conſidered as ſo many ſteps by which Alcibiades would riſe to tyrannical power.

Ariſtophanes, in one of his comedies*, ſhows admirably well, in a ſingle verſe, the diſpoſition of the people with regard to him: "They hate Alcibiades," ſays he, "and yet cannot do without him." And, indeed the prodigious ſums he ſquandered on the people; the pompous games and ſhows he exhibited to pleaſe them; the magnificent and almoſt incredible preſents which he made the city; the grace and beauty of his whole perſon; his eloquence, his bodily ſtrength, joined to his courage and experience; in a word, this aſſemblage of great qualities made the Athenians wink at his faults, and bear them patiently, always endeavouring to leſſen and ſcreen them under ſoft and favourable names; for they called them ſports, polite paſtimes, and indications of his humanity and good nature.

Timon the man-hater, moroſe and ſavage as he was, formed a better judgment of this conduct of Alcibiades. Meeting him one day as he was coming out of the aſſembly, vaſtly pleaſed at his having been gratified in all his demands, and to ſee the greateſt honours paid him by the people in general, who were attending him in crouds to his houſe; ſo far from ſhunning him as he did all other men, on the contrary he ran to meet him, and ſtretching out his hand to him in a friendly way; "Courage, my ſon," ſays he, "thou doſt right in puſh-

* The Frogs. Act v. Scene 4.

ing

ing thy fortune, for thy advancement will be the ruin of all these people." The war of Sicily will show that Timon was not mistaken.

The Athenians, from the time of Pericles, had meditated the conquest of Sicily. However, that wise guide had always endeavoured to check this ambitious and wild project. He used frequently to inculcate to them that by living in peace, by supporting their fleet, by contenting themselves with the conquests they had already gained, and by not engaging in hazardous enterprises, they would raise their city to a flourishing condition, and be always superior to their enemies. The authority he had at that time over the people, though it kept them from invading Sicily, could not surpass the desire they had to conquer it, and their eyes were continually upon that island. *Some time after Pericles's death, the Leontines, being invaded by the Syracusans, had sent a deputation to Athens to demand aid. They were originally of Chalcis, an Athenian colony. The chief of the deputies was Gorgis, a famous rhetorician, who was reputed the most eloquent man of his times. His elegant and florid diction, heightened by shining figures which he first employed, charmed the Athenians, who were prodigiously affected with the beauties and graces of eloquence. Accordingly the alliance was concluded, and they sent ships to Regium to the aid of the Leontines. The year following they sent a greater number. Two years after they sent a new fleet, something stronger than the former; but the Sicilians having put an end to all their divisions, by the advice of Hermocrates, the fleet was sent back; and the Athenians, not being able to prevail with themselves to pardon their generals for not conquering Sicily, sent two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles into banishment; and sentenced the third, Eurymedon, to pay a heavy fine; their prosperity having blinded them to so prodigious a degree, that they were persuaded no power was able to resist them. They made several attempts afterwards, and upon pretence of sending, from time to time, arms

*Diod. l. xii. p 99.

and

and ſoldiers to ſuch cities as were unjuſtly treated or oppreſſed by the Syracuſans, they by that means were preparing to invade them with a greater force.

But the perſon who moſt inflamed this ardour was Alcibiades, by his feeding the people with ſplendid hopes with which he himſelf was for ever filled or rather intoxicated. He was every night, in his dreams, taking Carthage, ſubduing Africa, croſſing from thence into Italy, and poſſeſſing himſelf of all Peloponneſus, looking upon Sicily not as the ſcope and end of this war, but as the beginning and the firſt ſtep of the exploits he revolved in his mind. All the citizens favoured his views, and without enquiring ſeriouſly into matters, were enchanted with the mighty hopes he gave them. This expedition was the only topic of all converſations. The young men, in the places where the public exerciſes were performed, and the old men in their ſhops, and elſewhere, were employed in nothing but in drawing the plan of Sicily; in diſcourſing on the nature and quality of the ſea with which it is ſurrounded; on its good harbours, and flat ſhores towards Africa: for theſe people, infatuated by the ſpeeches of Alcibiades, were (like him) perſuaded that they ſhould make Sicily only their place of arms and their arſenal, from whence they ſhould ſet out for the conqueſt of Carthage, and make themſelves maſters of all Africa and the ſea, as far as the Pillars of Hercules.

[p] It is related, that neither Socrates nor Methon the aſtronomer, believed that this enterpriſe would be ſucceſsful; the former, being inſpired, as he inſinuated, by his familiar ſpirit, who always warned him of the evils with which he was threatened; and the other, directed by his reaſon and good ſenſe, which, pointing out what he had to apprehend in reſpect to the future, induced him to act the madman on this occaſion; and to demand, in conſideration of the unhappy condition to which he was reduced, that the Athenians would not force away his ſon, and would diſpenſe with his carrying arms.

[p] Plut. in Alcib. p. 199. In Nic. p. 532.

SECT.

SECT. VI. *Account of the several People who inhabited Sicily.*

BEFORE I enter on the relation of the war of Sicily, it will not be improper to give a plan of the country, and of the nations who inhabited it: Thucydides begins in the same manner.

[q] It was first inhabited by the Lestrygones and the Cyclopes, of whom we do not know any particulars, except what we are told by the poets. The most ancient after these were the Sicani, who called themselves the original inhabitants of this country, though they are thought to have come into it from the neighbourhood of a river in Spain, called Sicanus, whose name they gave to the island, which before was called Trinacria: these people were afterwards confined to the western part of the island. Some Trojans, after the burning of their city, came and settled near them, and built Erix and * Egesta, who all assumed the name of Elymæi; and were afterwards joined by some inhabitants of Phocis, at their return from the siege of Troy. Those who are properly called Sicilians came from Italy in very great numbers; and having gained a considerable victory over the Sicani, confined them to a corner of their island, about three hundred years before the arrival of the Greeks; and in Thucydides's time, they still inhabited the middle part of the island and the northern coast. From them the island was called Sicily. The Phœnicians also spread themselves along the coast and in the little islands which border upon it, for the convenience of trade: but after the Greeks began to settle there, they retired into the country of the Elymæi, in order to be nearer Carthage, and abandoned the rest. It was in this manner the Barbarians first settled in Sicily.

[r] With regard to the Greeks, the first of them who crossed into Sicily were the Chalcidians of Eubœa, under Theocles who founded Naxos. The year after, which, according to Dionysius Halicarnassus, was the

[q] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 410—413 [r] A. M. 3294. Ant. J. C. 710.

* It is called Segesta by the Romans.

third

third of the seventeenth Olympiad, Archias the Corinthian laid the foundations of Syracuse. Seven years after, the Chalcidians founded Leontium and Catana, after having driven out the inhabitants of the country, who were Sicilians. Other Greeks, who came from Megara, a city of Achaia, about the same time, founded Megara, called Hyblæa, or barely Hybla, from Hyblon, a Sicilian king, by whose permission they settled in his dominions. It is well known that the Hyblæan honey was very famous among the ancients. A hundred years after, the inhabitants of that city built Selinonta. Gela, built on a river of the same name, forty-five years after the founding of Syracuse, founded Agrigentum about a hundred and eight years after. Zancle, called afterwards Messana or Messene, by Anaxilas tyrant of Regium, who was of Messene, a city of Peloponnesus, had several founders, and at different periods. The Zanclians built the city of Himera; the Syracusans built Acre, Casmene, and Camarina. These are most of the nations, whether Greeks or Barbarians, who settled in Sicily.

SECT. VII. *The People of Egesta implore Aid of the Athenians. Nicias opposes, but to no Purpose, the War of Sicily. Alcibiades carries that Point. They both are appointed Generals with Lamachus.*

[a] ATHENS was in the disposition above related when ambassadors were sent from the people of Egesta, who, in quality of their allies, came to implore their aid against the inhabitants of Selinunta, who were assisted by the Syracusans. It was the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war. They represented, among other things, that should they be abandoned, the Syracusans, after seizing their city as they had done that of Leontium, would possess themselves of all Sicily, and not fail to aid the Peloponnesians who were their founders; and, that they might put them to as little charge as possible, they offered to pay the troops that should be sent

[a] A. M. 3588. Ant. J. C. 416. Thucyd. l. vi. p. 413—415. Diod. l. xii. p. 129, 130. Plut. in Alcib. p. 200. In Nic. p. 531.

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to ſuccour them. The Athenians who had long waited for an opportunity to declare themſelves, ſent deputies to Egeſta to enquire into the ſtate of affairs, and to ſee whether there was money enough in the treaſury to defray the expence of ſo great a war. The inhabitants of that city had been ſo artful, as to borrow from the neighbouring nations a great number of gold and ſilver vaſes, worth an immenſe ſum of money; and of theſe they made a ſhow when the Athenians arrived. [t] The deputies returned with thoſe of Egeſta, who carried threeſcore talents in ingots, as a month's pay for the galleys which they demanded; and a promiſe of larger ſums, which, they ſaid, were ready both in the public treaſury and in the temples. The people, ſtruck with theſe fair appearances, the truth of which they did not give themſelves the leiſure to examine, and ſeduced by the advantageous reports which their deputies made in the view of pleaſing them, immediately granted the Egeſtans their demand, and appointed Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus to command the fleet; with full power, not only to ſuccour Egeſta, and reſtore the inhabitants of Leontium to their city; but alſo to regulate the affairs of Sicily, in ſuch a manner as might beſt ſuit the intereſts of the republic.

Nicias was appointed one of the generals, to his very great regret; for, beſides other motives which made him dread that command, he ſhunned it, becauſe Alcibiades was to be his colleague. But the Athenians promiſed themſelves greater ſucceſs from this war, ſhould they not reſign the whole conduct of it to Alcibiades, but temper his ardour and audacity with the coldneſs and wiſdom of Nicias.

[u] Five days after, to haſten the execution of the decree, and make the neceſſary preparations, a ſecond aſſembly was held. Nicias, who had had time enough to reflect deliberately on the affair, propoſed, and was ſtill better convinced of the difficulties and dangers which would enſue from it; thought himſelf obliged to ſpeak with ſome vehemence againſt a project, the

[t] A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 415. [u] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 415—428.

conſequences

conſequences of which he foreſaw might be very fatal to the republic. He ſaid, "That it was ſurpriſing ſo important an affair ſhould have been determined, the moment almoſt it was taken into deliberation: that without once enquiring into matters, they had given credit to whatever was told them by foreigners, who were very laviſh of their promiſes; and whoſe intereſt it was to offer mighty things, in order to extricate themſelves from their imminent danger. After all, what advantage," ſays he, "can accrue from thence to the republic: have we ſo few enemies at our doors, that we need go in ſearch of others at a diſtance from us? Will you act wiſely, to hazard your preſent poſſeſſions on the vain hopes of an uncertain advantage? To mediate new conqueſts before you have ſecured your ancient ones? To ſtudy nothing but the aggrandizing of your ſtate, and quite neglect your own ſafety? Can you depend in any manner on a truce, which you yourſelves know is very precarious; which you are ſenſible has been infringed more than once; and which the leaſt defeat on our ſide may ſuddenly change into an open war? You are not ignorant how the Lacedæmonians have always been, and ſtill continue diſpoſed with regard to us. They deteſt our government as different from theirs; it is with grief and diſdain they ſee us poſſeſſed of the empire of Greece; they conſider our glory as their ſhame and confuſion; and there is nothing they would not attempt, to humble a power which excites their jealouſy, and keeps them perpetually in fear. Theſe are our real enemies, and it is they we ought to guard againſt. Will it be a proper time to make theſe reflections, (when after having divided our troops, and our arms will be employed elſewhere) and unable to reſiſt them, we ſhall be attacked at once by all the forces of Peloponneſus? We do but juſt begin to breathe, after the calamities in which war and the plague had plunged us; and we are now going to plunge ourſelves into greater danger. If we are ambitious of carrying our arms into diſtant countries, would it not be more expedient to

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march and reduce the rebels of Thrace, and other nations who are ſtill wavering, and unfixed in their allegiance, than to fly to the ſuccour of the inhabitants of Egeſta, about whoſe welfare we ought to be very indifferent? And will it ſuit our intereſt, to attempt to revenge their injuries, at a time that we do not diſcover the leaſt reſentment for thoſe we ourſelves receive? Let us leave the Sicilians to themſelves, and not engage in their quarrels, which it is their buſineſs to decide. As the inhabitants of Egeſta undertook the war without us, let them extricate themſelves from it as well as they can. Should any of our generals adviſe you to this enterpriſe, from an ambitious or ſelf-intereſted view; merely to make a vain parade of his ſplendid equipages, or to raiſe money to ſupport his extravagance; be not guilty of ſo much imprudence as to ſacrifice the intereſt of the republic to his, or to permit him to involve it in the ſame ruin with himſelf. An enterpriſe of ſo much importance ought not to be committed wholly to the conduct of a young man. Remember it is prudence, not prejudice and paſſion, that gives ſucceſs to affairs." Nicias concluded with declaring it his opinion, that it would be proper to deliberate again on the affair, in order to prevent the fatal conſequences with which their taking raſh reſolutions might be attended.

It was plain he had Alcibiades in view, and that his enormous luxury was the object of his cenſure. And indeed he carried it to an incredible height; and laviſhed prodigious ſums of money on horſes, and equipages, and moveables; not to mention the delicacy and ſumptuouſneſs of his table. He diſputed the prize in the Olympic games with ſeven ſets of chariot horſes, which no private man had ever done before him; and he was crowned more than once on that occaſion. Extraordinary reſources were neceſſary for ſupporting ſuch luxury; and as avarice often ſerves as a reſource to ambition; there were ſome grounds to believe, that Alcibiades was no leſs ſolicitous for conquering Sicily and Carthage (which he pretended

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to poſſeſs afterwards as his own) to enrich his family, than to render it glorious. It is natural to ſuppoſe that Alcibiades did not let this ſpeech of Nicias go unanſwered.

"This, ſays Alcibiades, is not the firſt time that merit has excited jealouſy, and glory been made the object of envy. That very thing which is imputed to me for a crime, is, I will preſume to ſay it, the honour of my country, and ought to gain me applauſe. The ſplendor in which I live; the great ſums I expend, particularly in the public aſſemblies; beſides their being juſt and lawful, at the ſame time give foreigners a greater idea of the glory of Athens; and ſhow, that it is not in ſuch want of money as our enemies imagine. But this is not our preſent buſineſs. Let the world form a judgment of me, not from paſſion and prejudice, but from my actions. Was it an inconſiderable ſervice I did the republic, in bringing over (in one day) to its alliance, the people of Elis, of Mantinea, and of Argos, that is the chief ſtrength of Peloponneſus? Make uſe, therefore, to aggrandize your empire, of Alcibiades's youth and folly (ſince his enemies give it that name) as well as of the wiſdom and experience of Nicias; and do not repent, from vain and idle fears, your engaging in an enterpriſe publicly reſolved upon, and which may redound infinitely both to your glory and advantage. The cities of Sicily, weary of the unjuſt and cruel government of their princes, and ſtill more of the tyrannical authority which Syracuſe exerciſes over them, wait only for a favourable opportunity to declare themſelves; and are ready to open their gates to whomſoever ſhall offer to take off the yoke under which they have ſo long groaned. Though the citizens of Egeſta in quality of your allies, ſhould not have a right to your protection; yet the glory of Athens ought to engage you to ſupport them. Republics aggrandize themſelves by ſuccouring the oppreſſed, and not by living unactive. In the preſent ſtate of your affairs, the only way to diſpirit your enemies, and ſhow

that

that you are not afraid of them, will be, to haraſs one nation, to check the progreſs of another, to keep them all employed, and carry your arms into diſtant countries. Athens was not formed for eaſe; and it was not by inactivity that your anceſtors raiſed it to the height in which we now ſee it. For the reſt, what hazards will you run by engaging in the enterpriſe in queſtion? If it ſhould be crowned with ſucceſs, you will then poſſeſs yourſelves of all Greece; and ſhould it not anſwer your expectations your fleet will give you an opportunity of retiring whenever you pleaſe. The Lacedæmonians indeed may make an incurſion into our country; but, beſides that it would not be in our power to prevent it, though we ſhould not invade Sicily, we ſtill ſhall preſerve the empire of the ſea, in ſpite of them; a circumſtance which makes our enemies entirely deſpair of ever being able to conquer us. Be not therefore biaſed by Nicias's reaſons. The only tendency of them is to ſow the ſeeds of diſcord between the young and old men, who can do nothing without one another; ſince it is wiſdom and courage, counſel and execution, that give ſucceſs to all enterpriſes: and this in which we are going to embark, cannot but turn to your advantage."

* The Athenians, flattered and pleaſed with Alcibiades's ſpeech, perſiſted in their firſt opinion. Nicias, on the other ſide, did not depart from his; but at the ſame time did not dare to oppoſe Alcibiades any further. Nicias was naturally of a ſoft and timid diſpoſition. He was not, like Pericles, maſter of that lively and vehement eloquence, which, like a torrent, bears down all things in its way. And, indeed the latter, on ſeveral occaſions and at ſeveral times, had never failed to check the wild ſtarts of the populace, who, even then, meditated the expedition into Sicily; becauſe he was always inflexible, and never ſlackened the reins of that authority and kind of ſovereignty which he had acquired over the people; whereas

* Plut. in præc. de ger. rep. p. 802.

Nicias,

* Nicias, both by acting and ſpeaking in an eaſy, gentle manner, ſo far from winning over the people, ſuffered himſelf to be forcibly and involuntarily carried away: and accordingly he at laſt yielded to the people, and accepted the command in a war which he plainly foreſaw would be attended with the moſt fatal conſequences.

Plutarch makes this reflection in his excellent treatiſe, where, ſpeaking of the qualities requiſite in a ſtateſman, he ſhows how very neceſſary eloquence and inflexible conſtancy and perſeverance are to him.

Nicias, not daring to oppoſe Alcibiades any longer openly, endeavoured to do it indirectly, by ſtarting a great number of difficulties, drawn eſpecially from the great expence of this expedition. He declared, that ſince they were reſolved upon war, they ought to carry it on in ſuch a manner as might ſuit the exalted reputation to which Athens had attained: that a fleet was not ſufficient to oppoſe ſo formidable a power as that of the Syracuſans and their allies: that they muſt raiſe an army, compoſed of good horſe and foot, if they deſired to act in a manner worthy of ſo grand a deſign: that beſides their fleet, which was to make them maſters at ſea, they muſt have a great number of tranſports, to carry proviſions perpetually to the army, which otherwiſe could not poſſibly ſubſiſt in an enemy's country: that they muſt carry vaſt ſums of money with them, without waiting for that promiſed them by the citizens of Egeſta, who perhaps were ready in words only, and very probably might break their promiſe: that they ought to weigh and examine the diſparity there was between themſelves and their enemies with regard to the conveniencies and wants of the army; the Syracuſans being in their own country, in the midſt of powerful allies, diſpoſed by inclination, as well as engaged by intereſt, to aſſiſt them with men, arms, horſes, and proviſions; whereas the Athenians would carry on the war in a remote country poſ-

* Καθα περι αρ.δι.α χαλκων τω λογω πειθομενος αποτρεψειν τον δημον εκ κατεχειν.

ſeſſed

feſſed by their enemies, where, in the winter, news could not be brought them in leſs than four months time; a country, where all things would oppoſe the Athenians, and nothing be procured but by force of arms: that it would reflect the greateſt ignominy on the Athenians, ſhould they be forced to abandon their enterpriſe, and thereby become the ſcorn and contempt of their enemies, by their neglecting to take all the precautions which ſo important a deſign required: that as for himſelf, he was determined not to go, unleſs he was provided with all things neceſſary for the expedition, becauſe the ſafety of the whole army depended on that circumſtance; and that he would not rely on caprice, or the precarious engagements of the allies.

[y] Nicias had flattered himſelf, that this ſpeech would cool the ardour of the people, whereas it only inflamed it the more. Immediately the generals had full powers given them to raiſe as many troops, and fit out as many galleys as they ſhould judge neceſſary; and the levies were accordingly carried on in Athens, and other places, with inexpreſſible activity.

SECT. VIII. *The Athenians prepare to ſet Sail. Sinifter Omens. The Statues of Mercury are mutilated. Alcibiades is accuſed, and inſiſts upon his being tried, but his Requeſt is not granted. Triumphant Departure of the Fleet.*

[z] WHEN all things were ready for their departure, and they were preparing to ſail, there happened ſeveral bad omens, which filled the minds of the people with trouble and diſquietude. The * women were at that time celebrating the feſtival of Adonis, during which the whole city was in mourning, and full of images repreſenting dead perſons and funeral pro-

[y] Diod. l. xiii. p. 134. [z] A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 415. Thucyd. l. vi. p. 428. Plut. in Alcib. p. 200, 201.

* This ſuperſtitious rite had extended even to God's people. *And behold there ſat women weeping for Tammuz.* Ezek. viii. 14. N. B. The Latin verſion of the Bible, which Mr. Rollin follows, ſays *weeping for Adonis;* which is the ſame as Tammuz, the Hebrews called Adonis by that name.

ceſſions;

ceſſions; and every part echoed with the cries and groans of the women who followed thoſe ſtatues with lamentations of that kind. Whence it was feared, that this gay and magnificent armament would ſoon loſe all its ſplendor, and wither *away like a flower.

The general affliction was increaſed by another accident. The ſtatues of Mercury, which ſtood at the entrance of private houſes and temples, were all mutilated in one night, and particularly in the face; and although a great reward was promiſed to any perſon who ſhould diſcover the authors of ſo audacious a crime, no one was accuſed. The citizens could not forbear conſidering this uncommon event, not only as an unlucky omen, but as a contrivance of ſome factious men, who harboured very ill deſigns. Some young people had already been accuſed of committing much the like crime in the midſt of their cups; and particularly of having wantonly mimicked the ceremonies and myſteries of Ceres and Proſerpine; with Alcibiades, who repreſented the high-prieſt, at their head. [a] It highly concerns all thoſe in exalted ſtations, to be extremely careful of every ſtep they take, and not to give the leaſt opportunity to the moſt inveterate malice to cenſure them. They ought to call to mind, ſays Plutarch, that the eyes of all men are upon their conduct, and that they are ever eagle-eyed on theſe occaſions; that not only their outward actions paſs the moſt ſevere ſcrutiny, but that they penetrate to their moſt private apartments, and there take the ſtricteſt notice of their diſcourſes, their diverſions, and the moſt ſecret things tranſacted by them. It was this dread of the piercing eye of the people, that kept Themiſtocles and Pericles perpetually on their guard, and obliged them to refrain from moſt of thoſe pleaſures in which others indulge themſelves.

As for Alcibiades, he did not know what it was to lay himſelf under any reſtraints; and accordingly as his character was ſo well known, people were perſuaded he

[a] Plut. in præc. de rep. p. 800.

* The hiſtorian alludes to the plants and flowers that were carried in that ceremony, and which went by the name of Adonis's gardens.

very

very probably had been concerned in what had happened. His luxury, libertiniſm, and irreligion, gave an air of probability to this charge, and the accuſer was not afraid of telling his name. This attack ſtaggered the conſtancy and reſolution of Alcibiades; but hearing the ſoldiers and ſailors declare, that they were induced to engage in this expedition by no other motive but their affection for Alcibiades; and that, ſhould the leaſt injury be done him, they would all leave the ſervice; he took heart, and appeared at his trial on the day appointed for that purpoſe. His enemies, upon pretence that it was neceſſary for the fleet to ſet ſail, got the judgment ſuperſeded. It was to no purpoſe for Alcibiades to inſiſt upon being tried, in caſe he was guilty, and not be ruined in his abſence; and to repreſent, that it would be the moſt ſhocking and barbarous injuſtice to oblige him to embark for ſo important an expedition, without firſt making due enquiry into the accuſations and horrid ſlanders which were caſt upon him, the bare thoughts of which would keep him in perpetual fear and anxiety. However, none of theſe remonſtrances proved effectual, and the fleet was ordered to ſet out.

[b] They accordingly prepared to ſet ſail, after having appointed Corcyra the rendezvous for moſt of the allies, and ſuch ſhips as were to carry the proviſions, &c. All the citizens, as well as foreigners in Athens, flocked by day-break to the port of Pyræus. The former attended their children, relations, friends, or companions, with a joy overcaſt with a little ſorrow, upon their bidding adieu to perſons that were as dear to them as life, who were ſetting out on a far diſtant and very dangerous expedition, from which it was uncertain whether they ever would return, though they flattered themſelves with the hopes that it would be ſucceſsful. The foreigners came thither to feed their eyes with a ſight which was highly worthy their curioſity; for no ſingle city in the world had ever fitted out ſo gallant a fleet. Thoſe indeed which had been ſent againſt Epidaurus and Potidæa, were as conſiderable with regard to the number of ſol-

[b] Thucyd. p. 430—432. Diod. l. xiii. p. 185.

diers

diers and ships: but then they were not equipped with so much magnificence, neither was their voyage so long, nor their enterprise so important. Here were seen a land and a naval army, provided with the utmost care, and at the expence of particular persons as well as of the public, with all things necessary, on account of the length of the voyage, and the duration of the war. The city furnished a hundred empty galleys, that is, threescore light ones, and forty to transport the soldiers heavily armed. Every mariner received daily a drachma, or ten pence (French) for his pay, exclusively of what the captains of ships gave the rowers* of the first bench. Add to this, the pomp and magnificence that were displayed universally; every one striving to eclipse the rest, and each captain endeavouring to make his ship the lightest, and at the same time the gayest in the whole fleet. I shall not take notice of the choice of the soldiers and seamen, who were the flower of the Athenians; nor of their emulation with regard to the beauty and neatness of their arms and equipage; any more than of their officers who had laid out considerable sums purely to distinguish themselves, and to give foreigners an advantageous idea of their persons and circumstances; so that this sight had the air of a tournament, in which the utmost magnificence is displayed, rather than of a warlike expedition. But the boldness and greatness of the design still exceeded its expence and splendor.

When the ships were laden and the troops got on board, the trumpet sounded, and solemn prayers were offered up for the success of the expedition; gold and silver cups were filling every where with wine, and the accustomed libations were poured out; the people who lined the shore shouting at the same time, and lifting up their hands to heaven, to wish their fellow citizens a good voyage and success. And now, the hymn being sung, and the ceremonies ended, the ships sailed one after another out of the harbour; after which they strove to outsail one another, till the whole fleet met at Ægina.

* They were called Θρανῖται. They had longer oars than the rest, and consequently more trouble in rowing.

From thence it made for Corcyra, where the army of the allies was aſſembling with the reſt of the fleet.

SECT. IX. *Syracuſe is alarmed. The Athenian Fleet arrives in Sicily.*

[c] ADVICE of this expedition coming to Syracuſe from all quarters, it was thought ſo improbable, that at firſt nobody would believe it. But as it was more and more confirmed every day, the Syracuſans began to think ſeriouſly of making the neceſſary preparations; and ſent deputations to every part of the iſland, to aſk aſſiſtance of ſome, and ſend ſuccours to others. They garriſoned all the caſtles and forts in the country; reviewed all the ſoldiers and horſes; examined the arms in the magazines; and ſettled and prepared all things, as if the enemy had been in their country.

In the mean time the fleet ſailed in three ſquadrons, each under the command of its particular general. It conſiſted of a hundred and thirty-ſix ſhips, a hundred whereof belonged to Athens, and the reſt to the allies. On board theſe ſhips were five thouſand heavy-armed ſoldiers, two thouſand two hundred of whom were Athenian citizens, *viz.* fifteen hundred of thoſe who had eſtates, and ſeven hundred * who had none, but were equally citizens; the reſt conſiſted of allies. With regard to the light infantry, there were eighty archers of Crete, and four hundred of other countries; ſeven hundred Rhodian ſlingers, and a hundred and twenty exiles of Megara. There was but one company of horſe, conſiſting of thirty troopers, who had embarked on board a veſſel proper for tranſporting cavalry. Both the fleet and the land forces were afterwards increaſed conſiderably. Thirty veſſels carried the proviſions and cooks, with maſons, carpenters, and their ſeveral tools; the whole followed by a hundred ſmall veſſels for the ſervice, excluſive of merchant-ſhips, of which there were great numbers. All this fleet had ſailed together

[c] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 432—445. Diod. l. xiii. p. 135, 136.
* Theſe were called Θῆτες.

for

for Corcyra. Having met with but an indifferent reception from the people of Tarentum and Locris, they ſailed with a favourable wind for Rhegium, where they made ſome ſtay. The Athenians were very urgent with the inhabitants of Rhegium to ſuccour thoſe of Leontium, who came originally from Chalcis as well as themſelves: but theſe anſwered, that they were determined to ſtand neuter, and to undertake nothing but in concert with the reſt of Italy. Here they debated on the manner in which it was neceſſary to carry on the war, and waited for the coming up of thoſe ſhips that had been ſent out to make diſcoveries of a proper place for landing, and to enquire whether the citizens of Egeſta had got their money ready. Upon their return they brought advice that they had but thirty talents in the treaſury. This Nicias had foreſeen, but no regard had been paid to his ſalutary counſels.

[d] He did not fail, the inſtant this news was brought, to expatiate on the counſel he had given in Athens; to ſhow the wrong ſtep they had taken in engaging in this war; and to amplify the fatal conſequences which might be expected from it: in all which he acted very imprudently. It was extremely judicious in Nicias to oppoſe it in the beginning, and to ſet every engine at work, to cruſh if poſſible this ill-fated project. But as it was reſolved, and he himſelf had accepted of the command, he ought not to be perpetually looking backward, nor to have repeated inceſſantly, that this war had been undertaken in oppoſition to all the maxims of prudence; and, by that means, to cool the ardour of his two colleagues in the command, to diſpirit the ſoldiers, and blunt that edge of confidence and ardour, which aſſure the ſucceſs of great enterpriſes. The Athenians, on the contrary, ought to have advanced boldly towards the enemy; ſhould have attacked them with vigour, and have ſpread an univerſal terror by a ſudden and unexpected deſcent.

But Nicias acted in a quite different manner. His opinion in the council of war, was, that they ſhould ſail

[d] Plut. in Nic. p 532.

for Selinunta, which had been the firſt occaſion of this expedition; and then, if the citizens of Egeſta performed their promiſe, and gave a month's pay to the army, to proceed forward; or otherwiſe, to oblige them to furniſh proviſions for the ſixty galleys they had demanded, and continue in that road till they ſhould have concluded a peace with the citizens of Selinunta, either by force of arms or ſome other way. He ſaid, that they afterwards ſhould return to Athens, after having thus made a parade of their forces, and the aſſiſtance they gave their allies; unleſs they ſhould have an opportunity of making ſome attempt in favour of the Leontines, or of bringing over ſome city into their alliance.

Alcibiades anſwered, that it would be inglorious, after their ſailing out with ſo noble a fleet, to return without doing any thing; and that they ſhould firſt endeavour to conclude an alliance with the Greeks and Barbarians, in order to divide them from the Syracuſans, and procure troops and proviſions from them; and eſpecially to ſend a deputation to Meſſina, which was a kind of key to Sicily, and its harbour capacious enough to hold all the fleet. He declared further, that after ſeeing who were their friends and who their enemies, and ſtrengthening themſelves by the addition of a new reinforcement, they then ſhould attack either Selinunta or Syracuſe; in caſe the one ſhould refuſe to conclude a peace with Egeſta, and the other not permit the Leontines to return to their city.

Lamachus offered a third opinion, which perhaps was the moſt prudent; that was, to ſail directly for Syracuſe, before its citizens had time to recover from their ſurpriſe, or prepare for their defence. He obſerved, that the ſudden arrival of an armed force always ſtrikes the greateſt terror; and that when enemies are allowed time to reflect and make preparations, it alſo revives their courage; whereas, when they are ſuddenly attacked, and ſtill in confuſion, they are generally overcome; that as they would be maſters of the open country, they ſhould not be in want of any thing; but, on the contrary, would oblige the Sicilians to de-

clare for them: that at laſt they ſhould ſettle in Megara, which was quite deſert and a near neighbour to Syracuſe, and there lay up their fleet in ſafety. However, his counſel not being followed, he agreed to that of Alcibiades: accordingly they ſailed for Sicily, where Alcibiades took Catana by ſurpriſe.

SECT. X. *Alcibiades is recalled. He flies, and is ſentenced to die as an Outlaw. He retires to Sparta. Flexibility of his Genius and Diſpoſition.*

THIS was the firſt and laſt exploit performed by Alcibiades in this expedition, he being immediately recalled by the Athenians, in order to be tried upon the accuſation againſt him. For, from the departure of the fleet, his enemies, who had no regard to the welfare of their country; and who, upon the ſpecious pretence of religion, which is often made a cloak to cover the darkeſt deſigns, meditated nothing but ſatiating their hatred and revenge; his enemies, I ſay, taking advantage of his abſence, had proceeded in the affair with greater vigour than ever. All thoſe, againſt whom informations were lodged, were thrown into priſon, without ſo much as being ſuffered to be heard, and that too on the evidence of the moſt profligate and abandoned citizens; as if, ſays Thucydides, it was not as great a crime to puniſh the innocent, as to ſuffer the guilty to eſcape. One of the informers was proved to be perjured by his own words; having declared that he ſaw and knew one of the accuſed by moonlight; whereas it appeared, that there was no moon at that time. But notwithſtanding this manifeſt perjury, the populace were as furious as ever. The remembrance of the tyranny of the Piſiſtratides made them apprehenſive of the like fate; and ſtrongly poſſeſſed with this fear they would not give ear to any thing.

At laſt they ſent out the * ſhip of Salamin, ordering the captain not to carry off Alcibiades by force, for fear

[c] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 446—450. Plut. in Alcib. p. 202.

* This was a ſacred veſſel appointed to fetch criminals.

of

of raiſing a tumult in the army; but only to order him to return to Athens, to pacify the people by his preſence. Alcibiades obeyed the order, and went immediately on board his galley; but the inſtant he was arrived at Thurium, and had got on ſhore, he diſappeared, and eluded the purſuit of thoſe who ſought after him. Being aſked whether he would not rely on his country, with regard to the judgment it might paſs on him: "I would not," ſays he, "rely on my mother, for fear leſt ſhe ſhould inadvertently miſtake a * black bean for a white one." The galley of Salamin returned back without the commander, who was aſhamed of his having ſuffered his prey to eſcape him in that manner. Alcibiades was ſentenced to die for his contumacy. His whole eſtate was confiſcated, and all prieſts and prieſteſſes were commanded to curſe him. Among the latter was one Theano, who alone had the courage to oppoſe this decree, ſaying: "†That ſhe had been appointed prieſteſs, not to curſe but to bleſs." Some time after, news being brought him that the Athenians had condemned him to die, "I ſhall make them ſenſible," ſays he, "that I am alive."

[f] Much about this time Diagoras of Melia was proſecuted at Athens. He had ſettled himſelf in the latter city, where he taught atheiſm, and was brought to a trial for his doctrine. [g] Diagoras eſcaped the puniſhment which would have been inflicted on him, by flying from the city; but he could not wipe off the ignominy of the ſentence which condemned him to death. The Athenians had ſo great an abhorrence for the impious principles inculcated by him, that they even ſet a price upon his head, and promiſed a reward of a talent to any man who ſhould bring him dead or alive.

[h] About twenty years before, a like affair had happened to Protagoras, for having only treated the ſame queſtion by way of problem. He had ſaid in the begin-

[f] Joſeph. contr. App. [g] Diod. l. xiii. p. 137. [h] Diog. Laert. in Protag. Joſeph. contr. App. Cic. l. i. de nat. deor. n. 62.

* The judges made uſe of beans in giving their ſuffrages, and the black bean denoted condemnation.

† Φασκουσα τυχων α χαταιρων ιερειαν γεγονεναι.

ning

ning of one of his books: "Whether the gods do or do not exiſt is a queſtion which I know not whether I ought to affirm or deny: for our underſtandings are too much clouded, and the life of man is too ſhort, for the ſolution of ſo nice and difficult a point." But the Athenians could not bear to have a ſubject of this nature made a doubt; and for this reaſon they ordered proclamation to be made by the public crier, for all perſons who had any copies of this book, to bring them to the magiſtrates: after which they were burnt as infamous pieces, and the author was baniſhed for ever from all the territories of the Athenians.

Diagoras and Protagoras had been the diſciples of Democritus, who firſt invented the philoſophy of atoms. I ſhall ſpeak of him in another place.

[1] From the departure of Alcibiades, Nicias had poſſeſſed the whole authority: for Lamachus his colleague, though a man of bravery and experience, was however in no credit, becauſe of his extreme poverty, for which he was deſpiſed by the ſoldiers. But the Athenians were not always in this way of thinking; for we have ſeen that Ariſtides, poor as he was, was no leſs eſteemed and reſpected on that account: but in this laſt expedition, the people in general had imbibed a paſſion for luxury and magnificence; the natural conſequence of which is a love of riches. As Nicias, therefore, governed all affairs ſolely, all his actions were of the ſame caſt with his diſpoſition, that is, of a ſlow and fearful kind: he ſuffered every thing to languiſh, ſometimes either by lying ſtill and undertaking nothing, ſometimes by only ſailing along the coaſt, or loſing time in conſulting and deliberating; all which ſoon ſuppreſſed, on one ſide, the ardour and confidence the troops expreſſed at firſt; and, on the other, the fear and terror with which the enemy had been ſeized, at the ſight of ſo terrible an armament. He beſieged Hybla; and though it was but a ſmall city, he was however obliged to raiſe the ſiege ſome days after, which brought him into the higheſt contempt. He retired at laſt to

[1] Thucyd. p. 452, 453. Plut. in Nic. p. 533.

Catana,

Catana, after having performed but one exploit, *viz.* the ruining of Hyccara, a ſmall town inhabited by Barbarians, from which place, it is ſaid, that Lais the courteſan, at that time very young, was ſold with the reſt of the captives, and carried to Peloponneſus.

[k] In the mean time Alcibiades, having left Thurium, was arrived at Argos; and as he quite deſpaired of ever being recalled home, he ſent a meſſenger to the Spartans, deſiring leave to reſide among them, under their guard and protection. He promiſed in the moſt ſolemn manner, that if they would conſider him as their friend, he would perform greater ſervices for their ſtate than he before had done injuries to it. The Spartans received him with open arms; and ſoon after his arrival in their city, he gained the love and eſteem of all its inhabitants. He charmed, and even enchanted them, by his conforming himſelf ſo eaſily to their way of living. Such people as ſaw Alcibiades ſhave himſelf to the ſkin, bathe in cold water, eat of the coarſe, heavy cakes which were their uſual food, and be ſo well ſatisfied with their black broth; could not perſuade themſelves, that a man, who ſubmitted ſo cheerfully to this kind of life, had ever kept cooks in his palace; had uſed eſſences and perfumes; had worn the rich ſtuffs of Miletus; in a word, that he had hitherto lived in the midſt of voluptuouſneſs and profuſion of all things. But flexibility was the characteriſtic that chiefly diſtinguiſhed Alcibiades. Cameleon-like, he could aſſume all ſhapes and colours, to win the favour of thoſe among whom he reſided. He immediately aſſumed their manners and adapted himſelf to their taſte, as if they had been natural in him; and though he inwardly had an averſion to them, he could however cover his diſguſt with an eaſy, ſimple, and unconſtrained air. With ſome he had all the graces and vivacity of the gayeſt youth, and with others all the gravity of old age. In Sparta, he was laborious, frugal, and auſtere; in Ionia, enjoyment, idleneſs, and pleaſure made up his whole life: in Thrace, he was always on horſeback or carouſ-

[k] Plut. in Alcib. p. 230.

ing;

*
citur
aliq

A PLAN OF THE CITY OF SYRACUSE
Besieged by the Athenians

The Fortifications of the Athenians and Syracusans

1 *The fortified Camp of the Athenians*
2 *The Wall that faces Epipolæ in its whole extent built by the Syracusans to surround Temenos.*
3 *Contravallation which the Athenians attempt to carry from the Foot of Epipolæ along the Northern Wall of Syche as far as Trogilus.*
4 *The traverse Wall drawn by the Syracusans to cut the Contravallation of the Athenians.*
5 *Western Contravallation of the Athenians from the hills of Epipolæ downwards called the single Wall.*
6 *Continuation of the western Contravallation of the Athenians from the Plain to the great Harbour called the double Wall*
7 *The Fossa lined with Pales made by the Syracusans to cut the Contravallation thro' the Fens.*
8 *The Wall carried on by the Syracusans, going upwards from the City towards Epipolæ against the side Wall built by the Athenians.*

ing; and when he resided with Tissaphanes the satrap, he exceeded all the magnificence of the Persians in luxury and profusion.

But he was not barely satisfied with gaining the esteem of the Lacedæmonians. He insinuated himself so far into the affection of Timea, the wife of king Agis, that he had a son by her, who, in public, went by the name of Leotychides; though his mother, in private, and among her women and female friends, did not blush to call him Alcibiades; so violent was her passion for that Athenian. Agis was informed of this intrigue, and therefore refused to own Leotychides for his son; for which reason he was afterwards excluded the throne.

SECT. XI. *Description of Syracuse.*

AS the siege of Syracuse is one of the most considerable in the Grecian history; the particular circumstances of which I thought proper to relate, for that reason, in order to give my readers an idea of the manner of besieging by the ancients; I judged it necessary, before I enter into that detail, to give the reader a description and plan of the city of Syracuse; in which he will also find the different fortifications, both of the Athenians and Syracusans, mentioned in this siege.

[1] Syracuse stood on the eastern coast of Sicily. Its vast extent, its advantageous situation, the conveniency of its double harbour, its fortifications built with the utmost care and labour, and the multitude and wealth of its inhabitants, made it one of the greatest, the most beautiful, and most powerful among the Grecian cities. *We are told, its air was so pure and serene, that there was no day in the year, how cloudy soever it might be, in which the sun did not display its beams.

[1] Cic. Verr. 6. n. 117—119.

* *Urbem Syracusas elegerat, cujus hic situs atque hæc natura esse loci cœlique dicitur, ut nullus unquam dies tam magna turbulentaque tempestate fuerit, quin aliquo tempore solem ejus dici homines viderent.* Cic. Verr. 7. n. 26.

[m] It was built by Archias the Corinthian, a year after Naxos and Megara had been founded on the ſame coaſt.

When the Athenians beſieged this city, it was divided into three parts, viz. the Iſland, Acradina, and Tyche. Thucydides mentions only theſe three diviſions. Two more, viz. Neapolis and Epipolæ, were afterwards added.

The ISLAND, ſituated to the ſouth, was called Νασος, (Naſos) ſignifying, in Greek, an iſland, but pronounced according to the Doric dialect; and Ortygia. It was joined to the continent by a bridge, [n] It was in this iſland that the Syracuſans afterwards built the citadel, and the palace for their kings. This quarter or diviſion of the city was of very great importance, becauſe it might render thoſe who poſſeſſed it, maſter of the two ports which ſurround it. It was for this reaſon the Romans, when they took Syracuſe, would not ſuffer any Syracuſans to inhabit the iſland.

[o] There was in this iſland a very famous ſpring, called Arethuſa. The ancients, or rather the poets, from reaſons which have not the leaſt ſhadow of probability, ſuppoſed that Alpheus, a river of Elis in Peloponneſus, rolled its waters either through or under the waves of the ſea, without ever mixing with them, as far as the ſpring or fountain of Arethuſa. It was this fiction gave occaſion to the following lines of Virgil:

Extremum hunc, Arethuſa, mihi concede laborem ——
Sic tibi, cum fluctus ſubterlabêre Sicanos,
Doris amara ſuam non intermiſceat undam.
VIRG. Eclog. 10.

Thy ſacred ſuccour, Arethuſa, bring,
To crown my labour: 'tis the laſt I ſing,——

[m] A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C. 709. Strabo, l. vi. p. 269.
[n] Cic. Verr. 7. n. 97.
[o] Strab. l. vi. p. 270. Senec. Nat. Quæſt. l. iii. c. 26.

So

So may thy ſilver ſtreams beneath the tide,
Unmix'd with briny ſeas ſecurely glide.
DRYDEN.

ACHRADINA, ſituated entirely on the ſea-ſide, towards the eaſt, was the moſt ſpacious, the moſt beautiful, and beſt fortified quarter of the city.

TYCHE, ſo called from the temple of Fortune, (Τυχη) which embelliſhed that part of the city, extended along Achradina weſtward from the north towards the ſouth, and was very well inhabited. It had a famous gate called Hexapylum, which led into the country, and was ſituated to the north of the city.

EPIPOLÆ was a hill without the city, which it commanded. It was ſituated between Hexapylum and the point of Euryelus, towards the north and weſt. It was exceedingly ſteep in ſeveral places, and, for that reaſon, of very difficult acceſs. At the time of the ſiege in queſtion, it was not ſurrounded with walls; and the Syracuſans defended it with a body of troops, againſt the attacks of the enemy. Euryelus was the paſs or entrance which led to Epipolæ. On the ſame hill of Epipolæ was a fort called Labdalon, or Labdalum.

It was not till long after (under Dionyſius the tyrant) that Epipolæ was ſurrounded with walls, and incloſed within the city, of which it formed a fifth part, but was thinly inhabited. A fourth diviſion had been added before, called NEAPOLIS, that is, the new city which covered Tyche.

[p] The river Anapis ran at almoſt half a league diſtance from the city. The ſpace between them was a large and beautiful plain, terminated by two fens or moors, the one called Syraco, whence the city was named, and the other Lyſimelia. This river emptied itſelf into the great harbour. Near its mouth, ſouthward, was a kind of caſtle, called Olympia, from the temple of Jupiter Olympius ſtanding there, and in which were great riches. It was five hundred paces from the city.

[p] Plut. in Dionyſ. vit. p. 970.

Syracuſe

Syracuſe had two harbours, very near one another, and ſeparated only by the iſle, viz. the great harbour, and the ſmall one, called otherwiſe Laccus. According to the *deſcription which the Roman orator gives of them, both were ſurrounded with buildings as parts of the city.

The greateſt harbour was a little above †five thouſand paces, or two leagues, in circumference It had a gulph called Daſcon. The entrance of this port was but five hundred paces wide. It was formed, on one ſide, by the point of the iſland Ortygia; and, on the other, by the little iſland and cape of Plemmyrium, which was commanded by a fort or caſtle of the ſame name.

Above Achradina was a third port, called the harbour of Trogilus.

SECT. XII. *Nicias, after ſome Engagements, beſieges Syracuſe. Lamachus is killed in a Battle. The City is reduced to the greateſt Extremities.*

EIGHTEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

AT the end of the ſummer news was brought Nicias that the Syracuſans, having reſumed courage, intended to march againſt him. Already their cavalry advanced with an air of inſolence to attack him even in his camp; and aſked, with a loud laugh, whether he was come into Sicily to ſettle in Catana. Theſe ſevere reproaches rouſed him a little, ſo that he reſolved to ſail for Syracuſe. The enterpriſe was bold and dangerous. Nicias could not, without running the utmoſt hazard, attempt to land in preſence of an enemy, who waited for him with the greateſt reſolution; and would not fail to charge him the inſtant he ſhould offer to make a deſcent. Nor was it ſafer for him to march

[q] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 453—461. Plut. in Nic. p. 533, 534. Diod. l. cxxxvii, cxxxviii.

* *Portus habet prope in ædificatione aſpectuque urbis incluſos.* CIC. Verr. 6. n. 117.

† According to Strabo, it is eighty ſtadia in circumference, which is twice its real extent; a plain proof that this paſſage of Strabo is corrupt. CLUVER. p. 167.

his

his troops by land, becauſe, as he had no cavalry, that of the Syracuſans, which was very numerous, upon the firſt advice they ſhould have of their march, would come to blows, and overpower him by the ſuperiority of forces.

To extricate himſelf from this perplexity, and enable himſelf to ſeize, without oppoſition, upon an advantageous poſt, which a Syracuſan exile had diſcovered to him, Nicias had recourſe to ſtratagem. He cauſed a falſe piece of news to be given to the enemy, viz. that by means of a conſpiracy, which was to take effect on a certain day, they might ſeize on his camp, and poſſeſs themſelves of all the arms and baggage. The Syracuſans, on this promiſe, marched towards Catana, and pitched their camp near Leontium. The moment the Athenians had advice of this, they embarked with all their troops and ammunition, and, in the evening, ſteered for Syracuſe. They arrived, by day break, in the great harbour, landed near Olympia, in the place which had been pointed out to them, and there fortified themſelves. The enemy, finding themſelves ſhamefully overreached, returned immediately to Syracuſe: and, in the greateſt rage, drew up in battle array, ſome days after, before the walls of the city. Nicias marched out of the trenches, and a battle was fought. Victory was a long time doubtful, but a very heavy ſhower of rain, accompanied with thunder and lightning, coming unexpectedly, the Syracuſans, who were unexperienced, and the greateſt part of them having never carried arms before, were frightened at the tempeſt, whilſt their enemies laughed at it, as the mere effect of the ſeaſon; and regarded nothing but the enemy, who were much more to be dreaded than the ſtorm. The Syracuſans, after making a long and vigorous reſiſtance, were forced to give way. The Athenians could not purſue them far, becauſe their horſe, which was ſtill in a body, and had not been defeated, covered their retreat. The Syracuſans retreated in good order into the city, after having thrown a body of troops into the temple of Olympia, to prevent its being plundered.

This

This temple ſtood pretty near the camp of the Athenians, who were very deſirous of taking it, becauſe it abounded with gold and ſilver offerings, which the piety of kings and nations had conſecrated. Nicias having delayed ſending troops to ſeize it, loſt the opportunity, and gave the Syracuſans time to throw into it, as was before obſerved, a detachment to defend it. It was thought he did this on purpoſe, and out of reverence to the gods; becauſe, had the ſoldiers plundered this temple, the public would not have reaped any benefit by it, and himſelf only had been accuſed of the ſacrilege.

After the battle, the Athenians, who were not yet in a condition to attack Syracuſe, retired with their fleet to Naxos and Catana to winter there, with deſign to return in the beginning of the next ſpring, and lay ſiege to the city. To do this they wanted money, proviſions, and particularly horſe, of which they were abſolutely deſtitute. The Athenians depended upon obtaining part of theſe ſuccours from the people of Sicily, whom they ſuppoſed would join them the inſtant they ſhould hear of their victory; and at the ſame time they ſent an expreſs to Athens, to ſolicit the like aid. They alſo addreſſed the Carthaginians for their alliance; and ſent deputies to ſome cities of Italy, ſituated on the coaſt of the Tuſcan ſea, which had promiſed to aſſiſt them.

The Syracuſans were far from deſponding. Hermocrates, who, of all their leaders, was moſt diſtinguiſhed for his valour, his judgment, and experience, repreſented to them, in order to raiſe their hopes, that they had not been wanting in courage but in conduct; that the enemies, though very brave, owed their victory to their good fortune rather than to their merit; that the having a multitude of leaders, (they were fifteen in number) from which confuſion and diſobedience are inſeparable, had done them prejudice; that it would be abſolutely neceſſary for them to chooſe experienced generals, to keep the reſt in their duty; and exerciſe their forces continually during the winter ſeaſon. This advice being followed, Hermocrates and two more were elected generals; after which they ſent deputies to Corinth

rinth and Lacedæmon, to renew the alliance, and, at the same time, to engage them to make a diversion, in order to oblige, if possible, the Athenians to recal their troops out of Sicily, or, at least, to prevent their sending a reinforcement thither. The fortifying of Syracuse was the chief object of their care. Accordingly they took into the city, by a wall, all the tract of land towards Epipolæ, from the northern extremity of Tyche, descending westward towards the quarter or division of the city called afterwards Neapolis, in order to remove the enemy to a greater distance, and to give them more trouble in making their contravallation, by obliging them to give a larger extent to it. This part, in all probability, had been neglected, because it seemed to be sufficiently defended by its rugged and steep situation. They also garrisoned Megara and Olympia, and drove stakes into all those parts of the sea shore where the enemy might easily make a descent. Hearing afterwards that the Athenians were at Naxos, they went and burnt the camp of Catana, and retired, after laying waste the country adjacent to it.

[r] The ambassadors of Syracuse, being arrived among the Corinthians, asked succour of them, as having been their founders, which was immediately granted; and, at the same time, they sent an embassy to the Lacedæmonians, to invite them to declare in their favour. Alcibiades enforced their demand with all his credit and eloquence, which his resentment against Athens inflamed prodigiously. He advised and exhorted the Lacedæmonians to appoint Gylippus their general, and send him into Sicily; and, at the same time, to invade the Athenians, in order to make a powerful diversion. In the third place, he counselled them to fortify Decelia, in Attica, which quite completed the ruin of the city of Athens, it not being able ever to recover that blow: for, by this fort, the Lacedæmonians made themselves masters of the country, by which the Athenians were deprived of their silver mines of Laurium, and of the

[r] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 471—482. Plut. in Alcib. p. 203. In Nic. p. 534, 535. Diod. l. xiii. p. 138.

revenues of their lands: nor could they be ſuccoured by their neighbours, Decelia becoming the aſylum of all the malecontents and partizans of Sparta.

Nicias had received ſome ſuccours from Athens. It conſiſted of two hundred and fifty horſemen, whom the Athenians ſuppoſed would be furniſhed with horſes in Sicily (the troops bringing only the furniture) and of thirty horſe archers, with three hundred talents, that is, three hundred thouſand French crowns*. Nicias now began to prepare for action. He was accuſed of often letting ſlip opportunities, by his loſing time in deliberating, arguing, and concerting meaſures: however, when once he entered upon action, he was as bold and vigorous in executing, as he before had been ſlow and timorous in undertaking, as he ſhowed on the preſent occaſion.

The Syracuſans hearing that the Athenians had a reinforcement of cavalry, and would ſoon march and lay ſiege to their city; and knowing they could not poſſibly approach it, or make a contravallation, unleſs they ſhould poſſeſs themſelves of the hill of Epipolæ, which commanded Syracuſe, they reſolved to guard the avenue to it, which was the only paſs by which the enemy could get up to it, every other part being rugged and inacceſſible. Marching therefore down into the meadow, or plain, bordered by the river Anapis, and reviewing their troops there, they appointed ſeven hundred foot, under the command of Diomilus, to guard that important poſt; and commanded them to repair to it, at the firſt ſignal which ſhould be given for that purpoſe. But Nicias conducted his deſign with ſo much prudence, expedition, and ſecrecy, that they had not time to do this. He ſailed from Catana with all his fleet, without the enemy's having the leaſt ſuſpicion of his deſign. Being arrived at the port of Trogilus near Leontium, which is but a quarter of a league (ſix or ſeven furlongs) from Epipolæ, he put his land forces on ſhore, after which he retired with his fleet

* About 67,000l. ſterling.

to

to Thapſus, a ſmall peninſula of Syracuſe, the entrance to which he ſhut up with a ſtaccado.

The land forces marched with the utmoſt expedition to ſeize on Epipolæ, by the paſs of Euryelus, before the enemy, who were in the plains of Anapis at above a league's diſtance, had the leaſt notice of their arrival. At the firſt news of this, the ſeven hundred ſoldiers, under the command of Diomilus, advanced forward in confuſion, but were eaſily defeated; and three hundred of them, with their leader, left dead in the field. The Athenians, after ſetting up a trophy, built a fort in Labdalon, on the ſummit of Epipolæ; in order to ſecure their baggage and moſt valuable effects in it, whenever they ſhould be forced to fight, or work at the contravallation.

Soon after, the inhabitants of Egeſta ſent the Athenians three hundred horſe, to which ſome of their Sicilian allies added a hundred more, that with the two hundred and fifty ſent before by the Athenians, and who had furniſhed themſelves with horſes in Sicily, made a body of ſix hundred and fifty horſe.

The plan laid down by Nicias, in order for taking Syracuſe, was, to ſurround all the city on the land ſide with a ſtrong contravallation, in order to cut off all communication with the place from without, in hopes, no doubt, that his fleet would afterwards enable him to prevent the Syracuſans from receiving any ſuccours or proviſions by ſea.

Having left a garriſon in Labdalon, he came down from the hill, advanced towards the northern extremity of Tyche, and halting there, he employed the whole army in throwing up a line of contravallation, to ſhut up their city northward from Tyche as far as Trogilus, ſituate on the ſea ſide. This work was carried on with ſuch a rapidity, as terrified the Syracuſans. They thought it abſolutely neceſſary to prevent the carrying on of this work, and accordingly made ſome ſallies and attacks, but always with diſadvantage, and even their cavalry was routed. The day after the action, the contravallation

travallation (northward) was continued by part of the army, during which the reſt carried ſtones and other materials towards Trogilus, in order to finiſh it.

The beſieged, by the advice of Hermocrates, thought it adviſable not to venture a ſecond battle with the Athenians; and only endeavoured to put a ſtop to their works, at leaſt to render them uſeleſs, by running a line to cut that carried on by the Athenians. They imagined, that in caſe they ſhould be ſuffered to complete their wall, it would be impoſſible for the Athenians to make any farther progreſs in their work: or that, ſhould they endeavour to prevent it, it would ſuffice for the Syracuſans to oppoſe them with a part of their forces, after having ſhut up ſuch avenues as were moſt acceſſible with ſtrong paliſades; and that the Athenians, on the contrary, would be obliged to ſend for all their forces, and entirely abandon their works.

Accordingly they came out of their city, and working with inexpreſſible ardour, they began to raiſe a wall; and in order to carry it on with leſs moleſtation, they covered it with ſtrong paliſades, and flanked it with wooden towers, at proper diſtances, to defend it. The Athenians ſuffered the Syracuſans to carry on their works undiſturbed, becauſe, had they marched only part of their troops againſt them, they would have been too weak; and if they had brought them all, they then muſt have been obliged to diſcontinue their works, which they were reſolved not to do. The work being completed, the Syracuſans left a body of troops to defend the paliſade and guard the wall, and then returned into the city.

In the mean time the Athenians cut off the canals by which water was conveyed into the city; and obſerving the Syracuſan ſoldiers, who had been left to guard the wall, very negligent in their duty; ſome returning at noon either into the city or their tents, and the reſt not keeping a proper guard; they detached three hundred choſen ſoldiers, and ſome light infantry, to attack this poſt; during which the reſt of the army marched towards the city, to prevent any ſuccours from coming

coming out of it. Accordingly, the three hundred ſoldiers having forced the paliſade, purſued thoſe who guarded it as far as that part of the city wall which covered Temenos, were pouring in indiſcriminately with them, they were repulſed by the inhabitants with loſs. The whole army afterwards demoliſhed the wall, and pulled up the paliſades of the intrenchment, and carried them off.

After this ſucceſs, whereby the Athenians were maſters of the northern parts, they began the very next day, a ſtill more important work, and which would quite finiſh their incloſure of the city, viz. to carry a wall from the hills of Epipolæ, weſtward, through the plain and the fens as far as the great harbour. To prevent this, the beſieged beginning the ſame kind of work as they had carried on on the other ſide, ran a trench, lined with paliſades, from the city through the fens, to prevent the Athenians from carrying their contravallations as far as the ſea. But the latter, after finiſhing the firſt part of the wall on the hills of Epipolæ, reſolved to attack this new work. For this purpoſe, they ordered their fleet to ſail from Thapſus to the great harbour of Syracuſe, it having continued in that road hitherto; and the beſieged had always the ſea open to them, by which the beſiegers were obliged to get their proviſion from Thapſus by land. The Athenians came down therefore from Epipolæ into the plain before day-break; when throwing planks and beams into that part where the fen was only ſlimy, and more firm than in other places, they immediately carried the greateſt part of the foſſe lined with paliſades, and then the reſt, after having beaten the Syracuſans, who gave way and retired; ſuch as were on the right towards the city, and the reſt towards the river. Three hundred choſen Athenians having attempted to cut off the paſſage of the latter, flew towards the bridge; but the enemy's cavalry, the greateſt part of which were drawn up in battle, repulſed them; and afterwards charged the right wing of the Athenians, and put the firſt battalions into diſorder. Lamachus perceiving this from the left wing, where he commanded

commanded, ran thither with the Argives and ſome archers; but having paſſed a trench, and being abandoned by his ſoldiers, he was killed with ſix or ſix who followed him. The enemy immediately paſſed the river, and ſeeing the reſt of the army come up, they retired.

At the ſame time their right wing, which had returned towards the city, reſumed courage from this ſucceſs, and drew up in order of battle before the Athenians; after having detached ſome troops to attack the fort on the hills of Epipolæ, which ſerved as a magazine to the enemy, and was thought to be unguarded. They forced an intrenchment that covered the fort, but Nicias ſaved it. He was ſick in this fort, and at that time in his bed, with only his domeſtics about him. Animated by the danger and the preſence of the enemy, he ſtruggles with his indiſpoſition, riſes up, and commands his ſervants to ſet fire immediately to all the timber, lying between the intrenchment and the fort for the military engines, and to the engines themſelves. This unexpected conflagration ſtopped the Syracuſans, ſaved Nicias, the fort, and all the rich effects of the Athenians, who made haſte to the relief of that general. At the ſame time, the fleet was ſeen ſailing into the great harbour, according to the orders given for that purpoſe. The Syracuſans, having perceived this from the hill, and fearing they ſhould be attacked from behind, and overpowered by the land forces, they retired, and returned to the city with all their forces; now no longer expecting, after having loſt their foſſe lined with paliſades, that it would be poſſible for them to prevent the enemy from carrying on their contravallation as far as the ſea.

In the mean time the Athenians, who had contented themſelves with building a ſingle wall on the hills of Epipolæ, and through ſuch places as were craggy and of difficult acceſs, being come down into the plain, began to build, at the foot of the hills, a double wall, intending to carry it as far as the ſea, viz. a wall of contravallation againſt the beſieged, and another of circumvallation againſt thoſe Syracuſan troops which

were

were out of the city, and such allies as might come to its aid.

From thenceforth Nicias, who was now sole general, conceived great hopes; for several cities of Sicily, which hitherto had not declared for either side, came and joined him; and there arrived from all quarters, vessels laden with provisions for the army, all parties being eager to go over to him, because he had acquired the superiority, and been exceedingly successful in all his undertakings. The Syracusans, seeing themselves blocked up both by sea and land, and losing all hopes of being able to defend their city any longer, already proposed an accommodation. Gylippus, who was coming from Lacedæmon to their assistance, having heard in his passage, the extremity to which they were reduced, and looking upon the whole island as lost, sailed forward, nevertheless; not in the view of defending Sicily, but only to preserve to the nations of Italy, such cities as were subject to them in that island, if it were not too late, and if this could be done. For fame had declared in all places, that the Athenians had already possessed themselves of the whole island; and were headed by a general whose wisdom and good fortune rendered him invincible. Nicias himself, now (contrary to his natural disposition) confiding in his own strength, and elate from his success; persuaded also by the secret advices which were brought him daily from Syracuse, and the messengers who were sent to him, that the city would immediately capitulate; did not regard Gylippus's approach, and in consequence took no precautions to prevent his landing, especially when he heard that he brought but very few vessels; terming him a trifling pirate, not worthy, in any manner, his notice. But a general ought to be extremely careful not to abate his cares and vigilance, upon account of success, because the least negligence may ruin every thing. Had Nicias sent the smallest detachment to oppose Gylippus's landing, he would have taken Syracuse, and the whole affair had been ended.

SECT.

SECT. XIII. *The Syracusans resolve to capitulate, but Gylippus's Arrival changes the Face of Affairs. Nicias is forced by his Colleagues to engage in a Sea-fight, and is overcome. His Land Forces are also defeated.*

NINETEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE fortifications of the Athenians were now almost completed; and they had drawn a double wall, near half a league in length, along the plain and the fens towards the great port, and had almost reached it. There now remained, on the side towards Trogilus, only a small part of the wall to be finished. The Syracusans were therefore on the brink of ruin, and had no hopes left, as they were no longer able to defend themselves, and did not expect any succours. For this reason they resolved to surrender. Accordingly a council was held to settle articles of capitulation, in order to present them to Nicias; and several were of opinion, that it would be proper to capitulate soon, before the city should be entirely invested.

It was at that very instant, and in the most critical juncture, that an officer, Gongyles, by name, arrived from Corinth, on board a ship with three benches of oars. At his arrival all the citizens flocked round him. He informed them, that Gylippus would be with them immediately, and was followed by a great many other galleys, which came to their aid. The Syracusans astonished, or rather stupified, as it were, with this news, could scarce believe what they heard. Whilst they were thus fluctuating and in doubt, a courier arrived from Gylippus, to inform them of his approach, and order them to march out all their troops to meet him. He himself, after having taken a * fort in his way, marched in battle array directly for Epipolæ; and ascending by Euryelus, as the Athenians had done, he

[a] A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. l. vii. p. 485—489. Plut. in Nic. p. 535, 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 138, 139.

* Jeges.

prepared

prepared to attack them from without, whilſt the Syracuſans ſhould charge them, on their ſide, with the forces of Syracuſe and his. The Athenians, exceedingly ſurpriſed by his arrival, drew up haſtily, and without order under the walls. With regard to himſelf, laying down his arms when he approached, he ſent word by a herald, that he would allow the Athenians five days to leave Sicily. Nicias did not condeſcend to make the leaſt anſwer to this propoſal; and ſome of his ſoldiers burſting out a laughing, aſked the herald, "Whether the preſence of a Lacedæmonian privateer, and a trifling wand, could make any change in the preſent ſtate of the city?" Both ſides therefore prepared for battle.

Gylippus ſtormed the fort of Labdalon, and cut to pieces all who were found in it. The ſame day an Athenian galley was taken, as it ſailed into the harbour. The beſieged afterwards drew a wall from the city, towards Epipolæ, in order to cut (about the extremity of it) the ſingle wall of the Athenians; and to deprive them of all communication with the troops, poſted in the intrenchments which ſurrounded the city on the north ſide towards Tyche and Trogilus. The Athenians after having finiſhed the wall, which extended as far as the ſea towards the great harbour, were returned to the hills. Gylippus perceiving, in the ſingle wall which the Athenians had built on the hills of Epipolæ, a part that was weaker and lower than the reſt, marched in the night with his troops; but being diſcovered by the Athenians, who were encamped without, he was forced to retire, upon ſeeing them advance directly towards him. They raiſed the wall higher, and themſelves undertook the guard of it; after having fixed their allies in the ſeveral poſts of the remainder of the intrenchments.

Nicias, on the other ſide, thought proper to fortify the Cape of Plemmyrium, which, by its running into the ſea, ſtraitened the mouth of the great harbour; and his deſign thereby was, to procure proviſions, and all other things he might want, the more eaſily; becauſe the Athenians, by

by poſſeſſing themſelves of that poſt, drew near the little port, wherein lay the chief naval forces of the Syracuſans, and were the better able to obſerve the various motions of it; and that beſides, by having the ſea open, they would not be forced to have all their proviſions from the bottom of the great harbour; as they muſt have been, ſhould the enemy, by ſeizing on the mouth of it, oblige them to keep cloſe in the harbour, in the manner they then did. For Nicias, from the arrival of Gylippus, had no hopes left but from the ſide next the ſea. Sending therefore his fleet, and part of his troops thither, he built three forts, by which the ſhips were enabled to lie at anchor; he alſo ſecured there a great part of the baggage and ammunition. It was then that the troops on board the fleet ſuffered very much; for, as they were obliged to go a great way to fetch wood and water, they were ſurrounded by the enemy's horſe, the third part of which were poſted at Olympia, to prevent the garriſon of Plemmyrium from ſallying, and were maſters of the field. Advice being brought to Nicias, that the Corinthian fleet was advancing, he ſent twenty galleys againſt it; ordered them to obſerve the enemy towards Locris, Regium, and the reſt of the avenues of Sicily.

In the mean time Gylippus, employing thoſe very ſtones which the Athenians had got together for their uſe, went on with the wall which the Syracuſans had begun to carry through Epipolæ; and drew up daily in battle array before it, as did the Athenians. When he ſaw it was a proper time for engaging, he began the battle in the ſpot lying between the two walls. The narrowneſs of it having rendered his cavalry and archers uſeleſs, he came off with loſs, and the Athenians ſet up a trophy. Gylippus, to reanimate his ſoldiers by doing them juſtice, had the courage to reproach himſelf for the ill ſucceſs they had met with; and to declare publicly, that he, not they, had occaſioned the late defeat; becauſe he had made them fight in too narrow a ſpot of ground. However, he promiſed ſoon to give them an opportunity of recovering both their honour and his; and

and accordingly, the very next day, he led them againſt the enemy, after having exhorted them, in the ſtrongeſt terms, to behave in a manner worthy of their ancient glory. Nicias perceiving, that though he ſhould not deſire to come to a battle, it would however be abſolutely neceſſary for him to prevent the enemy from extending their line beyond the contravallation, to which they were already very near; (becauſe otherwiſe this would be granting them a certain victory) he therefore marched againſt the Syracuſans. Gylippus brought up his troops beyond that place, where the walls terminated on both ſides, in order that he might leave the more room to extend his battle; when charging the enemy's left wing with his horſe, he put it to flight, and ſoon after defeated the right. We have here an inſtance of what the experience and abilities of a great captain are capable of producing; for Gylippus, with the ſame men, the ſame arms, the ſame horſes, and the ſame ground, by only changing his order of battle, defeated the Athenians, and beat them quite to their camp. The following night, the victors carried on their wall beyond the contravallation of the Athenians, and thereby deprived them of all hopes of being ever able to ſurround them.

[t] After this ſucceſs, the Syracuſans, to whoſe aid the Corinthian fleet was arrived, unperceived by that of the Athenians, reſumed courage, armed ſeveral galleys, and marching into the plains, with their cavalry and other forces, took a great number of priſoners. They ſent deputies to Lacedæmonia and Corinth, to deſire a reinforcement; Gylippus went in perſon to all the cities of Sicily to ſolicit them to join him; and brought over the greateſt part of them, who accordingly ſent him powerful ſuccours. Nicias, finding his troops leſſen, and thoſe of the enemy increaſe daily, began to be diſcouraged; and not only ſent expreſſes to the Athenians, to acquaint them with the ſituation of affairs, but likewiſe wrote to them in the ſtrongeſt terms. I repeat his

[t] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 490—494. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 189.

whole letter, both as it gives a clear and exact account of the ſtate of things at that time in Syracuſe, and may ſerve as a model for ſuch kind of relations.

"Athenians: I have already informed you by ſeveral expreſſes, of what paſſed here: but it is neceſſary you ſhould know the preſent ſituation of affairs, that you may reſolve accordingly. After we had been victorious in ſeveral engagements, and almoſt completed our contravallation, Gylippus arrived in Syracuſe with a body of Lacedæmonian and Sicilian troops; and, having been defeated the firſt time, he was victorious the ſecond, by means of his cavalry and archers. We are, in conſequence, ſhut up in our intrenchments, without daring to make any attempt, or complete our works, through the ſuperiority of the enemy's forces; for part of our ſoldiers are employed in guarding our forts, and conſequently we have not an opportunity of employing all our forces in battle. Beſides, as the Syracuſans have cut our lines, by a wall, in that part where they were not complete, it will no longer be poſſible for us to inveſt the city, unleſs we ſhould force their intrenchments; ſo that inſtead of beſieging, we ourſelves are beſieged, and dare not ſtir out for fear of their horſe.

"Not contented with theſe advantages, they are bringing new ſuccours from Peloponneſus, and have ſent Gylippus to force all the neutral cities of Sicily to declare for them; and the reſt to furniſh them with men and ſhips, to attack us both by ſea and land. I ſay by ſea, which, though very ſurpriſing, is, however, but too true. For our fleet, which before was conſiderable, from the good condition of the galleys and mariners, is now very deficient in thoſe very circumſtances, and prodigiouſly weakened,

"Our galleys leak every where, becauſe we cannot draw them on ſhore to careen them, for fear, leſt thoſe of the enemy, which are more numerous, and in better condition than ours, ſhould attack us on a ſudden, which they ſeem to threaten every moment. Beſides,

we are under a neceſſity of ſending many backwards and forwards to guard the convoys which we are forced to fetch from a great diſtance, and bring along in ſight of the enemy; ſo that ſhould we be ever ſo little negligent in this point, our army would be ſtarved.

"With regard to the ſhips' crews, they decreaſe ſenſibly every day; for as great numbers of them diſperſe to maraud, or to fetch wood and water, they are often cut to pieces by the enemy's horſe. Our ſlaves, allured by the neighbourhood of the enemy's camp, deſert very faſt to it. The foreigners, which were forced into the ſervice, diminiſh daily; and ſuch as have been raiſed with money, who came for plunder rather than fighting, finding themſelves baulked, go over to the enemy, who are ſo near us, or elſe hide themſelves in Sicily, which they may eaſily do in ſo large an iſland. A great number of citizens, though long uſed to, and well ſkilled in working of ſhips, by bribing the captains put others in their room, who are wholly unexperienced, and incapable of ſerving, and, by that means, have quite ſubverted all diſcipline. I am now writing to men perfectly well verſed in naval affairs: and who are very ſenſible, that, when order is neglected, every thing grows worſe and worſe, and a fleet muſt inevitably be ruined.

"But the moſt unhappy circumſtance is, that though I am generaliſſimo, I cannot put a ſtop to theſe diſorders. For (Athenians) you are very ſenſible, that ſuch is your diſpoſition, that you do not eaſily brook reſtraint; beſides, I do not know where to furniſh myſelf with ſeamen, whilſt the enemy get numbers from all quarters. It is not in the power of our Sicilian allies to aid us; and ſhould the cities of Italy, from whence we have our proviſions (hearing the extremity to which we are reduced, and your not taking the leaſt care to ſend us any ſuccour) join the Syracuſans, we are undone; and the enemy will have no occaſion to fight us.

"I could write of things which would be more agreeable, but of none that could be more advantageous to you, nor which could give you a more juſt idea of the ſubjects on which you are to deliberate. I am ſenſible that you love to have ſuch advices only ſent you as are pleaſing; but then I know, on the other ſide, that when affairs turn out otherwiſe than you expected and hoped for, you accuſe thoſe who deceived you; which induced me to give you a ſincere and genuine account of things, without concealing a ſingle circumſtance. By the way, I am to inform you, that no complaints can be juſtly made either againſt the officers or common ſoldiers, both having done their duty very well.

"But now that the Sicilians join all their forces againſt us, and expect a new army from Peloponneſus; you may lay this down as the foundation for your deliberations, that our preſent troops are not ſufficient; and, therefore, we either muſt be recalled, or elſe a land and naval force, equal to the firſt, muſt be ſent us, with money in proportion. You muſt alſo think of appointing a perſon to ſucceed me; it being impoſſible for me, through my nephritic diſorder, to ſuſtain any longer the weight of the command. I imagine that I deſerve this favour at your hands on account of the ſervice I have done you, in the ſeveral commands conferred upon me, ſo long as my health would permit me to act.

"To conclude; whatever reſolution you may come to, the requeſt I have to make, is, that you would execute it ſpeedily, and in the very beginning of the ſpring. The ſuccours which our enemies meet with in Sicily are all ready; but thoſe which they expect from Peloponneſus may be longer in coming. However, fix this in your minds, that if you do not exert yourſelves, the Lacedæmonians will not fail, as they have already done, to be beforehand with you."

The Athenians were ſtrongly affected with this letter, which made as great an impreſſion on them as Nicias expected.

expected. However, they did not think proper to appoint him a ſucceſſor; and only nominated two officers who were under him, viz. Menander and Euthydemus, to aſſiſt him till other generals ſhould be ſent. Eurymedon and Demoſthenes were choſen to ſucceed Lamachus and Alcibiades. The former ſet out immediately with ten galleys, and ſome money *, about the winter ſolſtice, to aſſure Nicias that a ſpeedy ſuccour ſhould be ſent him; during which the latter was raiſing troops and contributions, in order to ſet ſail early in the ſpring.

[u] The Lacedæmonians, on the other ſide, being ſupported by the Corinthians, were very induſtrious in preparing reinforcements to ſend into Sicily, and to enter Attica, in order to keep the Athenian fleet from ſailing to that iſland. Accordingly they entered Attica early under the command of king Agis; and after having laid waſte the country, they fortified Decelia; having divided the work among all the forces, to make the greater diſpatch. This poſt is about a hundred and twenty furlongs from Athens, that is, about ſix French leagues, and the ſame diſtance from Bœotia. Alcibiades was perpetually ſoliciting the Lacedæmonians, and could not be eaſy, till he had prevailed with them to begin that work. This annoyed the Athenians moſt of all: for hitherto, the enemy retiring after they had laid waſte the Athenian territories, the latter were unmoleſted all the reſt of the year; but from the fortifying of Decelia, the garriſon left in it was continually making incurſions, and alarming the Athenians, Athens being now become a kind of frontier town: for, in the day time, a guard was mounted at all the gates; and, in the night, all the citizens were either on the walls, or under arms. Such veſſels as brought proviſions from the iſland of Eubœa, and which before had a much ſhorter paſſage by Decelia, were forced to go round about, in order to double the cape of Sunium; by which means proviſions, as well as goods imported, grew much dearer.

[u] A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. lib. vii. p. 494—496, & 502—504. Diod. l. xiii. p. 140. * 120 talents.

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To heighten the calamity, upwards of twenty thouſand ſlaves, the greateſt part of whom were artificers, went over to the enemy, to fly from the extreme miſery with which the city was afflicted. The cattle of all kinds died. Moſt of the horſes were lamed, being continually upon guard, or upon parties. Every thing being laid waſte in this manner, and the Athenians enjoying no longer the revenues which aroſe from the produce of their lands, there was a prodigious ſcarcity of money; ſo that they were forced to take the twentieth part of all the imports, to ſupply their uſual ſubſidies.

[x] In the mean time Gylippus, who had made the tour of Sicily, returned, with as many men as he could raiſe in the whole iſland; and prevailed with the Syracuſans to fit out the ſtrongeſt fleet in their power, and to hazard a battle at ſea, upon the preſumption that the ſucceſs would anſwer the greatneſs of the enterpriſe. This advice was ſtrongly enforced by Hermocrates, who exhorted the Syracuſans not to abandon to their enemies the empire of the ſeas. He obſerved, that the Athenians themſelves had not received it from their anceſtors, nor been always poſſeſſed of it: that the Perſian war had in a manner forced them into the knowledge of naval affairs, notwithſtanding two great obſtacles, their diſpoſition, and the ſituation of their city, which ſtood at a conſiderable diſtance from the ſea: that they had made themſelves formidable to other nations, not ſo much by their real ſtrength, as by their courage and intrepidity: that they ought to copy them; and ſince they had to do with enemies who were ſo enterpriſing, it was fit they ſhould be equally daring.

This advice was approved, and accordingly a large fleet was equipped. Gylippus led out all his land-forces in the night time, to attack the forts of Plemmyrium. Thirty-five galleys of Syracuſe, which were in the great harbour, and forty-five in the leſſer, where was an arſenal for ſhips, were ordered to advance towards Plemmyrium, to amaze the Athenians, who would ſee themſelves attacked both by ſea and land at the ſame time.

[x] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 497—500. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. p. 140.

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The Athenians, at this news, went on board alſo; and with twenty-five ſhips ſailed to fight the thirty-five Syracuſan veſſels, which were ſailing out againſt them from the great harbour; and oppoſed thirty-five more to the forty-five of the enemy, which were come out of the little port. A ſharp engagement was fought at the mouth of the great harbour; one party endeavouring to force their way into it, and the other to keep them out.

Thoſe who defended the forts of Plemmyrium, having flocked to the ſhore to view the battle, Gylippus attacked the forts unexpectedly by day-break; and having carried the greateſt of them by ſtorm, the ſoldiers who defended the other two were ſo terrified, that they abandoned them in a moment. After this advantage, the Syracuſans ſuſtained a conſiderable loſs; for ſuch of their veſſels as fought at the entrance of the harbour (after having forced the Athenians) bulged furiouſly one againſt the other as they entered it in diſorder; and by this means ſhifted the victory to their enemies, who were not contented with purſuing, but alſo gave chace to thoſe who were victorious in the great harbour. Eleven Syracuſan galleys were ſunk, and a great number of the ſailors in them killed. Three were taken; but the Athenians likewiſe loſt three, and after towing off thoſe of the enemy, they raiſed a trophy on a little iſland lying before Plemmyrium, and retired to the centre of their camp.

The Syracuſans alſo raiſed three trophies for their taking of the three forts; and after raſing one of the ſmaller, they repaired the fortifications of the other two, and put garriſons into them. Several Athenians had been either killed or made priſoners there; and great ſums of money were taken, the property of the public, as well as of merchants and captains of galleys, beſides a large quantity of ammunition; this being a kind of magazine for the whole army. They likewiſe loſt the ſtores and rigging of forty galleys, with three ſhips that lay in the dock. But a more conſiderable circumſtance was, Gylippus thereby prevented Nicias from getting proviſions and ammunition ſo eaſily; for, whilſt the

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latter was poſſeſſed of Plemmyrium, they procured theſe ſecurely and expeditiouſly; whereas, after their being diſpoſſeſſed of it, it was equally difficult and hazardous, becauſe they could not bring in any thing without fighting; the enemy lying at anchor juſt off their fort. Thus the Athenians could have no proviſions but from the point of their ſwords, which diſpirited the ſoldiers very much, and threw the whole army into a great conſternation.

[y] There afterwards was a little ſkirmiſh in defending a ſtaccado which the inhabitants had made in the ſea, at the entrance of the old harbour, to ſecure the ſhipping. The Athenians having raiſed towers and parapets on a large ſhip, made it advance as near as poſſible to the ſtaccado, in order that it might ſerve as a bulwark to ſome ſhips which carried military engines, with which they drew up ſtakes by the help of pullies and ropes, excluſive of thoſe which the divers ſawed in two; the beſiegers defending themſelves with their harbour, and the enemies with their tower. Such ſtakes as had been driven in, level with the ſurface of the water, in order to ſtrand thoſe veſſels that ſhould come near them, were the hardeſt to force away. The divers alſo bribed the enemy, and moſt of the ſtakes were torn up; but then others were immediately driven in their places. The utmoſt efforts were uſed on both ſides, in the attack as well as the defence.

[z] One circumſtance, which the beſieged conſidered of the greateſt importance, was to attempt a ſecond engagement both by ſea and land, before the fleet, and other ſuccours, ſent by the Athenians, ſhould arrive. They had concerted freſh meaſures for a battle at ſea, by improving from the errors they had committed in the laſt engagement. The change made in the galleys was, their prows were now ſhorter, and at the ſame time ſtronger and more ſolid than before. For this purpoſe they fixed great pieces of timber, projecting forward, on each ſide of the prows; and to theſe pieces they

[y] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 500, 501.
[z] Ibid. p. 509—513. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. p. 140, 141.

joined

joined beams by way of props. Theſe beams extended to the length of ſix cubits on each ſide of the veſſel, both within and without. By this they hoped to gain the advantage over the galleys of the Athenians, which did not dare, becauſe of the weakneſs of their prows, to attack an enemy in front, but only in flank; not to mention, that ſhould the battle be fought in the harbour, they would not have room to ſpread themſelves, nor to paſs between two galleys, in which lay their greateſt art; nor to tack about after they ſhould have been repulſed, in order to return to the charge; whereas the Syracuſans, by their being maſters of the whole extent of the harbour, would have all theſe advantages, and might reciprocally aſſiſt one another. On theſe circumſtances the latter founded their hopes of victory.

Gylippus therefore firſt drew all the infantry out of the camp, and advanced towards that part of the contravallation of the Athenians which faced the city; whilſt the troops of Olympia marched towards the other, and their galleys ſet ſail.

Nicias did not care to venture a ſecond battle, ſaying, that as he expected a freſh fleet every moment, and a great reinforcement under Demoſthenes, it would betray the greateſt want of judgment, ſhould he, as his troops were inferior in number to thoſe of the enemy, and already fatigued, hazard a battle without being forced to it. On the contrary, Menander and Euthydemus, who had juſt before been appointed to ſhare the command with Nicias till the arrival of Demoſthenes, fired with ambition, and jealous of thoſe generals, were eager to perform ſome great exploit, to bereave the one of his glory, and, if poſſible, to eclipſe that of the other. The pretence they alleged on this occaſion was the fame and reputation of Athens; and they aſſerted with ſo much vehemence, that it would be entirely deſtroyed ſhould they ſhun the battle, as the Syracuſans offered it them, that they at laſt forced Nicias to a compliance. The Athenians had ſeventy-five galleys, and the Syracuſans eighty.

The firſt day the fleets continued in ſight of each other, in the great harbour, without engaging; and only a few ſkirmiſhes paſſed, after which both parties retired; and it was juſt the ſame with the land forces. The Syracuſans did not make the leaſt motion the ſecond day. Nicias, taking advantage of this inactivity, cauſed the tranſports to draw up in a line, at ſome diſtance from one another, in order that his galleys might retire behind them with ſafety, in caſe he ſhould be defeated. On the morrow, the Syracuſans came up ſooner than uſual, when a great part of the day was ſpent in ſkirmiſhing, after which they retired. The Athenians did not ſuppoſe they would return, but imagined that fear had made them fly: but having refreſhed themſelves in great diligence, and returning on board their galleys, they attacked the Athenians, who were far from expecting them. The latter being now forced to return immediately on board their ſhips, they entered them in great diſorder, ſo that they had not time to draw them up in a line of battle, and moſt of the ſailors were faſting. Victory did not long continue in ſuſpenſe. The Athenians, after making a ſhort and ſlight reſiſtance, retired behind their line of tranſport ſhips. The enemy purſued them thither, and were ſtopped by the ſail-yards of thoſe ſhips, to which were fixed dolphins * of lead, which being very heavy, had they fallen on the enemy's galleys, would have ſunk them at once. The Athenians loſt ſeven galleys in this engagement, and a great number of ſoldiers were either killed or taken priſoners.

[a]This loſs threw Nicias into the utmoſt conſternation. All the misfortunes he had met with, ever ſince the time he had firſt enjoyed the ſupreme command, came into his mind; and he now is involved in a greater than any of them, by his complying with the advice of his colleagues. Whilſt he was revolving theſe gloomy

[a] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 513—518. Plut. in Nic. p. 537. Diod. p. 141, 142.

* This engine, ſo violent was its motion, broke through a galley from the deck to the hold.

ideas

ideas, Demoſthenes's fleet was ſeen coming forward in great pomp; and with ſuch an air as ſhould fill the enemy with dread: it was now the day after the battle. This fleet conſiſted of ſeventy-three galleys, on board of which were five thouſand fighting men, and about three thouſand archers, ſlingers and bowmen. All theſe galleys were richly trimmed; their prows being adorned with ſhining ſtreamers, manned with ſtout rowers, commanded by good officers, and echoing with the ſound of clarions and trumpets; Demoſthenes having affected an air of pomp and triumph, purpoſely to ſtrike terror into the enemy.

This gallant ſight alarmed them indeed beyond expreſſion. They did not ſee any end, or even the leaſt ſuſpenſion of their calamities: all they had hitherto done or ſuffered was as nothing, and their work was to begin again. What hopes could they entertain of being able to weary out the patience of the Athenians, ſince, though they had a camp intrenched in the middle of Attica, they were however able to ſend a ſecond army into Sicily, as conſiderable as the former; and that their power, as well as their courage, ſeemed, notwithſtanding all their loſſes, inſtead of diminiſhing to increaſe daily?

Demoſthenes having made an exact enquiry into the ſtate of things, imagined that it would not be proper for him to loſe time, as Nicias had done, who, having ſpread an univerſal terror at his firſt arrival, became afterwards the object of contempt, for his having wintered in Catana inſtead of going directly to Syracuſe; and had afterwards given Gylippus an opportunity of throwing troops into it. He flattered himſelf with the hopes that he ſhould be able to carry the city at the firſt attack, by taking advantage of the alarm which the news of his arrival would ſpread in every part of it, and by that means ſhould immediately put an end to the war. Otherwiſe he intended to raiſe the ſiege, and no longer haraſs and leſſen the troops by fighting battles never deciſive; nor quite exhauſt the city of Athens, by employing its treaſures in needleſs expences.

Nicias

Nicias, terrified by this bold and precipitate reſolution of Demoſthenes, conjured him not to be ſo haſty, but to take time to weigh things deliberately, that he might have no cauſe to repent of what he ſhould do. He obſerved to him, that the enemy would be ruined by delays; that their proviſions as well as money were entirely exhauſted, that their allies were going to abandon them; that they muſt ſoon be reduced to ſuch extremity, for want of proviſions, as would force them to ſurrender, as they had before reſolved: for there were certain perſons in Syracuſe who held a ſecret correſpondence with Nicias, and exhorted him not to be impatient, becauſe the Syracuſans were tired with the war and with Gylippus; and that ſhould the neceſſity to which they were reduced be ever ſo little increaſed, they would ſurrender at diſcretion.

As Nicias did not explain himſelf clearly, and would not declare in expreſs terms, that ſure and certain advices were ſent him of whatever was tranſacted in the city, his remonſtrances were conſidered as an effect of the timidity and ſlowneſs with which he had always been reproached. "Such," ſaid they, "are his uſual protraction, delays, diſtruſts, and fearful precaution, whereby he has deadened all the vivacity, and extinguiſhed all the ardour of the troops, in not marching them immediately againſt the enemy; but on the contrary, by deferring to attack them, till his own forces were weakened and deſpiſed." This made the reſt of the generals and all the officers come over to Demoſthenes's opinion, and Nicias himſelf was at laſt forced to acquieſce with it.

Demoſthenes, after having attacked, to no purpoſe, the wall which cut the contravallation of the beſiegers, confined himſelf to the attack of Epipolæ, from a ſuppoſition that ſhould he once be maſter of it, the wall would be quite undefended. He therefore took proviſions for five days, with workmen, implements, and every thing neceſſary for him to defend that poſt after he ſhould poſſeſs himſelf of it. As there was no going up to it in the day time undiſcovered, he marched thither

thither in the night with all his forces, followed by Eurymedon and Menander; Nicias ſtaying behind to guard the camp. They went up by the way of Euryelus, as before, unperceived by the ſentinels; attack the firſt intrenchment, and ſtorm it, after killing part of thoſe who defended it. Demoſthenes, not ſatisfied with this advantage, to prevent the ardour of his ſoldiers from cooling, and not delay the execution of his deſign, marches forward. During this interval, the forces of the city, ſuſtained by Gylippus, march under arms out of the intrenchments. Being ſeized with aſtoniſhment, which the darkneſs of the night increaſed, they were immediately repulſed and put to flight. But as the Athenians advanced in diſorder, to force whatever might reſiſt their arms, leſt the enemy might rally again, ſhould time be allowed them to breathe and recover from their ſurpriſe, they are ſtopped on a ſudden by the Bœotians, who make a vigorous ſtand, and marching againſt the Athenians with their pikes preſented, they repulſe them with great ſhouts, and make a dreadful ſlaughter. This ſpreads an univerſal terror through the reſt of the army. Thoſe who fled either force along ſuch as were advancing to their aſſiſtance, or elſe, miſtaking them for enemies, turn their arms againſt them. They now were all mixed indiſcriminately, it being impoſſible to diſcover objects in the horrors of a night, which was not ſo gloomy as entirely to make objects imperceptible, nor yet light enough to diſtinguiſh thoſe which were ſeen. The Athenians fought for one another to no purpoſe; and from their often aſking the *word*, by which only they were able to know one another, a ſtrange confuſion of ſounds was heard, which occaſioned no little diſorder; not to mention that they, by this means, divulged the word to the enemy, and could not learn theirs; becauſe by their being together and in a body, they had no occaſion to repeat it. In the mean time, thoſe who were purſued threw themſelves from the top of the rocks, and many were daſhed to pieces by the fall; and as moſt of thoſe who eſcaped ſtraggled from one another up and down the fields and woods,

woods, they were cut to pieces the next day by the enemy's horſe, who purſued them. Two thouſand Athenians were ſlain in this engagement, and a great number of arms were taken; thoſe who fled having thrown them away, that they might be the better able to eſcape over the precipices.

SECT. XIV. *The Conſternation with which the Athenians are ſeized. They again hazard a Sea-fight, and are defeated. They reſolve to retire by Land. Being cloſe purſued by the Syracuſans, they ſurrender. Nicias and Demoſthenes are ſentenced to die, and executed. The Effect which the News of the Defeat of the Army produces in Athens.*

[b] THE Athenian generals, after ſuſtaining ſo great a loſs, were in a prodigious dilemma, and did not know how to act in the preſent diſcouragement and deſpair of the troops who died daily, either by the diſeaſes of the autumn, or by the bad air of the fens near which they were encamped. Demoſthenes was of opinion that it would be proper for them to leave the country immediately, ſince they had been unſucceſsful in ſo important an enterpriſe; eſpecially as the ſeaſon was not too far advanced for ſailing; and that they had ſhips enough to force a paſſage, in caſe the enemy ſhould diſpute it with them. He declared, that it would be of much greater advantage to oblige the enemy to raiſe their blockade of Athens than for them to continue that of Syracuſe, by which they exhauſted themſelves to no purpoſe; that he was certain they would not be reinforced by a new army; and that they could not hope to overcome the enemy with the weak one under their command.

Nicias was ſenſible that the arguments his colleague uſed were very juſt, and he himſelf was of his opinion: but at the ſame time he was afraid, leſt ſo public a confeſſion of the weak condition to which they were reduc-

[b] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 511—520. Plut. in Nic. p. 538—542. Diod. p. 142.

ed,

ed, and their resolution to leave Sicily (the report of which would certainly reach the enemy) should complete the ruin of their affairs; and perhaps make them unable to execute their resolution when they should attempt it. Besides they had some little hopes left that the besieged, being themselves reduced to great extremity by their absolute want of provisions and money, would at last be inclined to surrender upon honourable terms. Thus, although he was in reality uncertain and wavering, he insinuated, that he did not care to quit Sicily, till the Athenians should have first sent orders for that purpose; and that otherwise they would be highly displeased: that as those who were to judge them had not been eye-witnesses of the state of things, they would be of a different opinion; and, at the instigation of some orator, certainly condemn them: that most of those men, who now exclaimed with the greatest vehemence against the difficulties they laboured under, would then change their note, and accuse them of having been bribed to raise the siege: that knowing so well, as he did, the disposition and character of the Athenians, he chose to die gloriously by the enemy's sword, rather than be ignominiously condemned by his fellow-citizens.

These reasons, though they appeared very strong, were not yet able to convince Demosthenes; and it was still his opinion, that the only good choice they could make would be to retire. However, as he had been unsuccessful in his former opinion, he was afraid of insisting upon this; and he was the more inclined to come into that of Nicias, from imagining with many others, that this general might have some secret resource, as he was so firmly resolved to stay.

[c] Gylippus, after having made the tour of Sicily, had brought a great body of troops with him. This new reinforcement terrified the Athenians exceedingly, whose army diminished daily by sickness; and they now began to repent their not having raised the siege, especially as the besieged were preparing to attack them

[c] Thucyd. l. vii. p. 521—548. Plut. in Nic. p. 538. Diod. l. xiii. 142—161.

both

both by ſea and land. Beſides Nicias no longer oppoſed this reſolution, and only deſired to have it kept ſecret. Orders were therefore given, as privately as poſſible, for the fleet to prepare for ſetting ſail with the utmoſt expedition.

When all things were ready, the moment they were going to ſet ſail (wholly unſuſpected by the enemy, who were far from ſurmiſing they would leave Sicily ſo ſoon) the moon was ſuddenly eclipſed in the middle of the night, and loſt all its ſplendor; which terrified Nicias and the whole army, who, from ignorance and ſuperſtition, were aſtoniſhed at ſo ſudden a change, the cauſes of which they did not know, and therefore dreaded the conſequences of it. They then conſulted the ſoothſayers; and who being equally unacquainted with the reaſons of this phænomenon, only augmented their conſternation. It was the cuſtom, after ſuch accidents had happened, to ſuſpend their enterpriſes but for three days. The ſoothſayers pronounced, that he muſt not ſet ſail till three times nine days were paſt, (theſe are Thucydides's words) which doubtleſs was a myſterious number in the opinion of the people. Nicias ſcrupulous to a fault, and full of a miſtaken veneration for theſe blind interpreters of the will of the gods, declared that he would wait a whole revolution of the moon, and not return till the ſame day of the next month; as if he had not ſeen the planet very clearly, the inſtant it had emerged from that part which was darkened by the interpoſition of the earth's body.

But he was not allowed time for this. The news of the intended departure of the Athenians being ſoon ſpread over the city, a reſolution was taken to attack the beſiegers both by ſea and land. The Syracuſans began the firſt day by attacking the intrenchments, and gained a ſlight advantage over the enemy. On the morrow they made a ſecond attack; and at the ſame time ſailed with ſeventy-ſix galleys againſt eighty-ſix of the Athenians. Eurymedon, who commanded the right of the Athenian fleet, having ſpread along the ſhore to ſurround them, this movement proved fatal to him;

him: for, as he was detached from the body of the fleet, the Syracuſans, after forcing the main battle, which was in the centre, attacked him; drove him vigorouſly into the gulph called Daſcon, and there defeated him entirely. Eurymedon loſt his life in the engagement. They afterwards gave chace to the reſt of the galleys, and run them againſt the ſhore. Gylippus, who commanded the land army, ſeeing the Athenian galleys were forced aground, and not able to return into their ſtaccado, landed with part of his troops, in order to charge the ſoldiers, in caſe they ſhould be forced to run aſhore; and to give his friends the more room to tow ſuch galleys as they ſhould have taken. However, he was repulſed by the Tyrrhenians, who were poſted on that ſide; and obliged by the Athenians, who flew to ſuſtain them, to retire with ſome loſs as far as the moor called Lyſimelia, which lay near it. The latter ſaved moſt of their ſhips, eighteen excepted, which were taken by the Syracuſans, and their crews cut to pieces by them. After this, reſolving to burn the reſt, they filled an old veſſel with combuſtible materials; and having ſet fire to it, they drove it by the help of the wind againſt the Athenians, who nevertheleſs extinguiſhed the fire, and drove off that ſhip.

Each ſide erected trophies: the Syracuſans for the defeat of Eurymedon, and the advantage they had gained the day before; and the Athenians for their having driven part of the enemy into the moor, and put the other part to flight. But the minds of the two nations were very differently diſpoſed. The Syracuſans, who had been thrown into the utmoſt conſternation at the arrival of Demoſthenes with his fleet, ſeeing themſelves victorious in a naval engagement, reſumed freſh hope, and aſſured themſelves of a complete victory over their enemies. The Athenians, on the contrary, fruſtrated of their only reſource, and overcome by ſea, ſo contrary to their expectations, entirely loſt courage, and had no thoughts but of retiring.

The enemy, to deprive them of all reſource and prevent their eſcaping, ſhut the mouth of the great harbour,

bour, which was about five hundred paces wide, with galleys placed croſſwiſe, and other veſſels fixed with anchors and iron chains; and at the ſame time made the requiſite preparations for the battle, in caſe they ſhould have courage to engage again. When the Athenians ſaw themſelves thus hemmed in, the generals and principal officers aſſembled, in order to deliberate on the preſent ſtate of affairs. They were in abſolute want of proviſions, which was owing to their having forbid the people of Catana to bring any, from the hopes they entertained of their being able to retire; and they could not procure any from other places, unleſs they were maſters of the ſea. This made them reſolve to venture a ſea-fight. In this view they were determined to leave their old camp, and their walls, which extended to the temple of Hercules, and to intrench themſelves on the ſhore, near their ſhips, in the ſmalleſt compaſs poſſible. Their deſign was to leave ſome forces in that place to guard their baggage and the ſick; and to fight with the reſt on board all the ſhips they ſhould have ſaved. They intended to retire into Catana, in caſe they ſhould be victorious: otherwiſe, to ſet fire to their ſhips, and to march by land to the neareſt city belonging to their allies.

This reſolution being taken, Nicias immediately filled a hundred and ten galleys (the others having loſt their oars) with the flower of his infantry; and drew up the reſt of the forces, particularly the bowmen, in order of battle on the ſhore. As the Athenians dreaded very much the beaks of the Syracuſan galleys, Nicias had provided harping irons to grapple them, in order to break the force of the blow, and to come immediately to cloſe fight, as on ſhore. But the enemy perceiving this, covered the prows and upper part of their galleys with leather, to prevent their being ſo eaſily laid hold of. The commanders on both ſides had employed all their rhetoric to animate their men; and none could ever have been prompted from ſtronger motives; for the battle which was going to be fought,

was

was to determine, not only their lives and liberties, but alſo the fate of their country.

The battle was very obſtinate and bloody. The Athenians being arrived at the mouth of the port, eaſily took thoſe ſhips which defended the entrance of it; but, when they attempted to break the chain of the reſt to widen the paſſage, the enemy came up from all quarters. As near two hundred galleys came ruſhing on each ſide, in a narrow place, there muſt neceſſarily be a very great confuſion; and the veſſels could not eaſily advance forward or retire, nor turn about to renew the attack. The beaks of the galleys, for this reaſon, did very little execution; but there were very furious and frequent diſcharges. The Athenians were overwhelmed with a ſhower of ſtones, which always did execution from what place ſoever they were thrown; whereas they defended themſelves only by ſhooting darts and arrows, which, by the motion of the ſhips from the agitation of the ſea, did not carry true, and by that means the greateſt part of them did little execution. Ariſton the pilot had given the Syracuſans this counſel. Theſe diſcharges being over, the ſoldiers, heavily armed, attempted to enter the enemy's ſhips in order to fight hand to hand: and it often happened, that whilſt they were climbing up one ſide, their own ſhips were entered on the other; and two or three ſhips would be grappled to one, which occaſioned a great perplexity and confuſion. Further, the noiſe of the ſhips that daſhed one againſt the other, the different cries of the victors and vanquiſhed, prevented the orders of the officers from being heard. The Athenians wanted to force a paſſage, whatever might be the conſequence, to ſecure their return into their own country; and this the enemy employed their utmoſt efforts to prevent, in order that they might gain a more complete and more glorious victory. The two land armies, which were drawn up on the higheſt part of the ſhore, and the inhabitants of the city who were there ran to the walls; whilſt the reſt kneeling in the temples, were imploring heaven to give ſucceſs to their citizens; all theſe

ſaw

ſaw clearly, becauſe of their little diſtance from the fleets, every thing that paſſed; and contemplated the battle as from an amphitheatre, but not without great anxiety and terror. Attentive to, and ſhuddering at every moment, and the ſeveral changes which happened; they diſcovered the concern they had in the battle, their fears, their hopes, their grief, their joy, by different cries and different geſtures; ſtretching out their hands, ſometimes towards the combatants to animate them, and at other times towards heaven, to implore the ſuccour and protection of the gods. At laſt, the Athenian fleet, after ſuſtaining a long battle and a vigorous reſiſtance, was put to flight, and driven againſt the ſhore. The Syracuſans, who were ſpectators of this victory, conveyed to the whole city, by an univerſal ſhout, the news of this victory. The victors, now maſters of the ſea, and ſailing with a favourable wind towards Syracuſe, erected a trophy; whilſt the Athenians, who were quite dejected and overpowered, did not ſo much as requeſt that their dead ſoldiers might be delivered to them, in order to pay the laſt ſad duty to their remains.

There now remained but two methods for them to chooſe; either to attempt the paſſage a ſecond time, for which they had ſhips and ſoldiers ſufficient, or to abandon their fleet to the enemy, and retire by land. Demoſthenes propoſed the former; but the ſailors, in the deepeſt affliction, refuſed to obey, fully perſuaded that it would be impoſſible for them to ſuſtain a ſecond engagement. The ſecond method was therefore reſolved upon, and accordingly they prepared to ſet out in the night, to conceal the march of their army from the enemy.

But Hermocrates, who ſuſpected their deſign, was very ſenſible that it was of the utmoſt importance not to ſuffer ſo great a body of forces to eſcape; ſince they otherwiſe might fortify themſelves in ſome corner of the iſland, and renew the war. The Syracuſans were at that time in the midſt of their feſtivity and rejoicings; and meditating nothing but how they might beſt divert themſelves

themſelves after the toils they had ſuſtained in fight. They were then ſolemnizing the feſtival of Hercules. To deſire the Syracuſans to take up arms again, in order to purſue the enemy; and to attempt to draw them from their diverſions, either by force or perſuaſion, would have been to no purpoſe; for which reaſon another expedient was employed. Hermocrates ſent out a few horſemen, who were to paſs for friends of the Athenians, and ordered them to cry aloud: "Tell Nicias not to retire till daylight; for the Syracuſans lie in ambuſh for him, and have ſeized on the paſſes." This falſe advice ſtopped Nicias at once; and he did not even ſet out the next day, in order that the ſoldiers might have time to prepare for their departure; and carry off whatever might be neceſſary for their ſubſiſtence, and abandon the reſt.

The enemy had time enough for ſeizing the avenues. The next morning early they poſſeſſed themſelves of the moſt difficult paſſes, fortified thoſe places where the rivers were fordable, broke down the bridges, and ſpread detachments of horſe up and down the plain; ſo that there was not one place through which the Athenians could paſs without fighting. They ſet out upon their march the third day after the battle, with deſign to retire to Catana, the whole army was in inexpreſſible conſternation, to ſee ſuch great numbers of men, either dead or dying, ſome of whom were left expoſed to wild beaſts, and the reſt to the cruelty of the enemy. Thoſe who were ſick and wounded conjured them with tears to take them along with the army, and held by their clothes when they were going; or elſe, dragging themſelves after them, followed them as far as their ſtrength would permit; and, when this failed, they had recourſe to tears, ſighs, imprecations; and ſending up towards heaven plaintive and dying groans, they called upon the gods as well as men to avenge their cruelty, whilſt every place echoed with lamentations.

The whole army was in as deplorable a condition. All men were ſeized with the deepeſt melancholy. They were inwardly tortured with rage and anguiſh, when

when they repreſented to themſelves the greatneſs from which they were fallen, the extreme miſery to which they were reduced, and the ſtill greater evils from which they foreſaw it would be impoſſible for them to eſcape. They could not bear the compariſon for ever preſent in their thoughts, of the triumphant ſtate in which they had left Athens, in the midſt of the good wiſhes and acclamations of the people; with the ignominy of their retreat, aggravated by the cries and imprecations of their relations and fellow-citizens.

But the moſt melancholy part of the ſpectacle, and that which moſt deſerved compaſſion, was Nicias. Dejected and worn out by a tedious illneſs; deprived of the moſt neceſſary things, at a time when his age and infirmities required them moſt; pierced, not only with his private grief, but with that of others, all which preyed upon his heart, this great man, ſuperior to all his evils, thought of nothing but how he might beſt comfort his ſoldiers, and revive their courage. He ran up and down in all places, crying aloud, that matters were not yet deſperate, and that other armies had eſcaped from greater dangers; that they ought not to accuſe themſelves, or grieve too immoderately, for misfortunes which they had not occaſioned; that if they had offended ſome god, his vengeance muſt be ſatiated by this time; that fortune, after having ſo long favoured the enemy, would at laſt be tired of perſecuting them; that their bravery and their numbers made them ſtill formidable (being ſtill near forty thouſand ſtrong;) that no city in Sicily would be able to withſtand them, nor prevent their ſettling wherever they might think proper; that they had no more to do, but to take care ſeverally of themſelves, and march in good order; that by a prudent and courageous retreat, which was now become their only reſource, they would not only ſave themſelves, but alſo their country, and enable it to recover its former grandeur.

The army marched in two bodies, both drawn up in the form of a phalanx; the firſt commanded by Nicias, and the ſecond by Demoſthenes, with the baggage in the centre.

centre. Being come to the river Anapis, they forced the paſſage, and afterwards were charged by all the enemy's cavalry, as well as archers, who diſcharged perpetually upon them. They were annoyed in this manner during ſeveral days march; every one of the paſſes being guarded, and the Athenians being obliged to diſpute every inch of their way. The enemy did not care to hazard a battle againſt an army which deſpair alone might render invincible; and, the inſtant the Athenians preſented the Syracuſans battle, the latter retired; but whenever the former would proceed in their march, they advanced and charged them in their retreat.

Demoſthenes and Nicias, ſeeing the miſerable condition to which the troops were reduced, being in extreme want of proviſions, and great numbers of them wounded, judged it adviſable to retire towards the ſea, by a quite contrary way from that in which they then marched; and to make directly for Camarina and Gela, inſtead of proceeding to Catana, as they firſt intended. They ſet out in the night, after lighting a great number of fires. The retreat was made in great confuſion and diſorder, as generally happens to great armies in the gloomy horrors of the night, eſpecially when the enemy is not far off. However, the vanguard, commanded by Nicias, came forward in good order; but above half the rearguard, with Demoſthenes at their head, quitted from the main body, and loſt their way. On the next day the Syracuſans, who, on the report of their retreat, had marched with the utmoſt diligence, came up with him about noon; and having ſurrounded him with their horſe, they drove him into a narrow place incloſed with a wall, where his ſoldiers fought like lions. Perceiving, at the cloſe of the day, that they were oppreſſed with fatigue, and covered with wounds, they gave the iſlanders leave to retire, which ſome of them accepted, and afterwards ſpared the lives of the reſt, who ſurrendered at diſcretion with Demoſthenes, after having ſtipulated that they ſhould not be put to death, nor ſentenced to perpetual impriſonment. About ſix thouſand ſoldiers ſurrendered on theſe conditions.

Nicias

Nicias arrived the ſame evening at the river Erineus, and paſſing it, encamped on a mountain, where the enemy came up with him the next day, and ſummoned him to ſurrender at diſcretion, as Demoſthenes had done. Nicias could not perſuade himſelf at firſt, that what they told him concerning that general was true, and therefore deſired leave to ſend ſome horſe for information. Upon their returning with the news that Demoſthenes had really ſurrendered in that manner. Nicias offered to pay the expences of the war, upon condition that they would permit him to leave the country with his forces, and to give as many Athenians for hoſtages, as they ſhould be obliged to pay talents. But the enemy rejected this propoſal with diſdain and inſolence, and renewed the attack. Nicias, though in abſolute want of all things, however ſuſtained the charge the whole night, and marched towards the river Aſinarus. When they were got to the banks of it, the Syracuſans advancing up to them, threw moſt of them into the ſtream; the reſt having already plunged voluntarily into it, to quench their thirſt. Here the greateſt and moſt bloody havoc was made, the poor wretches being butchered without the leaſt pity as they were drinking. Nicias finding all loſt, and unable to bear this diſmal ſpectacle, ſurrendered at diſcretion; upon condition that Gylippus ſhould diſcontinue the fight, and ſpare the reſt of his army. A great number were killed and more taken priſoners, ſo that all Sicily was filled with them. [d] The Athenians ſeemed to have been diſpleaſed with their general, for ſurrendering in this manner at diſcretion; and, for this reaſon, his name was omitted in a public monument on which was engraved the names of thoſe commanders who had loſt their lives in fighting for their country.

The victors adorned with the arms taken from the priſoners the fineſt and largeſt trees they could find on the banks of the rivers, and made a kind of trophies of thoſe trees, when crowning themſelves with chaplets of flowers, dreſſing their horſes in the richeſt capariſons,

[d] Pauſan. l. i. p. 56.

and

and cropping those of their enemies, they entered triumphantly into Syracuse, after having happily terminated the most considerable war in which they had ever been engaged with the Greeks; and won, by their strength and valour, a most signal and most complete victory. The next day a council was held, to deliberate on what was to be done with the prisoners. Diocles, one of the leaders of the greatest authority among the people, proposed, that all the Athenians who were born of free parents, and all such Sicilians as had joined with them, should be imprisoned, and only two measures of flour, and one of water, given them daily; that the slaves and all the allies should be publicly sold; and that the two Athenian generals should be first scourged with rods, and afterwards put to death.

[e] This last article was exceedingly disliked by all wise and compassionate Syracusans. Hermocrates, who was very famous for his probity and justice, attempted to make some remonstrances to the people, but they would not hear him; and the shouts which echoed on all sides, prevented him from continuing his speech. At that instant an *ancient man, venerable for his great age and gravity, who, in this war, had lost two sons, the only heirs to his name and estate, made his servants carry him to the tribunal for harangues, and the instant he appeared a profound silence was made. "You here behold," says he, "an unfortunate father, who has felt more than any other Syracusan the fatal effects of this war, by the death of two sons, who formed all the consolation, and were the only supports of my old age. I cannot, indeed, forbear admiring their courage and felicity, in sacrificing, to their country's welfare, a life of which they would one day have been deprived by the common course of nature: but then I cannot but be strongly affected with the cruel wound which their death has made in my heart; nor forbear hating and detesting the Athenians, the authors of this unhappy war, as the murderers of my children. But,

[e] Diod. l. xiii. p. 149—161.
* Nicolaus.

however, I cannot conceal one circumſtance, which is, that I am leſs ſenſible to my private affliction, than to the honour of my country; and I ſee it expoſed to eternal infamy by the barbarous advice which is now given you. The Athenians, indeed, merit the worſt treatment, and every kind of puniſhment that could be inflicted on them, for ſo unjuſtly declaring war againſt us; but have not the gods, the juſt avengers of crimes, puniſhed them and revenged us ſufficiently? When their generals laid down their arms, and ſurrendered, did they not do this in the hopes of having their lives ſpared? And, if we put them to death, will it be poſſible for us to avoid the juſt reproach of our having violated the law of nations, and diſhonoured our victory by an unheard-of cruelty? How! will you ſuffer your glory to be thus ſullied in the face of the whole world: and have it ſaid, that a nation, who firſt dedicated a temple in their city to clemency, had not found any in yours? Surely victories and triumph do not give immortal glory to a city; but the exerciſing mercy towards a vanquiſhed enemy, the uſing moderation in the greateſt proſperity, and fearing to offend the gods by a haughty and inſolent pride. You doubtleſs have not forgot, that this Nicias, whoſe fate you are going to pronounce, was the very man who pleaded your cauſe in the aſſembly of the Athenians; and employed all his credit, and the whole power of his eloquence, to diſſuade his country from embarking in this war. Should you therefore pronounce ſentence of death on this worthy general, would it be a juſt reward for the zeal he ſhowed for your intereſt? With regard to myſelf, death would be leſs grievous to me, than the ſight of ſo horrid an injuſtice, committed by my countrymen and fellow citizens."

The people ſeemed moved to compaſſion at this ſpeech, eſpecially, as, when this venerable old man firſt aſcended, they expected to hear him cry aloud for vengeance on thoſe who had brought all his calamities upon him, inſtead of ſuing for their pardon. But the enemies of the Athenians having expatiated, with vehemence, on the unheard-of cruelties which their

republic had exercised on several cities belonging to their enemies, and even to their ancient allies; the inveteracy which their commanders had shown against Syracuse, and the evils they would have made it suffer had they been victorious; the afflictions and groans of infinite numbers of Syracusans, who bewailed the death of their children and near relations, whose manes could be appeased no other way than by the blood of their murderers; on these representations, the people returned to their sanguinary resolution, and followed Diocles's advice in every respect. Gylippus used his utmost endeavours, but in vain, to have Nicias and Demosthenes given up to him (especially as he had taken them) in order for him to carry them to Lacedæmon. But his demand was rejected with a haughty scorn, and the two generals were put to death.

All wise and compassionate men could not forbear shedding tears for the tragical fate of two such illustrious personages; and particularly for Nicias, who, of all men of his time, seemed least to merit so ignominious and untimely an end. When people recollected the speeches and remonstrances he had made to prevent this war; and, on the other side, when they considered how high a regard he had always retained for things relating to religion; the greatest part of them were tempted to exclaim against Providence, in seeing that a man, who had ever shown the highest reverence for the gods, and had always exerted himself to the utmost for their honour and worship, should be so ill rewarded by them, and meet with no other fate than the most abandoned wretches. But it is no wonder that the calamities of good men should inspire the heathens with such thoughts, and make them murmur and despond; since they did not know the holiness of the Divine Being, nor the corruption of human nature.

The prisoners were shut up in the mines *(prisons of Syracuse)* where, crouded one upon the other, they suffered incredible torments for eight months. Here they were for ever exposed to the inclemencies of the weather; scorched, in the day-time, by the burning rays of

the ſun, or frozen, in the night, by the colds of autumn; poiſoned by the ſtench of their own excrements, by the carcaſes of thoſe who died of their wounds and ſickneſs; in fine, worn out by hunger and thirſt, for their daily allowance to each was but a ſmall meaſure of water, and two of meal. Thoſe who were taken out of this place two months after, in order to be ſold as ſlaves (many of whom were citizens who had concealed their condition) found a leſs rigorous fate. Their wiſdom, their patience, and a certain air of probity and modeſty, were of great advantage to them; for they were ſoon reſtored to their liberty, or met with the kindeſt and moſt generous treatment from their maſters. Several of them even owed the good uſage they met with to Euripides, the fineſt ſcenes of whoſe tragedies they repeated to the Sicilians, who were extremely fond of them; ſo that when they returned to their own country, they went and ſaluted that poet as their deliverer; and informed him of the admirable effects wrought in their favour by his verſes.

[f] The news of the defeat being carried to Athens, the citizens would not believe it at firſt; and were ſo far from giving credit to it, that they ſentenced that man to death who had firſt publiſhed it. But when it was confirmed, all the Athenians were ſeized with the utmoſt conſternation; and as if themſelves had not decreed the war, they vented their rage and reſentment againſt the orators who had promoted the enterpriſe, as well as againſt the ſoothſayers, who, by their oracles, or ſuppoſed prodigies, had flattered them with the hopes of ſucceſs. They had never been reduced to ſo deplorable a condition as now, having neither horſe, foot, money, galleys, nor mariners; in a word, they were in the deepeſt deſpair, expecting every moment that the enemy, elate with ſo great a victory, and ſtrengthened by the revolt of the allies, would come and invade Athens, both by ſea and land, with all the forces of Peloponneſus. Cicero had reaſon to obſerve*, ſpeaking of the battles in

[f] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 551—553. Plut. de Garrulit. p. 509.

* *Hic primùm opes illius civitatis victæ, comminutæ, depreſſæque ſunt: in hoc portu Athenienſium nobilitatis, imperii, gloriæ naufragium factum exiſtimatur.* Cic. Verrin. 7. n. 97.

the harbour of Syracuſe, that it was there the troops of Athens, as well as their galleys, were ruined and ſunk: and that, in this harbour, the power and glory of the Athenians were miſerably ſhipwrecked.

The Athenians, however, did not ſuffer themſelves to be wholly dejected, but reſumed courage. They now reſolved to raiſe money on all ſides, and to import timber for building of ſhips, in order to awe the allies, and particularly the inhabitants of the iſland of Eubœa. They retrenched all ſuperfluous expences, and eſtabliſhed a new council of ancient men, who were to weigh and examine all affairs before they ſhould be propoſed to the people. In fine, they omitted nothing which might be of ſervice in the preſent conjuncture; the alarm which they were in, and their common danger, obliging every individual to be attentive to the neceſſities of the ſtate, and docile to all advice that might promote its intereſt.

The defeat of the army under Nicias was followed by the taking of Athens, of which the ancient form of government was entirely changed by Lyſander.

CHAP. II.

SECT. I.* *Conſequences of the Defeat of the Athenians in Sicily. Revolt of the Allies. Alcibiades grows into great Power with Tiſſaphernes.*

[s] THE defeat of the Athenians before Syracuſe gave occaſion for great movements throughout all Greece. The people, who had not yet joined either ſide, and waited to be determined by the event, reſolved to declare againſt them. The allies of the Lacedæmonians believed, that the time was come to deliver them for ever from the expences of a war which lay very heavy upon them, by the ſpeedy and final ruin of Athens. Thoſe of Athens, who followed them only out of conſtraint, ſeeing no appearance of any future reſource for

[s] A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. l. viii. p. 553.

that

that republic, after the dreadful blow it had received, thought it beſt to take the advantage of ſo favourable a conjuncture, for throwing off the yoke of dependance, and reſuming their liberty. Diſpoſitions of this kind inſpired the Lacedæmonians with great views, which were ſupported by the hopes they had conceived that their Sicilian allies would join them in the ſpring with a naval army, augmented by the ruins of the Athenian fleet.

[h] In effect the people of Eubœa, Chio, and Leſbos, with ſeveral others, gave the Lacedæmonians to underſtand; that they were ready to quit the party of the Athenians, if they would take them under their protection. At the ſame time came deputies from Tiſſaphernes and Pharnabaſus. The firſt was governor of Lydia and Ionia, the other of the Helleſpont. Thoſe viceroys of Darius wanted neither application nor zeal for the intereſt of their maſter. Tiſſaphernes, promiſing the Lacedæmonians all the neceſſary expences for their troops, preſſed them to arm directly, and to join him; becauſe the Athenian fleet prevented him from levying the uſual contributions in his province; and had put it out of his power to remit thoſe of preceding years to the king. He hoped beſides, with that powerful aid, to get into his hands, with more eaſe, a certain nobleman who had revolted, and whom he had the king's orders to ſend to him dead or alive. This was Amorges the baſtard of Piſſuthna. Pharnabaſus, at the ſame time, demanded ſhips to reduce the cities of the Helleſpont from their ſubjection to the Athenians; who alſo prevented him from levying the tributes of his government.

The Lacedæmonians thought it proper to begin by ſatisfying Tiſſaphernes; and the credit of Alcibiades contributed very much to the taking that reſolution. He embarked with Chalcidæus for Chio, which took arms upon their arrival, and declared for the Lacedæmonians. Upon the news of this revolt the Athenians reſolved to take the * thouſand talents out of the trea-

[h] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 555—558.
* Three millions of livres.

ſury,

fury, which had been depoſited there from the beginning of the war, after having repealed the decree which prohibited it. Miletus alſo revolted ſoon after. Tiſſaphernes, having joined his troops with thoſe of Sparta, attacked and took the city of Iaſus, in which Amorges [i] had ſhut himſelf up, who was taken alive and ſent into Perſia. That governor gave a month's pay to the whole army, at a drachma, or ten pence, a day to each ſoldier, obſerving, that he had orders to give them only half that ſum for the future.

[k] Calcidæus then made a treaty with Tiſſaphernes, in the name of the Lacedæmonians, of which one of the principal articles was, that all the country which had been ſubject to the king or his predeceſſors, ſhould remain in his hands. It was renewed ſome time after by Theramenes, another general of the Lacedæmonians, with ſome ſmall alterations. But when this treaty came to be examined at Sparta, it was found, that too great conceſſions had been made to the king of Perſia, in giving up all the places held by himſelf or his anceſtors, which was to make him maſter of the greateſt part of Greece, Theſſaly, Locris, and the whole country as far as Bœotia, without mentioning the iſlands; from whence the Lacedæmonians would appear rather to have enſlaved Greece, than re-eſtabliſhed its liberty. It was therefore neceſſary to make further alterations in it, with which Tiſſaphernes and the other governors made great difficulties to comply. A new treaty was however concluded, as we ſhall ſee in the ſequel.

In the mean time, ſeveral cities of Ionia declared for Lacedæmon, to which Alcibiades contributed very much, Agis, [l] who was already his enemy in effect of the injury he had done him, could not ſuffer the glory he acquired: for nothing was done without the advice of Alcibiades, and it was generally ſaid, that the ſucceſs of all enterpriſes was owing to him. The moſt powerful and ambitious of the Spartans, from the ſame ſentiments of jealouſy, looked upon him with an evil

[i] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 568. [k] Idem. p. 561—571, 572—576.
[l] Idem. p. 577—579. Plut. in Alcib. p. 164, 165.

eye,

eye, and at length by their intrigues obliged the principal magiſtrates to ſend orders into Ionia for putting him to death. Alcibiades, being ſecretly apprized of this order, did not diſcontinue his ſervices to the Lacedæmonians, but kept himſelf ſo well upon his guard, that he avoided all the ſnares which were laid for him.

[m] For his better ſecurity he threw himſelf into the protection of Tiſſaphernes, the great king's governor at Sardis, and was not long without ſeeing himſelf in the higheſt degree of credit and authority in the court of the Barbarian. For the Perſian, who was full of fraud and artifice, a great friend to knaves and bad men, and ſet no value upon ſimplicity and integrity, infinitely admired the ſmooth addreſs of Alcibiades, the eaſe with which he aſſumed all kind of manners and characters, and his great ability in the conduct of affairs. And indeed there was no heart ſo hard, or temper ſo untractable, as to hold out againſt the graces and charms of his converſation and intimacy. Even thoſe who feared and envied him moſt, enchanted, in a manner, by his affable air and engaging behaviour, could not diſſemble the infinite ſatisfaction they felt in ſeeing and converſing with him.

Tiſſaphernes therefore, though otherwiſe very haughty and brutal, and who, of all the Perſians, hated the Greeks moſt, was ſo much taken with the complacency and inſinuations of Alcibiades, that he gave himſelf wholly up to him, and flattered him more than he was flattered by him: inſomuch that he gave the name of Alcibiades to the fineſt and moſt delightful of his gardens, as well from the abundance of its fountains and canals, and the verdure of its groves, as the ſurpriſing beauty of its retreats and ſolitudes, which art and nature ſeemed to vie in embelliſhing, and wherein a more than royal magnificence was diſplayed.

Alcibiades, who found there was no longer any ſafety for him in the party of the Spartans, and who always apprehended the reſentment of Agis, began to do them

[m] A. M. 3593. Ant. J. C. 411.

ill

ill offices with Tiſſaphernes, to prevent his aiding them with all his forces, and ruining the Athenians entirely. He had no difficulty in bringing the Perſian into his views, which was conformable to his maſter's intereſts, and to the orders he had received from him. For after the famous treaty concluded under Cimon, the kings of Perſia, not daring to attack the Greeks with open force, took other meaſures to ruin them. They endeavoured underhand to excite diviſions amongſt them, and to foment troubles by conſiderable ſums of money, which they found means to convey ſometimes to Athens, and ſometimes to Sparta. They applied themſelves ſo ſucceſsfully to keep up a balance of power between thoſe two republics, that the one could never entirely reduce the other. They granted them only ſlight aids, that could effect nothing deciſive, in order to undermine them inſenſibly, and exhauſt both parties gradually, by weakening them upon one another.

It is in this kind of conduct that policy makes the ability of miniſters conſiſt; who from the receſs of their cabinets, without noiſe or emotion, without any great expences, or ſetting numerous armies on foot, effect the reduction of the ſtates whoſe power gives them umbrage, either by ſowing domeſtic diviſions amongſt them, or by promoting the jealouſy of their neighbours, in order to ſet them at variance with each other.

We muſt confeſs, however, that this kind of policy gives us no very favourable idea of the kings of Perſia. To reduce themſelves, powerful as they were, to ſuch mean, obſcure, and indirect meaſures, was to confeſs their weakneſs, and how unable they believed themſelves to attack their enemies with open force, and to reduce them by honourable means. Beſides, does it conſiſt with juſtice to employ ſuch methods in regard to people, againſt whom there is no foundation of complaint, who live in peace under the faith of treaties, and whoſe ſole crime is the apprehenſion of their being one day in a condition to do hurt? And it is lawful by ſecret corruptions to enſnare the fidelity of ſubjects,

and to be the accomplice of their treaſons, by putting arms into their hands againſt their native country?

What glory and renown would not the kings of Perſia have acquired, if content with the vaſt and rich dominions, which Providence had given them, they had applied their good offices, power, and even treaſures, to conciliate the neighbouring people with each other, to remove their jealouſies, to prevent injuſtice and oppreſſion; and if, feared and honoured by them all, they had made themſelves the mediators of their differences, the ſecurity of their peace, and the guarantee of their treaties? Can any conqueſt, however great, be compared with ſuch glory?

Tiſſaphernes acted upon other principles, and had no thought but of preventing the Greeks from being in a condition to attack the Perſians, their common enemy. He entered freely therefore into the views of Alcibiades, and at the ſame time that he declared himſelf openly for the Lacedæmonians, did not fail to aſſiſt the Athenians underhand, and by a thouſand ſecret methods; deferring the payment of the Lacedæmonian fleet, and retarding the arrival of the Phœnician ſhips, of which he had long kept them in hopes. He omitted no occaſion of giving Alcibiades new marks of his friendſhip and eſteem, which rendered that general equally conſiderable to both parties. The Athenians, who had ſadly experienced the effects of having drawn his anger upon them, were not now to repent their paſſing ſentence of condemnation upon him. Alcibiades alſo on his ſide, who was extremely ſorry to ſee the Athenians in ſo mournful a ſituation, began to fear that the city of Athens being entirely ruined, he might fall into the hands of the Spartans, who mortally hated him.

SECT.

SECT. II. *The Return of Alcibiades to Athens negociated, upon Condition of eſtabliſhing the ariſtocratical, in the Room of the democratical, Government. Tiſſaphernes concludes a new Treaty with the Lacedæmonians.*

[n] THE Athenians were intent upon nothing ſo much as Samos, where they had all their forces. From thence with their fleet they reduced all the cities that had abandoned them under their obedience, kept the reſt in their duty [o], and found themſelves ſtill in a condition to make head againſt their enemies, over whom they had obtained ſeveral advantages. But they were afraid of Tiſſaphernes, and the hundred and fifty Phœnician ſhips which he hourly expected; and rightly perceived, that if ſo powerful a fleet ſhould join the enemy, there was no longer any ſafety for their city. Alcibiades, who was well informed of all that paſſed amongſt the Athenians, ſent ſecretly to the principal of them at Samos, to ſound their ſentiments, and to let them know that he was not averſe to returning to Athens, provided the adminiſtration of the republic were put into the hands of the great and powerful, and not left to the populace, who had expelled him. Some of the principal officers went from Samos, with deſign to concert with him the proper meaſures for the ſucceſs of that undertaking. He promiſed to procure the Athenians not only the favour of Tiſſaphernes, but of the king himſelf, upon condition they would aboliſh the democracy or popular government; becauſe the king would place more confidence in the engagements of the nobility, than upon thoſe of the inconſtant and capricious multitude.

The deputies lent a willing ear to theſe propoſals, and conceived great hopes of diſcharging themſelves from part of the public impoſitions, becauſe being the richeſt of the people, the burden lay heavieſt upon them, and of making their country triumph after having poſſeſſed

[n] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 579—587 [o] Plut. in Alcib. p. 204—206.

themſelves

themſelves of the government. At their return, they began by bringing over ſuch as were moſt proper to ſhare in their deſign: after which they cauſed a report to be ſpread amongſt the troops, that the king was inclined to declare in favour of the Athenians, upon condition that Alcibiades was reinſtated, and the popular government aboliſhed. That propoſal ſurpriſed the ſoldiers, and was generally rejected at firſt; but the charm of gain, and the hope of a change to their advantage, ſoon ſoftened what was harſh and ſhocking in it, and even made them ardently deſire the recal of Alcibiades.

Phrynicus, one of their generals, rightly judging that Alcibiades affected an oligarchy no more than he did the democracy, and that in decrying the people's conduct, he had no other view than to acquire the favour and confidence of the nobility for his own re-eſtabliſhment, had the boldneſs to oppoſe their reſolutions, which were about to take place. He repreſented, that the change they meditated might very probably excite a civil war to the ruin of the ſtate; that it was very unlikely that the king of Perſia would prefer the alliance of the Athenians to that of the Spartans, ſo much more advantageous to him; that this change would not retain the allies in their duty, nor bring over thoſe who had renounced it, who would perſiſt in preferring their liberty; that the government of a ſmall number of rich and powerful perſons would not be more favourable to either the citizens or allies, than that of the people, becauſe ambition was the great cauſe of all misfortunes in a republic, and the rich were the ſole promoters of all troubles for the aggrandizing of themſelves; that a ſtate ſuffered more oppreſſions and violences under the rule of the nobility, than that of the people, whoſe authority kept the former within due bounds, and was the aſylum of ſuch as they deſired to oppreſs; that the allies were too well acquainted with theſe truths from their own experience, to want any leſſons upon the ſubject.

Theſe remonſtrances, as wiſe as they were, had no effect. Piſander was ſent to Athens with ſome of the

ſame faction, to propoſe the return of Alcibiades, the alliance of Tiſſaphernes, and the abolition of the democracy. They repreſented, that by changing the government, and recalling Alcibiades, Athens might obtain a powerful aid from the king of Perſia, which would be a certain means to triumph over Sparta. Upon this propoſal great numbers exclaimed againſt it, and eſpecially the enemies of Alcibiades. They alleged amongſt other reaſons, the imprecations pronounced by the prieſts, and all the orders of religion, againſt him, and even againſt ſuch as ſhould propoſe to recal him. But Piſander, advancing into the midſt of the aſſembly, demanded, whether they knew any other means to ſave the republic in the deplorable condition to which it was reduced: and as it was admitted there were none, he added, that the preſervation of the ſtate was the queſtion, and not the authority of the laws, which might be provided for in the ſequel; but at preſent there was no other method for the attainment of the king's friendſhip and that of Tiſſaphernes. Though this change was very offenſive to the people, they gave their conſent to it at length, with the hope of re-eſtabliſhing the democracy in time, as Piſander had promiſed; and they decreed that he ſhould go with ten more deputies to treat with Alcibiades and Tiſſaphernes, and that in the mean time Phrynicus ſhould be recalled, and another general appointed to command the fleet in his ſtead.

The deputies did not find Tiſſaphernes in ſo good a diſpoſition as they had been made to hope. He was afraid of the Lacedæmonians, but did not care to render the Athenians too powerful. It was his policy, by the advice of Alcibiades, to leave the two parties always at war, in order to weaken and conſume them by each other. He therefore made great difficulties. He demanded at firſt, that the Athenians ſhould abandon all Ionia to him, and afterwards inſiſted upon their adding the neighbouring iſlands. Thoſe demands being complied with, he further required, in a third interview, permiſſion to fit out a fleet, and to cruiſe in the Grecian

ſeas;

ſeas; which had been expreſsly provided againſt in the celebrated treaty concluded with Artaxerxes. The deputies thereupon broke up the conferences with indignation, and perceived that Alcibiades had impoſed upon them.

Tiſſaphernes without loſs of time concluded a new treaty with the Lacedæmonians; in which, what had diſpleaſed in the two preceding treaties was retrenched. The article, which yielded to Perſia the countries in general, that had been in the actual poſſeſſion of the reigning king Darius, or his predeceſſors, was limited to the provinces of Aſia. The king engaged to defray all expences of the Lacedæmonian fleet, upon the foot, and in the condition it then was, till the arrival of that of Perſia; after which they were to ſupport it themſelves; unleſs they ſhould chooſe that the king ſhould pay it, to be reimburſed after the concluſion of the war. It was further agreed, that they ſhould unite their forces, and continue the war, or make peace, by common conſent. Tiſſaphernes, to keep his promiſe, ſent for the fleet of Phœnicia. This treaty was made in the eleventh year of Darius, and the twentieth of the Peloponneſian war.

SECT. III. *The whole Authority of the Athenian Government having been veſted in four hundred Perſons, they abuſe it tyrannically, and are depoſed. Alcibiades is recalled. After various Accidents, and ſeveral conſiderable Victories, he returns in Triumph to Athens, and is appointed Generaliſſimo. He cauſes the great Myſteries to be celebrated, and departs with the Fleet.*

[p] PISANDER, at his return to Athens, found the change he had propoſed at his ſetting out much forwarded, to which he put the laſt hand ſoon after. To give a form to this new government, he cauſed ten commiſſaries with abſolute power to be appointed, who were however at a certain fixed time to give the people

[p] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 590, 594. Plut. in Alcib. p. 105.

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an account of what they had done. At the expiration of that term, the general aſſembly was ſummoned, wherein their firſt reſolution was, that every one ſhould be admitted to make ſuch propoſals as he thought fit, without being liable to any accuſation of infringing the law, or conſequential penalty. It was afterwards decreed, that a new council ſhould be formed, with full power to adminiſter the public affairs, and to elect new magiſtrates. For this purpoſe five preſidents were eſtabliſhed, who nominated a hundred perſons, including themſelves. Each of theſe choſe and aſſociated three more at his own pleaſure, which made in all four hundred, in whom an abſolute power was lodged. But to amuſe the people, and conſole them with a ſhadow of popular government, whilſt they inſtituted a real oligarchy, it was ſaid that the four hundred ſhould call a council of five thouſand citizens, to aſſiſt them when they ſhould judge it neceſſary. The council and aſſemblies of the people were held as uſual; nothing was done however, but by order of the four hundred. The people of Athens were deprived in this manner of their liberty, which they had enjoyed almoſt a hundred years, after having aboliſhed the tyranny of the Piſiſtratides.

This decree being paſſed without oppoſition, after the ſeparation of the aſſembly, the four hundred, armed with daggers, and attended by a hundred and twenty young men, whom they made uſe of when any execution required it, entered the ſenate, and compelled the ſenators to retire, after having paid them the arrears due upon their appointments. They elected new magiſtrates out of their own body, obſerving the uſual ceremonies upon ſuch occaſions. They did not think proper to recal thoſe who were baniſhed, leſt they ſhould authoriſe the return of Alcibiades, whoſe uncontrollable ſpirit they apprehended, and who would ſoon have made himſelf maſter of the people. Abuſing their power in a tyrannical manner, ſome they put to death, others they baniſhed, confiſcating their eſtates with impunity. All who ventured to oppoſe this change, or

even

even to complain of it, were butchered upon falſe pretexts; and thoſe would have met with a bad reception, who demanded juſtice of the murderers. The four hundred, ſoon after their eſtabliſhment, ſent ten deputies to Samos for the army's concurrence to it.

[q] All that had paſſed at Athens was already known there, and the news had enraged the ſailors to the higheſt degree. They depoſed immediately ſeveral of their chiefs, whom they ſuſpected, and put others into their places, of whom Thraſylus and Thraſybulus were the principal, and in higheſt credit. Alcibiades was recalled and choſen generaliſſimo by the whole army, which deſired to ſail directly for the Piræus, to attack the tyrants: but he oppoſed it, repreſenting that it was neceſſary he ſhould firſt have an interview with Tiſſaphernes, and that as they had choſen him general, they might rely upon him for the care of the war. He ſet out immediately for Miletus. His principal deſign was to ſhow himſelf to that governor with all the power he had been inveſted, and to let him ſee that he was in a condition to do him much good or much harm. The conſequence of which was, that as he had kept the Athenians in awe by Tiſſaphernes, he now awed Tiſſaphernes no leſs by the Athenians; and we ſhall ſee in the ſequel that this interview was not unneceſſary.

Alcibiades, upon his return to Samos, found the army more inflamed than at firſt. The deputies of the four hundred arrived there during his abſence, and had endeavoured in vain to juſtify the alteration made at Athens to the ſoldiery. Their diſcourſes, which were often interrupted by tumultuous cries, ſerved only to exaſperate them more, and they earneſtly demanded to be led againſt the tyrants directly. Alcibiades did not act on this occaſion as every body elſe would have done, in conſequence of having been raiſed to ſo high a dignity by the favour of the people: for he did not think himſelf obliged to an abſolute and implicit compli-

[q] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 595—604. Plut. in Alcib. p. 205. Diod. p. 165.

ance

ance with them in every thing, though, from an exile and a fugitive, they had made him general of so great a fleet, and so numerous and formidable an army: but, as a statesman and great politician, he believed it his duty to oppose the blind fury that hurried them on into evident danger, and to prevent them from committing a fault, which must have been attended with their utter ruin. This wise steadiness preserved the city of Athens. For had they sailed thither at first, the enemy had made themselves masters of Ionia, the Hellespont, and all the islands without resistance; whilst the Athenians, by carrying the war into their own city, would have exhausted their whole forces against one another. He prevented the deputies from being ill treated, and dismissed them; saying, that he did not object to the five thousand citizens having the supreme authority in the republic, but that it was necessary to depose the four hundred, and to re-establish the senate.

[r] Whilst this passed, the Phœnician fleet, which the Lacedæmonians impatiently expected, approached, and and news came that it was arrived at * Aspendus. Tissaphernes went to meet it; nobody being able to divine the cause of that journey. He had sent for that fleet at first to flatter the Lacedæmonians with the hopes of a powerful aid, and to put a stop to their progress, by making them wait its arrival. It was believed that his journey had the same motive; to prevent their doing any thing in his absence, and that their soldiers and mariners might disband for want of pay. However it was, he did not bring the fleet with him, from the view, no doubt, of keeping the balance equal, which was the king of Persia's interest, and to exhaust both parties, by the length of the war. For it had been very easy to have put an end to it by the assistance of this additional fleet, as the Lacedæmonians alone were already as strong at sea as the Athenians. His frivolous excuse, of its not being complete, for not bringing it with him, sufficiently shows that he had other reasons for his conduct.

[r] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 604, 606. * A city of Pamphylia.

The

[s] The return of the deputies without ſucceſs, who had been ſent to Samos, and the anſwer of Alcibiades, excited new troubles in the city, and gave a mortal wound to the authority of the four hundred. The tumult increaſed exceedingly, when news was brought, that the enemy, after having beat the fleet, ſent by the four hundred to the aid of Eubœa, had made themſelves maſters of the iſland. Athens was in the higheſt terror and conſternation upon this account. For neither the defeat of Sicily, nor any other preceding it, were ſo conſiderable as the loſs of this iſland, from whence the city received conſiderable ſupplies, and almoſt all its proviſions. If in the confuſion, in which Athens was at that time between two factions, the victorious fleet had fallen upon the port, as it might have done, the army of Samos would have been indiſpenſably obliged to have flown to the defence of their country: and then the republic would have had only the city of Athens remaining of all its dominions. For the Helleſpont, Ionia, and all the iſlands, ſeeing themſelves abandoned, would have been reduced to take party, and go over to the Peloponneſians. But the enemy were not capable of ſuch great deſigns; and this was not the firſt time the Lacedæmonians had been obſerved to have loſt their advantages by the ſlowneſs and protraction natural to them.

Athens without delay depoſed the four hundred, as authors of all the troubles and diviſions under which they groaned. Alcibiades was recalled by unanimous conſent, and earneſtly ſolicited to make all poſſible haſte to the aſſiſtance of the city. But judging, that if he returned immediately to Athens, he ſhould owe his recal to the compaſſion and favour of the people, he reſolved to render his return glorious and triumphant, and to deſerve it by ſome conſiderable exploit. [t] For this purpoſe, leaving Samos with a ſmall number of ſhips, he cruiſed about the iſland of Cos and Cnidos;

[s] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 607—614. Plut. in Alcib. p. 206—210 Diod. p. 171, 172, & 175—177, & 189—192.

[t] A. M. 3595. Ant. J. C. 409.

and

and having learned that Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, was ſailed to the Helleſpont with his whole fleet, and that the Athenians were in purſuit of him, he ſteered that way with the utmoſt diligence to ſupport them, and arrived happily with his eighteen veſſels, at the time the fleets were engaged near Abydos in a battle, which laſted till night, without any advantage on either ſide. His arrival gave the Spartans new courage at firſt, who believed him ſtill their friend, and diſpirited the Athenians. But Alcibiades, hanging out the Athenian flag in the admiral's galley, fell upon the Lacedæmonians, who were ſtrongeſt, and purſued the Athenians, put them to flight, drove them aſhore; and, animated by his ſucceſs, ſunk their veſſels, and made a great ſlaughter of the ſoldiers, who had thrown themſelves into the ſea to ſave themſelves by ſwimming, though Pharnabaſus ſpared no pains to aſſiſt them, and had advanced at the head of his troops to the coaſt, to favour their flight, and to ſave their ſhips. The Athenians, after having taken thirty of their galleys, and retaken thoſe they had loſt, erected a trophy.

Alcibiades, vain of his ſucceſs, had the ambition to deſire to appear before Tiſſaphernes in his triumphant equipage, and to make him rich preſents, as well in his own, as in the name of the people of Athens. He went to him therefore with a magnificent retinue, worthy of the general of Athens. But he did not meet with the favourable reception he expected. For Tiſſaphernes, who knew he was accuſed by the Lacedæmonians, and feared that the king would puniſh him at length for not having executed his orders, found Alcibiades's preſenting himſelf very opportune, and cauſed him to be ſeized and ſent priſoner to Sardis; to ſhelter himſelf by that injuſtice againſt the repreſentations of the Lacedæmonians.

Thirty days after Alcibiades, having found means to get a horſe, eſcaped from his guards and fled to Clazomena, where, to revenge himſelf on Tiſſaphernes, he gave out that he had ſet him at liberty. From Clazomena he repaired to the Athenian fleet, where he was joined by Theramenes with twenty ſhips from Macedonia,

nia, and by Thrasybulus with twenty more from Thasos. He sailed from thence to Parium in the Propontis. All those ships, to the number of fourscore and six, being come thither, he left that place in the night, and arrived the next morning at Proconnesus, a small isle near Cyzicum. He heard there that Mindarus was at Cyzicum, with Parnabasus and his land army. He rested that whole day at Proconnesus. On the morrow he harangued his soldiers, and represented to them the necessity there was for attacking the enemy by sea and land, and for making themselves masters of Cyzicum; demonstrating, at the same time, that without a complete and absolute victory, they could have neither provisions nor money. He had taken great care that the enemy should not be apprized of his approach. By good fortune for him, a great storm of rain and thunder, followed by a thick gloom, helped him to conceal his enterprise so successfully, that not only the enemy were prevented from perceiving that he advanced, but the Athenians themselves, whom he had caused to embark with precipitation, did not know that he had weighed anchor and put to sea.

When the gloom was dispersed, the Lacedæmonian fleet appeared, exercising at some distance before the port. Alcibiades, who apprehended that the enemy, upon the sight of so great a number of ships, would make the harbour, ordered the captains to keep back a little, and to follow him at a good distance; and taking only forty vessels, he advanced towards the enemy, to offer them battle. The enemy, deceived by this stratagem, and despising his small number, advanced against him, and began the fight. But when they saw the rest of the Athenian fleet come up, they immediately lost courage, and fled. Alcibiades, with twenty of his best ships, pursued them to the shore, landed, and killed a great number of them in the flight. Mindarus and Pharnabasus opposed his efforts in vain; the first, who fought with astonishing valour, he killed, and put the other to flight.

The Athenians by this victory, which made them masters of the slain, the arms, spoils, and whole fleet of the enemy,

enemy, besides the taking of Cyzicum, not only possessed themselves of the Hellespont, but drove the Spartans entirely out of that sea. Letters were intercepted, in which the latter, with a conciseness truly laconic, advised the Ephori of the blow they had received in terms to this effect: "The flower of your army is cut off; Mindarus is dead; the rest of the troops are dying with hunger; and we neither know what to do, nor what will become of us."

The news of this victory occasioned no less joy to the Athenians than consternation to the Spartans. [u] They dispatched ambassadors immediately to demand, that an end should be put to a war equally destructive to both people, and that a peace should be concluded upon reasonable conditions, for the re-establishment of their ancient concord and amity, of which they had for many years experienced the salutary effects. The wisest and most judicious of the citizens of Athens were unanimously of opinion, that it was proper to take the advantage of so favourable a conjuncture for the concluding of a treaty which might put an end to all jealousies, appease all animosities, and remove all distrusts. But those, who found their advantage in the troubles of the state prevented the good effects of that disposition. [x] Cleophon, amongst others, the most reputed orator at that time, animated the people from the tribunal of harangues, by a violent and seditious discourse, insinuating, that their interests were betrayed by a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, which aimed at depriving them of all the advantages of the important victory they had gained, and at making them lose for ever the opportunity of being fully avenged for all the wrongs and misfortunes Sparta had caused them to suffer. This Cleophon was an inconsiderable fellow, a musical instrument maker. It was reported also that he had been a slave, and had got himself fraudulently inrolled in the register of the citizens. He carried his audacity and fury so far, as to threaten to plunge his dagger into the throat of any one who should talk of peace. The Athenians

[u] Diod. l. iii. p. 177—179. [x] Æsch. in Orat. de fals. legat.

puffed

puffed up with their preſent proſperity, forgetting their paſt misfortunes, and promiſing themſelves all things from the valour and good fortune of Alcibiades, rejected all propoſals of accommodation, without reflecting, that there is nothing ſo fluctuating and precarious as the ſucceſs of war. The ambaſſadors retired without being able to effect any thing. Such infatuation and irrational pride are generally the forerunners of ſome great misfortune.

Alcibiades knew well how to make uſe of the victory he had gained, and preſently after beſieged Chalcedonia, which had revolted from the Athenians, and received a Lacedæmonian garriſon. During this ſiege he took another town, called Selymbria. Pharnabaſus, terrified by the rapidity of his conqueſts, made a treaty with the Athenians to this effect; "That Pharnabaſus ſhould pay them a certain ſum of money; that the Chalcedonians ſhould return to their obedience, depend upon the Athenians, and pay them tribute; and that the Athenians ſhould commit no hoſtilities in the province of Pharnabaſus, who engaged for the ſafe conduct of their ambaſſadors to the great king." Byzantium and ſeveral other cities ſubmitted to the Athenians.

[y] Alcibiades, who deſired with the utmoſt paſſion to ſee his country again, or rather to be ſeen by his country after ſo many victories over their enemies, ſet out for Athens. The ſides of his ſhips were covered with bucklers and all ſorts of ſpoils, in form of trophies; and cauſing a great number of veſſels to be towed after him by way of triumph, he diſplayed alſo the enſigns and ornaments of thoſe he had burnt, which were more than the others; the whole amounting to about two hundred ſhips. It is ſaid, that reflecting on what had been done againſt him, upon approaching the port, he was ſtruck with ſome terror, and was afraid to quit his veſſel till he ſaw from the deck a great number of his friends and relations, who were come to the ſhore to receive him, and earneſtly entreated him to land.

The people came out of the city in a body to meet

[y] A. M. 3597. Ant. J. C. 407.

him,

him, and at his appearance ſet up incredible ſhouts of joy. In the midſt of an infinite number of officers and ſoldiers, all eyes were fixed ſolely on him, whom they conſidered as victory itſelf deſcended from the ſkies: all around him paſſionately careſſing, bleſſing, and crowning him in emulation of each other. Thoſe who could not approach him, were never tired with contemplating him at a diſtance, whilſt the old men ſhowed him to their children. They repeated with the higheſt praiſes all the great actions he had done for his country; nor could they refuſe their admiration even to thoſe he had done againſt it during his baniſhment, of which they imputed the fault to themſelves alone. This public joy was mingled with tears and regret, from the remembrance of paſt misfortunes, which they could not avoid comparing with their preſent felicity. "We could not have failed," ſaid they, "of the conqueſt of Sicily; our other hopes could never have proved abortive, if we had referred all our affairs and forces to the diſpoſal of Alcibiades alone. In what a condition was Athens when he took upon him our protection and defence! We had not only almoſt entirely loſt our power at ſea, but were ſcarce poſſeſſed of the ſuburbs of our city; and, to add to our misfortunes, were torn in pieces by a horrid civil war. He notwithſtanding has raiſed the republic from its ruins; and not content with having reinſtated it in the poſſeſſion of the ſovereignty of the ſea, has rendered it univerſally victorious by land; as if the fate of Athens had been in his hands alone, either to ruin or preſerve it, and victory was annexed to his perſon, and obeyed his orders."

This favourable reception of Alcibiades did not prevent his demanding an aſſembly of the people, in order to his juſtification before them; well knowing how neceſſary it was for his ſafety to be abſolved in form. He appeared therefore; and after having deplored his misfortunes, which he imputed very little to the people, and entirely aſcribed to his ill fortune, and ſome demon envious of his proſperity, he repreſented to them the deſigns of the enemy, and exhorted them not to conceive

conceive other than great hopes. The Athenians, tranſported with hearing him ſpeak, decreed him crowns of gold, appointed him general by ſea and land with unlimited power, reſtored him all his fortunes, and ordered the * Eumolpides and Ceryces to abſolve him from the curſes they had pronounced againſt him by the order of the people; doing their utmoſt to make him amends for the injury and ſhame of his baniſhment by the glory of his recal, and to efface the remembrance of the anathemas themſelves had decreed, by the vows and prayers which they made in his favour. Whilſt all the Eumolpides and Ceryces were employed in revoking thoſe imprecations, Theodorus, the principal of them, had the courage to ſay: "But for me, I have not curſed him, if he has done no evil to his country;" inſinuating, by that bold expreſſion, that the maledictions, being conditional, could not fall upon the head of the innocent, nor be averted from the guilty.

In the midſt of this glory and ſhining proſperity of Alcibiades, the majority of the people could not help being concerned, when they conſidered the time of his return. For it happened preciſely upon the day when the Athenians celebrated the feaſt in honour of Minerva, adored under the name of Agraulis. The prieſts took off all the ornaments from the goddeſs's ſtatue to waſh it, from whence that feaſt was called Πλυντηρια, and afterwards covered it; and that day was accounted one of the moſt omnious and unfortunate. It was the 25th of the month Thargelion, which anſwers to the ſecond of July[z]. This circumſtance diſpleaſed that ſuperſtitious people, becauſe it ſeemed to imply, that the goddeſs, patroneſs and protectreſs of Athens, did not receive Alcibiades agreeably, and with a benign aſpect, ſince ſhe covered and concealed herſelf, as if ſhe would keep him off, and remove him from her.

[z] N. S.

* The Eumolpides and Ceryces were two families at Athens, who had different functions in the myſteries of Ceres. They took their names from Eumolpus and Ceryx, the firſt who had exerciſed thoſe offices. Perhaps the employment of the latter had ſome relation to that of heralds, Κηρυκες.

All

[a] All things having however ſucceeded according to his wiſh, and the hundred ſhips he was to command being ready, he deferred his departure out of a laudable ambition to celebrate the great myſteries; for from the time the Lacedæmonians had fortified Decelia, and taken poſſeſſion of all the ways from Athens to Eleuſina, the feaſt had not been ſolemnized in all its pomp, and the proceſſion had been obliged to go by ſea. The particular ceremonies of this ſolemnity may be ſeen in the beginning of the next volume.

Alcibiades believed it would be a moſt glorious action, and attract the bleſſings of the gods, and the praiſes of men, if he reſtored all its luſtre and ſolemnity to this feaſt, in making the proceſſion go by land under the convoy of his troops, to defend it againſt the attacks of the enemy. For either Agis would ſuffer it to paſs quietly, notwithſtanding the numerous troops he had at Decelia, which would conſiderably leſſen the reputation of that king, and be a blot in his glory: or, if he ſhould chooſe to attack it, and oppoſe the march, he ſhould then have the ſatisfaction to fight a ſacred battle, a battle grateful to the gods, for the greateſt and moſt venerable of all their myſteries, in the ſight of his country and citizens, who would be witneſſes of his valour and regard for religion. It is very likely, that by this public and oſtentatious act of piety, which ſtruck the people's view in ſo ſenſible a manner, and was ſo extremely to his taſte, Alcibiades's principal deſign was to efface entirely from their minds the ſuſpicions of impiety, to which the mutilation of ſtatues, and profanation of myſteries, had given birth.

Having taken that reſolution, he gave notice to the Eumolpides and Ceryces to hold themſelves in readineſs, poſted ſentinels upon the hills, ſent out runners at the break of day, and taking with him the prieſts, the initiated, and the probationers, with thoſe who initiated them, he covered them with his army, and diſpoſed the whole pomp with wonderful order, and pro-

[a] Plut. in Alcib. p. 210.

found ſilence. Never was ſhow, ſays Plutarch, more auguſt, nor more worthy the majeſty of the gods, than this warlike proceſſion, and religious expedition; in which even thoſe, who envied the glory of Alcibiades, were obliged to own, that he was no leſs happy in diſcharging the functions of a high prieſt, than thoſe of a general. No enemy dared to appear, or diſturb that pompous march, and Alcibiades reconducted the ſacred troops to Athens with entire ſafety. This ſucceſs gave him new courage, and raiſed the valour and boldneſs of his army to ſuch a degree, that they looked upon themſelves as invincible whilſt he commanded them.

He acquired the affection of the poor, and the lower ſort of people ſo much, that they moſt ardently deſired to have him for their king. Many of them openly declared themſelves to that effect; and there were ſome who addreſſed themſelves to him, and exhorted him to ſet himſelf above envy, and not to trouble himſelf about laws, decrees, or ſuffrages; to put down thoſe wordy impertinents that diſturbed the ſtate with their vain harangues, to make himſelf maſter of affairs, and to govern with entire authority without fearing accuſers. For him, what his thoughts of the tyranny, and his deſigns were, are unknown; but the moſt powerful citizens, apprehending the breaking out of a fire, of which they already ſaw the ſparks, preſſed him to depart without delay; granting whatever he demanded, and giving him for colleagues the generals moſt agreeable to him. He ſet ſail accordingly, with a hundred ſhips, and ſteered for the iſland of Andros, that had revolted. His high reputation, and the good fortune which had attended him in all his enterpriſes, made nothing but what was great and extraordinary to be expected from him.

SECT. IV. *The Lacedæmonians appoint Lysander Admiral. He becomes very powerful with young Cyrus, who commanded in Asia. He beats the Athenian Fleet near Ephesus, in the Absence of Alcibiades, who is deprived of the Command. Ten Generals are chosen in his Stead. Callicratidas succeeds Lysander.*

[b] THE Lacedæmonians, justly alarmed at the return and success of Alcibiades, conceived that such an enemy made it necessary to oppose him with an able general, capable of making head against him. For this reason they made choice of Lysander, and gave him the command of the fleet. When he arrived at Ephesus, he found the city very well disposed in his favour, and well affected to Sparta; but otherwise in a very unhappy situation. For it was in danger of becoming barbarous, by assuming the manners and customs of the Persians, who had great commerce with it, as well from the neighbourhood of Lydia, as because the king's generals commonly took up their winter quarters there. An idle and voluptuous life, filled up with luxury and empty show, could not fail of disgusting infinitely a man like Lysander, who had been bred from his birth in the simplicity, poverty, and severe discipline of Sparta. Having brought his army to Ephesus, he gave orders for assembling ships of burden there from all parts, erected an arsenal for building of galleys, made the ports free for merchants, gave the public places to artificers, put all arts in motion, and held them in honour; and by these means filled the city with riches, and laid the foundations of that grandeur and magnificence, to which it afterwards attained. So great a change can the application and ability of a single person occasion in a state!

Whilst he was making these dispositions, he received advice that Cyrus, the king's youngest son, was arrived at Sardis. That prince could not be above sixteen years old at that time, being born after his father's accession

[b] Xenoph. Hellen. l. xi. p. 440—442. Plut. in Lysand. p. 434, 435. Diod. l. xiii. p. 192—197.

to the crown, in the ſeventeenth year of his reign. Paryſatis, his mother, loved him to idolatry, and had the entire aſcendant of her huſband. It was ſhe that occaſioned his having the ſupreme government of all the provinces of Aſia Minor given him; a command that ſubjected all the provincial governors of the moſt important part of the empire to his authority. The view of Paryſatis was, without doubt, to put the young prince into a condition to diſpute the throne with his brother after the king's death; as we ſhall ſee he does to ſome effect. One of the principal inſtructions, given him by his father upon ſending him to his government, was to give effectual aid to the Lacedæmonians againſt Athens; an order very contrary to the meaſures obſerved till then by Tiſſaphernes, and the other governors of thoſe provinces. It had always been their maxim, ſometimes to aſſiſt one party, ſometimes the other, in order to hold their power in ſuch a balance, that the one might never be able to cruſh the other entirely: from whence it followed, that both parties were kept weak by the war, and neither in condition to form any enterpriſes againſt the Perſian empire.

Upon Lyſander's being appriſed, therefore, of the arrival of Cyrus at Sardis, he ſet out from Epheſus to make him a viſit, and to complain of the delays and breach of faith of Tiſſaphernes, who, notwithſtanding the orders he had received to ſupport the Lacedæmonians, and to drive the Athenians out of the ſea, had always covertly favoured the latter, out of regard for Alcibiades, whoſe meaſures he entirely gave into, and had been the ſole cauſe of the loſs of the fleet, by not ſupplying it with the neceſſary quantity of proviſions. This diſcourſe pleaſed Cyrus, who looked upon Tiſſaphernes as a very bad man, and his particular enemy; and he anſwered, that the king had given him orders to ſupport the Lacedæmonians powerfully, and that he had received five hundred talents* for that purpoſe. Lyſander, contrary to the common character of the Spartans, was ſubmiſſive and condeſcending, full of

* Five hundred thouſand crowns, about 112,500l. ſterling.

complacency for the grandees, always ready to pay his court to them, and supporting, for the good of the service, all the weight of their haughtiness and vanity with incredible patience; in which behaviour some people make the whole address and merit of a courtier consist.

He did not forget himself on this occasion, and setting at work all that the industry and art of a complete courtier could suggest of flattery and insinuation, he perfectly gained the young prince's favour and good opinion. After having praised his generosity, magnificence, and zeal for the Lacedæmonians, he desired him to give each soldier and mariner a drachma * per day, in order to debauch those of the enemy by that means, and thereby terminate the war the sooner. Cyrus very much approved the project; but said, that he could make no change in the king's order, and that the treaty with them expressly settled only half a talent † to be paid monthly for each galley. The prince, however, at the end of a banquet, which he gave him before his departure, drinking to his health, and pressing him to ask something of him, Lysander desired that an ‡ obolus a day might be added to the seamen's pay. This was granted, and he gave them four oboli instead of three, which they received before, and paid them all the arrears due to them, with a month's advance; giving Lysander ten thousand § daricks for that purpose; that is, a hundred thousand livres, or about five thousand pounds sterling.

This largess filled the whole fleet with ardour and alacrity, and almost unmanned the enemy's galleys; the greatest part of the mariners deserting to the party where the pay was best. The Athenians, in despair upon receiving this news, endeavoured to conciliate Cyrus by the interposition of Tissaphernes; but he would not hearken to them notwithstanding the satrap represented,

* Ten pence.

† One thousand five hundred livres, about 112l. sterling.

‡ The drachma was six oboli, or ten pence French; each obolus being three halfpence; so that the four oboli were sixpence halfpenny a day, instead of five pence, or three oboli.

§ A darick is about a pistole.

that

that it was not for the king's intereſt to aggrandize the Lacedæmonians, but to balance the power of one ſide with that of the other, in order to perpetuate the war, and to ruin both by their own diviſions.

Though Lyſander had conſiderably weakened the enemy by augmenting the mariners pay, and thereby very much hurt their naval power, he dared not however hazard a battle with them, particularly apprehending Alcibiades, who was a man of execution, had the greater number of ſhips, and had never been overthrown in any battle either by ſea or land. But after Alcibiades had left Samos to go into Phocæa and Ionia, to raiſe money, of which he was in want for the payment of his troops, and had given the command of his fleet to Antiochus, with expreſs orders not to fight or attack the enemy in his abſence; the new commander, to make ſhow of his courage, and to brave Lyſander, entered the port of Epheſus with two galleys, and after having made a great noiſe, retired with loud laughter, and an air of contempt and inſult. Lyſander, enraged at that affront, immediately detached ſome galleys, and went himſelf in purſuit of him. But as the Athenians advanced to ſupport Antiochus, he ordered other galleys of his ſide to come on, till the whole fleet arrived by little and little, and the engagement became general on both ſides. Lyſander gained the victory, and having taken fifteen of the Athenian galleys, he erected a trophy. Alcibiades, on his return to Samos, ſailed even into the port to offer him battle; but Lyſander was contented with his victory, and did not think proper to accept it; ſo that he retired without doing any thing.

[c] Thraſybulus, at the ſame time, the moſt dangerous enemy he had in his army, left the camp, and went to Athens to accuſe him. To inflame his enemies in the city the more, he told the people in a full aſſembly, that Alcibiades had entirely ruined their affairs, and the navy, by the licence he had introduced; that he had given

[c] A. M. 3598. Ant. J. C. 506.

himſelf

himſelf up to the moſt * notorious debauchees and drunkards, who, from common ſeamen were the only perſons in credit about him; that he abandoned his whole authority to them, to be at leiſure to enrich himſelf in the provinces, and to plunge himſelf there into intemperance and all other infamous exceſſes, to the diſgrace of Athens, whilſt his fleet was left neglected in the face of the enemy's.

Another article of accuſation againſt him was taken from the forts he had built near the city of Byzantium, for an aſylum and retreat for him; as neither being able nor willing to return any more to his country. The Athenians, a capricious, inconſtant people, gave credit to theſe impeachments. The loſs of the laſt battle, and his little ſucceſs ſince his departure from Athens, inſtead of the great and wonderful actions expected from him, entirely ſunk him in their opinions; and his own glory and reputation may be ſaid to have occaſioned his ruin. For he was ſuſpected of not deſiring to do what was not done, which they could not believe out of his power, becauſe they were fully perſuaded, that nothing he deſired to do was impoſſible to him. They made it a crime in Alcibiades, that the rapidity of his conqueſts did not anſwer to that of their imaginations; not conſidering, that he made war without money upon a people who had the great king for their treaſurer, and that he was often obliged to quit his camp, to go in queſt of what was neceſſary for the payment and ſubſiſtence of his troops. However it was, Alcibiades was depoſed, and ten generals nominated in his ſtead; of which, when he received advice, he retired, in his galley, to ſome caſtles he had in the Thracian Cherſoneſus.

[d] About this time died Pliſtonax, one of the kings of Lacedæmonia, and was ſucceeded by Pauſanias, who reigned fourteen years. The latter made a fine anſwer

[d] Diod. p. 196.

* Antiochus is pointed at in this place, a mean, debauched man, who had acquired the favour of Alcibiades by catching a quail for him which he had let fly.

to

to one who aſked, why it was not permitted to change any thing in the ancient cuſtoms of Sparta: "*Becauſe," ſays he, "at Sparta the laws command men, and not men the laws."

[1] Lyſander, who intended to eſtabliſh the government of the nobility in all the cities in the dependence of Sparta, that the governors of his chooſing might be always at his diſpoſal, from his having rendered them independent of their people, he cauſed ſuch perſons of the principal cities to come to Epheſus, as he knew to be the boldeſt, and moſt enterpriſing and ambitious. Theſe he placed at the head of affairs, promoted to the greateſt honours, and raiſed to the firſt employments of the army, thereby rendering himſelf, ſays Plutarch, the accomplice of all the crimes and oppreſſions they committed to advance and enrich themſelves. For this reaſon they were always extremely attached to him, and regretted him infinitely, when Callicratidas came to ſucceed him, and took upon him the command of the fleet. He was not inferior to Lyſander either in valour or military knowledge, and was infinitely above him in point of moral virtue. Alike ſevere to himſelf and others, inacceſſible to flattery and ſloth, the declared enemy of luxury, he retained the modeſty, temperance, and auſterity of the ancient Spartans; virtues that began to diſtinguiſh him particularly, as they were not too common in his time. His probity and juſtice were proof againſt all things; his ſimplicity and integrity abhorred all falſehood and fraud, to which were joined a truly Spartan nobleneſs and grandeur of ſoul. The great and powerful could not hinder themſelves from admiring his virtue; but they were better pleaſed with the facility and condeſcenſion of his predeceſſor, who was blind to the injuſtice and violence of their actions.

It was not without mortification and jealouſy Lyſander ſaw him arrive at Epheſus to take upon him the com-

[1] Xenoph. Hellen l. i. p. 442—444. Plut. in Lyſand. p. 433—436. Diod. p. 197, 198.

* Οτι τους νομους των ανδρων ο τους ανδρας των νομων κυριους ειναι δει. Plut. in Apoph. p. 230.

mand, and out of a criminal baſeneſs and treachery, not uncommon with thoſe who hearken more to their private ambition than the good of the public, he did him all the ill offices in his power. Of the ten thouſand daricks, which Cyrus had given him for the augmentation of the mariners pay, he returned the remainder to that prince; telling Callicratidas, that he might apply to the king for the money, and that it depended on him to find means for the ſubſiſtence of his army. This conduct gave him great trouble, and diſtreſſed him exceedingly. For he had brought no money with him from Sparta, and could not reſolve to extort any from the citizens, as he found them ſufficiently rifled already.

[f] In this urgent neceſſity a perſon having offered him fifty talents (that is to ſay, fifty thouſand crowns) to obtain a favour he could not grant with juſtice, he refuſed them. Upon which Cleander, one of his officers, ſaid, "I would accept them, were I in your place." "And ſo would I," replied the general, "were I in yours."

He had no other reſource therefore than to go, as Lyſander had done, to aſk money at the gates of the king's general and lieutenants, for which he was the leaſt proper of all mankind. Nurtured and educated in the love of liberty, full of great and noble ſentiments, and infinitely remote from all flattery and baſeneſs, he was convinced at heart, that it was leſs evil and diſhonour for Greeks to be overcome by Greeks, than infamouſly to make their court, and beg at the gates of Barbarians, whoſe only merit conſiſted in their gold and ſilver. The whole nation were indeed diſgraced by ſo mean a proſtitution.

Cicero, in his Offices, draws two very different characters of perſons employed in the adminiſtration of government, and makes the application of them to the two generals, of whom we ſpeak. The one, ſays he, *zealous lovers of truth, and declared enemies of all

[f] Plut. in Apoph. p. 222.

* *Sunt his alii multum diſpares ſimplices et aperti: qui nihil ex occulto, nihil ex inſidiis agendum putant veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici: itemque alii, qui quidvis*

fraud, piqued themſelves upon their ſimplicity and candour, and do not believe, that it can ever conſiſt with honour to lay ſnares, or uſe artifice. The others, prepared to do or ſuffer for every thing, are not aſhamed of the meaneſt actions and proſtitutions, provided from thoſe unworthy means they have reaſon to expect the ſucceſs of their deſigns. Cicero places Callicratidas amongſt the former, and Lyſander amongſt the latter, to whom he gives two epithets not much to his honour, and hardly conſiſtent with the Spartan character, when he calls him *very artful and very patient*, or rather *very complaiſant*.

Callicratidas, however, forced by neceſſity, went to Lydia, and repaired immediately to the palace of Cyrus, where he deſired that prince might be told, that the admiral of the Grecian fleet was come to ſpeak with him. He was anſwered, that Cyrus was then at table, engaged in a * party of pleaſure; to which he replied with a modeſt tone and air, that he was in no haſte, and would wait till the prince came forth. The guards ſet up a laugh, wondering at the honeſt ſtranger's ſimplicity, which had ſo little the air of the world in it; and he was obliged to retire. He came thither a ſecond time, and was again denied admittance. Upon which he returned to Epheſus, loading thoſe with curſes and imprecations, who had firſt made their court to Barbarians, and by their flattery and ſubmiſſions had taught them to make their riches a title and pretence for inſulting the reſt of mankind. Addreſſing himſelf at the ſame time to thoſe about him, he ſwore, that as ſoon as he returned to Sparta, he would uſe his utmoſt endeavours to reconcile the Greeks amongſt themſelves, that for the future they might become formidable to the Barbarians, and have no further occaſion for

quidvis perpetiantur cuivis deſerviant, dum, quod velint, conſequantur. Quo in genere verſutiſſimum et patientiſſimum Lacedæmonium Lyſandrum accepimus, nectraque Callicratidem. Offic. l. i. n. 109.

* The Greek ſays literally that he was drinking, *πινει*. The Perſians valued themſelves upon drinking a great deal, as an inſtance of their merit, as we ſhall ſee in Cyrus's letter to the Lacedæmonians.

their

their aid to invade and ruin each other. But that generous Spartan, whose thoughts were so noble, and so worthy the Lacedæmonian name, and whose justice, magnanimity, and valour, might rank him with all that Greece had ever produced, of the most excellent and most consummate, had not the good fortune to return to his country, nor to apply himself to a work so great, and so worthy of him.

SECT. V. *Callicratidas is defeated by the Athenians near the Arginusæ. The Athenians pass Sentence of Death upon several of their Generals, for not having brought off the Bodies of those who had been slain in the Battle. Socrates alone has the Courage to oppose so unjust a Sentence.*

[g] CALLICRATIDAS, after having gained several victories over the Athenians, had at last pursued Conon, one of their generals, into the port of Mitylene, where he kept him blocked up. This was in the twenty-sixth year of the Peloponnesian war. Conon seeing himself besieged by sea and land without hope of aid, and in want of provisions, found means to apprise Athens of the extreme danger he was in. Extraordinary efforts were made to relieve him, and in less than a month's time a fleet of a hundred and ten sail were fitted out, on board of which were embarked all who were capable of bearing arms, as well slaves as freemen, with some horse. At Samos they were joined by the allies with forty galleys, and steered for the Arginusæ, islands situate between Cuma and Mitylene. Callicratidas, being informed of their course, left Eteonicus to continue the siege with fifty ships, and put to sea with a hundred and twenty sail, with design to face the enemy, and prevent their relieving Conon. The right wing of the Athenians was commanded by Protomachus and Thrasylus, who had each fifteen galleys. They were supported by a second line with a like number of ships, commanded by Lysias and Arist-

[g] Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 444—452. Diod. l. xiii. p. 198, & 201, 217—222.

togenes.

togenes. The left wing, like the other, drawn up in two lines, was under Ariſtocrates and Diomedon, ſupported by Erafmides and Pericles*. The main body, conſiſting of near thirty galleys, amongſt which were the three Athenian admirals, was diſpoſed in one line. They had ſtrengthened each of their wings with a ſecond line, becauſe their galleys were neither ſo ſwift, nor ſo eaſy to manage, as thoſe of the enemy; ſo that there was reaſon to fear their getting between two, and being charged on both ſides at the ſame time. The Lacedæmonians and their allies, who perceived they were inferior in number to the enemy, contented themſelves with drawing up in one line, in order to equal their front, and for the greater facility of running between the Athenian galleys, and turning nimbly round them. Callicratidas's pilot, daunted at the inequality, adviſed him not to hazard the battle, and to retire: but he replied, that he could not fly without ſhame, and that his death was of ſmall importance to the republic. "Sparta," ſaid he, "does not depend upon one man." He commanded the right wing, and Thraſonidas the Theban the left.

It was terrible to behold the ſea covered with three hundred galleys ready to engage. Never had more numerous naval armies of the Greeks joined battle before. The ability, experience, and valour of the generals who commanded, left nothing to deſire; ſo that there was reaſon to believe this battle would decide the fate of both people, and put an end to a war that had endured ſo long. When the ſignals were given, the two armies raiſed great ſhouts and began the fight. Callicratidas, who from the anſwer of the augurs expected to fall in the battle, did amazing actions of valour. He attacked the enemy with incredible courage and boldneſs, ſunk ſome of the ſhips, diſabled others by breaking their oars and piercing their ſides with the prow or beak of his galley. At length he attacked that of Pericles, and made a thouſand holes in it; but the latter having hooked him faſt with a grappling iron, he found it impoſſible to diſ-

* He was ſon of the great Pericles.

engage

engage himſelf, and was ſurrounded in an inſtant by ſeveral of the Athenian veſſels. His own was immediately filled with the enemy, and after a dreadful ſlaughter, he fell dead, rather overwhelmed by their numbers than vanquiſhed. The right wing, which he commanded, having loſt its admiral, was put to flight. The left, compoſed of Bœotians and Eubœans, ſtill made a long and vigorous reſiſtance, from the important concern they were in, leſt they ſhould fall into the hands of the Athenians, againſt whom they had revolted; but they were at length obliged to give way, and retire in diſorder. The Athenians erected a trophy in the Arginuſæ. They loſt twenty-five galleys in this battle, and the enemy more than ſeventy, of which number were nine of the ten furniſhed by the Lacedæmonians.

[h] Plutarch equals Callicratidas, the Lacedæmonian general, for his juſtice, valour, and magnanimity, with all who had ever rendered themſelves moſt worthy of admiration amongſt the Greeks.

[i] He blames him however exceedingly for hazarding the battle at the Arginuſæ, and obſerves, that to avoid the reproach of having retired out of fear, he had through a miſtaken ſenſe of honour, failed in the eſſential duty of his function. For, ſays Plutarch, if (to uſe the compariſon of * Iphicrates) the light-armed infantry reſemble the hands, the horſe the feet, the main body the breaſt, and the general the head; the general, who abandons himſelf raſhly to the impetuoſity of his valour, does not ſo much neglect or expoſe his own life, as the lives of thoſe, whoſe ſafety depends upon his. Our Lacedæmonian chief was therefore in the wrong, continues Plutarch, to anſwer the pilot, who adviſed him to retire, "Sparta does not depend upon one man." For though it be true, that Callicratidas, fighting under the orders of another by ſea or land, *was no more than one man*, yet, commanding an army, all who obeyed his orders were collected in his perſon; and he, in whom ſo many thouſands might be loſt, *was no longer*

[h] Plut. in Lyſand. p. 436. [i] Plut. in Pelop. p. 278.
* He was a famous general of the Athenians.

one

one man. * Cicero had paſſed the ſame judgment upon him before Plutarch. After having ſaid, that there were many perſons to be found, who were ready to ſacrifice their fortunes, and even lives, for their country, but who out of a falſe delicacy in point of glory would not hazard their reputation for it in the leaſt; he cites the example of Callicratidas, who anſwered thoſe who adviſed him to retreat from the Arginuſæ, "That Sparta could fit out another fleet, if this were loſt; but for himſelf, he could not fly before the enemy without ſhame and infamy."

I return to the ſequel of the battle near the Arginuſæ. The Athenian generals ordered Theramenes, Thraſybulus, and ſome other officers, to return with about fifty galleys to take up the wrecks and dead bodies, in order to their interment, whilſt they rowed on with the reſt againſt Eteonicus, who kept Conon beſieged before Mitylene. But a rude tempeſt came on ſuddenly and prevented the execution of this order. Eteonicus having received news of the defeat, and fearing it might occaſion alarm and terror amongſt the troops, ſent back thoſe who brought it, with orders to return with wreaths of flowers upon their heads, and to give out that Callicratidas had gained the victory, and deſtroyed the whole Athenian fleet. Upon their return he offered ſacrifices of thankſgiving, and having made his troops take ſome refreſhment, he ſent the galleys away directly, the wind being fair, and marched off the land-army to Methymna, after having burnt the camp. Conon being delivered in this manner from the blockade, joined the victorious fleet, which returned forthwith to Samos. However, when it was known at Athens that the dead bodies had been left without interment, the

* *Inventi multi ſunt, qui non modo pecuniam, ſed vitam etiam, profundere pro patria parati eſſent, iidem gloriæ jacturam ne minima quidem facere vellent, ne republica quidem poſtulante: ut Callicratidas, qui, cum Lacedæmoniorum dux fuiſſet Peloponneſiaco bello, multaque feciſſet egregiè, vertit ad extremum omnia cum conſilio non paruit eorum, qui claſſem ab Arginuſis removendam, nec cum Athenienſibus dimicandum putabant. Quibus ille reſpondit, Lacedæmonios, claſſe illa amiſſa, aliam parare poſſe, ſe fugere ſine ſuo dedecore non poſſe.* Offic. l. i. n. 48.

people

people were highly enraged, and laid the whole weight of their resentment upon those they believed guilty of that crime. The ancients held it a great one not to provide sepulture for the dead; and we may observe, that after all their battles, the first care of the conquered, notwithstanding the sense of their misfortune, and their great affliction for a bloody defeat, was to demand a suspension of arms from the victor, in order to pay their last duties to those who had fallen in battle; upon which they believed their happiness in another life depended. They had little or no idea of the resurrection of the body; but however, the Pagans, in the soul's concern for the body after death, the religious regard paid to it, and the passion with which they rendered solemn honours to the dead, seem to argue, that they had some confused notion of a resurrection which subsisted amongst all nations, and descended from the most ancient tradition, though they could not distinguish clearly upon it.

Hence arose the fury of the people of Athens. They immediately nominated new generals, retaining only Conon of the old ones, to whom they gave Adimantes and Philocles for colleagues. Eight days after which, two of them withdrew themselves, and only six returned to Athens. Theramenes, the tenth general, who returned before the rest of the fleet, accused the other chiefs before the people, making them responsible for not bringing off the dead after the battle; and to clear himself, read the letter they had written to the senate and people, wherein they excused themselves from the violence of the storm, without charging any body. That calumny was detestably vile, as done in abuse of their reserve in not mentioning him in their letter, and in not laying a fault to his charge of which he might have appeared the most guilty. The generals, at their return not being able to prevail for the time necessary for making their defence, contented themselves with representing in few words the state of the affair, and appealed for the truth of what they said to the pilots, and all present when it happened. The people seemed to receive their excuse favourably, and several persons

ſons offered themſelves for their ſureties; but it was thought proper to adjourn the aſſembly, becauſe of the night, and it being the people's cuſtom to give their ſuffrages by lifting up of hands, their reſolution could not be known; beſides which the council were firſt to give their opinion upon the queſtion to be propoſed to the people.

The feaſt of Apaturia unexpectedly coming on, in which it was the cuſtom to aſſemble by families, the relations of Theramenes poſted ſeveral perſons in mourning habits, and ſhaved, in proper places, who ſaid, they were the kindred of thoſe who had been ſlain in the battle, and obliged Callixenes to accuſe the generals in the Senate. It was decreed in conſequence, that as the accuſation and defence had been heard in the laſt aſſembly, the people by their reſpective tribe ſhould give their voices, and if the accuſed were found guilty, they ſhould be puniſhed with death, their eſtates confiſcated, and the tenth part conſecrated to the * goddeſs. Some ſenators oppoſed this decree as unjuſt, and contrary to the laws: but as the people, at the inſtigation of Callixenes, threatened to include the oppoſers in the ſame cauſe and crime with the generals, they were ſo mean as to deſiſt from their oppoſition, and to ſacrifice the innocent generals to their own ſafety, by conſenting to the decree. Socrates (the celebrated philoſopher) was the only one of the ſenators who ſtood firm, perſiſted obſtinately in oppoſing a decree ſo notoriouſly unjuſt, and ſo contrary to all laws. The orator, who mounted the tribunal in defence of the generals, ſhowed, "That they had failed in nothing of their duty, as they had given orders that the dead bodies ſhould be taken up: that if any one were guilty, it was he, who being charged with theſe orders, had neglected to put them in execution; but that he accuſed nobody; and that the tempeſt which came on unexpectedly at the very inſtant was an unanſwerable apology, and entirely diſcharged the accuſed from all guilt. He demanded, that a whole day ſhould be allowed them to make their

* Minerva.

defence,

defence, a favour not denied to the moſt criminal, and that they ſhould be tried ſeparately. He repreſented, that they were not in the leaſt obliged to precipitate a ſentence, wherein the lives of the moſt illuſtrious of the citizens were concerned; that it was in ſome meaſure attacking the gods to make * men reſponſible for the winds and weather; that they could not, without the moſt flagrant ingratitude and injuſtice, put the conquerors to death, to whom they ought to decree crowns and honours, or give up the defenders of their country to the rage of thoſe who envied them; that if they did ſo, their unjuſt judgment would be followed with a ſudden, but vain repentance, which would leave behind it the ſharpeſt remorſe, and cover them with eternal ſhame and infamy." The people ſeemed at firſt to be moved with theſe reaſons; but animated by the accuſers, they pronounced ſentence of death againſt eight of their generals; and ſix of them, who were preſent, were ſeized, in order to their being carried to execution. One of them, Diomedon, a perſon of great reputation for his valour and probity, demanded to be heard. "Athenians," ſaid he, "I wiſh the ſentence you have paſſed upon us may not prove the misfortune of the republic; but I have one favour to aſk of you in behalf of my colleagues and myſelf, which is to acquit us before the gods of the vows we made to them for you and ourſelves, as we are not in a condition to diſcharge them; for it is to their protection, invoked before the battle, we acknowledge that we are indebted for the victory gained by us over the enemy." There was not one good citizen, that did not melt into tears at this diſcourſe, ſo full of goodneſs and religion, and admire with ſurpriſe the moderation of a perſon, who ſeeing himſelf unjuſtly condemned, did not however vent the leaſt reſentment, or even complaint againſt his judges, but was ſolely intent (in favour of an ungrateful country, which had doomed them to pe-

* *Quem adeo iniquum, ut ſceleri aſſignet, quod venti et fluctus deliquerint?* TACIT. Annal. l. xiv. c. 3.

riſh)

riſh) upon what it owed the gods in common with them for the victory they had lately obtained.

The ſix generals were hardly executed, when the people opened their eyes, and perceived all the horror of that ſentence; but their repentance could not reſtore the dead to life. Callixenes, the orator, was put in priſon, and refuſed to be heard. Having found means to make his eſcape, he fled to Decelia to the enemy, from whence he returned ſome time after to Athens, where he died of hunger, univerſally deteſted and abhorred by all the world, as all falſe accuſers and ſlanderers ought to be. Diodorus remarks, that the people themſelves were juſtly puniſhed for their crime by the gods, who abandoned them ſoon after, not to a ſingle maſter, but to thirty tyrants, who treated them with the utmoſt rigour and cruelty.

[k] The diſpoſition of a people is very naturally imaged in this account; and Plato, upon the ſame event, draws in few words their character with much ſpirit and reſemblance. The * commonalty, ſays he, is an unconſtant, ungrateful, cruel, ſuſpicious animal, incapable of ſubmitting to the government of reaſon; which is no wonder, adds he, as it is commonly compoſed of the dregs of a city, and is a monſtrous aſſemblage, without form or order, of all that is worſt in it.

The ſame relation ſhows what effect fear can have upon the minds of men, even upon thoſe who paſs for the wiſeſt, and how few there are, who are capable of ſupporting inflexibly the view of preſent danger and diſgrace. Though the juſtneſs of the generals cauſe was perfectly known in the ſenate, at leaſt by the major part of it, as ſoon as the people's rage was mentioned, and the terrible menaces they murmured, thoſe grave ſenators, moſt of whom had commanded armies, and who all of them had frequently expoſed themſelves to the greateſt dangers of war, inſtantly changed ſides and came over to the moſt notorious calumny, and crying injuſtice, that ever had being. An evident proof, that

[k] Plut. in Axioch. p. 368, 369.

* Δημος αψικορον, αχαριστον, ωμον, βασανιστη, ανταιδευτον.

there

there is a courage, though very rare, which infinitely tranſcends the valour, that induces ſo many thouſands of men every day to confront the moſt terrible dangers in battle.

Amongſt all the judges, only one, truly worthy of his reputation, the great Socrates, in this general treaſon and perfidy, ſtood firm and immovable; and though he knew his ſuffrage and unaided voice would be of little or no conſequence to the accuſed, he thought them a juſt homage to oppreſſed innocence, and that it was * unworthy an honeſt man to govern himſelf by the fury of a blind and frantic people. We ſee in this inſtance how far the cauſe of juſtice may be abandoned. We may conclude it was not better defended before the people. Of more than three thouſand citizens, who compoſed the aſſembly, two only took upon them the defence of their generals, Euriptodemus and Axiochus. Plato has preſerved their names, and given that of the latter to the dialogue, from whence part of theſe reflections are taken.

[l] The ſame year the battle of the Arginuſæ was fought, Dionyſius poſſeſſed himſelf of the tyranny in Sicily. I ſhall defer ſpeaking of him till the enſuing volume, in which I ſhall treat the hiſtory of the tyrants of Syracuſe at large.

SECT. VI. *Lyſander commands the Lacedæmonian Fleet. Cyrus is recalled to Court by his Father. Lyſander's celebrated Victory over the Athenians at Ægoſpotamos.*

[m] AFTER the defeat at the Arginuſæ, the affairs of the Peloponneſians declining, the allies, ſupported by the credit of Cyrus, ſent an embaſſy to Sparta, to demand that the command of the fleet ſhould again be given to Lyſander, with the promiſe of ſerving with more affection and courage, if their requeſt

[l] A. M. 3598. Ant. J. C. 406.

[m] A. M. 3519. Ant. J. C. 405. Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 45. Plut. in Lyſ. l. ix. 436, 437. Diod. l. xiii. p. 223.

* Ου γαρ εφαινετο μοι σεμνον ἠμω μαινομενω συνεξαρχειν.

were

were granted. As it was contrary to the laws of Sparta that the same person should be twice admiral; the Lacedæmonians, to satisfy the allies, gave the title of admiral to one Aracus, and sent Lysander with him, whom in appearance they commissioned only as vice-admiral, though in effect with all the authority of the supreme command.

All those who had the greatest share in the government of the cities, and were of most authority in them, saw him arrive with extreme joy; promising themselves, from his influence, the final subversion of the democratic power. His character of complacency for his friends, and indulgence to all their faults, suited much better with their ambitious and injurious views, than the austere equity of Callicratidas. For Lysander was a man of the most corrupt heart, and gloried in having no principles in point of virtue or the most sacred duties. He made no scruple to employ artifice and deceit upon all occasions, and esteemed justice only as far as it served his measures. When it did not promote them, he never failed to prefer the useful, which with him was alone laudable and excellent; from a persuasion that truth had in its own nature no advantage over falsehood, and that the value of both one and the other was to be determined by the convenience resulting from them. And for those who represented to him, that it was unworthy the descendants of Hercules to make use of fraud and treachery, he laughed at them; "For," said he, "where the lion's skin is not long enough, it is necessary to tack the fox's tail to it."

An expression ascribed to him, sufficiently denotes how small an account he made of perjury. He used to say, "*Children are amused with baubles, and men with oaths;" showing, by so professed a want of religion, that the gods were more inconsiderable with him

* The Greek text admits another sense, which is perhaps no less good. "Children may use art, and cheat one another in their games, and men in their oaths." Ἐκέλευε τοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἀστραγάλοις, τοὺς δὲ ἄνδρας ὅρκοις ἐξαπατᾶν.

than

than his enemies. For he who deceives with a falſe oath, plainly declares in ſo doing, that he fears his enemies, but that he deſpiſes God.

[n] Here ends the twenty-ſixth year of the Peloponneſian war. In this year, it was, that young Cyrus dazzled with the uſual ſplendor of ſupreme authority, and jealous of the leaſt omiſſion in point of ceremonial homage, diſcovered, by a remarkable action, the ſecret of his heart. Brought up from his infancy in the reigning houſe, nurtured under the ſhade of the throne amidſt the ſubmiſſions and proſtrations of the courtiers, entertained long by the diſcourſes of an ambitious mother who idolized him, in the deſire and hope of empire, he began already to affect the rights of ſovereignty, and to exact the honours paid to it with ſurpriſing haughtineſs and rigour. Two Perſians of the royal family, his couſin-germans by their mother, his father Darius's ſiſter, had omitted to cover their hands with their ſleeves in his preſence, according to a ceremonial obſerved only to the kings of Perſia. Cyrus, reſenting that neglect as a capital crime, condemned them both to die, and cauſed them to be executed at Sardis without mercy. Darius, at whoſe feet their relations threw themſelves to demand juſtice, was very much affected with the tragical end of his two nephews, and looked upon this action of his ſon's as an attempt upon himſelf, to whom alone that honour was due. He reſolved therefore to take his government from him, and ordered him to court upon the pretext of being ſick, and having a deſire to ſee him.

Cyrus before his departure ſent for Lyſander to Sardis, and put into his hands great ſums of money for the payment of his fleet, promiſing him ſtill more for the future. And with the oſtentation of a young man, to let him ſee how much he deſired to oblige him, he aſſured him, that though the king his father ſhould ceaſe to afford him any ſupplies, he would furniſh him the more willingly out of his own coffers, and that rather than he ſhould want the neceſſary proviſions, he

[n] Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii, p. 454.

would

would even cauſe the throne of maſſy gold and ſilver, upon which he ſat in judgment, to be melted down. At length, when he was upon the point of ſetting out, he empowered him to receive the tributes and revenues of the cities, confided the government of his provinces to him, and conjured him with embraces not to give battle in his abſence, unleſs ſuperior in force; becauſe the king neither wanted the will nor the power to give him that ſuperiority to the enemy; promiſing at the ſame time, with the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of affection, to bring him a great number of ſhips from Phœnicia and Cilicia.

[n] After that prince's departure, Lyſander ſailed towards the Helleſpont, and laid ſiege to Lampſacus. Torax, having marched thither with his land forces at the ſame time, aſſaulted the city on his ſide. [o] The place was carried by ſtorm, and abandoned by Lyſander to the mercy of the ſoldiers. The Athenians, who followed him cloſe, came to an anchor in the port of Eleontum in the Cherſoneſus, with a hundred and fourſcore galleys. But upon the news of the taking of Lampſacus, they immediately ſteered for Seſtos, and after having taken in proviſions, they ſtood away from thence, ſailing along the coaſt to a place called * Ægoſpotamos, where they halted over againſt the enemy, who were then at anchor before Lampſacus. The Helleſpont is not above two thouſand paces broad in that place. The two armies, ſeeing themſelves ſo near each other, expected only to reſt that day, and were in hopes of coming to a battle on the next.

But Lyſander had another deſign in view. He commanded the ſeamen and pilots to go on board their galleys, as if they were in reality to fight the next morning at break of day, to hold themſelves in readineſs, and to wait his orders with profound ſilence. He ordered the land army in like manner to draw up in battle upon the coaſt, and to wait the day without any noiſe. On the morrow, as ſoon as the ſun was riſen,

[n] Xenoph. Hellen l. ii. p. 455—458. [o] Plut. in Lyſ. p. 437, & 440. Idem in Alcib. p. 212. Diod. l. xiii, p. 225, 226.

* The river of the goat.

the

the Athenians began to row towards them with their whole fleet in one line, and to bid them defiance. Lyſander, though his ſhips were ranged in order of battle, with their heads towards the enemy, lay ſtill without making any movement. In the evening, when the Athenians withdrew, he did not ſuffer his ſoldiers to go aſhore, till two or three galleys, which he had ſent out to obſerve them, were returned with advice, that they had ſeen the enemy land. The next day paſſed in the ſame manner, as did the third and fourth. Such a conduct, which argued reſerve and apprehenſion, extremely augmented the ſecurity and boldneſs of the Athenians, and inſpired them with an extreme contempt for an army, which fear, in their ſenſe, prevented from ſhowing themſelves, and attempting any thing.

Whilſt this paſſed, Alcibiades, who was near the fleet, took horſe and came to the Athenian generals; to whom he repreſented, that they kept upon a very diſadvantageous coaſt, where there were neither ports nor cities in the neighbourhood; that they were obliged to bring their proviſions from Seſtos with great danger and difficulty; and that they were very much in the wrong to ſuffer the ſoldiers and mariners of the fleet, as ſoon as they were aſhore, to ſtraggle and diſperſe themſelves at their own pleaſure, whilſt the enemy's fleet faced them in view, accuſtomed to execute the orders of their general with inſtant obedience, and upon the ſlighteſt ſignal. He offered alſo to attack the enemy by land with a ſtrong body of Thracian troops, and to force them to a battle. The generals, eſpecially Tydeus and Menander, jealous of their command, did not content themſelves with refuſing his offers, from the opinion, that if the event proved unfortunate, the whole blame would fall upon them, and if favourable, that Alcibiades would engroſs the honour of it; but rejected alſo with inſult his wiſe and ſalutary counſel, as if a man in diſgrace loſt his ſenſe and abilities with the favour of the commonwealth. Alcibiades withdrew.

The fifth day the Athenians preſented themſelves again, and offered him battle; retiring in the evening

according to cuſtom with more inſulting airs than the days before. Lyſander, as uſual, detached ſome galleys to obſerve them, with orders to return with the utmoſt diligence, when they ſaw the Athenians landed, and to put up a brazen buckler at each ſhip's head as ſoon as they reached the middle of the channel. Himſelf in the mean time ran through the whole line in his galley, exhorting the pilots and officers to hold the ſeamen and ſoldiers in readineſs to row and fight on the firſt ſignal.

As ſoon as the bucklers were put up in the ſhips heads and the admiral's galley had given the ſignal by the ſound of trumpet, the whole fleet ſet forwards in good order. The land army at the ſame time made all poſſible haſte to the top of the promontory to ſee the battle. The ſtrait that ſeparates the two continents in this place, is about fifteen ſtadia*, or three quarters of a league in breadth, which ſpace was preſently cleared through the activity and diligence of the rowers. Conon, the Athenian general, was the firſt who perceived from ſhore, the enemy's fleet advance in good order to attack him; upon which he immediately cried out for the troops to embark. In the height of ſorrow and perplexity, ſome he called to by their names, ſome he conjured, and others he forced to go on board their galleys; but all his endeavours and emotion were ineffectual, the ſoldiers being diſperſed on all ſides. For they were no ſooner come on ſhore, than ſome were run to the ſuttlers, ſome to walk in the country, ſome to ſleep in their tents, and others had begun to dreſs their ſuppers. This proceeded from the want of vigilance and experience in the generals, who not ſuſpecting the leaſt danger, indulged themſelves in taking their repoſe, and gave their ſoldiers the ſame liberty.

The enemy had already fallen on with loud cries and a great noiſe of their oars, when Conon, diſengaging himſelf with nine galleys, of which number was the ſacred ſhip called the *Paralian*, ſtood away for Cyprus, where he took refuge with Evagoras. The Peloponneſians, falling upon the reſt of the fleet, took immediate-

* 1875 paces.

Ly

ly the galleys which were empty, and disabled and destroyed such as began to fill with men. The soldiers, who ran without order or arms to their relief, were either killed in the endeavour to get on board, or flying on shore were cut to pieces by the enemy, who landed in pursuit of them. Lysander took three thousand prisoners, with all the generals, and the whole fleet. After having plundered the camp, and fastened the enemy's galleys to the sterns of his own, he returned to Lampsacus, amidst the sound of flutes and songs of triumph. It was his glory to have achieved one of the greatest military exploits recorded in history, with little or no loss, and to have terminated a war in the small space of an hour, which had already lasted seven and twenty years, and which, perhaps, without him, had been of much longer continuance. Lysander immediately sent dispatches with this agreeable news to Sparta.

The three thousand prisoners, taken in this battle, having been condemned to die, Lysander called upon Philocles, one of the Athenian generals, who had caused all the prisoners taken in two galleys, the one of Andros, the other of Corinth, to be thrown from the top of a precipice, and had formerly persuaded the people of Athens to make a decree for cutting off the thumb of the right hand of all the prisoners of war, in order to disable them from handling the pike, and that they might be fit only to serve at the oar. Lysander therefore caused him to be brought forth, and asked him, what sentence he would pass upon himself, for having induced his city to pass that cruel decree. Philocles, without departing from his haughtiness in the least, notwithstanding the extreme danger he was in, made answer, "Accuse not people of crimes who have no judges, but, as you are victor, use your right, and do by us as we had done by you, if we had conquered." At the same instant he went into a bath, put on afterwards a magnificent robe, and marched foremost to the execution. All the prisoners were put to the sword, except Adamantus, who had opposed the decree.

After this expedition, Lyſander went with his fleet to all the maritime cities, and gave orders for all Athenians in them to withdraw, as ſoon as poſſible, to Athens, without permitting them to take any other route; declaring, that after a certain time fixed, all ſuch ſhould be puniſhed with death, as ſhould be found out of Athens. This he did as an able politician, to reduce the city by famine the more eaſily, and to render it incapable of ſuſtaining a long ſiege. He afterwards applied himſelf in ſubverting the democratic, and all other forms of government throughout the cities; leaving in each of them a Lacedæmonian governor, called *harmoſtes*, and ten archons or magiſtrates, whom he choſe out of the ſocieties he had eſtabliſhed in them. He thereby, in ſome meaſure, ſecured to himſelf univerſal authority, and a kind of ſovereignty over all Greece; putting none into power but ſuch as were entirely devoted to his ſervice.

SECT. VII. *Athens, beſieged by Lyſander, capitulates, and ſurrenders. Lyſander changes the Form of Government, and eſtabliſhes thirty Commanders in it. He ſends Gylippus before him to Sparta with all the Gold and Silver taken from the Enemy. Decree of Sparta upon the Uſe to be made of it. The Peloponneſian War ends in this Manner. Death of Darius Nothus.*

[p] WHEN the news of the entire defeat of the army came to Athens by a ſhip, which arrived in the night at the Piræus, the city was in univerſal conſternation. Nothing was heard but cries of ſorrow and deſpair in every part of it. They imagined the enemy already at their gates. They repreſented to themſelves the miſeries of a long ſiege, a cruel famine, the ruin and burning of their city, the inſolence of a proud victor, and the ſhameful ſlavery they were upon the point of experiencing, more afflicting and inſupportable to them than the moſt ſevere puniſhments, and death

[p] A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 458—462. Plut. in Lyſand. p. 440, 441.

itſelf.

itſelf. The next day the aſſembly was ſummoned, wherein it was reſolved to ſhut up all the ports, one only excepted; to repair the breaches in the walls; and mount guard, to prepare againſt a ſiege.

In effect Agis and Pauſanias, the two kings of Sparta, advanced towards Athens with all their troops. Lyſander ſoon after arrived at the Piræeus with a hundred and fifty ſail, and prevented all ſhips from going in or coming out. The Athenians, beſieged by ſea and land, without proviſions, ſhips, hope of relief, or any reſource, reinſtated all perſons attainted by any decree, without ſpeaking the leaſt word of a capitulation, however, though many already died of famine. But when their corn was entirely conſumed, they ſent deputies to Agis, to propoſe a treaty with Sparta, upon condition of abandoning all their poſſeſſions, the city and port only excepted. He referred the deputies to Lacedæmon, as not being empowered to treat with them. When they arrived at Salaſia, upon the frontier of Sparta, and had made known their commiſſion to the Ephori, they were ordered to retire, and to come with other propoſals, if they expected peace. The ephori had demanded, that twelve hundred paces of the wall on each ſide of the Piræeus ſhould be demoliſhed: but an Athenian, for venturing to adviſe a compliance, was ſent to priſon, and prohibition made againſt propoſing any thing of that kind for the future.

In this deplorable condition, Theramenes declared in the aſſembly, that if he were ſent to Lyſander, he would know, whether the propoſal made by the Lacedæmonians for diſmantling the city was intended to facilitate its ruin, or to prevent a revolt. The Athenians having deputed him accordingly, he was more than three months abſent; no doubt with the view of reducing them, by famine, to accept any conditions that ſhould be offered. On his return, he told them, that Lyſander had detained him all that time, and that at laſt he had been given to underſtand that he might apply to the Ephori. He was therefore ſent back with nine others to Sparta, with full powers to conclude a treaty. When

they arrived there, the Ephori gave them audience in the general aſſembly, where the Corinthians and ſeveral other allies, eſpecially the Thebans, inſiſted that it was abſolutely neceſſary to deſtroy the city without hearkening any further to a treaty. But the Lacedæmonians, preferring the glory and ſafety of Greece to their own grandeur, made anſwer, that they would never be reproached with having deſtroyed a city that had rendered ſuch great ſervices to all Greece; the remembrance of which ought to have much greater weight with the allies, than the reſentment of private injuries received from it. The peace was therefore concluded under theſe conditions: "That the fortifications of the Piræus, with the long wall that joined that port to the city, ſhould be demoliſhed; that the Athenians ſhould deliver up all their galleys, twelve only excepted; that they ſhould abandon all the cities they had ſeized, and content themſelves with their own lands and country; that they ſhould recal their exiles, and make a league offenſive and defenſive with the Lacedæmonians, under whom they ſhould march wherever they thought fit to lead them."

The deputies on their return were ſurrounded with an innumerable throng of people, who apprehended that nothing had been concluded, for they were not able to hold out any longer, ſuch multitudes dying every day of famine. The next day they reported the ſucceſs of their negociation; the treaty was ratified, notwithſtanding the oppoſition of ſome perſons; and Lyſander, followed by the exiles, entered the port. It was upon the very day the Athenians had formerly gained the famous naval battle of Salamin. He cauſed the walls to be demoliſhed to the ſound of flutes and trumpets, and with all the exterior marks of triumph and rejoicing, as if all Greece had that day regained its liberty. Thus ended the Peloponneſian war, after having continued during the ſpace of twenty-ſeven years.

Lyſander, without giving the Athenians time to look about them, changed the form of their government entirely, eſtabliſhed thirty archons, or rather tyrants, over

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the city, put a good garrison into the citadel, and left the Spartan Callibius *harmostes*, or governor. Agis dismissed his troops. Lysander, before he disbanded his, advanced against Samos, which he pressed so warmly, that it was at last obliged to capitulate. After having established its ancient inhabitants in it, he proposed to return to Sparta, with the Lacedæmonian galleys, those of the Piræeus, and the beaks of those he had taken.

He had sent Gylippus, who had commanded the army in Sicily, before him, to carry the money and spoils, which were the fruit of his glorious campaigns, to Lacedæmon. The money, without reckoning the innumerable crowns of gold, given him by the cities, amounted to fifteen hundred talents, that is to say, fifteen hundred thousand crowns*. Gylippus, who carried this considerable sum, could not resist the temptation of converting some part of it to his own use. The bags were sealed up carefully, and did not seem to leave any room for theft. He unsewed them at the bottom; and after having taken out of each of them what money he thought fit, to the amount of three hundred talents, he sewed them up again very neatly, and thought himself perfectly safe. But when he arrived at Sparta, the accounts, which had been put up in each bag, discovered him. To avoid punishment, he banished himself from his country, carrying along with him in all places the disgrace of having sullied, by so base and sordid an avarice, the glory of all his great actions.

From this unhappy example, the wisest and most distinguishing of the Spartans, apprehending the all-powerful effects of money, which enslaved not only the vulgar, but even the greatest of men, extremely blamed Lysander for having acted so contradictorily to the fundamental laws of Sparta, and warmly represented to the Ephori, how incumbent it was upon them to † banish all that gold and silver from the republic, and to lay the heaviest of curses and imprecations upon it,

* About 337,000l. sterling.

† Απεδει πομπειω θαι παν το αργυριον κ το χρυσιον ωσπερ κηρος επαγγελμας.

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as the fatal bane of all other ſtates, introduced only to corrupt the wholeſome conſtitution of the Spartan government, which had ſupported itſelf for ſo many ages with vigour and proſperity. The Ephori immediately paſſed a decree to proſcribe that money, and ordained that none ſhould be current, except the uſual pieces of iron. But Lyſander's friends oppoſed this decree, and ſparing no pains to retain the gold and ſilver in Sparta, the affair was referred for further deliberation. There naturally ſeemed only two methods to be conſidered, which were, either to make the gold and ſilver ſpecies current, or to cry them down, and prohibit them abſolutely. The men of addreſs and policy found out a third expedient, which, in their ſenſe, reconciled both the others with great ſucceſs: this was wiſely to chooſe the mean betwixt the vicious extremes of too much rigour, and too much neglect. It was therefore reſolved, that the new coin of gold and ſilver ſhould be ſolely employed by the public treaſury; that it ſhould only paſs in the occaſions and uſes of the ſtate; and that every private perſon, in whoſe poſſeſſion it ſhould be found, ſhould be immediately put to death.

A ſtrange expedient, ſays Plutarch! As if Lycurgus had feared the ſpecies of gold and ſilver, and not the avarice they occaſion; an avarice, leſs to be extinguiſhed by prohibiting to particulars the poſſeſſion of it, than inflamed by permitting the ſtate to amaſs and make uſe of it for the ſervice of the public. For it was impoſſible, whilſt that money was in honour and eſteem with the public, that it ſhould be deſpiſed in private as uſeleſs, and that people ſhould look upon that as of no value in their domeſtic affairs, which the city prized, and were ſo much concerned to have for its occaſions; bad uſages, authoriſed by the practice and example of the public, being a thouſand times more dangerous to particulars, than the vices of particulars to the public. The Lacedæmonians, therefore, continues Plutarch, in puniſhing thoſe with death who ſhould make uſe of the new money in private, were ſo blind and imprudent to imagine, that the placing of the law, and the terror of puniſh-

puniſhment as a guard at the door, was ſufficient to prevent gold and ſilver from entering the houſe: they left the hearts of their citizens open to the deſire and admiration of riches, and introduced themſelves a violent paſſion for amaſſing treaſure, in cauſing it to be deemed a great and honourable thing to become rich.

[q] It was about the end of the Peloponneſian war, that Darius Nothus, king of Perſia, died, after a reign of nineteen years. Cyrus had arrived at the court before his death, and Paryſatis, his mother, whoſe idol he was, not contented with having made his peace, notwithſtanding the faults he had committed in his government, preſſed the old king to declare him his ſucceſſor alſo, after the example of Darius the Firſt, who gave Xerxes the preference before all his brothers, becauſe born, as Cyrus was, after his father's acceſſion to the throne. But Darius did not carry his complaiſance for her ſo far. He gave the crown to Arſaces, his eldeſt ſon, by Paryſatis alſo, whom Plutarch called Arſicas, and bequeathed only to Cyrus the provinces he had already.

[q] A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404.

BOOK THE NINTH.

THE

ANCIENT HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CONTINUED,

DURING THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE REIGN OF ARTAXERXES MNEMON.

CHAP. I.

THIS chapter contains the domeſtic troubles of the court of Perſia; the death of Alcibiades; the reeſtabliſhment of the liberty of Athens; and Lyſander's ſecret deſigns to make himſelf king.

SECT. I. *Coronation of Artaxerxes Mnemon. Cyrus attempts to aſſaſſinate his Brother, and is ſent into Aſia Minor. Cruel Revenge of Statira, Wife of Artaxerxes, upon the Authors and Accomplices in the Murder of her Brother. Death of Alcibiades. His Character.*

[a] ARSACES, upon aſcending the throne, aſſumed the name of Artaxerxes, the ſame to whom the Greeks gave the ſurname of *MNEMON, from his prodigious memory. [b] Being near his father's bed, when he was dying, he aſked him, a few moments be-

[a] A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. [b] Athen. l. xii. p. 548.

* Which word ſignifies in the Greek, one of a good memory.

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fore he expired, what had been the rule of his conduct during so long and happy a reign as his, that he might make it his example. "It has been," replied he, "to do always what justice and religion required of me." Words of deep sense, and well worthy of being set up in letters of gold in the palaces of kings, to keep them perpetually in mind of what ought to be the guide and rule of all their actions. It is not uncommon for princes to give excellent instructions to their children on their death-beds, which would be more efficacious, if preceded by their own example and conduct; without which they are as weak and impotent as the sick man who gives them, and seldom survive him long.

[b] Soon after Darius's death, the new king set out from his capital for the city of *Pasargades, in order to his coronation, according to custom, by the priests of Persia. There was in that city a temple of the goddess who presided in war, in which the coronation was solemnized. It was attended with very singular ceremonies, which no doubt had some mysterious sense; though Plutarch does not explain it. The prince at his consecration took off his robe in the temple, and put on that worn by the ancient Cyrus, before he came to the throne, which was preserved in that place with great veneration. After that, he ate a dry fig, chewed some leaves of the turpentine tree, and drank a draught composed of milk and vinegar. This might signify, that the sweets of sovereign power are mingled with the sours of care and disquiet, and that if the throne be surrounded with pleasures and honours, it is also attended with pains and anxieties. It seems sufficiently evident, that the design in putting the robes of Cyrus upon the new king, was to make him understand, that he should also clothe his mind with the great qualities and exalted virtues of that prince.

Young Cyrus, whose soul was all ambition, was in despair upon being for ever prevented from ascending a throne his mother had given him, and on seeing the

[b] Plut. in Artax. p. 1012.

* A city of Persia built by Cyrus the Great.

ſceptre which he thought his right, transferred into the hands of his brother. The blackeſt crimes coſt the ambitious nothing. Cyrus reſolved to aſſaſſinate Artaxerxes in the temple itſelf, and in the preſence of the whole court, juſt when he took off his own, to put on the robe of Cyrus. Artaxerxes was apprized of this deſign by the prieſt himſelf, who had educated his brother, to whom he had imparted it. Cyrus was ſeized, and condemned to die, when his mother Paryſatis, almoſt out of her ſenſes, flew to the place, claſped him in her arms, tied herſelf to him with the treſſes of her hair, faſtened her neck to his, and by her ſhrieks and tears, and prayers, prevailed ſo far as to obtain his pardon, and that he ſhould be ſent back to his government of the maritime provinces. He carried thither with him an ambition no leſs ardent than before, was animated beſides with the reſentment of the check he had received, and the warm deſire of revenge, and armed with an almoſt unbounded power. Artaxerxes, upon this occaſion, acted contrary to the moſt common rules of policy, which do not admit * the nouriſhing and enflaming, by extraordinary honours, the pride and haughtineſs of a bold and enterpriſing young prince like Cyrus, who had carried his perſonal enmity to his brother ſo far, as to have reſolved to aſſaſſinate him with his own hand, and whoſe ambition for empire was ſo great, as to employ the moſt criminal methods for the attainment of its end.

[c] Artaxerxes had eſpouſed Statira. Scarce had her huſband aſcended the throne, when ſhe employed the power her beauty gave her over him, to avenge the death of her brother Teriteuchmes. Hiſtory has not a more tragical ſcene, nor a more monſtrous complication of adultry, inceſt, and murder; which, after having occaſioned great diſorders in the royal family, terminated at length in the moſt fatal manner to all who had any ſhare in it. But it is neceſſary, for the reader's knowledge of the fact, to trace it from the beginning.

[c] Cteſ. c. li. lv.

* *Ne quis mobiles adoleſcentium animos præmaturis honoribus ad ſuperbiam extolleret.* TACIT. Annal. l. iv. c. 17.

Hidarnes,

Hidarnes, Statira's father, a Perſian of very great quality, was governor of one of the principal provinces of the empire. Statira was a lady of extraordinary beauty, which induced Artaxerxes to marry her, who was then called Arſaces. At the ſame time Teriteuchmes, Statira's brother, married Hameſtris, Arſaces's ſiſter, one of the daughters of Darius and Paryſatis; in favour of which marriage Teriteuchmes, upon his father's death, had his government given him. There was at the ſame time another ſiſter in this family, no leſs beautiful than Statira, and who beſides excelled in the arts of ſhooting with the bow, and throwing the dart. Teriteuchmes, her brother, conceived a criminal paſſion for her, and, to gratify it, reſolved to ſet himſelf at liberty by killing Hameſtris, whom he had eſpouſed. Darius, having been informed of this project, by the force of preſents and promiſes engaged Udiaſtes, Teriteuchmes's intimate friend and confident, to prevent ſo black a deſign, by aſſaſſinating him. He obeyed, and had for his reward the government of him he had put to death with his own hands.

Amongſt Teriteuchmes's guards was a ſon of Udiaſtes, called Mithridates, very much attached to his maſter. The young gentleman, upon hearing that his father had committed this murder in perſon, uttered all manner of imprecations againſt him, and full of horror for ſo infamous and vile an action, ſeized on the city of Zaris, and openly revolting, declared for the eſtabliſhment of Teriteuchmes's ſon. But that young man could not hold out long againſt Darius. He was blocked up in the place with the ſon of Teriteuchmes, whom he had with him; and all the reſt of the family of Hidarnes were put in priſon, and delivered to Paryſatis, to do with them as that mother, exaſperated to the laſt exceſs by the treatment either done or intended againſt her daughter Hameſtris, ſhould think fit. That cruel princeſs began by cauſing Roxana, whoſe beauty had been the occaſion of this evil, to be ſawed in two, and ordered all the reſt to be put to death, except Statira, whoſe life ſhe granted to the tears and the moſt tender

and ardent ſolicitations of Arſaces; whoſe love for his wife made him ſpare no pains for her preſervation, though Darius, his father, believed it neceſſary, even for his own good, that ſhe ſhould ſhare the ſame fate with the reſt of her family. Such was the ſtate of the affair at the death of Darius.

Statira, as ſoon as her huſband was upon the throne, cauſes Udiaſtes to be delivered into her hands. She ordered his tongue to be torn out, and made him die in the moſt exquiſite torments ſhe could invent, to puniſh the crime which had occaſioned the ruin of her family. She gave his government to Mithridates, in recompence for his attachment to the intereſts of her family. Paryſatis, on her ſide, took her revenge on the ſon of Teriteuchmes, whom ſhe cauſed to be poiſoned, and we ſhall ſee that Statira's turn was not very remote.

We ſee here the terrible effects of female revenge, and in general of what exceſſes they are capable, who find themſelves above all laws, and have no other rule for their actions than their will and paſſions.

Cyrus, having reſolved to dethrone his brother, employed Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian general, to raiſe a body of Grecian troops, under pretence of a war, which that Spartan was to carry into Thrace. I ſhall defer ſpeaking of this famous expedition, and alſo of the death of Socrates, which happened about the ſame time; intending to treat thoſe two great events in all the extent they deſerve. It was without doubt with the ſame view, that Cyrus preſented Lyſander a galley of two cubits in length, made of ivory and gold, to congratulate him upon his naval victory. That galley was conſecrated to Apollo in the temple of Delphos. Lyſander went ſoon after to Sardis, charged with magnificent preſents for Cyrus from the allies.

It was upon that occaſion Cyrus had the celebrated converſation with Lyſander, related by Xenophon, and which Cicero after him has applied ſo beautifully. That young * prince, who piqued himſelf more upon

* *Narrat Socrates in eo libro Cyrum minorem, regem Perſarum, præſtantem ingenio atque imperii gloria, cum Lyſander Lacedæmonius vir ſummæ virtutis, veniſſet*

his integrity and politeneſs than nobility and grandeur, pleaſed himſelf with conducting in perſon ſo illuſtrious a gueſt through his gardens, and to make him obſerve the various beauties of them. Lyſander, ſtruck with ſo fine a proſpect, admired the manner in which the ſeveral parts were laid out, the height and projection of the trees, the neatneſs and diſpoſition of the walks; the abundance of fruits, planted with an art which had known how to unite the uſeful with the agreeable; the beauty of the parterres, and the glowing variety of flowers, exhaling odours univerſally throughout the delightful ſcene. "Every thing charms and tranſports me in this place," ſaid Lyſander, addreſſing himſelf to Cyrus; "but what ſtrikes me moſt, is the exquiſite taſte and elegant induſtry of the perſon who drew the plan of the ſeveral parts of this garden, and gave it the fine order, wonderful diſpoſition, and happineſs of ſymmetry, which I cannot ſufficiently admire." Cyrus infinitely pleaſed with this diſcourſe, replied, "It was I that drew the plan, and entirely marked it out; and not only that, many of the trees which you ſee, were planted with my own hands."—"What," replied Lyſander, conſidering him from head to foot, "is it poſſible, with theſe purple robes and ſplendid veſtments, thoſe ſtrings of jewels and bracelets of gold, thoſe buſkins ſo richly embroidered, that you could play the gardener, and employ your royal hands in planting trees?"—"Does that ſurpriſe you?" ſaid Cyrus, "I ſwear by the god * Mithras, that when my

veniſſet ad eum Sardes, eique que dona à ſociis attuliſſet, et cæteris in rebus comem erga Lyſandrum atque humanum fuiſſe, et ei quemdam conſeptum agrum diligenter conſitum oſtendiſſe. Cum autem admiraretur Lyſander et proceritates arborum, et directos in quincuncem ordines, et humum ſubactam atque puram, et ſuavitatem odorum qui efflarentur è floribus; tum eum dixiſſe, mirari ſe non modo diligentiam, ſed etiam ſolertiam ejus, à quo eſſent illa dimenſa atque deſcripta. Et ei Cyrum reſpondiſſe: Atque ego iſta ſum dimenſus, mei ſunt ordines, mea deſcriptio, multæ etiam iſtarum arborum mea manu ſunt ſatæ. Tum Lyſandrum intuentem ejus purpuram et nitorem corporis, ornatumque Perſicum multo auro multiſque gemmis, dixiſſe: Recte vero, te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuæ fortuna conjuncta eſt. Cic. de Senec. n. 59.

* The Perſians adored the ſun under that name, who was their principal god.

health admits, I never ſit down to table without having made myſelf ſweat with ſome fatigue or other, either in military exerciſe, rural labour, or ſome other toilſome employment, to which I apply with pleaſure, and without ſparing myſelf." Lyſander was amazed at this diſcourſe, and preſſing him by the hand; * "Cyrus," ſaid he, "you are truly happy, and deſerve your high fortune; becauſe you unite it with virtue."

Alcibiades was at no ſmall pains to diſcover the myſtery of the levies made by Cyrus, and went into the province of Pharnabaſus, with deſign to proceed to the court of Perſia, and to apprize Artaxerxes of the ſcheme laid againſt him. Had he arrived there, a diſcovery of ſuch importance had infallibly procured him the favour of that prince, and the aſſiſtance he wanted for the re-eſtabliſhment of his country. But the Lacedæmonian partizans at Athens, that is to ſay, the thirty tyrants, apprehended the intrigues of ſo ſuperior a genius as his, and repreſented to their maſters, that they were inevitably ruined, if they did not find means to rid themſelves of Alcibiades. The Lacedæmonians thereupon wrote to Pharnabaſus, and with an abject meanneſs not to be excuſed, and which ſhowed how much Sparta had degenerated from her ancient manners, made preſſing inſtances to him, to deliver them at any rate from ſo formidable an enemy. The ſatrap complied to their wiſh. Alcibiades was then in a ſmall town in Phrygia, where he lived with his concubine † Timandra. Thoſe who were ſent to kill him, not daring to enter his houſe, contented themſelves with ſurrounding and ſetting it on fire. Alcibiades, having quitted it through the flames, ſword in hand, the Barbarians were afraid to ſtay to come to blows with him, but flying and retreating as he advanced, they poured their darts and arrows upon him, and he fell dead upon

* Δικαιως, ω Κυρε ευδαιμονις· αγαθος γαρ ων ευδαιμονεις. Which Cicero tranſlates: *Recte verò te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuæ fortuna conjuncta eſt.*

† It was ſaid that Lais the famous courtezan, called the Corinthian, was the daughter of this Timandra.

the

the ſpot. Timandra took up his body, and having adorned and covered it with the fineſt robes ſhe had, ſhe made as magnificent a funeral for it, as her preſent condition would admit.

Such was the end of Alcibiades, whoſe great virtues were ſtifled and ſuppreſſed by ſtill greater vices. * It is not eaſy to ſay, whether his good or bad qualities were moſt pernicious to his country; for, with the one he deceived, and with the other he oppreſſed it. In him diſtinguiſhed valour was united with nobility of blood. His perſon was beautiful and finely made, he was eloquent, of great ability in affairs, inſinuating, and formed for charming all mankind. He loved glory; but without prejudice to his inclination for pleaſure; nor was he ſo fond of pleaſure as to neglect his glory for it. He knew how to give into, or abſtract himſelf from it, according to the ſituation of his affairs. Never was there ductility of genius equal to his. He metamorphoſed himſelf with incredible facility, like a Proteus, into the moſt contrary forms, and ſupported them all with as much eaſe and grace, as if each had been natural to him.

This convertibility of character, according to occaſions, the cuſtoms of countries, and his own intereſts, diſcover a heart void of principles, without either truth or juſtice. He did not confine himſelf either to religion, virtue, laws, duties, or his country. His ſole rule of action was his private ambition, to which he reduced every thing. His aim was to pleaſe, to dazzle, and be beloved; but at the ſame time to ſubject thoſe he ſoothed. He favoured them only as they ſerved his purpoſes; and made his correſpondence and ſociety a means for engroſſing every thing to himſelf.

His life was a perpetual mixture of good and evil. His ſallies for virtue were ill ſuſtained, and quickly degenerated into vices and crimes, very little to the honour of the inſtructions of that great philoſopher,

* *Cujus neſcio utrum bona an vitia patriæ pernicioſiora fuerint; illis enim cives ſuos decepit, his afflixit.* VAL. MAX. l. iii. c. 1.

who

who took no ſmall pains to cultivate him into a man of worth. His actions were glorious; but without rule or principle. His character was elevated and grand; but without connection and conſiſtence. He was ſucceſſively the ſupport and terror of the Lacedæmonians and Perſians. He was either the misfortune or refuge of his own country, according to his declaring for or againſt it. In fine, he was the author of an univerſal deſtructive war in Greece, from the ſole motive of commanding, by inducing the Athenians to beſiege Syracuſe; much leſs from the hope of conquering Sicily, and afterwards Africa, than with the deſign of keeping Athens in dependence upon himſelf; convinced, that having to deal with an inconſtant, ſuſpicious, ungrateful, jealous people, averſe to thoſe that governed, it was neceſſary to engage them continually in ſome great affair, in order to make his ſervices always neceſſary to them, and that they might not be at leiſure to examine, cenſure, and condemn his conduct.

He had the fate generally experienced by perſons of his character, and of which they cannot reaſonably complain. He never loved any one, himſelf being his ſole motive; nor ever found a friend. He made it his merit and glory to amuſe all men, and nobody confided in, or adhered to him. His ſole view was to live with ſplendor, and to lord it univerſally; and he periſhed miſerably, abandoned by the whole world, and obliged at his death to the feeble ſervices and impotent zeal of one only woman for the laſt honours rendered to his remains.

About this time died Democritus the philoſopher, of whom more will be ſaid elſewhere.

SECT.

SECT. II. *The Thirty exercise the most horrid Cruelties at Athens. They put Theramenes, one of their Colleagues, to Death. Socrates takes his Defence upon himself. Thrasybulus attacks the Tyrants, makes himself Master of Athens, and restores its Liberty.*

THE council of thirty, established at Athens by Lysander, committed the most execrable cruelties. Upon pretence of restraining the multitude within their duty, and to prevent seditions, they had caused guards to be assigned them, had armed three thousand of the citizens for that service, and at the same time disarmed all the rest. The whole city was in the utmost terror and dismay. Whoever opposed their injustice and violence, became the victims of them. Riches were a crime that never failed of drawing a sentence upon their owners, always followed with death, and the confiscation of estates; which the thirty tyrants divided amongst themselves. They put more people to death, says Xenophon, in eight months of peace, than the enemies had done in a war of thirty years.

The two most considerable persons of the thirty were Critias and Theramenes, who at first lived in great union, and always acted in concert with each other. The latter had some honour, and loved his country. When he saw with what an excess of violence and cruelty his colleagues behaved, he declared openly against them, and thereby drew their resentment upon him. Critias became his most mortal enemy, and acted as informer against him before the senate, accusing him of disturbing the tranquillity of the state, and of designing to subvert the present government. As he perceived that the defence of Theramenes was heard with silence and approbation, he was afraid, that if the affair was left to the decision of the senate, they would acquit him. Having therefore caused a band of young men, whom he had armed with poniards, to advance

[a] Xenoph. Hist. l. ii. p. 462, & 479. Diod. l. xiv. p. 235—238. Justin. l. v. c. 8, 10.

to

to the bar, he ſaid that he thought it the duty of a ſupreme magiſtrate to prevent juſtice from being abuſed, and that he ſhould act conformably upon this occaſion. "But," continued he, "as the law does not admit, that any of the three thouſand ſhould be put to death without the conſent of the ſenate, I exclude Theramenes from that number, and condemn him to die in virtue of my own and my colleagues authority." Theramenes, upon theſe words, leaping upon the altar; "I demand," ſaid he, "Athenians, that I may be tried according to the laws; which cannot be refuſed me without manifeſt injuſtice. Not that I imagine, that the goodneſs of my cauſe will avail me any thing, or the ſanction of altars protect me, but I would ſhow at leaſt that my enemies reſpect neither the gods nor men. What moſt aſtoniſhes me is, that perſons of your wiſdom do not ſee, that your own names may be as eaſily ſtruck out of the liſt of the citizens, as that of Theramenes." Critias, upon this, ordered the officers of juſtice to pull him down from the altar. An univerſal ſilence and terror enſued upon the ſight of the armed ſoldiers that ſurrounded the ſenate. Of all the ſenators, only Socrates, whoſe diſciple Theramenes had been, took upon him his defence, and oppoſed the officers of juſtice. But his weak endeavours could not deliver Theramenes, who was led to the place of execution, notwithſtanding all he could do, through crouds of the citizens, who ſaw with tears, in the fate of a man equally conſiderable for his love of liberty and the great ſervices he had done his country, what they had to fear for themſelves. When they preſented him the hemloc, that is, the poiſon (which was the manner of putting the citizens of Athens to death) he took it with an intrepid air, and after having drank it; he poured the bottom upon the table, after the uſual manner obſerved in feaſts or public rejoicings, ſaying, "This for the noble Critias." Xenophon relates this circumſtance, inconſiderable in itſelf, to ſhow, ſays he, the tranquillity of Theramenes in his laſt moments.

The

The tyrants delivered from a colleague, whose presence alone was a continual reproach to them, no longer observed any measures. Nothing passed throughout the city but imprisonments and murders. * Every body trembled for themselves or their friends. The general desolation had no remedy, nor was there any hope of regaining their liberty. Where had they then as many † Harmodiuses as they had tyrants? Terror had taken entire possession of their minds, whilst the whole city deplored in secret their loss of liberty, without having one amongst them generous enough to attempt the breaking of its chains. The Athenian people seemed to have lost that valour, which till then had made them awful and terrible to their neighbours and enemies. They seemed to have lost the very use of speech; not daring to vent the least complaint, lest it should be made a capital crime in them. Socrates only continued intrepid. He consoled the afflicted senate, animated the desponding citizens, and set all men an admirable example of courage and resolution; preserving his liberty, and sustaining his port in the midst of thirty tyrants, who made all else tremble, but could never shake the constancy of Socrates with their menaces. [e] Critias, who had been his pupil, was the first to declare most openly against him, taking offence at the free and bold discourses which he held against the government of the thirty. He went so far as to prohibit his instructing the youth: but Socrates, who neither acknowledged his authority, nor feared the violent effects of it, paid no regard to so unjust an order.

[e] Xenoph. memorab. l. i. p. 716, 717.

* *Poteratne civitas illa conquiescere, in qua tot tyranni erant, quot satellites essent? Ne spes quidem ulla recipiendæ libertatis animis poterat offerri, nec ulli remedio locus apparebat contra tantam vim malorum. Unde enim miseræ civitati tot Harmodios? Socrates tamen in medio erat, et lugentes patres consolabatur, et desperantes de republica exhortabatur —— et imitari volentibus magnum circumferebat exemplar, cum inter triginta dominos liber incederat.* SENEC. de tranquil. anim. c. iii.

† Harmodius formed a conspiracy for the deliverance of Athens from the tyranny of the Pisistratides.

All

All the citizens of any conſideration in Athens, and who retained a love of liberty, quitted a place reduced to ſo hard and ſhameful a ſlavery, and fought elſewhere an aſylum and retreat, where they might live in ſafety. At the head of theſe was Thraſybulus, a perſon of extraordinary merit, who beheld with the moſt lively affliction the miſeries of his country. The Lacedæmonians had the inhumanity to endeavour to deprive thoſe unhappy fugitives of this laſt reſource. They publiſhed an edict to prohibit the cities of Greece from giving them refuge, decreed that they ſhould be delivered up to the thirty tyrants, and condemned all ſuch as ſhould contravene the execution of this edict, to pay a fine of five talents. Only two cities rejected with diſdain ſo unjuſt an ordinance, Megara and Thebes; the latter of which made a decree to puniſh all perſons whatſoever, who ſhould ſee an Athenian attacked by his enemies without doing his utmoſt to aſſiſt him. Lyſias, an orator of Syracuſe, who had been baniſhed by the thirty, * raiſed five hundred ſoldiers at his own expence, and ſent them to the aid of the common country of eloquence.

Thraſybulus loſt no time. After having taken Phyla, a ſmall fort of Attica, he marched to the Piræus, of which he made himſelf maſter. The thirty flew thither with their troops, and a battle ſufficiently warm enſued. But as the ſoldiers on one ſide fought with valour and vigour for their liberty, and on the other with indolence and neglect for the power of others, the ſucceſs was not doubtful, but followed the better cauſe. The tyrants were overthrown. Critias was killed upon the ſpot. And as the reſt of the army were taking to flight, Thraſybulus cried out; "Wherefore do you fly from me as from a victor, rather than aſſiſt me as the avenger of your liberty? We are not enemies, but fellow-citizens; nor have we declared war againſt the city, but againſt the thirty tyrants." He continued with bidding them remember, that they had the ſame origin, country, laws,

* *Quingentos milites, ſtipendio ſuo inſtructos, in auxilium patriæ communis eloquentiæ miſit.* JUSTIN. l. v. c. 9.

and

and religion; he exhorted them to compaſſionate their exiled brethren, to reſtore their country to them, and reſume their liberty themſelves. This diſcourſe had ſuitable effects. The army, upon their return to Athens, expelled the thirty, and ſubſtituted ten perſons to govern in their room, whoſe conduct proved no better than theirs.

It is a matter of ſurpriſe, that ſo ſudden, ſo univerſal, ſo tenacious, and ſo uniform a conſpiracy againſt the public good, ſhould always actuate the ſeveral bodies of perſons eſtabliſhed in the adminiſtration of this government. This we have ſeen in the four hundred formerly choſen by Athens; again in the thirty; and now in the ten. And what augments our wonder is, that this paſſion for tyranny ſhould poſſeſs ſo immediately republicans, born in the boſom of liberty, accuſtomed to an equality of condition on which it is founded, and principled from their earlieſt infancy in an abhorrence of all ſubjection and dependency. [f] There muſt be on the one ſide in power and authority ſome violent impulſe to actuate in this manner ſo many perſons, of whom many, no doubt, were not without ſentiments of virtue and honour; and to baniſh ſo ſuddenly the principles and manners natural to them; and on the other an exceſſive propenſity in the mind of man to ſubject his equals, to rule over them imperiouſly, to carry him on to the laſt extremes of oppreſſion and cruelty, and to make him forget at once all laws, nature, and religion.

The thirty being fallen from their power and hopes, ſent deputies to Lacedæmon to demand aid. It was not Lyſander's fault, who was ſent to them with troops, that the tyrants were not re-eſtabliſhed. But king Pauſanias, moved with compaſſion for the deplorable condition, to which a city, once ſo flouriſhing, was reduced, had the generoſity to favour the Athenians in ſecret, and at length obtained a peace for them. It was ſealed with the blood of the tyrants, who, having taken arms to reinſtate themſelves in the government, and being

[f] *Vi dominationis convulſus.* TACIT.

preſent

preſent at a parley for that purpoſe, were all put to the ſword, and left Athens in the full poſſeſſion of its liberty. All the exiles were recalled. Thraſybulus at that time propoſed the celebrated amneſty, by which the citizens engaged upon oath that all paſt tranſactions ſhould be buried in oblivion. The government was re-eſtabliſhed upon its ancient foot; the laws reſtored to their priſtine vigour, and magiſtrates elected with the uſual forms.

I cannot forbear obſerving in this place the wiſdom and moderation of Thraſybulus, ſo ſalutary and eſſential after ſo long a continuance of domeſtic troubles. This is one of the fineſt events in ancient hiſtory, worthy the Athenian lenity and benevolence, and has ſerved as a model to ſucceſſive ages in good government.

Never had tyranny been more cruel and bloody than that the Athenians had lately thrown off. Every houſe was in mourning; every family bewailed the loſs of ſome relation. It had been a ſeries of public robbery and rapine, in which licence and impunity had authorized all manner of crimes. The people ſeemed to have a right to demand the blood of all accomplices in ſuch notorious malverſations, and even the intereſt of the ſtate to authorize ſuch a claim, that by exemplary ſeverities ſuch enormous crimes might be prevented for the future. But Thraſybulus riſing above thoſe ſentiments, from the ſuperiority of his more extenſive genius, and the views of a more diſcerning and profound policy, foreſaw, that by giving in to the puniſhment of the guilty, eternal ſeeds of diſcord and enmity would remain, to weaken the republic by domeſtic diviſions, which it was neceſſary to unite againſt the common enemy, and occaſion the loſs to the ſtate of a great number of citizens, who might render it important ſervices from the view itſelf of making amends for paſt miſbehaviour.

Such a conduct after great troubles in a ſtate has always ſeemed, with the ableſt politicians, the moſt certain and ready means to reſtore the public peace and tranquillity.

tranquillity. * Cicero, when Rome was divided into two factions upon the occasion of Cæsar's death, who had been killed by the conspirators, calling to mind this celebrated amnesty, proposed after the example of the Athenians, to bury all that had passed in eternal oblivion. § Cardinal Mazarin observed to Don Lewis de Haro, prime minister of Spain, that this gentle and humane conduct in France had prevented the troubles and revolts of that kingdom from having any fatal consequences, and "that the king had not lost a foot of land by them to that day;" whereas the inflexible severity of the Spaniards "was the occasion, that the subjects of that monarchy, whenever they threw off the mask, never returned to their obedience but by the force of arms; which sufficiently appears," says he, "in the example of the Hollanders, who are in the peaceable possession of many provinces, that not an age ago were the patrimony of the king of Spain."

Diodorus Siculus takes occasion from the thirty tyrants of Athens, whose immoderate ambition induced them to treat their country with the most excessive cruelties, to observe how unfortunate it is † persons in power to want a sense of honour, and to disregard either the present opinion, or the judgment posterity will form of their conduct: for from the contempt of reputation the transition is too common to that of virtue itself. They may perhaps, by the awe of their power, suppress for some time the public voice, and impose a forced

§ Let. XV. of Card. Maz.

* *In ædem Telluris convocati sumus; in quo templo, quantum in me fuit, jeci fundamentum pacis; Athenienſiumque renovavi vetus exemplum, Græcum etiam* ‡ *verbum uſurpavi, quòd tum in ſedandis diſcordiis uſurpaveret civitas illa; atque omnem memoriam diſcordiarum oblivione ſempiterna delendam cenſui.* PHILIP. l. i. n. i.

‡ Some believe that word was αμνησια; but as it is not found in the hiſtorians who have treated this fact, it is more likely, that it was μεμνησικακησειν, which has the ſame ſenſe, and is uſed by them all.

† *Cetera principibus ſtatem adeſſe unum inſatiabiliter parandum, proſperam ſui memoriam; nam contemptâ famâ, contemni virtutes—Quo magis ſocordiam eorum irrideri libet, qui præſenti potentiâ credunt extingui poſſe etiam ſequentis ævi memoriam—ſuum cuique decus poſteritas rependit.* TACIT. Annal. l. iv. c. 30, & 55.

ſilence

ſilence upon cenſure; but the more conſtraint they lay upon it during their lives, the more liberal will it be, after their deaths, of complaints and reproaches, and the more infamy and imputation will be fixed to their memories. The power of the thirty was of a very ſhort duration, their guilt immortal, which will be remembered with abhorrence throughout all ages, whilſt their names will be recorded in hiſtory only to render them odious, and to make their crimes deteſtable. He applies the ſame reflection to the Lacedæmonians, who after having made themſelves maſters of Greece by a wiſe and moderate conduct, fell from that glory, through the ſeverity, haughtineſs, and injuſtice, with which they treated their allies. There is doubtleſs no reader, whom their abject and cruel jealouſy, in regard to Athens, enſlaved and humbled, has not prejudiced againſt them; nor is there any reſemblance in ſuch behaviour of the greatneſs of mind and noble generoſity of ancient Sparta; ſo much power has the luſt of dominion and proſperity over even virtuous men. Diodorus concludes his reflection with a maxim very true, though very little known: "The greatneſs and majeſty of princes," ſays he, (and the ſame may be ſaid of all perſons in high authority) "can be ſupported only by humanity and juſtice with regard to their ſubjects; as on the contrary they are ruined and deſtroyed by a cruel and oppreſſive government, which never fails to draw upon them the hatred of their people."

SECT. III. *Lyſander abuſes his Power in an extraordinary Manner. He is recalled to Sparta upon the Complaint of Pharnabaſus.*

[h] AS Lyſander had the greateſt ſhare in the celebrated exploits, which had raiſed the glory of the Lacedæmonians to ſo high a pitch; ſo had he acquired a degree of power and authority, of which there was no example before in Sparta; but he ſuffered himſelf to be carried away by a preſumption and vanity ſtill greater

[h] Plut. in Lyſand. p. 443—445.

than

than his power. He permitted the Grecian cities to dedicate altars to him as to a god, and to offer ſacrifices, and ſing hymns and canticles in honour of him. The Samians ordained, by a public decree, that the feaſts celebrated in honour of Juno, and which bore the name of that goddeſs ſhould be called the *Feaſts of Lyſander*. He had always a crowd of poets about him (who are often a tribe of venal flatterers) who emulated each other in ſinging his great exploits, for which they were magnificently paid. Praiſe is undoubtedly due to noble deeds; but diminiſhes their luſtre when either forged or exceſſive.

This ſort of vanity and ambition, had he ſtopped there, would have hurt only himſelf, by expoſing him to envy and contempt; but a natural conſequence of it was that through his arrogance and pride, in conjunction with the inceſſant flatteries of thoſe around him, he carried the ſpirit of command and authority to an inſupportable exceſs, and obſerved no longer any meaſures either in rewarding or puniſhing. The abſolute government of cities with tyrannic power were the fruits of his friendſhip, and the ties of hoſpitality with him; and only the death of thoſe he hated, could put an end to his reſentment and diſpleaſure, without its being impoſſible to eſcape his vengeance. What Sylla cauſed to be inſcribed upon his tomb, might, with equal propriety, have been engraved upon Lyſander's: That no man had ever ſurpaſſed him in doing good to his friends, or evil to his enemies.

Treachery and perjury coſt him nothing whenever they prompted his deſigns; nor was he leſs cruel than revengeful; of which what he did at Miletus is a ſufficient proof. Apprehending that thoſe who were at the head of the people would eſcape him, he ſwore not to do them any hurt. Thoſe unfortunates gave credit to his oath, and no ſooner appeared in public, than they were put to the ſword with his conſent by the nobility, who killed them all, though no leſs than eight hundred. The number of thoſe in the party of the people, whom he cauſed to be maſſacred in the other cities, is incredible;

for he did not only deſtroy to ſatiate his own reſentments, but to ſerve, in all places, the enmity, malice, and avarice of his friends, whom he ſupported in gratifying their paſſions by the death of their enemies.

There was no kind of injuſtice and violence which the people did not ſuffer under the government of Lyſander; whilſt the Lacedæmonians, who were ſufficiently informed of his conduct, gave themſelves no trouble to prevent its effects. It is too common for thoſe in power to be little affected with the vexations and oppreſſions laid upon perſons of low condition and credit, and to be deaf to their juſt complaints, though authority is principally confided in them for the defence of the weak and poor, who have no other protectors. But if ſuch remonſtrances are made by a great or powerful perſon, from whom they may have any thing to hope or fear, the ſame authority that was ſlow and drowſy, becomes immediately warm and officious; a certain proof that it is not the love of juſtice that actuates it: this appears here in the conduct of the Lacedæmonian magiſtrates. Pharnabaſus, weary of Lyſander's repeated injuſtices, who ravaged and pillaged the provinces under his command, having ſent ambaſſadors to Sparta, to complain of the wrongs he had received from that general, the Ephori recalled him. Lyſander was at that time in the Helleſpont. The letter of the Ephori threw him into great conſternation. As he principally feared the complaints and accuſations of Pharnabaſus, he made all the haſte he could to come to an explanation with him, from the hope of ſoftening him, and making his peace. He went for that purpoſe to him, and deſired, that he would write another letter to the Ephori, intimating a ſatisfaction in his conduct. But Lyſander, ſays Plutarch, in ſuch an application to Pharnabaſus, forgot the *proverb, *Set a thief to catch a thief.* The ſatrap, promiſed all he deſired, and accordingly wrote ſuch a letter in Lyſander's preſence as he had aſked of him, but prepared another to a quite different effect. When he was to ſeal it, as both letters were of the ſame ſize and

*The Greek proverb is *Cretan againſt Cretan*, from the people of Crete, who paſſed for the greateſt cheats and liars in the world.

form, he dexterously put that he had written in secret into the place of the other, without being observed, which he sealed and gave him.

Lysander departed well satisfied, and being arrived at Sparta, alighted at the palace where the senate was assembled, and delivered Pharnabasus's letter to the Ephori. But he was strangely surprised when he heard the contents, and withdrew in extreme confusion and disorder. Some days after he returned to the senate, and told the Ephori, that he was obliged to go to the temple of Ammon to acquit himself of the sacrifices he had vowed to that god before his battles. That pilgrimage was no more than a pretence, to cover the pain it gave him to live as a private person in Sparta, and to submit to the yoke of obeying; he, who till then had always governed. Accustomed long to commanding armies, and to the flattering distinctions of a kind of sovereignty exercised by him in Asia, he could not endure the mortifying equality with the multitude, nor restrain himself to the simplicity of a private life. Having obtained permission, not without great difficulties, he embarked.

As soon as he was gone, the kings, reflecting that he held all the cities in his dependence, by the means of their governors and magistrates established by him, to whom they were also indebted for their unlimited authority, and that he was thereby effectually lord and master of all Greece, applied themselves vigorously to restore the government of the people, and to depose all his creatures and friends from any share in it. This alteration occasioned great tumults at first. About the same time Lysander, being apprized of the design of Thrasybulus, to re-establish the liberty of his country, returned with the utmost diligence to Sparta, and endeavoured to engage the Lacedæmonians to support the party of the nobility at Athens. We have before observed, that Pausanias, from a more noble spirit of equity and generosity, gave peace to Athens, and by that means, says Plutarch, clipped the wings of Lysander's ambition.

CHAP. II.

Young Cyrus, with the Aid of the Grecian Troops, endeavours to dethrone his Brother Artaxerxes. He is killed in Battle. Famous Retreat of the Ten Thousand.

ANTIQUITY has few events so memorable as those I am about to relate in this place. We see on one side a young prince, abounding, otherwise, with excellent qualities, abandoned to his violent ambition, carry the war from far against his brother and sovereign, and go to attack him almost in his own palace, with the view of depriving him at once of his crown and life. We see him, I say, fall dead in the battle, at the feet of that brother, and terminate, by so unhappy a fate, an enterprise equally glaring and criminal. On the other hand, the Greeks who follow him*, destitute of all succour after the loss of their chiefs, without allies, provisions, money, horse, or archers, reduced to less than ten thousand men, with no resource but in their own persons and valour, supported only by the warm desire of preserving their liberty, and of returning to their native countries; these Greeks, with bold and intrepid resolution, make their retreat before a victorious army of a million of men, traverse five or six hundred leagues, notwithstanding vast rivers and innumerable passes, and arrive at last in their own country, through a thousand fierce and barbarous nations, victorious over all obstacles in their way, and over all the dangers which either concealed fraud or open force reduce them to undergo.

This retreat, in the opinion of the best judges, and most experienced in the art of war, is the boldest and best-conducted exploit to be found in ancient history, and is deemed a perfect model in its kind. Happily for us it is described to the most minute circumstance by a historian, who was not only eye-witness of the facts he

* *Post mortem Cyri, neque armis à tanto exercitu vinci, neque dolo capi potuerunt; revertentesque inter tot indomitas nationes et barbaras gentes per tanta itineris spatia, virtute se usque terminos patriæ defenderunt.* JUSTIN, l. v. c. 11.

relates,

A MAP OF THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND

EUXINE OR BLACK SEA

CASPIAN SEA

IBERIA OR GEORGIA

THAIXIBES

TAOCHI

ARMENIA

ASIA SUPERIOR

ASIA MINOR

PHLAGONIA

TIBARENI

TURKEY IN ASIA

PISIDIA

MESOPOTAMIA OR DIARBEK

SYRIA

CARDUCHI

MEDIA

CYPRUS

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

PHOENICIA

SYRIA

ARABIA DESERTA

HOLY LAND

ARABIA PETRÆA

EGYPT

ASSYRIA

BABYLONIA

A SCALE

relates, but the first mover, the soul of this great enterprise. I shall only abridge it, and abstract its most material circumstances; but I cannot omit advising young persons, who make arms their profession, to consult the original, of which there is a good translation extant in French, though far short of the admirable beauties of the text. It is very difficult to meet with a more able master than Xenophon in the art of war, to whom may be well applied here what Homer says of Phœnix, the governor of Achilles [u], "That he was equally capable of forming his pupil for eloquence or arms."

Μυθων τε ρητηρ' εμεναι, πρηκτηρα τε εργων.

SECT. I. *Cyrus raises Troops secretly against his Brother Artaxerxes. Thirteen Thousand Greeks join him. He sets out for Sardis, and arrives in Babylonia after a March of six Months.*

[x] WE have already said, that young Cyrus, son of Darius Nothus and Paryfatis, saw with pain his elder brother Artaxerxes upon the throne, and that at the very time the latter was taking possession of it, he had attempted to deprive him of his crown and life together. Artaxerxes was not insensible of what he had to fear from a brother of his enterprising and ambitious spirit, but could not refuse pardoning him to the prayers and tears of his mother Paryfatis, who doated upon this youngest son. He removed him therefore into Asia to his government; confiding to him, contrary to all the rules of policy, an absolute authority over the provinces left him by the will of the king his father.

As soon as he arrived there, his thoughts were solely intent upon revenging the supposed affront he had received from his brother, and to dethrone him. [y] He received all that came from the court with great favour and affability, to induce them insensibly to quit the

[u] Iliad. x. ver. 443.

[x] A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 440. Diod. l. xiv. p. 243—249, & 252. Justin. l. v. c. 11. Xenoph. de Cyri Exped. l. i. p. 243—248.

[y] A. M. 3601. Ant. J. C. 403.

king's

king's party and adhere to him. He gained alſo the hearts of the Barbarians under his government; familiarizing himſelf with them, and mingling with the common ſoldiery, though without forgetting the dignity of their general; theſe he formed, by various exerciſes, for the trade of war. He applied particularly in ſecret to raiſe, from ſeveral parts, and upon different pretexts, a body of Grecian troops, upon whom he relied much more than upon thoſe of the Barbarians. Clearchus retired to his court after having been baniſhed from Sparta, and was of great ſervice to him, being an able, experienced, and valiant captain. [n] At the ſame time ſeveral cities in the provinces of Tiſſaphernes revolted from their obedience in favour of Cyrus. This incident, which was not an effect of chance, but of the ſecret practices of that prince, gave birth to a war between them. Cyrus, under the pretence of arming againſt Tiſſaphernes, aſſembled troops openly; and to amuſe the court the more ſpeciouſly, ſent grievous complaints to the king, againſt that governor, demanding his protection and aid in the moſt ſubmiſſive manner, Artaxerxes was deceived by theſe appearances, and believed that all Cyrus's preparations regarded only Tiſſaphernes, and continued quiet, from the aſſurance of having nothing to apprehend for himſelf.

[o] Cyrus knew well how to improve the imprudent ſecurity and indolence of his brother, which ſome people conceived the effect of his goodneſs and humanity. And indeed in the beginning of his reign he ſeemed to imitate the virtues of the firſt Artaxerxes, whoſe name he bore. For he demeaned himſelf with great mildneſs and affability to ſuch as approached him; he honoured and rewarded magnificently all thoſe whoſe ſervices had merited favour; when he paſſed ſentence to puniſh, it was without either outrage or inſult; and when he made preſents, it was with a gracious air, and ſuch obliging circumſtances, as infinitely exalted their value, and implied, that he was never better pleaſed than when he had an opportunity of doing good to his ſub-

[n] A. M. 3602. Ant. J. C. 402. [o] Plut. in Artax. p. 1013.

jects.

jects. To all these excellent qualities it had been very necessary for him to have added one no less royal, and which would have put him upon his guard against the enterprises of a brother, whose character he ought to have known; I mean a wise foresight, that penetrates the future, and renders a prince attentive to prevent or frustrate whatever may disturb the tranquillity of the state.

The emissaries of Cyrus at the court were perpetually dispersing reports and opinions amongst the people, to prepare their minds for the intended change and revolt. They talked that the state required a king of Cyrus's character; a king magnificent, liberal, who loved war, and showered his favours upon those that served him; and that it was necessary for the grandeur of the empire to have a prince upon the throne, fired with ambition and valour for the support and augmentation of its glory.

[p] The young prince lost no time on his side, and hastened the execution of his great design. He was then twenty-three years old at most. After the important services he had done the Lacedæmonians, without which they had never obtained the victories that had made them masters of Greece, he thought he might safely open himself to them. He therefore imparted to them the present situation of his affairs, and the end he had in view; convinced that such a confidence could not but incline them the more in his favour.

In the letter he wrote them, he spoke of himself in very magnificent terms. He told them he had a greater and more royal heart than his brother; that he was better versed in philosophy and the knowledge of the Magi*, and that he could drink more wine without being disordered in his senses, a very meritorious quality amongst the Barbarians, but not so proper to recommend him to the opinion of those he wrote to. The Lacedæmonians sent orders to their fleet to join that of the prince

[p] A. M. 3603. Ant. J. C. 401.

* By the knowledge of the Magi, amongst the Persians, was meant the science of religion and government.

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immediately, and to obey the commands of Tamos, his admiral, in all things, but without the leaſt mention of Cyrus, or ſeeming, in any manner, privy to his deſign. They thought that precaution * neceſſary for their juſtification with Artaxerxes, in caſe affairs ſhould happen to terminate in his favour.

The troops of Cyrus, according to the review afterwards made, conſiſted of thirteen thouſand Greeks, which were the flower and chief force of his army, and of a hundred thouſand regular men of the barbarous nations. Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian, commanded all the Peloponneſian troops, except the Achæans, who had Socrates of Achaia for their leader. The Bœotians were under Proxenes the Theban, and the Theſſalians under Menon. [q] The Barbarians had Perſian generals, of whom the chief was Ariæus. The fleet conſiſted of thirty-five ſhips under Pythagoras the Lacedæmonian, and of twenty-five commanded by Tamos the Egyptian, admiral of the whole fleet. It followed the land army, coaſting along the ſhore.

Cyrus had opened his deſign only to Clearchus of all the Greeks, foreſeeing aright that the length and boldneſs of the enterpriſe could not fail of diſcouraging and diſguſting the officers, as well as ſoldiers. He made it his ſole application to gain their affections during the march, by treating them with kindneſs and humanity, converſing freely with them, and giving effectual orders that they ſhould want for nothing. Proxenes, between whoſe family and Xenophon's an ancient friendſhip ſubſiſted, preſented that young Athenian to Cyrus [r], who received him very favourably, and gave him an employment in his army amongſt the Greeks. He ſet out for Sardis at length, and marched towards the upper provinces of Aſia. The troops knew neither the occaſion of the war, nor into what countries they were going. Cyrus had only cauſed it to be given

[q] Xenoph. Cyri Exped. l. i. p. 252. [r] Xenoph. l. ii. p. 294.

* *Quærentus apud Cyrum gratiam; et apud Artaxerxem, ſi viciſſet, ſeniæ patrocinia, cum nihil adverſus eum aperte decreviſſent.* JUSTIN. l. v. c. 11.

out,

out, that he ſhould act againſt the Piſidians, who had infeſted his province by their incurſions.

[s] Tiſſaphernes, rightly judging that all theſe preparations were too great for ſo ſmall an enterpriſe as againſt Piſidia, had ſet out poſt from Miletus to give the king an account of them. This news occaſioned great trouble at court. Paryſatis, the mother of Artaxerxes and Cyrus was looked upon as the principal cauſe of this war; and all perſons in her ſervice and intereſt were ſuſpected of holding intelligence with Cyrus. Statira, eſpecially, the reigning queen, reproached her inceſſantly in the moſt violent terms. "Where is now," ſaid ſhe to her, "that faith you have ſo often engaged for your ſon's behaviour? Where thoſe ardent prayers you employed to preſerve from death that conſpirator againſt his king and brother? It is your unhappy fondneſs has kindled this war, and plunged us into an abyſs of misfortunes." The antipathy and hatred of the two queens for each other was already very great, and much enflamed by ſuch warm reproaches. We ſhall ſee what conſequences they have. Artaxerxes aſſembled a numerous army to receive his brother.

[t] Cyrus advanced continually by great marches. What troubled him moſt on the way was the paſs of Cilicia, which was a narrow defile between very high and ſteep mountains, that would admit no more than one carriage to paſs at a time. Syenneſis, king of the country, prepared to diſpute this paſſage with him, and would infallibly have ſucceeded, but for the diverſion made by Tamos with his fleet, in conjunction with that of the Lacedæmonians. To defend the coaſts againſt the inſults of the fleet, Syenneſis abandoned that important poſt, which a ſmall body of troops might have made good againſt the greateſt army.

When they arrived at Tarſus, the Greeks refuſed to march any farther, rightly ſuſpecting that they were intended againſt the king, and loudly exclaiming that they

[s] Plut. in Artax. p. 1014. [t] Xenoph. l. i. p. 248—261.

had

had not entered into the ſervice on that condition. Clearchus, who commanded them, had occaſion for all his addreſs and ability to ſtifle this commotion in its birth. At firſt he made uſe of authority and force, but with very ill ſucceſs, and deſiſted therefore from an open oppoſition to their ſentiments: he even affected to enter into their views, and to ſupport them with his approbation and credit. He declared publicly, that he would not ſeparate himſelf from them, and adviſed them to depute perſons to the prince, to know from his own mouth againſt whom they were to be led, that they might follow him voluntarily, if they approved his meaſures; if not, that they might demand his permiſſion to withdraw. By this artful evaſion he appeaſed the tumult, and made them eaſy, and they choſe him and ſome other officers for their deputies. Cyrus, whom he had ſecretly appriſed of every thing, made anſwer that he was going to attack * Abrocomas his enemy, at twelve days march from thence upon the Euphrates. When this anſwer was repeated to them, though they plainly ſaw againſt whom they were going, they reſolved to proceed, and only demanded an augmentation of their pay. Cyrus, inſtead of one † daric a month to each ſoldier, promiſed to give them one and a half.

Some time after Cyrus was informed that two of the principal officers, upon account of a private quarrel with Clearchus, had deſerted, with part of their equipage, on board a merchant ſhip. Many were of opinion, that it was proper to ſend two galleys after them; which might be done with great eaſe, and that when they were brought back, they ſhould be made an example, by ſuffering death in the ſight of the whole army. Cyrus, convinced that favour ‡ was the moſt certain means to the attainment of affection, and that puniſhments, like

* It is not ſaid where he commanded. It appears to be upon the Euphrates. He marched with three hundred thouſand men to join the king's army, but did not arrive till after the battle.

† The daric was worth ten livres.

‡ *Beneficiis potius quam remediis ingenia experiri placuit.* PLIN. in Traj.

violent

violent remedies, ought never to be uſed but in extreme neceſſity, declared publicly that he would not ſuffer it to be ſaid, that he had detained any one in his ſervice by force; and added, that he would ſend them their wives and children, whom they had left as hoſtages in his hands. An anſwer of ſo much wiſdom and generoſity had a ſurpriſing effect; and made even thoſe his firm adherents, who were before inclined to retire. This is an excellent leſſon for all who govern. There is in the mind of man a fund of natural generoſity, which it is neceſſary to know and apply. Threats exaſperate them, and chaſtiſement makes them revolt, when endeavours are uſed to force them to do their duty againſt their will. * They deſire a certain degree of confidence in their honour, and that the glory of acquitting themſelves of it out of choice be left in their power: to ſhow that you believe men faithful, is often the beſt means to make them ſo.

Cyrus ſoon after declared, that he marched againſt Artaxerxes. Upon which ſome murmuring was heard at firſt, but it ſoon gave place to the expreſſions of joy and ſatisfaction, occaſioned by that prince's magnificent promiſes to the army.

"As Cyrus advanced by long marches, he was informed from all parts that the king did not intend to come directly to battle, but had reſolved to wait in the remote parts of Perſia, till all his forces were aſſembled; and that to ſtop his enemies, he had ordered an intrenchment to be thrown up in the plains of Babylonia, with a foſſe of five fathoms broad, and three deep, extending the ſpace of twelve † paraſangas or leagues, from the Euphrates to the wall of Media. Between the Euphrates and the foſſe a way had been left

" Plut. in Artax. p. 1014. Xenoph. l. i. p. 261—266.

* *Neſcio an plus moribus conferat princeps, qui bonos eſſe patitur, quam qui cogit.* PLIN. ibid.

Plerumque habita fides ipſam obligat fidem. LIV.

† The paraſanga is a meaſure of ways peculiar to the Perſians. It was commonly thirty ſtadia, which make about a league and a half French. Some were from twenty to ſixty ſtadia. In the march of Cyrus's army, I ſuppoſe the paraſanga only twenty ſtadia, or one league, for reaſons I ſhall give hereafter.

of

of twenty feet in breadth, by which Cyrus paſſed with his whole army, having reviewed it the day before. The king had neglected to diſpute this paſs with him, and ſuffered him to continue his march towards Babylon. It was Tiribaſus, who determined him not to fly in ſuch a manner before an enemy, againſt whom he had infinite advantages, as well from the number of his troops as the valour of his generals. He reſolved therefore to advance againſt the enemy.

SECT. II. *The Battle of Cunaxa. The Greeks are Victorious on their ſide, Artaxerxes on his. Cyrus is killed.*

[x] THE place where the battle was fought, was called Cunaxa, about * twenty-five leagues from Babylon. The army of Cyrus conſiſted of thirteen thouſand Greeks, a hundred thouſand Barbarians, and twenty chariots armed with ſcythes. The enemy in horſe and foot might amount to about twelve hundred thouſand under four generals, Tiſſaphernes, Gobryas, Arbaces, and Abrocomas, without including ſix thouſand choſen horſe, that fought where the king was preſent, and never quitted his perſon. But Abrocomas, who had the command of three hundred thouſand men, did not arrive till five days after the battle. In the king's army were only a hundred and fifty chariots armed with ſcythes.

Cyrus believed, from the enemy's not having defended the paſs at the foſſe, that there would be no battle; ſo that the next day the army marched with great negligence. But on the third, Cyrus being in his chariot, with a few ſoldiers in their ranks before him, and the reſt marching without any order, or having their arms carried for them, a horſeman came in full ſpeed, crying as he paſſed that the enemy approached in order of battle. Upon this, great confuſion enſued, from the apprehenſion that they ſhould not have

[x] Xenoph. in Exped. Cyr. l. i. p. 263—266. Diod. l. xiv. p. 253, 254. Plut. p. 1014—1017.

* Five hundred ſtadia.

time

time to draw up the army. Cyrus, leaping from his chariot, put on his arms immediately, and getting on horseback with his javelin in his hand, he gave orders universally to the troops to stand to their arms, and fall into their ranks; which was executed with so much expedition, that the troops had not time to refresh themselves.

Cyrus posted upon his right a thousand Paphlagonian horse, supported by the Euphrates, and the light-armed infantry of the Greeks; and next them, Clearchus, Proxenes, and the rest of the general officers to Menon, at the head of their several corps. The left wing, composed of Lydians, Phrygians, and other Asiatic nations were commanded by Ariæus, who had a thousand horse. Cyrus placed himself in the centre, where the chosen troops of the Persians and other Barbarians were posted. He had around him six hundred horsemen, armed at all points, as were their horses with head and breast pieces. The prince's head was uncovered, as were those of all the Persians, whose custom it was to give battle in that manner: the arms of all his people were red, and those of Artaxerxes were white.

A little before the onset Clearchus advised Cyrus not to charge in person, but to cover himself in the rear of the Grecian battalions. "What is it you say?" replied Cyrus. "At the time I am endeavouring to make myself king, would you have me show myself unworthy of being so?" That wise and generous answer proves, that he knew the duty of a general, especially on a day of battle. Had he withdrawn when his presence was most necessary, it would have argued his want of courage, and intimidated others. It is necessary, always preserving the due distinction between the leader and the troops, that their danger should be common, and no one exempt from it; lest the latter should be alarmed by a different conduct. Courage in an army depends upon example, upon the desire of being distinguished, the fear of dishonour, the incapacity of doing otherwise than the rest, and the equality of danger. The retiring of Cyrus had either ruined, or greatly weakened

weakened all these potent motives, by discouraging as well the officers as soldiers of his army. He thought, that being their general, it was incumbent upon him to discharge all the functions of that office, and to show himself worthy to be the leader and soul of such a number of valiant men, ready to shed their blood for his service.

It was now noon, and the enemy did not appear. But about three of the clock a great dust like a white cloud arose, followed soon after with a blackness that overcast the whole plain; after which was seen the glittering of armour, lances, and standards. Tissaphernes commanded the left, which consisted of cavalry armed with white cuirasses, and of light armed infantry; in the centre was the heavy armed foot, a great part of which had bucklers made of wood, which covered the soldier entirely (these were Egyptians). The rest of the light armed infantry and of the horse formed the right wing. The foot were drawn up by nations, with as much depth as front, and in that order composed square battalions. The king had posted himself in the main body with the flower of the whole army, and had six thousand horse for his guard, commanded by Artagerses. Though he was in the centre he was beyond the left wing of Cyrus's army, so much did the front of his own exceed that of the enemy in extent. A hundred and fifty chariots, armed with scythes, were placed in the front of the army at some distance from one another. The scythes were fixed to the axle downwards and aslant, so as to cut down, and overthrow all before them.

As Cyrus relied very much upon the valour and experience of the Greeks, he bade Clearchus, as soon as he had beat the enemies in his front, to take care to incline to his left, and fall upon the centre where the king was posted, the success of the battle depending upon that attack. But Clearchus, finding it very difficult to make his way through so great a body of troops, replied, that he need be in no pain, and that he would take care to do what was necessary.

The

The enemy in the mean time advanced ſlowly in good order. Cyrus marched in the ſpace between the two armies, the neareſt his own, and conſidered both of them with great attention. Xenophon, perceiving him, ſpurred directly up to him, to know whether he had any further orders to give. He called out to him, that the ſacrifices were favourable, and that he ſhould tell the troops ſo. He then haſtened through the ranks to give his orders, and ſhowed himſelf to the ſoldiers with ſuch a joy and ſerenity in his countenance, as inſpired them with new courage, and at the ſame time with an air of kindneſs and familiarity, that excited their zeal and affection. It is not eaſy to comprehend, what great effects a word, a kind air, or a look of a general, will have upon a day of action; and with what ardour a common man will ruſh into danger, when he believes himſelf not unknown to his general, and thinks his valour will oblige him.

Artaxerxes moved on continually, though with a ſlow pace, and without noiſe and confuſion. That good order and exact diſcipline extremely ſurpriſed the Greeks, who expected to ſee much hurry and tumult in ſo great a multitude, and to hear confuſed cries, as Cyrus had foretold them.

The armies were not diſtant above four or five hundred paces, when the Greeks began to ſing the hymn of battle, and to march on, ſoftly at firſt, and with ſilence. When they came near the enemy, they ſet up great cries, ſtriking their darts upon their ſhields to frighten the horſe, and then moving all together, they ſprung forwards upon the Barbarians with all their force, who did not wait their charge, but took to their heels, and fled univerſally; except Tiſſaphernes, who ſtood his ground with a ſmall part of his troops.

Cyrus ſaw with pleaſure the enemy routed by the Greeks, and was proclaimed king by thoſe around him. But he did not give himſelf up to a vain joy, nor as yet reckon himſelf victor. He perceived, that Artaxerxes was wheeling his right to attack him in flank, and marched directly againſt him with his ſix hundred

horſe. He killed Artagerſes, who commanded the king's guards of ſix thouſand horſe, with his own hand, and put the whole body to flight. Diſcovering his brother, he cried out, with his eyes ſparkling with rage, *I ſee him*, and ſpurred againſt him, followed only by his principal officers; for his troops had quitted their ranks to follow the runaways, which was an eſſential fault.

[y] The battle then became a ſingle combat, in ſome meaſure, between Artaxerxes and Cyrus, and the two brothers were ſeen tranſported with rage and fury, endeavouring, like Eteocles and Polynices, to plunge their ſwords into each others hearts, and to aſſure themſelves of the throne by the death of their rival.

Cyrus, having opened his way through thoſe who were drawn up in battle before Artaxerxes, joined him, and killed his horſe, which fell with him to the ground. He roſe, and was remounted upon another, when Cyrus attacked him again, gave him a ſecond wound, and was preparing to give him a third, in hopes that it would prove his laſt. The king, like a lion wounded by the hunters, was only the more furious from the ſmart, and ſprung forward, impetuouſly puſhing his horſe againſt Cyrus, who, running headlong, and without regard to his perſon, threw himſelf into the midſt of a flight of darts aimed at him from all ſides, and received a wound from the king's javelin, at the inſtant all the reſt diſcharged upon him. Cyrus fell dead: ſome ſay by the wound given him by the king; others affirm, that he was killed by a Carian ſoldier. Mithridates, a young Perſian nobleman, aſſerted, that he had given him the mortal ſtroke with a javelin, which entered his temple and pierced his head quite through. The greateſt perſons of his court, reſolving not to ſurvive ſo good a maſter, were all killed around his body; a certain proof, ſays Xenophon, that he well knew how to chooſe his friends, and that he was truly beloved by them. Ariæus, who ought to have been the firmeſt of all his adherents, fled with the left wing, as ſoon as he heard of his death.

[y] Diod. l. xiv. p. 254.

Artaxerxes,

Artaxerxes, after having caused the head and right hand of his brother to be cut off by the eunuch Mesabetes, pursued the enemy into their camp. Ariæus had not stopped there, but having passed through it, continued his retreat to the place where the army had encamped the day before, which was about four leagues distant.

Tissaphernes, after the defeat of the greatest part of his left wing by the Greeks, led on the rest against them, and by the side of the river, passed through the light-armed infantry of the Greeks, who opened to give him passage, and made their discharge upon him as he passed without losing a man. They were commanded by Epistenes of Amphipolis, who was esteemed an able captain. Tissaphernes kept on without returning to the charge, because he perceived he was too weak, and went forward to Cyrus's camp, where he found the king, who was plundering it; but had not been able to force the quarter defended by the Greeks left to guard it, who saved their baggage.

The Greeks on their side, and Artaxerxes on his, who did not know what had passed elsewhere, believed each of them that they had gained the victory; the first, because they had put the enemy to flight, and pursued them; and the king, because he had killed his brother, beat the troops he had fought and plundered their camp. The event was soon cleared up on both sides. Tissaphernes, upon his arrival at the camp, informed the king, that the Greeks had defeated his left wing, and pursued it with great vigour; and the Greeks on their side learned, that the king, in pursuing Cyrus's left, had penetrated into the camp. Upon this advice, the king rallied his troops, and marched in quest of the enemy; and Clearchus, being returned from pursuing the Persians, advanced to support the camp.

The two armies were soon very near each other, when by a movement made by the king, he seemed to intend to charge the Greeks by their left, who fearing to be surrounded on all sides, wheeled about, and halted with the river on their backs, to prevent their being taken

taken in the rear. Upon ſeeing that, the king changed his form of battle alſo, drew up his army in front of them, and marched on to the attack. As ſoon as the Greeks ſaw him approach, they began to ſing the hymn of battle, and advanced againſt the enemy even with more ardour than in the firſt action.

The Barbarians again took to their heels, ran farther than before, and were purſued to a village at the foot of a hill, upon which their horſe halted. The king's ſtandard was obſerved to be there, which was a golden eagle upon the top of a pike, having its wings diſplayed. The Greeks preparing to purſue them, they abandoned alſo the hill, fled precipitately with all their troops, broke, and in the utmoſt diſorder and confuſion. Clearchus having drawn up the Greeks at the bottom of the hill, ordered Lycias the Syracuſan and another to go up it, and obſerve what paſſed in the plain. They returned with an account that the enemies fled on all ſides, and that their whole army was routed.

As it was almoſt night, the Greeks laid down their arms to reſt themſelves, much ſurpriſed, that neither Cyrus, nor any one from him appeared; and imagining, that he was either engaged in the purſuit of the enemy, or was making haſte to poſſeſs himſelf of ſome important place, for they were ſtill ignorant of his death, and the defeat of the reſt of his army. They determined therefore to return to their camp, and found the greateſt part of their baggage taken, with all the proviſions, and four hundred waggons laden with corn and wine, which Cyrus had expreſsly cauſed to be carried along with the army for the Greeks, in caſe of any preſſing neceſſity. They paſſed the night in the camp, the greateſt part of them without any refreſhment, concluding that Cyrus was alive and victorious.

The ſucceſs of this battle ſhows the ſuperiority of valour and military knowledge to a multitude without it. The ſmall army of the Greeks did not amount to more than twelve or thirteen thouſand men; but they were ſeaſoned and diſciplined troops, inured to fatigues, accuſtomed

cuſtomed to confront dangers, ſenſible, to glory, and who, during the long Peloponneſian war, had not wanted either time or means to acquire, and complete themſelves in the art of war and the methods of battle. Artaxerxes's ſide was computed at a million of men; but they were ſoldiers only in name, without force, courage, diſcipline, experience, or any ſenſe of honour. Hence it was, that as ſoon as the Greeks appeared, terror and diſorder enſued amongſt the enemy; and in the ſecond action, Artaxerxes himſelf did not dare to wait their attack, but ſhamefully betook himſelf to flight.

Plutarch here blames Clearchus the general of the Greeks very much, and imputes to him, as an unpardonable neglect, his not having followed Cyrus's order, who recommended to him above all things to incline and charge Artaxerxes's perſon. This reproach ſeems groundleſs. It is not eaſy to conceive how it was poſſible for that captain, who was poſted on the right wing, to attack Artaxerxes immediately, who, in the centre of his own army, lay beyond the utmoſt extent of the enemy's left, as has been ſaid before. It ſeems that Cyrus, depending as he did with great reaſon upon the valour of the Greeks; and deſiring they ſhould charge Artaxerxes in his poſt, ought to have placed them in the left wing, which anſwered directly to the part where the king was; that is, to the main body, and not in the right, which was very remote from it.

Clearchus may indeed be reproached with having followed the purſuit too warmly and too long. If after having put the left wing which oppoſed him into diſorder, he had charged the reſt of the enemy in flank, and had opened his way to the centre, where Artaxerxes was, it is highly probable that he had gained a complete victory, and placed Cyrus upon the throne. The ſix hundred horſe of that prince's guard committed the ſame fault, and by purſuing the body of troops they had put to flight too eagerly, left their maſter almoſt alone, and abandoned to the mercy of the enemy; without conſidering, that they were choſen from the whole army for

for the immediate guard of his perſon, and for no oth purpoſe whatſoever. Too much ardour is often pr judicial in a battle, and it is the duty of an able gen ral to know how to reſtrain and direct it.

Cyrus himſelf erred highly in this reſpect, and aba doned himſelf too much to his blind paſſion for glo and revenge. In running headlong to attack his br ther, he forgot that there is a wide difference betwe a general and a private ſoldier. He ought not to ha expoſed himſelf, but as it was conſiſtent with a princ as the head, not the hand; as the perſon who was to gi orders, and not as thoſe who were to execute them.

I ſpeak in this manner after the judges in the art war, and would not chooſe to advance my own opini upon things out of my ſphere.

SECT. III. *Eulogy of Cyrus.*

[2] XENOPHON gives us a magnificent character Cyrus, and that not upon the credit of othe but from what he ſaw and knew of him in his own pe ſon. He was, ſays he, in the opinion of all that we acquainted with him, after Cyrus the Great, a prin the moſt worthy of the ſupreme authority, and had t moſt noble, and moſt truly royal ſoul. From his i fancy he ſurpaſſed all of his own age in every exerci whether it were in managing the horſe, drawing t bow, throwing the dart, or in the chace, in which h diſtinguiſhed himſelf once by fighting and killing bear that attacked him. Thoſe advantages were exal ed in him by the nobleneſs of his air, an engagi aſpect, and by all the graces of nature, that conduce recommend merit.

When his father had made him ſatrap of Lydia, an the neighbouring * provinces, his chief care was t make the people ſenſible, that he had nothing ſo much at heart, as to keep his word inviolably, not only with regard to public treaties, but the moſt minute of hi

[2] De Exped. Cyr. l. i. p. 266, 267.
* Great Phrygia and Cappadocia.

promiſe

promiſes; a quality very rare amongſt princes, and which however is the baſis of all good government, and the ſource of their own, as well as their people's happineſs. Not only the places under his authority, but the enemy themſelves, repoſed an entire confidence in him.

Whether good or ill were done him, he always deſired to return it double, and that he might live no longer (as he ſaid himſelf) than whilſt he ſurmounted his friends in benefits, and his enemies in vengeance. (It had been more glorious for him to have overcome the latter by the force of favour and benevolence.) Nor was there ever prince, that people were more afraid to offend, nor for whoſe ſake they were more ready to hazard their poſſeſſions, lives, and fortunes.

Leſs intent upon being feared than beloved, his ſtudy was to make his greatneſs appear only where it was uſeful and beneficial, and to extinguiſh all other ſentiments, but thoſe which flow from gratitude and affection. He was induſtrious to do good upon all occaſions, to confer his favours with judgment and in ſeaſon, and to ſhow, that he thought himſelf rich, powerful, and happy, only as he made others ſenſible of his being ſo by his benevolence and liberality. But he took care not to exhauſt the means by an imprudent profuſion. He did not * laviſh, but diſtribute his favours. He choſe rather to make his liberalities the rewards of merit than mere donations, and that they ſhould be ſubſervient in promoting virtue, and not in ſupporting the ſoft and abject ſloth of vice.

He was particularly pleaſed with conferring his favours upon valiant men, and governments and rewards were only beſtowed on thoſe who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their actions. He never granted any honour or dignity to favour, intrigue, or faction, but to merit only; upon which depends not only the glory but the proſperity of governments. By that means he ſoon made virtue eſtimable, and the purſuit of men; and rendered vice contemptible and horrid. The provinces,

* *Habebit ſinum facilem, non perforatum: ex quo multa exeant, nihil excidat.* SENEC. de vit beat. l. xxiii.

animated with a noble emulation to deſerve, furniſhed him in a very ſhort time with a conſiderable number of excellent ſubjects of every kind; who under a different government would have remained unknown, obſcure, and uſeleſs.

Never did any one know how to oblige with a better grace, or to win the hearts of thoſe who could ſerve him with more engaging behaviour. As he was fully ſenſible that he ſtood in need of the aſſiſtance of others for the execution of his deſigns, he thought juſtice and gratitude required that he ſhould render his adherents all the ſervices in his power. All the preſents made him, whether of ſplendid arms, or rich apparel, he diſtributed among his friends, according to their ſeveral taſtes or occaſions; and uſed to ſay, that the brighteſt ornament, and moſt exalted riches of a prince, conſiſted in adorning and enriching thoſe who ſerved him well. In effect, ſays Xenophon, to do good to one's friends, and to excel them in liberality, does not ſeem ſo admirable in ſo high a fortune; but to tranſcend them in goodneſs of heart and ſentiments of friendſhip and affection, and to take more pleaſure in conferring, than receiving obligations; in this, I find Cyrus truly worthy of eſteem and admiration. The firſt of theſe advantages he derives from his rank; the other from himſelf and his intrinſic merit.

By theſe extraordinary qualities he acquired the univerſal eſteem and affection as well of the Greeks as Barbarians. A great proof of what Xenophon here ſays, is, that none ever quitted the ſervice of Cyrus for the king's; whereas great numbers went over every day to him from the king's party after the war was declared, and even of ſuch as had moſt credit at the court; becauſe they were all convinced, that Cyrus knew beſt how to diſtinguiſh and reward their ſervices.

It is moſt certain that young Cyrus did not want great virtues and a ſuperior merit; but I am ſurpriſed that Xenophon, in drawing his character, has deſcribed only the moſt beautiful features, and ſuch as are proper to excite our admiration of him, without ſaying the leaſt

leaſt word of his defects, and eſpecially of that immoderate ambition, that was the ſoul of all his actions, and which at length put arms into his hands againſt his elder brother and king. Is it allowable in an hiſtorian, whoſe chief duty it is to paint virtue and vice in their proper colours, to relate at large an enterpriſe of ſuch a nature, without intimating the leaſt diſlike or imputation againſt it? but with the Pagans, ambition was ſo far from being conſidered as a vice, that it often paſſed for a virtue.

SECT. IV. *The King is for compelling the Greeks to deliver up their Arms. They reſolve to die rather than ſurrender themſelves. A Treaty is made with them. Tiſſaphernes takes upon him to conduct them back to their own Country. He treacherouſly ſeizes Clearchus and four other Generals, who were all put to Death.*

[n] THE Greeks having learned, the day after the battle, that Cyrus was dead, ſent deputies to Ariæus, the general of the Barbarians, who had retired with his troops to the place from whence they had marched the day before the action, to offer him as victors, the crown of Perſia in the room of Cyrus. At the ſame time arrived Perſian heralds at arms from the king, to ſummon them to deliver up their arms; to whom they anſwered with an haughty air, that they talked a ſtrange language to conquerors; that if the king would have their arms, he might come and take them if he could; but that they would die before they would part with them: that if he would receive them into the number of his allies, they would ſerve him with fidelity and valour; * but if he imagined to reduce them into ſlavery as conquered, he might know, they had wherewithal to defend themſelves, and were determined to looſe their lives and liberty together. The heralds added, that they had orders to tell them, that if they continued in the place where

[n] Xenoph. in Exped. Cyr. l. ii. p. 272—292. Diod. l. xiv. p. 255—257.

* *Sin ut victis ſervitium indiceretur, eſſe ſibi ferrum et juventutem, et promptum libertati aut ad mortem animum.* TACIT. Annal. l. iv. c. 46.

they

they were, they would be allowed a ſuſpenſion of arms, but if they advanced or retired, that they would be treated as enemies. The Greeks agreed, and were aſked by the heralds what anſwer they ſhould report. Peace in continuing here, or war in marching, replied Clearchus, without explaining himſelf farther; from the view of keeping the king always in ſuſpence and uncertainty.

The anſwer of Ariæus to the Grecian deputies was, that there were many Perſians more conſiderable than himſelf, who would not ſuffer him upon the throne, and that he ſhould ſet out early the next day to return into Ionia; that, if they would march thither with him, they might join him in the night. Clearchus, with the advice of the officers, prepared to depart. He commanded from thenceforth, as being the ſole perſon of ſufficient capacity; for he had not been actually elected general in chief.

The ſame night, Milthocytes the Thracian, who commanded forty horſe, and about three hundred foot of his own country, went and ſurrendered himſelf to the king; the reſt of the Greeks began their march under the conduct of Clearchus, and arrived about midnight at the camp of Ariæus. After they had drawn up in battle, the principal officers went to wait on him in his tent, where they ſwore alliance with him; and the Barbarian engaged to conduct the army without fraud. In confirmation of the treaty, they ſacrificed a wolf, a ram, a boar, and a bull; the Greeks dipped their ſwords, and the Barbarians the points of their javelins, in the blood of the victims.

Ariæus did not think it proper to return by the ſame rout they came, becauſe, having found nothing for their ſubſiſtence the laſt ſeventeen days of their march, they muſt have ſuffered much more, had they taken the ſame way back again. He therefore took another; exhorting them only to make long marches at firſt; in order to evade the king's purſuit, which they could not effect. Towards the evening, when they were not far from ſome villages where they propoſed to halt, the ſcouts came in with

with advice, that they had seen several equipages and convoys, which made it reasonable to judge, that the enemy were not far off. Upon which they stood their ground, and waited their coming up; and the next day, before sun-rising, drew up in the same order as in the preceding battle. So bold an appearance terrified the king, who sent heralds, not to demand, as before, the surrender of their arms, but to propose peace and a treaty. Clearchus, who was informed of their arrival, whilst he was busy in drawing up his troops, gave orders to bid them wait, and to tell them, that he was not yet at leisure to hear them. He assumed, purposely, an air of haughtiness and grandeur, to denote his intrepidity, and, at the same time, to show the fine appearance and good condition of his phalanx. When he advanced with the most showy of his officers, expressly chosen for the occasion, and had heard what the heralds had to propose; he made answer, that they must begin with giving battle, because the army being in want of provisions, had no time to lose. The heralds having carried back this answer to their master, returned immediately; which showed, that the king, or whoever spoke in his name, was not very distant. They said, they had orders to conduct them to villages, where they would find provisions in abundance, and conducted them thither accordingly.

The army staid there three days, during which, Tissaphernes arrived from the king, with the queen's brother, and three other Persian grandees, attended by a great number of officers and domestics. After having saluted the generals, who advanced to receive him, he told them by his interpreter, that being a neighbour of Greece, and seeing them engaged in dangers, out of which it would be difficult to extricate themselves, he had used his good offices with the king, to obtain permission to reconduct them into their own country; being convinced, that neither themselves nor their cities would ever be unmindful of that favour: that the king, without having declared himself positively upon that head, had commanded him to come to them, to know

for what cauſe they had taken arms againſt him; and adviſed them to make the king ſuch an anſwer, as might not give any offence, and might enable him to do them ſervice. "We call the gods to witneſs," replied Clearchus, "that we did not liſt ourſelves to make war with the king, or to march againſt him. Cyrus concealing his true motives under different pretexts, brought us almoſt hither without explaining himſelf, the better to ſurpriſe you. And when we ſaw him ſurrounded with dangers, we thought it infamous to abandon him, after the favours we had received from him. But as he is dead, we are releaſed from our engagement, and neither deſire to conteſt the crown with Artaxerxes, nor to ravage his country, provided he does not oppoſe our return. However, if we are attacked, we ſhall endeavour, with the aſſiſtance of the gods, to make a good defence; and ſhall not be ungrateful in regard to thoſe who render us any ſervice." Tiſſaphernes replied, that he would let the king know what they ſaid, and return with his anſwer. But his not coming the next day gave the Greeks ſome anxiety: he, however, arrived on the third, and told them, that after much controverſy, he had at length obtained the king's grace for them: for, that it had been repreſented to the king, that he ought not to ſuffer people to return with impunity into their country, who had been ſo inſolent to come thither to make war upon him. "In fine," ſaid he, "you may now aſſure yourſelves of not finding any obſtacle to your return, and of being ſupplied with proviſions or ſuffered to buy them; and you may judge, that you are to paſs without committing any diſorders in your march, and that you are to take only what is neceſſary; provided you are not furniſhed with it." Theſe conditions were ſworn to on both ſides. Tiſſaphernes and the queen's brother gave their hands to the colonels and captains in token of amity. After which Tiſſaphernes withdrew to diſpoſe his affairs; promiſing to return as ſoon as they would admit, in order to go back with them into his government.

The

The Greeks waited for him above twenty days, continuing encamped near Ariæus, who received frequent visits from his brothers, and other relations, as did the officers of his army from the Persians of the different party; who assured them from the king of an entire oblivion of the past; so that the friendship of Ariæus for the Greeks appeared to cool every day more and more. This change gave them cause of uneasiness. Several of the officers went to Clearchus and the other generals, and said to them, "What do we here any longer? Are we not sensible, that the king desires to see us all perish, that others may be terrified by our example? Perhaps he keeps us waiting here till he reassembles his dispersed troops, or sends to seize the passes in our way; for he will never suffer us to return into Greece, to divulge our own glory and his shame." Clearchus made answer to this discourse, that to depart without consulting the king, was to break with him, and to declare war by violating the treaty; that they should remain without a conductor in a country where nobody would supply them with provisions; that Ariæus would abandon them; and that even their friends would become their enemies; that he did not know, but there might be other rivers to pass, and that, though the Euphrates were the only one, they could not get over it, were the passage ever so little disputed. That if it were necessary to come to a battle they should find themselves without cavalry against an enemy, that had a very numerous and excellent body of horse; so that if they gained the victory, they could make no great advantage of it, and if they were overcome, they were utterly and irretrievably lost. "Besides, why should the king, who has so many other means to destroy us, engage his word only to violate it, and thereby render himself execrable in the sight of gods and men?"

Tissaphernes, however, arrived with his troops, in order to return into his government, and they set forwards all together under the conduct of that satrap, who supplied them with provisions. Ariæus with his troops encamped with the Barbarians, and the Greeks sepa-

rately, at ſome diſtance, which kept up a continual diſtruſt amongſt them. Beſides which, there happened frequent quarrels for wood or forage, which augmented their averſion for each other. After three days march, they arrived at the wall of Media, which is a hundred feet high, twenty broad, and twenty leagues* in extent, all built of bricks, cemented with bitumen, like the walls of Babylon, from which it was not very diſtant, at one of its extremities. When they had paſſed it, they marched eight leagues, in two days, and came to the river Tygris, after having croſſed two of its canals, cut expreſsly for watering the country. They then paſſed the †Tygris upon a bridge of twenty-ſeven boats, near Sitacum, a very great and populous city. After four days march, they arrived at another city, very powerful alſo, called Opis. They found there a baſtard brother of Artaxerxes with a very conſiderable body of troops, which he was bringing from Suſa and Ecbatana to his aid. He admired the fine order of the Greeks. From thence, having paſſed the deſerts of Media, they came, after a march of ſix days, to a place called the Lands of Paryſatis, the revenues of which appertained to that princeſs. Tiſſaphernes, to inſult the memory of her ſon Cyrus, ſo dearly beloved by her, gave the villages to be plundered by the Greeks. Continuing their march through the deſert on the ſide of the Tygris, which they had on the left, they arrived at Cænæ, a very great and rich city, and from thence at the river Zabates.

The occaſions of diſtruſt increaſed every day between the Greeks and Barbarians. Clearchus thought it incumbent on him to come to an explanation once for all with Tiſſaphernes. He begun with obſerving upon the ſacred and inviolable nature of the treaties ſubſiſting between them. "Can a man," ſaid he,

* Twenty paraſangas.

† The march of the Greeks and the reſt of the army, from the day after the battle till the paſſing of the Tygris, abounds, in the text of Xenophon, with very great obſcurities, to explain which fully require a long diſſertation. My plan does not admit me to enter into ſuch diſcuſſions, which I muſt therefore refer to thoſe who are more able than me.

" conſcious of the guilt of perjury, be capable of living at eaſe? How would he ſhun the wrath of the gods, the witneſſes of treaties, and eſcape their vengeance, whoſe power is univerſal?" He added afterwards many things to prove, that the Greeks were obliged, by their own intereſt, to continue faithful to him, and that, by renouncing his alliance, they muſt firſt inevitably renounce not only all religion, but reaſon and common ſenſe. Tiſſaphernes ſeemed to reliſh this diſcourſe, and ſpoke to him with all the appearance of the moſt perfect ſincerity; inſinuating, at the ſame time, that ſome perſons had done him bad offices with him. "If you will bring your officers hither," ſaid he, "I will ſhow you thoſe who have wronged you in their repreſentations." He kept him to ſupper, and profeſſed more friendſhip for him than ever.

The next day Clearchus propoſed, in the aſſembly, to go with the ſeveral commanders of the troops to Tiſſaphernes. He ſuſpected Menon in particular, whom he knew to have had a ſecret conference with the ſatrap in the preſence of Ariæus; beſides which, they had already differed ſeveral times with each other. Some objected that it was not proper that all the generals ſhould go to Tiſſaphernes, and that it did not conſiſt with prudence to rely implicitly upon the profeſſions of a Barbarian. But Clearchus continued to inſiſt upon what he had moved, till it was agreed that the four other commanders, with twenty captains, and about two hundred ſoldiers, under the pretext of buying proviſions in the Perſian camp, where there was a market, ſhould be ſent along with him. When they came to the tent of Tiſſaphernes, the five commanders, Clearchus, Menon, Proxenes, Agias, and Socrates, were ſuffered to enter, but the captains remained without at the door. Immediately, on a certain ſignal before agreed on, thoſe within were ſeized, and the others put to the ſword. Some Perſian horſe afterwards ſcoured the country, and killed all the Greeks they met, whether freemen or ſlaves. Clearchus, with the other generals was ſent to the king, who ordered their heads to be

ſtruck

ſtruck off. Xenophon deſcribes, with ſufficient extent, the characters of thoſe officers.

Clearchus was valiant, bold, intrepid, and of a capacity for forming great enterpriſes. His courage was not raſh, but directed by prudence, and he retained all the coolneſs of his temper and preſence of mind in the midſt of the greateſt dangers. He loved the troops, and let them want for nothing. He knew how to make them obey him; but out of fear. His mien was awful and ſevere; his language rough; his puniſhments inſtant and rigorous: he gave way ſometimes to paſſion, but preſently came to himſelf, and always chaſtiſed with juſtice. His great maxim was, that nothing could be done in an army without a ſevere diſcipline; and from him came the ſaying, that a ſoldier ought to fear his general more than the enemy. The troops* eſteemed his valour and did juſtice to his merit; but they were afraid of his humour, and did not love to ſerve under him. In a word, ſays Xenophon, the ſoldiers feared him as ſcholars do a ſevere pedagogue. We may ſay of him, with Tacitus, that by an exceſs of ſeverity he made, what had otherwiſe been well done by him, unamiable; [b] *Cupidine ſeveritatis in his etiam, quæ rite faceret, acerbus.*

Proxenes was of Bœotia. From his infancy he aſpired at great things, and was induſtrious to make himſelf capable of them. He ſpared no means for the attainment of inſtruction, and was the diſciple of Gorgias the Leontine, a celebrated rhetorician, who ſold his lectures at a very high price. When he found himſelf capable of commanding, and of doing good to his friends, as well as of being ſerved by them, he entered into Cyrus's ſervice with the view of advancing himſelf. He did not want ambition, but would take no other path to glory than that of virtue. He had been a perfect captain, had he had to do with none but brave and diſciplined men, and it had been only neceſſary to be beloved. He was more apprehenſive of being in his

[b] Tacit. Annal. c. lxxv.

* *Manebat admiratio viri et fama; ſed oderant.* TACIT. Hiſtor. l. ii. c. 68.

ſoldiers

ſoldiers diſpleaſure, than his ſoldiers in his. He thought it ſufficient for a commander to praiſe good actions, without puniſhing bad ones; for which reaſon he was beloved by the worthy; but thoſe of a different character abuſed his facility. He died at thirty years of age.

*Could the two great perſons, we have here drawn after Xenophon, have been moulded into one, ſomething perfect might have been made of them; retrenching their ſeveral defects, and retaining only their virtues: but it rarely happens that the ſame man †, as Tacitus ſays of Agricola, behaves, according to the exigency of times and circumſtances, ſometimes with gentleneſs, and ſometimes with ſeverity, without leſſening his authority by the former, or the people's affection by the latter.

Menon was a Theſſalian, avaricious and ambitious, but ambitious only from the motive of avarice, purſuing honour and eſtimation for the mere lucre of money. He courted the friendſhip of the great, and of perſons in authority, that he might have it in his power to commit injuſtice and oppreſſion with impunity. To obtain his ends, all means with him were virtue; falſehood, fraud, perjury; whilſt ſincerity, and integrity of heart, ſtood in his ſcheme for weakneſs and ſtupidity. He loved nobody; and, if he profeſſed friendſhip, it was only to deceive. As others made their glory conſiſt in religion, probity, and honour, he valued himſelf upon injuſtice, deceit, and treachery. He gained the favour of the great by falſe reports, whiſpering, and calumny; and that of the ſoldiery by licence and impunity. In fine, he endeavoured to render himſelf terrible by the miſchief it was in his power to do, and imagined he favoured thoſe to whom he did none.

It was in my thoughts to have retrenched theſe characters, which interrupt the thread of the hiſtory, but

* *Egregium principatus temperamentum, ſi; demptis utriuſque vitiis ſolæ virtutes miſcerentur.* TACIT. Hiſtor. l. ii. c. 5.

† *Pro variis temporibus ac negotiis ſeverus et comis—nec illi, quod eſt rariſſimum, aut facilitas authoritatem, aut ſeveritas amorem, deminuit.* TACIT. in Agric. c. ix.

as

as they are a lively image of the manners of men, which in all times are the same, I thought retaining them would neither be useless nor disagreeable to the reader.

Sect. V. *Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks from the Province of Babylon to Trebisond.*

THE generals of the Greeks having been seized, and the officers who attended them massacred, the troops were in the highest consternation. They were five or six hundred leagues from Greece, surrounded with great rivers and enemy nations, without any supplies of provisions. In this state of general dejection, they could not think of taking either nourishment or repose. In the middle of the night, Xenophon, a young Athenian, but of prudence and capacity superior to his years, went to some of the officers, and represented to them, that they had no time to lose; that it was of the last importance to prevent the bad designs of the enemy; that, however small their number, they would render themselves formidable if they behaved with boldness and resolution; that valour and not multitude determines the success of arms; and that it was necessary, above all things, to nominate generals immediately, because an army without commanders is like a body without a soul. A council was immediately held, at which a hundred officers were present, and Xenophon, being desired to speak, deduced the reasons at large, he had at first but lightly touched upon; and by his advice commanders were appointed. They were Timasion for Clearchus, Xanthicles for Socrates, Cleanor for Agias, Philesius for Menon, and Xenophon for Proxenes.

Before the break of day, they assembled the army. The generals made speeches to animate the troops, and Xenophon amongst the rest. "Fellow soldiers," said he, "the loss of so many brave men by vile treachery, and the being abandoned by our friends, is very deplorable; but we must not sink under our misfortunes, and, if

[c] Xenoph. in Exped. Cyr. l. iii. & iv.

we

we cannot conquer, let us chooſe rather to puniſh glorioufly, than to fall into the hands of Barbarians, who would inflict upon us the greateſt miſeries. Let us call to mind the glorious battles of Platæa, Thermopylæ, Salamin, and the many others wherein our anceſtors, though with a ſmall number, have fought and defeated the innumerable armies of the Perſians, and thereby rendered the name alone of Greek for ever formidable. It is to their invincible valour we owe the honour we poſſeſs, of acknowledging no maſters upon earth but the gods, nor any happineſs, but what conſiſts with liberty. Thoſe gods, the avengers of perjury, and witneſſes of the enemy's treaſon will be favourable to us; and as they are attacked in the violation of treaties, and take pleaſure in humbling the proud, and exalting the low, they will alſo follow us to battle, and combat for us. For the reſt, fellow ſoldiers, as we have no refuge but in victory, which muſt be our hope, and will make us ample amends for whatever it coſts to attain it; I ſhould believe, if it were your opinion, that, for the making a more ready and leſs difficult retreat, it would be very proper to rid ourſelves of all the uſeleſs baggage, and to keep only what is abſolutely neceſſary in our march." All the ſoldiers that moment lifted up their hands to ſignify their approbation and conſent to all that had been ſaid; and without loſs of time ſet fire to their tents and carriages; ſuch of them as had too much equipage giving it others who had too little, and deſtroying the reſt.

It was reſolved to march the army without tumult or violence, if their return was not oppoſed; but otherwiſe to open themſelves a paſſage ſword in hand through the enemy. They began their march in the form of a great hollow ſquare, with the baggage in the centre. Chiriſophus the Lacedæmonian had the van guard; two of the oldeſt captains the right and left; and Timaſion with Xenophon were poſted in the rear as the youngeſt officers. The firſt day was rude; becauſe, having neither horſe nor ſlingers, they were extremely

haraſſed by a detachment ſent againſt them: but they provided againſt that inconvenience by following Xenophon's advice. They choſe two hundred men out of the Rhodians in the army, whom they armed with ſlings, and augmented their pay for their encouragement. They could throw as far again as the Perſians, becauſe they diſcharged balls of lead, and the other made uſe of large flints. They mounted alſo a ſquadron of fifty men upon the horſes intended for the baggage, and ſupplied their places with other beaſts of burden. By the means of this ſupply a ſecond detachment of the enemy were very ſeverely handled.

After ſome days march, Tiſſaphernes appeared with all his forces. He contented himſelf with haraſſing the Greeks, who moved on continually. The latter obſerving the difficulty of retreating in a hollow ſquare in the face of an enemy, from the unevenneſs of ground, hedges, and other obſtacles, which might oblige them to break it, changed their order of battle, and marched in two columns, with the little baggage they had in the ſpace between them. They formed a body of reſerve of ſix hundred choſen men, whom they divided into ſix companies, and ſubdivided by fifties and tens, to facilitate their motions according to occaſion. When the columns came cloſe to each other, they either remained in the rear, or filed off upon the flanks on both ſides, to avoid diſorder; and when they opened, they fell into the void ſpace in the rear between the two columns. Upon any occaſion of attack, they immediately ran where it was neceſſary. The Greeks ſtood ſeveral charges, but they were neither conſiderable, nor attended with much loſs.

They arrived at the river Tigris. As its depth would not permit them to repaſs it without boats, they were obliged to croſs the Carducian mountains, becauſe there was no other way, and the priſoners reported, that from thence they would enter Armenia, where they might paſs the Tygris at its ſource, and afterwards the Euphrates, not very diſtant from it. To gain thoſe defiles

files before the enemy could seize them, it was thought proper to set forwards in the night, in order to arrive at the foot of the mountains by the break of day; which was done accordingly. Chirisophus continued at the head of the advanced guard, with the troops armed with missive weapons, besides his ordinary corps; and Xenophon in the rear, with only the heavy-armed soldiers, because at that time there was nothing to fear on that side. The inhabitants of the country had taken possession of several of the heights, from whence it was necessary to drive them, which could not be done without great danger and difficulty.

The officers, having held a council of war, were of opinion, that it was proper to leave behind them all the beasts of burden not absolutely necessary, with all the slaves lately taken; because both the one and the other would retard their march too much in the great defiles they had to pass; besides which, it required a greater quantity of provisions to support them, and those who had the care of the beasts were useless in fight. That regulation was executed without delay, and they continued their march, sometimes fighting, and sometimes halting. The passing of the mountains, which took up seven days, fatigued the troops exceedingly, and occasioned some loss; but at length they arrived at villages, where they found provisions in abundance, and rested some days, to recover the severe fatigues the army had suffered; in comparison with which, all they had undergone in Persia was trivial.

They found themselves soon after exposed to new danger. Almost at the foot of the mountains they came to a river, two hundred feet in breadth, called Centrites, which stopped their march. They had to defend themselves against the enemy, who pursued them in the rear, and the Armenians, the soldiers of the country, who defended the opposite side of the river. They attempted in vain to pass it in a place where the water came up to their armpits, and were carried away by the rapidity of the current, against which the weight of their

their arms made them unable to reſiſt. By good fortune they diſcovered another place not ſo deep, where ſome ſoldiers had ſeen the people of the country paſs. It required abundance of addreſs, diligence, and valour, to keep off the enemy on both ſides of them. The army however paſſed the river at length without much loſs. They marched afterwards with leſs interruption; paſſed the ſource of the Tygris, and arrived at the little river Teleboa, which is very beautiful, and has many villages on its banks. Here began the weſtern Armenia; which was governed by Tiribaſus, a ſatrap much beloved by the king, and had the honour to help him to * mount on horſeback when at the court: he offered to let the army paſs, and to ſuffer the ſoldiers to take all they wanted, upon condition that they ſhould commit no ravages in their march; which propoſal was accepted and ratified on each ſide. Tiribaſus kept always a flying camp at a ſmall diſtance from the army. There fell a great quantity of ſnow, which gave the troops ſome inconvenience; and they learnt from a priſoner, that Tiribaſus had a deſign to attack the Greeks at a paſs of the mountains, in a defile, through which they muſt neceſſarily march. They prevented him by ſeizing that poſt, after having put the enemy to flight. After ſome days march through deſerts, they paſſed the Euphrates near its ſource, not having the water above their middles.

They ſuffered exceedingly afterwards from a north wind which blew in their faces, and prevented reſpiration; ſo that it was thought neceſſary to ſacrifice to the wind, upon which it ſeemed to abate. They marched, on in ſnow five or ſix feet deep, which killed ſeveral ſervants and beaſts of burden, beſides thirty ſoldiers. They made fires during the night, for they found plenty of wood. All the next day, they continued their march through the ſnow, when many of them from the exceſs of hunger, followed with langour or fainting, continued lying upon the ground, through weakneſs and

* The French tranſlator of Xenophon ſays, *he held the king's ſtirrup when he got on horſeback*, without conſidering that the ancients uſed none.

want

want of ſpirits. When ſomething had been given them to eat, they found themſelves relieved, and continued their march.

The enemy ſtill purſued them, of whom many, overtaken by the night, remained on the way without fire or proviſions, ſo that ſeveral died of their hardſhips, and the enemy who followed them took ſome baggage. Some ſoldiers were alſo left behind, that had loſt their ſight, and others their toes, by the ſnow. Againſt the firſt evil it was good to wear ſomething black before their eyes; and againſt the other, to keep the legs always in motion, and to bare the feet at night. Arriving in a more commodious place, they diſperſed themſelves into the neighbouring villages to recover and repoſe after their fatigues. The houſes were built under ground, with an opening at top, like a well, through which the deſcent was by a ladder; but there was another entrance for cattle. They found there ſheep, cows, goats, poultry; with wheat, barley, and pulſe; and for drink, there was beer, which was very ſtrong, when not mingled with water, but was agreeable to thoſe who were uſed to it. They drank this with a reed out of the veſſels that held the beer, upon which they ſaw the barley ſwim. The maſter of the houſe, where Xenophon lay, received him very kindly, and even ſhowed him where he had concealed ſome wine; beſides which he made him a preſent of ſeveral horſes. He taught him alſo to faſten a kind of hurdles to their feet, and to do the ſame to the other beaſts of burden, to prevent their ſinking in the ſnow; without which they would have been up to the girth in it at every ſtep. The army, after having reſted ſeven days in theſe villages, reſumed their route.

After a march of ſeven days they arrived at the river Araxes, called alſo the Phaſus, which is about a hundred feet in breadth. Two days after they diſcovered the Phaſians, the Chalybes, and the Taochians, who kept the paſs of the mountains, to prevent their deſcending into the plain. They ſaw it was impoſſible

to

to avoid coming to a battle with them, and reſolved to give it the ſame day. Xenophon, who had obſerved that the enemy defended only the ordinary paſſage, and that the mountain was three leagues in extent, propoſed the ſending of a detachment to take poſſeſſion of the heights that commanded the enemy; which would not be difficult, as they might prevent all ſuſpicion of their deſign by a march in the night, and by making a falſe attack by the main road, to amuſe the Barbarians. This was accordingly executed, the enemy put to flight, and the paſs cleared.

They croſſed the country of the Chalybes, who are the moſt valiant of all the Barbarians in thoſe parts. When they killed an enemy, they cut off his head and carried it about in triumph, ſinging and dancing. They kept themſelves cloſe ſhut up in their cities, and when the army marched, fell ſuddenly upon the rear, after having carried every thing of value in the country into places of ſafety. After twelve or fifteen days march, they arrived at a very high mountain, called Tecqua, from whence they deſcried the ſea. The firſt who perceived it, raiſed great ſhouts of joy for a conſiderable time; which made Xenophon imagine that the van guard was attacked, and go with all haſte to ſupport it. As he approached nearer, the cry of *the ſea! the ſea!* was heard diſtinctly, and the alarm changed into joy and gaiety; and when they came to the top, nothing was heard but a confuſed noiſe of the whole army, crying out together, *the ſea! the ſea!* whilſt they could not refrain from tears, nor from embracing their generals and officers. And then, without waiting for orders, they heaped up a pile of ſtones, and erected a trophy with broken bucklers and other arms.

From thence they advanced to the mountains of Colchis, one of which was higher than the reſt, and of that the people of the country had poſſeſſed themſelves. The Greeks drew up in battle at the bottom of it to aſcend, for the acceſs was not impracticable. Xenophon did not judge it proper to march in line of battle,

but

but by files; becauſe the ſoldiers could not keep their ranks, from the inequality of the ground, that in ſome places was eaſy, and in others difficult to climb, which might diſcourage them. That advice was approved, and the army marched according to it. The heavy-armed troops amounted to fourſcore files, each conſiſting of about a hundred men, with eighteen hundred light armed ſoldiers, divided in three bodies, one of which was poſted on the right, another on the left, and a third in the centre. After having encouraged his troops, by repreſenting to them that this was the laſt obſtacle they had to ſurmount, and implored the aſſiſtance of the gods, the army began to aſcend the hill. The enemy were not able to ſupport their charge, and diſperſed. They paſſed the mountain, and encamped in villages, where they found proviſions in abundance.

A very ſtrange accident happened there to the army, which put them into great conſternation. For the ſoldiers finding abundance of beehives in that place, and eating the honey, they were taken with violent vomiting and fluxes, attended with raving fits; ſo that thoſe, who were leaſt ill, ſeemed like drunken men, and the reſt, either furiouſly mad, or dying. The earth was ſtrewed with their bodies as after a defeat; however, none of them died, and the diſtemper ceaſed the next day about the ſame hour it had taken them. The third or fourth day the ſoldiers got up, but in the condition people are after taking a violent medicine.

Two days after the army arrived near Trebiſond, a Greek colony of Sinopians, ſituate upon the Euxine or Black Sea, in the province of Colchis. Here they lay encamped for thirty days, and acquitted themſelves of the vows they had made to Jupiter, Hercules, and the other deities, to obtain a happy return into their own country. They alſo celebrated the games of the horſe and foot races, wreſtling, boxing, the pancratium; the whole attended with the greateſt joy and ſolemnity.

SECT.

SECT. VI. *The Greeks, after having undergone exceſſive Fatigues, and ſurmounted many Dangers, arrive upon the Sea-coaſt oppoſite to Byzantium. They paſs the Strait, and engage in the Service of Seuthes, Prince of Thrace. Xenophon afterwards repaſſes the Sea, advances to Pergamus, and joins Thimbron, General of the Lacedæmonians, who marches againſt Tiſſaphernes and Pharnabaſus.*

[d] AFTER having offered ſacrifices to the ſeveral divinities, and celebrated the games, they deliberated upon the proper meaſures for their return into Greece. They concluded upon going thither by ſea, and for that purpoſe Chiriſophus offered to go to Anaxibius, the admiral of Sparta, who was his friend, to obtain ſhips of him. He ſet out directly, and Xenophon regulated the order it was neceſſary to obſerve, and the precautions to be taken for the ſecurity of the camp, proviſions, and forage. He believed it alſo proper to make ſure of ſome veſſels, beſides thoſe that were expected, and made ſome expeditions againſt the neighbouring people.

As Chiriſophus did not return ſo ſoon as was expected, and proviſions began to be wanting, it was reſolved to proceed by land; becauſe there was not a ſufficient number of ſhips to tranſport the whole army, and thoſe, which the precaution of Xenophon had procured, were allotted to carry the women, the old and ſick men, with all the unneceſſary baggage. The army continued its march, and lay ten days at * Ceraſus, where there was a general review of the troops, who were found to amount to eight thouſand ſix hundred men, out of about ten thouſand; the reſt having died in their retreat, of their wounds, fatigues, or diſeaſes.

[d] Xenoph. l. iii.

* This city of Ceraſus became famous from the cherry trees, which Lucullus firſt brought into Italy, and which from thence have been diſperſed all over the weſtern world.

In

In the ſmall time the Greeks continued in theſe parts, ſeveral diviſions aroſe, as well with the inhabitants of the country, as with ſome of the officers, who were jealous of Xenophon's authority, and endeavoured to render him odious to the army. But his wiſdom and moderation put a ſtop to thoſe diſorders; having made the ſoldiers ſenſible that their ſafety depended upon preſerving union and a good underſtanding amongſt themſelves, and obedience to their generals.

From Cerafus they went to Cotyora, which is not very remote from it. They there deliberated again upon the proper meaſures for their return. The inhabitants of the country repreſented the almoſt inſuperable difficulties of going by land, from the defiles and rivers they had to paſs, and offered to ſupply the Greeks with ſhips. This ſeemed the beſt expedient, and the army embarked accordingly. They arrived the next day at Sinope, a city of Paphlagonia, and a colony of the Mileſians. Chiriſophus repaired thither with galleys, but without money, though the troops expected to receive ſome. He aſſured them that the army ſhould be paid, as ſoon as they were out of the Euxine Sea; and that their retreat was univerſally celebrated; and the ſubject of the diſcourſe and admiration of all Greece.

The ſoldiers, finding themſelves near enough to Greece, deſired to make ſome booty before they arrived there, and with that view reſolved to nominate a general with full authority, whereas, till then, all affairs were determined in the council of war by the plurality of voices. They caſt their eyes upon Xenophon, and cauſed him to be deſired to accept that office. He was not inſenſible of the honour of commanding in chief; but he foreſaw the conſequences, and deſired time to conſider. After having expreſſed the higheſt ſenſe of gratitude for an offer ſo much to his honour, he repreſented, that, to avoid jealouſy and diviſion, the ſucceſs of affairs, and the intereſt of the army, ſeemed to require that they ſhould chooſe a Lacedæmonian for their general; the Spartan ſtate at that time actually ruling Greece, and in conſideration of that choice would be

diſpoſed

diſpoſed to ſupport them. This reaſon was not reliſhed, and they objected to it, that they were far from intending a ſervile dependence upon Sparta, or to ſubmit to regulate their enterpriſes by the pleaſure or diſlike of that ſtate; and preſſed him again to accept the command. He was then obliged to explain himſelf ſincerely, and without evaſion; and declared, that having conſulted the gods by ſacrifice, upon the offer they made him, they had manifeſted their will by evident ſigns, from whence it appeared that they did not approve their choice. It was ſurpriſing to ſee the impreſſion which the ſole mention of the gods made upon the ſoldiers, otherwiſe very warm and tenacious, and who beſides are commonly little affected with the motives of religion. Their great ardour abated immediately, and without making any reply, they proceeded to elect Chiriſophus though a Lacedæmonian, for their general.

His authority was of no long continuance. Diſcord, as Xenophon had foreſeen, aroſe amongſt the troops, who were angry that their general prevented their plundering the Grecian cities, by which they paſſed. This diſturbance was principally excited by the Peloponneſians, who compoſed one half of the army, and could not ſee Xenophon an Athenian in authority without pain. Different meaſures were propoſed; but nothing being concluded, the troops divided themſelves into three bodies, of which the Achaians and Archadians, that is, the Peloponneſians, were the principal, amounting to four thouſand five hundred heavy-armed foot, with Lycon and Callimachus for their generals. Chiriſophus commanded another part of about fourteen hundred men, beſides ſeven hundred light-armed infantry. Xenophon had the third, almoſt the ſame in number, of which three hundred were light-armed ſoldiers, with about forty horſe, which were all the cavalry of the army. The firſt having obtained ſhips from the people of * Heraclea, to whom they had ſent to demand them, ſet out before the reſt to make ſome booty, and made a deſcent in the port of Calpe. Chiriſophus,

* A city of Pontus.

who

who was ſick, marched by land; but without quitting the coaſt. Xenophon landed at Heraclea, and entered into the heart of the country.

New diviſions aroſe. The imprudence of the troops and their leaders had involved them in ill meaſures, not without loſs, from whence the addreſs of Xenophon extricated them more than once. Being all reunited again, after various ſucceſs, they arrived by land at Chryſopolis in Caledonia, facing Byzantium, whither they repaired ſome days after, having paſſed the ſmall arm of the ſea, which ſeparates the two continents. They were upon the point of plundering that rich and powerful city, to revenge a fraud and injury which had been done them, and from the hope of enriching themſelves once for all, when Xenophon made all poſſible haſte thither. He admitted the juſtneſs of their revenge, but he made them ſenſible of the fatal conſequences which would attend it. "After your plundering this city, and deſtroying the Lacedæmonians eſtabliſhed in it, you will be deemed the mortal enemies of their republic, and of all their allies. Athens, my country, that had four hundred galleys at ſea and in the arſenals, when it took up arms againſt them, great ſums of money in its treaſury, a revenue of a thouſand talents, and was in poſſeſſion of all the iſles of Greece, and of many cities in Europe and Aſia, of which this was one, has nevertheleſs been reduced to yield to their power, and ſubmit to their ſway. And do you hope, who are but a handful of men, without generals, proviſions, allies, or any reſource, either from Tiſſapherne, who has betrayed you, or the king of Perſia, whom you have attempted to dethrone; can you hope, I ſay, in ſuch a condition to make head againſt the Lacedæmonians? Let us demand ſatisfaction from the Byzantines, and not avenge their fault by a much greater of our own, which muſt draw upon us inevitable ruin." He was believed, and the affair accommodated.

[c] From thence he led them to Salmydeſſa, to ſerve

[c] Xenoph. l. vii.

Seuthes,

Seuthes, prince of Thrace, who had before ſolicited him by his envoys to bring troops to his aid, in order to his re-eſtabliſhment in his father's dominions, of which his enemies had deprived him. He had made Xenophon great promiſes for himſelf and his troops; but when they had done him the ſervice he wanted, he was ſo far from keeping his word, that he did not give them the pay agreed upon. Xenophon reproached him exceedingly with this breach of faith; imputing his perfidy to his miniſter Heraclides, who thought to make his court to his maſter, by ſaving him a ſum of money, at the expence of juſtice, faith, and honeſty; qualities which ought to be dearer than all others to a prince, as they contribute the moſt to his reputation, as well as to the ſucceſs of affairs and the ſecurity of a ſtate. But that treacherous miniſter who looked upon honour, probity, and juſtice, as mere chimeras, and that there was nothing real but the poſſeſſion of much money, had no thoughts, in conſequence, but of enriching himſelf by any means whatſoever, and robbed his maſter firſt with impunity, and all his ſubjects along with him. "However," continued Xenophon, "every wiſe man, eſpecially in authority and command, ought to regard juſtice, probity, and the faith of engagements, as the moſt precious treaſure he can poſſeſs; and as an aſſured reſource, and an infallible ſupport in all the events that can happen." Heraclides was the more in the wrong for acting in this manner with regard to the troops as he was a native of Greece, and not a Thracian: but avarice had extinguiſhed all ſenſe of honour in him.

Whilſt the diſpute between Seuthes and Xenophon was warmeſt, Charminus and Polynices arrived, as ambaſſadors from Lacedæmon, and brought advice, that the republic had declared war againſt Tiſſaphernes and Pharnabaſus; that Thimbron had already embarked with the troops and promiſed a darick a month to every ſoldier, two to each officer, and four to the colonels, who ſhould engage in the ſervice. Xenophon accepted the offer, and having obtained from Seuthes, by the mediation

mediation of the ambaſſadors, part of the pay due to him, he went by ſea to Lampſacus with the army, which amounted at that time to almoſt ſix thouſand men. From thence he advanced to Pergamus, a city in the province of Troas. Having met near Parthenia, where ended the expedition of the Greeks, a great nobleman returning into Perſia, he took him, his wife, and children, with all his equipage, and by that means found himſelf in a condition to beſtow great liberalities amongſt the ſoldiers, and to make them a ſatisfactory amends for all the loſſes they had ſuſtained. Thimbron at length arrived, who took upon him the command of the troops, and having joined them with his own, marched againſt Tiſſaphernes and Pharnabaſus.

[f] Such was the event of Cyrus's expedition. Xenophon reckons from the firſt ſetting out of that prince's army from the city of Epheſus to their arrival where the battle was fought, five hundred and thirty paraſangas or leagues, and fourſcore and thirteen days march; [g] and in their return from the place of battle to Cotyora, a city upon the coaſt of the Euxine or Black Sea, ſix hundred and twenty paraſangas or leagues, and a hundred and twenty days march. And adding both together, he ſays, the way, going and coming, was eleven hundred and fifty *five paraſangas or leagues, [h] and two hundred and fifteen days march; and that the whole time the army took to perform that journey, including the days of reſt, was fifteen months.

It appears by this calculation, that the army of Cyrus marched daily, one day with another, almoſt ſix paraſangas † or leagues in going, and only five in their return.

[f] Xenoph. de Exped. l. ii. p. 276. [g] Ibid. Cyr. l. iii. p. 355.
[h] Xenoph. l. vii. p. 427.

* I add, *five*, which are left out in the text, to make the total agree with the two parts.

† The paraſanga is a meaſure of the ways peculiar to the Perſians, and conſiſts of three ſtadia. The ſtadium is the ſame with the Greeks, and contains, according to the moſt received opinion, one hundred and twenty-five geometrical paces; twenty of which in conſequence are required to the common French league. And this has been my rule hitherto, according to which the paraſanga is a league and a half.

I obſerve

return. It was natural, that Cyrus, who defired to furprife his brother, fhould ufe all poffible diligence for that purpofe.

This retreat of the ten thoufand Greeks has always paffed amongft the judges in the art of war, as I have alreadv obferved, for a perfect model in its kind, and never had a parallel. Indeed no enterprife could be formed with more valour and bravery, nor conducted with more prudence, nor executed with more fuccefs. Ten thoufand men, five or fix hundred leagues from their own country; who had loft their generals and beft officers, and find themfelves in the heart of the enemy's vaft empire, undertake, in the fight of a victorious and numerous army, with the king at the head of them, to retire through the feat of his empire, and in a manner from the gates of his palace, and to traverfe a vaft extent of unknown countries, almoft all in arms againft them, without being difmayed by the profpect of the innumerable obftacles and dangers, to which they were every moment expofed; paffes of rivers, of mountains, and defiles; open attacks; fecret ambufcades from the people upon their route; famine, almoft inevitably in vaft and defert regions; and above all the treachery they had to fear from the troops, who feemed to be employed in efcorting them, but in reality had orders to deftroy them. For Artaxerxes, who was fenfible how much the return of thofe Greeks into their country would cover him with difgrace, and decry the majefty of the empire in the fenfe of all nations, had left nothing undone to prevent it; and he defired their deftruction, fays Plutarch, more paffionately, than to conquer Cyrus himfelf, or to preferve the fovereignty of his

I obferve here a great difficulty. In this calculation we find, the ordinary days marches of Cyrus, with an army of more than a hundred thoufand men, would have been one day with another nine leagues, during fo long a time; which according to the judges in military affairs is abfolutely impoffible. This is what has determined me to compute the parafanga at no more than a league. Several authors have remarked, and indeed it is not to be doubted, that the ftadium, and all the other meafures of ways of the ancients, have differed widely according to times and places, as they ftill do amongft us.

eftates.

eſtates. Thoſe ten thouſand men, however, notwithſtanding ſo many obſtacles, carried their point, and arrived, through a thouſand dangers, victorious and triumphant in their own country. [k] Anthony long after, when purſued by the Parthians almoſt in the ſame country, finding himſelf in like danger, cried out in admiration of their invincible valour, *O the retreat of the ten thouſand!*

And it was the good ſucceſs of this famous retreat, which filled the people of Greece with contempt for Artaxerxes, by demonſtrating to them, that gold, ſilver, luxury, voluptuouſneſs, and a numerous ſeraglio of women, were the ſole merit of the grand monarch; but that as to the reſt, his opulence and all his boaſted power were only pride and oſtentation. It was this prejudice, more univerſal than ever in Greece after this celebrated expedition, that gave birth to thoſe bold enterpriſes of the Greeks of which we ſhall ſoon treat, that made Artaxerxes tremble upon his throne, and brought the Perſian empire to the very brink of deſtruction.

SECT. VII. *Conſequences of Cyrus's Death in the Court of Artaxerxes. Cruelty and Jealouſy of Paryſatis. Statira poiſoned.*

[l] I RETURN to what paſſed after the battle of Cunaxa in the court of Artaxerxes. As he believed that he killed Cyrus with his own hand, and looked upon that action as the moſt glorious in his life, he deſired that all the world ſhould think the ſame; and it was wounding him in the moſt tender part to diſpute that honour, or endeavour to divide it with him. The Carian ſoldier, whom we mentioned before, not contented with the great preſents the king had made him upon a different pretext, perpetually declared to all that would hear him, that none but himſelf had killed Cyrus, and that the king did him great injuſtice in depriving him of the glory due to him. The prince, upon being informed

[k] Plut. in Ant. p. 937. Ἀμανῆν. [l] Plut. in Artax. p. 1018—1021.

informed of that inſolence, conceived a jealouſy equally baſe and cruel, and had the weakneſs to cauſe him to be delivered to Paryſatis, who had ſworn the deſtruction of all thoſe that had any ſhare in the death of her ſon. Animated by her barbarous revenge, ſhe commanded the executioners to take that unfortunate wretch, and to make him ſuffer the moſt exquiſite tortures during ten days; then after they had torn out his eyes, to pour molten braſs into his ears, till he expired in that cruel miſery; which was accordingly executed.

Mithridates alſo, having boaſted in an entertainment, where he had heated his brain with wine, that it was he gave Cyrus his mortal wound, paid very dear for that ſottiſh and imprudent vanity. He was condemned to ſuffer the puniſhment of the * troughs, one of the moſt cruel that was ever invented, and after having languiſhed in torment during ſeventeen days, died at laſt ſlowly in exquiſite miſery.

There only remained for the final execution of her project, and fully to ſatiate her vengeance, the puniſhment of the king's eunuch Meſabates, who, by his maſter's order, had cut off the head and hand of Cyrus. But as there was nothing to take hold of in his conduct, Paryſatis laid this ſnare for him. She was a woman of great addreſs, had abundance of wit, and excelled in playing at a certain game with dice. After the war, ſhe had been reconciled with the king, played often with him, was of all his parties, had an unbounded complaiſance for him, and far from contradicting him in any thing, prevented his deſires, did not bluſh at indulging his paſſions, and even at ſupplying him with the means of gratifying them. But ſhe took eſpecial care never to loſe ſight of him, and to leave Statira as little alone with him as ſhe could, deſiring to gain an abſolute aſcendant over her ſon.

One day ſeeing the king entirely unemployed, and with no thoughts but of diverting himſelf, ſhe propoſed

* See the deſcription of this torture, as before given in a former Volume.

playing

playing at dice with him for a thousand daricks*, to which he readily consented. She suffered him to win, and paid down the money. But affecting regret and vexation, she pressed him to begin again, and to play with her for a eunuch. The king, who suspected nothing, complied, and they agreed to except five of the favourite eunuchs on each side, that the winner should take their choice out of the rest, and the loser be bound to deliver him. Having made these conditions, they sat down to play. The queen was all attention to the game, and made use of all her skill and address in it; besides which the dice favoured her. She won, and chose Mesabates, for he was not one of the excepted. As soon as she got him into her hands, before the king could have the least suspicion of the revenge she meditated, she delivered him to the executioners, and commanded them to flea him alive, to lay him afterwards upon three † cross bars, and to stretch his skin at large before his eyes upon two stakes prepared for that purpose; which was performed accordingly. When the king knew this, he was very sorry for it, and violently angry with his mother, But without giving herself any further trouble about it, she told him with a smile, and in a jesting way, "Really you are a great loser, and must be highly in the right, to be so much out of humour for a decrepid wretch of a eunuch, when I, who lost a thousand good daricks, and paid them down upon the spot, do not say a word, and am satisfied."

All these cruelties seem to be only essays and preparations for a greater crime Parysatis meditated. She had retained at heart a violent hatred for queen Statira, which she had suffered to escape her upon many occasions. She perceived plainly, that her credit with the king her son was only the effect of his respect and consideration for her as his mother; whereas, that for Statira was founded in love and confidence, the best security of credit with him. Of what is not the jealousy of an ambitious woman capable! She resolved

* The darick was worth ten livres.

† Plutarch explains this circumstance no farther.

to rid herſelf, whatever it coſt her, of ſo formidable a rival.

For the more certain attainment of her ends, ſhe feigned a reconciliation with her daughter-in-law, and treated her with all the exterior marks of ſincere friendſhip and real confidence. The two queens appearing, therefore to have forgot their former ſuſpicions and differences, lived well together, ſaw one another as before, and ate at each other's apartments. But as both of them knew how much the friendſhips and careſſes of the court were to be relied upon, eſpecially amongſt the women, they were neither of them deceived in the other; and the ſame fears always ſubſiſting, they kept upon their guard, and never ate but of the ſame diſhes and pieces. Could one believe it poſſible to deceive ſo attentive and cautious a vigilance? Paryſatis, one day when her daughter-in-law was at table with her, took an extremely exquiſite bird, that had been ſerved up, cut it in two parts, gave one half to Statira, and ate the other herſelf. Statira ſoon after was ſeized with ſharp pains, and, having quitted the table, died in the moſt horrible convulſions, not without inſpiring the king with the moſt violent ſuſpicions of his mother, of whoſe cruelty, and implacable and revengeful ſpirit, he was ſufficiently ſenſible before. He made the ſtricteſt enquiry into the crime. All his mother's officers and domeſtics were ſeized and put to the queſtion; when Gygis, one of Paryſatis's women and confidents, confeſſed the whole. She had cauſed one ſide of a knife to be rubbed with poiſon, ſo that Paryſatis, having cut the bird in two, put the ſound part into her own mouth directly, and gave Statira the other that was poiſoned. Gygis was put to death after the manner the Perſians puniſhed poiſoners, which is thus; they lay their heads upon a great and very broad ſtone, and beat upon it with another till they are entirely cruſhed, and have no remains of their former figure. As for Paryſatis, the king contented himſelf with confining her to Babylon, where ſhe demanded to retire, and told her, that he would never ſet his foot within it while ſhe was there.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

SECT. I. *The Grecian Cities of Ionia implore aid of the Lacedæmonians againſt Artaxerxes. Rare Prudence of a Lady continued in her Huſband's Government after his Death. Ageſilaus elected King of Sparta. His Character.*

[m] THE cities of Ionia, that had taken party with Cyrus, apprehending the reſentment of Tiſſaphernes, had applied to the Lacedæmonians, as the deliverers of Greece, for their ſupport in the poſſeſſion of the liberty they enjoyed, and to prevent their country from being ravaged. We have already ſaid that Thimbron was ſent thither, to whoſe troops Xenophon had joined his, after their return from Perſia. [n] Thimbron was ſoon recalled upon ſome diſcontent, and had for his ſucceſſor Dercyllidas, ſurnamed Siſyphus, from his induſtry in finding reſources, and his capacity in inventing machines of war. He took upon him the command of the army at Epheſus. When he arrived there, he was apprized, that there was a difference between the two ſatraps, who commanded in the country.

The provinces of the Perſian monarchy, of which ſeveral, ſituate at the extremity of the empire, required too much application to be governed immediately by the prince, were confided to the care of the great lords, commonly called ſatraps. They had each of them, in their government, an almoſt ſovereign authority, and were, properly ſpeaking, not unlike the viceroys we ſee in our days in ſome neighbouring ſtates. They were ſupplied with a number of troops ſufficient for the defence of the country. They appointed all officers, diſpoſed of the governments of cities, and were charged with levying and remitting the tributes to the prince. They had power to raiſe troops, to treat with neighbouring ſtates, and even with the generals of the enemy; in a word, to do every thing neceſſary to the good-

[m] Xenoph. Hiſt. Græc. l. iii. p. 479—487.
[n] A. M. 3605. Ant. J. C. 399.

order and tranquillity of their governments. They were independent of one another; and though they ſerved the ſame maſter, and it was their duty to concur to the ſame ends, nevertheleſs each being more affected with the particular advantage of his own province, than the general good of the empire, they often differed among themſelves; formed oppoſite deſigns, refuſed aid to their colleagues in neceſſity, and ſometimes even acted entirely againſt them. The remoteneſs of the court, and the abſence of the prince, gave room for theſe diſſenſions; and perhaps a ſecret policy contributed to keep them up, to elude or prevent conſpiracies, which too good an underſtanding amongſt the governors might have excited.

Dercyllidas, having heard, therefore, that Tiſſapherne and Pharnabaſus were at variance, made a truce with the former, that he might not have them both upon his hands at the ſame time, entered Pharnabaſus's province, and advanced as far as Æolia.

Zenis, the Dardanian, had governed that province under the ſatrap's authority; and as, after his death, it was to have been given to another, Mania, his widow, went to Pharnabaſus with troops and preſents, and told him, that having been the wife of a man who had rendered him great ſervices, ſhe deſired him not to deprive her of her huſband's reward; that ſhe would ſerve him with the ſame zeal and fidelity; and that, if ſhe failed in either, he was always at liberty to take her government from her. She was continued in it by this means, and acquitted herſelf with all the judgment and ability that could have been expected from the moſt conſummate perſon in the arts of ruling. To the ordinary tributes which her huſband had paid, ſhe added preſents of an extraordinary magnificence; and when Pharnabaſus came into her province, ſhe entertained him more ſplendidly than any of the other governors. She was not contented with the conſervation of the cities committed to her care, ſhe made new conqueſts, and took * Lariſſa, Amixita, and Colona.

* From the Lydians and Piſidians.

Hence

Hence we may obſerve, that prudence, good ſenſe, and courage, are of all ſexes. She was preſent in all expeditions in a chariot, and in perſon decreed rewards and puniſhments. None of the neighbouring provinces had a finer army than hers, in which ſhe had a great number of Greek ſoldiers in her pay. She even attended Pharnabaſus in all his enterpriſes, and was of no common ſupport to him. So that the ſatrap, who knew all the value of ſo extraordinary a merit, did more honour to this lady, than to all the other governors. He even admitted her into his council, and treated her with ſuch a diſtinction as might have excited jealouſy, if the modeſty and affability of that lady had not prevented bad effects, by throwing, in a manner, a veil over all her perfections, which ſoftened their luſtre, and let them only appear to be the objects of admiration.

She had no enemies but in her own family. Midias, her ſon-in-law, ſtung with the reproach of ſuffering a woman to command in his place, and abuſing the entire confidence ſhe repoſed in him, which gave him acceſs to her at all times, ſtrangled her with her ſon. After her death he ſeized two fortreſſes, wherein ſhe had ſecured her treaſures; the other cities declared againſt him. He did not long enjoy the fruits of his crime. Dercyllidas happily arrived at this juncture. All the fortreſſes of Æolia, either voluntarily or by force, ſurrendered to him, and Midias was deprived of the poſſeſſions he had ſo unjuſtly acquired. The Lacedæmonian general, having granted Pharnabaſus a truce, took up his winter quarters in Bithynia, to avoid being chargeable to his allies.

[a]The next year, being continued in the command, he marched into Thrace, and arrived at the Cherſoneſus. He knew that the deputies of the country had been at Sparta, to repreſent the neceſſity of fortifying the iſthmus with a good wall againſt the frequent incurſions of the Barbarians, which prevented the cultivation of the lands. Having meaſured the ſpace, which is more than a league in breadth, he diſtributed the work amongſt

[a] A. M. 3606. Ant. J. C. 398. Xenoph. p. 487, 488.

the

the ſoldiers, and the wall was finiſhed in the autumn of the ſame year. Within this ſpace were incloſed eleven cities, ſeveral ports, and a great number of arable lands and plantations, with paſture of all kinds. The work being finiſhed, he returned into Aſia, after having reviewed the cities and found them all in good condition.

[p] Conon, the Athenian, after loſing the battle of Ægoſopotamos, having condemned himſelf to a voluntary baniſhment, continued in the iſle of Cyprus with king Evagoras, not only for the ſafety of his perſon, but in expectation of a change in affairs; like one, ſays Plutarch, who waits the return of the tide before he embarks. He had always in view the re-eſtabliſhment of the Athenian power, to which his defeat had given a mortal wound; and full of fidelity and zeal for his country, though little favourable to him, perpetually meditated the means to raiſe it from its ruins, and reſtore it to its ancient ſplendor.

This Athenian general, knowing the ſucceſs of his views, had occaſion for a powerful ſupport, wrote to Artaxerxes to explain his project to him, and ordered the perſon who carried his letter, to apply himſelf to Cteſias, who would give it to the king. It was accordingly delivered to that phyſician, who, it is ſaid, though he did not approve the contents of it, added to what Conon had wrote, "That he deſired the king would ſend Cteſias to him, being a perſon very capable of his ſervice, eſpecially in maritime affairs." [q] Pharnabaſus, in concert with Conon, was gone to court to complain againſt the conduct of Tiſſaphernes, as too much in favour of the Lacedæmonians. Upon the warm inſtances of Pharnabaſus, the king ordered five hundred talents * to be paid him for the equipment of a fleet, with inſtructions to give Conon the command of it. He ſent Cteſias into Greece, who, after having viſited Cnidos, his native country, went to Sparta.

[p] Plut. in Artax. p. 1021.
[q] Diod. l. xiv. p. 267. Juſtin, l. vi. c. 1.
* 500,000 crowns, or about 112,000l. ſterling.

This

This Cteſias was at firſt in the ſervice of Cyrus, whom he had followed in his expedition. He was taken priſoner in the battle wherein Cyrus was killed, and was made uſe of to dreſs the wounds Artaxerxes had received, of which he acquitted himſelf ſo well, that the king retained him in his ſervice, and made him his firſt phyſician. He paſſed ſeveral years in his ſervice in that quality. Whilſt he was there, the Greeks, upon all their occaſions at the court, applied themſelves to him, as Conon did on this. His long reſidence in Perſia, and at the court, had given him the neceſſary time and means for his information in the hiſtory of the country, which he wrote in three-and-twenty books. The firſt contained the hiſtory of the Aſſyrians and Babylonians, from Ninus and Semiramis, down to Cyrus. The other ſeventeen treated of the Perſian affairs, from the beginning of Cyrus's reign to the third year of the XCVth Olympiad, which agrees with the three hundred and ninety-eighth before JESUS CHRIST. He wrote alſo a hiſtory of India. Photius had given us ſeveral extracts of both theſe hiſtories, which are all that remain of Cteſias. He often contradicts Herodotus, and differs ſometimes alſo from Xenophon. He was in no great eſtimation with the ancients, who ſpeak of him as of a very vain man, whoſe veracity is not to be relied on, and who has inſerted fables, and ſometimes even lies, in his hiſtory.

[s] Tiſſaphernes and Pharnabaſus, though ſecretly each other's enemies, had, upon the king's orders, united their troops to oppoſe the enterpriſes of Dercyllidas, who had marched into Caria. They had reduced him to poſt himſelf ſo diſadvantageouſly, that he muſt inevitably have periſhed, had they charged him immediately, without giving him time to look about him. Pharnabaſus was of this opinion: but Tiſſaphernes apprehended the valour of the Greeks, who had been of

[r] Strab. l. xiv. p. 656. Plut. in Artax. p. 1014—1017—1020. Diod. l. xiv. p. 273. Ariſtot. de Hiſt. anim. l. viii. c. 28. Phot. Cod. lxii.

[s] A. M. 3607. Ant. J. C. 379. Xenoph. Hiſt. Græc. l. iii. 489, 490. Diod. l. xiv. p. 267.

Cyrus's

Cyrus's army, which he had experienced, and to whom he conceived all others reſembled, propoſed an interview, which was accepted. Dercyllidas having demanded that the Grecian cities ſhould continue free, and Tiſſaphernes, that the army and generals of Lacedæmon ſhould retire, they made a truce, till the anſwers of their reſpective maſters could be known.

[t] Whilſt theſe things paſſed in Aſia, the Lacedæmonians reſolved to chaſtiſe the inſolence of the people of Elis, who, not content with having entered into an alliance with their enemies in the Peloponneſian war, prevented their diſputing the prizes in the Olympic games. Upon pretence of the non-payment of a fine by Sparta, they had inſulted their citizens during the games, and hindered Agis from ſacrificing in the temple of Jupiter Olympius. That king was charged with this expedition, which did not terminate till the third year after. He could have taken their city Olympia, which had no works, but contented himſelf with plundering the ſuburbs, and the places for the exerciſes, which were very fine. They demanded peace, which was granted, and were ſuffered to retain the ſuperintendency of the temple of Jupiter Olympius, to which they had not much right, but were more worthy of that honour than thoſe that diſputed it with them.

[u] Agis in his return fell ſick, and died upon arriving at Sparta. Almoſt divine honours were paid to his memory, and after the expiration of ſome days, according to the cuſtom, Leotychides and Ageſilaus, the one ſon and the other brother of the deceaſed, diſputed the crown. The latter maintained, that his competitor was not the ſon of Agis, and ſupported his aſſertion by the confeſſion of the queen herſelf, who knew beſt, and who had often, as well as her huſband, acknowledged as much. In effect, there was a current report, that ſhe had him by Alcibiades[x], as has been related in its place, and that the Athenian general had corrupted her by a

[t] Xenoph. Hiſt. Græc. l. iii. p. 486, 493. Diod. l. xiv. p. 292.
[u] Xenoph. p. 493. Plut. in Lyſ. p. 445. In Ageſil. p. 597.
[x] Athen. l. xii. p. 534.

preſent

preſent of a thouſand * daricks. Agis proteſted the contrary at his death. Leotychides having thrown himſelf at his feet; all bathed in tears, he could not refuſe the grace he implored of him, and owned him for his ſon before all that were preſent.

Moſt of the Spartans, charmed with the virtue and great merit of Ageſilaus, and deeming it an extraordinary advantage to have a perſon for their king who had been educated amongſt them, and paſſed like them through all the rigour of the Spartan education, ſupported him with their whole power. An ancient oracle, that adviſed Sparta to beware of a *lame reign*, was urged againſt him. Lyſander only made a jeſt of it, and turned its ſenſe againſt Leotychides himſelf; endeavouring to prove, that, as a baſtard, he was the lame king the oracle intended to caution them againſt. Ageſilaus, as well by his own great qualities as the powerful ſupport of Lyſander, carried it againſt his nephew, and was declared king.

As by the laws the kingdom had devolved to Agis, his brother Ageſilaus, who ſeemed to be deſtined to paſs his life as a private perſon, was educated like other children in the Spartan diſcipline, which was a very rough manner of life, and full of laborious exerciſe, but † taught youth obedience perfectly well. The law diſpenſed with this education only to ſuch children, as were deſigned for the throne. Ageſilaus therefore had this in peculiar, that he did not arrive at commanding, till he had firſt learned perfectly well how to obey. From thence it was, that of all the kings of Sparta he beſt knew how to make his ſubjects love and eſteem him ‡, becauſe that prince, to the great qualities with which nature had endowed him for commanding and the ſo-

* 1000 piſtoles.

† Hence it was, that the poet Simonides called Sparta, *the tamer of men*, δαμασιμβροτον, as that of the Grecian cities, which rendered its inhabitants by good habits the moſt active and vigorons, and at the ſame time the moſt obedient to the laws, of all mankind, ως μαλιστα δια των εθων τους πολιτας τοις νομοις πειθομενους και χειροηθεις ποιησαν.

‡ Τω Φυσει ηγεμονικω και βασιλικω προσκτησαμενος απο της αγωγης το δημοτικον και φιλανθρωπον.

vereignty, had united by his education the advantage of being humane and popular.

It is ſurpriſing that Sparta, a city ſo renowned in point of education and policy, ſhould conceive it proper to abate any thing of its ſeverity and diſcipline in favour of the princes who were to reign; they having moſt need of being early habituated to the yoke of obedience, in order to their being better qualified to command.

[x] Plutarch obſerves, that from his infancy Ageſilaus was remarkable for uniting qualities in himſelf, which are generally incompatible; a vivacity of ſpirit, a vehemence, an invincible reſolution in appearance, an ardent paſſion for being firſt and ſurpaſſing all others, with a gentleneſs, ſubmiſſion, and docility, that complied at a ſingle word, and made him infinitely ſenſible of the lighteſt reprimand, ſo that every thing might be obtained of him from the motives of honour, but nothing by fear or violence.

He was lame, but that defect was covered by the gracefulneſs of his perſon, and ſtill more by the gaiety with which he ſupported and rallied it firſt himſelf. It may even be ſaid, that the infirmity of his body ſet his valour and paſſion for glory in a ſtronger light; there being no labour nor enterpriſe, however difficult, that he would refuſe upon account of that inconvenience.

[y] Praiſe, without an air of truth and ſincerity, was ſo far from giving him pleaſure, that it offended him, and was never received by him as ſuch, but when it came from the mouths of thoſe, who upon other occaſions had repreſented his failings to him with freedom. He would never ſuffer during his life that his picture ſhould be drawn, and even in dying, expreſsly forbad any image to be made of him, either in colours or relievo. [z] His reaſon was that his great actions, if he had done any, would ſupply the place of monuments; without which all the ſtatues in the world would do him no manner of honour. We only know, that he

[x] In Ageſil. p. 596. [y] Plut. in Moral. p. 55.
[z] Ibid. p. 191.

was

was of small stature, which the Spartans did not affect in their kings; and Theophrastus affirms, that the Ephori laid a fine upon their king Archidamus, the father of him we speak of, for having espoused a very little woman: "*For," said they, "she will give us poppets instead of kings."

[a] It has been remarked, that Agesilaus, in his way of living with the Spartans, behaved better with regard to his enemies than his friends; for he never did the least wrong to the former, and often violated justice in favour of the latter. He would have been ashamed not to have honoured and rewarded his enemies, when their actions deserved it; and was not able to reprove his friends when they committed faults. He would even support them when they were in the wrong [b], and upon such occasions looked upon the zeal for justice as a vain pretence to cover the refusal of serving them. And in proof of this, a short letter is cited, written by him to a judge in recommendation of a friend; the words are: "If Nicias be not guilty, acquit him for his innocence; if he be, acquit him for my sake; but however it be, acquit him."

It is understanding the rights and privileges of friendship very ill, to be capable of rendering it in this manner the accomplice of crimes, and the protectress of bad actions. It is the fundamental law of friendship, says Cicero, never to ask of, or grant any thing to, friends, that does not consist with justice and honour: [c] *Hæc prima lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati.*

Agesilaus was so delicate in this point, at least in the beginning, and omitted no occasion of gratifying his friends, and even his enemies. By this officious and obliging conduct, supported by his extraordinary merit, he acquired great credit, and almost absolute power in the city, which ran so high as to render him suspected by his country. The Ephori, to prevent its effects, and give a check to his ambition, laid a fine

[a] Plut. in Agesil. p. 598 [b] Ibid. p. 603. [c] De amicit. n. 40.
* Ου γαρ βασιλις, ιδεσθαι, αμμιν αλλα βασιλειδια γενησει.

upon

upon him; alleging as their ſole reaſon*, that he attached the hearts of the citizens to himſelf alone, which were the right of the republic, and ought not to be poſſeſſed but in common.

When he was declared king, he was put into poſſeſſion of the whole eſtate of his brother Agis, of which Leotychides was deprived as a baſtard. But ſeeing the relations of that prince, on the ſide of his mother Lampito, were all very poor, he divided the whole inheritance with them, and by that act of generoſity acquired great reputation, and the good will of all the world, inſtead of the envy and hatred he might have drawn upon himſelf by the inheritance. Theſe ſort of ſacrifices are glorious, though rare, and can never be ſufficiently eſteemed.

Never was king of Sparta ſo powerful as Ageſilaus, and it was only, as Xenophon ſays, by obeying his country, in every thing, that he acquired ſo great an authority; which ſeems a kind of paradox, thus explained by Plutarch. The greateſt power was veſted at that time in the Ephori and ſenate. The office of the Ephori ſubſiſted only one year; they were inſtituted to limit the too great power of the kings, and to ſerve as a barrier againſt it, as we have obſerved elſewhere. For this reaſon, the kings of Sparta, from their eſtabliſhment had always retained a kind of hereditary averſion for them, and continually oppoſed their meaſures. Ageſilaus took a quite contrary method. Inſtead of being perpetually at war with them, and claſhing upon all occaſions with their meaſures, he made it his buſineſs to cultivate their good opinion, treated them always with the utmoſt deference and regard, never entered upon the leaſt enterpriſe without having firſt communicated it to them, and upon their ſummons quitted every thing, and repaired to the ſenate with the utmoſt promptitude and reſignation: whenever he ſat upon his throne to adminiſter juſtice, if the Ephori entered, he never failed to riſe up to do them honour. By all theſe inſtances of reſpect, he ſeemed to add new dig-

* Οτι τας κοινας πολιτας, κλατεν.

nity

nity to their office, whilſt in reality he augmented his own power, without its being obſerved, and added to the ſovereignty a grandeur the more ſolid and permanent, as it was the effect of the people's good will and eſteem for him. The greateſt of the Roman emperors, as Auguſtus, Trajan, and Marcus Antoninus, were convinced, that the utmoſt a prince could do, to honour and exalt the principal magiſtrates, was only adding to his own power, and ſtrengthening his authority, which neither ſhould, nor can be founded in any thing but juſtice.

Such was Ageſilaus, of whom much will be ſaid hereafter, and with whoſe character it was therefore neceſſary to begin.

SECT. II. *Ageſilaus ſets out for Aſia. Lyſander falls out with him, and returns to Sparta. His ambitious Deſigns to alter the Succeſſion to the Throne.*

[d] AGESILAUS had ſcarce aſcended the throne when accounts came from Aſia, that the king of Perſia was fitting out a great fleet, with intent to deprive the Lacedæmonians of their empire at ſea. Conon's letters, ſeconded by the remonſtrances of Pharnabaſus, who had in concert repreſented to Artaxerxes the power of Sparta, as formidable, had made a ſtrong impreſſion upon that prince. From that time he had it ſeriouſly in his thoughts to humble that proud republic, by raiſing up its rival, and by that means re-eſtabliſhing the ancient balance between them, which could alone aſſure his ſafety, by keeping them perpetually employed againſt each other, and thereby prevented from uniting their forces againſt him.

Lyſander, who deſired to be ſent into Aſia, in order to re-eſtabliſh his creatures and friends in the government of the cities, from which Sparta had removed them, ſtrongly diſpoſed Ageſilaus to take upon himſelf the charge of the war, and to prevent the Barbarian

[d] A. M. 3608. Ant. J. C. 396. Xenoph. Hiſt. Græc. l. iii. p. 495, 496. Ibid. de Ageſil. p. 652. Plut. in Ageſil. p. 598, & in Lyſand. p. 446.

king

king, by attacking him remote from Greece, before he ſhould have finiſhed his preparations. The republic having made this propoſal to him, he could not refuſe it, and charged himſelf with the expedition againſt Artaxerxes, upon condition that thirty Spartan captains ſhould be granted him, to aſſiſt him and compoſe his council, with two thouſand new citizens to be choſen out of the helots who had been lately made freemen, and ſix thouſand troops of the allies, which was immediately reſolved. Lyſander was placed at the head of the thirty Spartans, not only upon account of his great reputation, and the authority he had acquired, but for the particular friendſhip between him and Ageſilaus, who was indebted to him for the throne, as well as the honour which had been lately conferred upon him of being elected generaliſſimo.

The glorious return of the Greeks who had followed Cyrus, and whom the whole power of Perſia was not able to prevent from retreating into their own country, had inſpired all Greece with a wonderful confidence in their forces, and a ſupreme contempt for the Barbarians. In this diſpoſition of the people, the Lacedæmonians conceived it would reproach them, to neglect ſo favourable a conjuncture for delivering the Greeks in Aſia from their ſubjection to thoſe Barbarians, and for putting an end to the outrages and violences with which they were continually oppreſſing them. They had already attempted this by their generals Thimbron and Dercyllidas; but all their endeavours having hitherto proved ineffectual, they referred the conduct of this war to the care of Ageſilaus. He promiſed them either to conclude a glorious peace with the Perſians, or to employ them ſo effectually, as ſhould leave them neither leiſure nor inclination to carry the war into Greece. The king had great views, and thought of nothing leſs than attacking Artaxerxes in Perſia itſelf.

When he arrived at Epheſus, Tiſſaphernes ſent to demand what reaſons had induced his coming into Aſia, and why he had taken up arms. He replied, that he came to aid the Greeks who inhabited there, and to re-

eſtabliſh them in their ancient liberty. [e] The ſatrap, who was not yet prepared, preferred art to force, and aſſured him that his maſter would give the Grecian cities of Aſia their liberty, provided he committed no acts of hoſtility till the return of the couriers. Ageſilaus agreed, and the truce was ſworn on both ſides. Tiſſaphernes, who laid no great ſtreſs upon an oath, took the advantage of this delay to aſſemble troops on all ſides. The Lacedæmonian general was apprized of it, but however kept his word; being convinced, that in affairs of ſtate, the breach of faith can have but a very ſhort and precarious ſucceſs; whereas a reputation eſtabliſhed upon inviolable fidelity in the obſervance of engagements, which the perfidy itſelf of other contracting parties has not power to alter, will eſtabliſh a credit and confidence, equally uſeful and glorious. In effect, Xenophon remarks, that this religious obſervation of treaties gained him the univerſal eſteem and opinion of the cities; whilſt the different conduct of Tiſſaphernes entirely loſt him their favour.

[f] Ageſilaus made uſe of this interval in acquiring an exact knowledge of the ſtate of the cities, and in making ſuitable regulations. He found great diſorder every where, their government being neither democratical, as under the Athenians, nor ariſtocratical, as Lyſander had eſtabliſhed it. [g] The people of the country had no communication with Ageſilaus, nor had ever known him; for which reaſon they made no court to him, conceiving, that he had the title of general for form ſake only, and that the whole power was really veſted in Lyſander. As no governor had ever done ſo much good to his friends, or hurt to his enemies, it is not wonderful that he was ſo much beloved by the one and feared by the other. All therefore were eager to pay their homage to him, were every day in crowds at his door, and made his train very numerous when he went abroad; whilſt Agéſilaus remained almoſt alone. Such a conduct could not fail of offending a general and king,

[e] Xenoph. p. 496, & 652. [f] A. M. 3609. Ant. J. C. 395.
[g] Plut. in Ageſil. p. 599, 600. In Lyſand. p. 446, 447.

extremely

extremely ſenſible and delicate in what regarded his authority; though otherwiſe not jealous of any one's merit, but on the contrary, much inclined to diſtinguiſh it with his favour. He did not diſſemble his diſguſt. He paid no regard to Lyſander's recommendation, and ceaſed to employ him himſelf. Lyſander preſently perceived this alteration in regard to him. He diſcontinued his applications for his friends to the king, deſired them not to viſit him any more, nor attach themſelves to him, but to addreſs themſelves directly to the king, and to cultivate the favour of thoſe, who in the preſent times had power to ſerve and advance their creatures. The greateſt part of them gave over importuning him with their affairs, but did not ceaſe to pay their court to him. On the contrary, they were only more aſſiduous than ever about his perſon, attended him in throngs when he took the air abroad, and regularly aſſiſted at all his exerciſes. Lyſander, naturally vain, and long accuſtomed to the homage and ſubmiſſion that attended abſolute power, did not take ſufficient care to remove the buſy crowd from his perſon, that continually made their addreſſes to him with more application than ever.

This ridiculous affectation of authority and grandeur grew ſtill more and more offenſive to Ageſilaus, and ſeemed as if intended to inſult him. He reſented it ſo highly, that having given the moſt conſiderable commands and beſt governments to private officers, he appointed Lyſander commiſſary of the ſtores, and diſtributer of proviſions; and afterwards to inſult and deride the Ionians, he told them, "that they might now go and conſult his maſter butcher."

Lyſander thought it then incumbent upon him to ſpeak and to come to an explanation with him. Their converſation was brief and laconic. "Certainly, my lord," ſaid Lyſander, "you very well know how to depreſs your friends." "Yes, when they would ſet themſelves above me; but when they are ſtudious of my dignity, I know alſo how to let them ſhare in it." "But perhaps, my lord," replied Lyſander, "I have been injured by falſe reports, and things I never did have been imputed

imputed to me. I must beg therefore, if it be only upon account of the strangers, who have all of them their eyes upon us, that you would give me an employment in your army, wherein you shall think me least capable of displeasing, and most of serving you effectually."

The effect of this conversation was the lieutenantcy of the Hellespont, which Agesilaus gave him. In this employment he retained all his resentment, without however neglecting any part of his duty, or of what conduced to the success of affairs. Some small time after he returned to Sparta without any marks of honour and distinction, extremely incensed against Agesilaus, and with the hope of making him perfectly sensible of it.

It must be allowed that Lysander's conduct, as we have here represented it, denotes a vanity and narrowness of mind on his side, much unworthy of his reputation. Perhaps Agesilaus carried too far his sensibility and delicacy in point of honour, and that he was a little too severe upon a friend and benefactor, whom secret animadversions, attended with openness of heart and expressions of kindness, might have reclaimed to his duty. But as shining as Lysander's merit, and as considerable as the services he had rendered Agesilaus might be, they could not all of them give him a right, not only to an equality with his king and general, but to the superiority he affected, which in some measure tended to making the other insignificant. He ought to have remembered, that it is never allowable for an inferior to forget himself, and to exceed the bounds of just subordination.

[h] Upon his return to Sparta he had it seriously in his thoughts to execute a project, which he had many years revolved in his mind. At Sparta there were only two families, or rather branches of the posterity of Hercules, who had a right to the throne. When Lysander had attained to that high degree of power which his great actions had acquired him, he began to see with pain a city, whose glory had been so much augmented by his exploits, under the government of princes, to whom he

[h] Plut. in Lysand. p. 447, 448. Diod. l. xiv. p. 244, 245.

gave

gave place neither in valour nor birth; for he defcended, as well as themfelves, from Hercules. He therefore fought means to deprive thofe two houfes of the fole fucceffion to the crown, and to extend that right to all the other branches of the Heraclides, and even, according to fome, to all the natives of Sparta; flattering himfelf, that if his defign took effect, no Spartan could be capable of difputing that honour with him, and that he fhould have the preference to all others.

This ambitious project of Lyfander fhows, that the greateft captains are often thofe from whom a republic has moft to apprehend. Thofe haughty valiant fpirits, accuftomed to abfolute power in armies, bring back with victory a daring loftinefs of mind, always to be dreaded in a free ftate. Sparta, in giving Lyfander unlimited power, and leaving it for fo many years in his hands, did not fufficiently confider, that nothing is more dangerous than to confide to perfons of fuperior merit and abilities, employments of fupreme authority, which naturally expofes them to the temptation of rendering themfelves independent, and abfolute maflers of power. Lyfander was not proof againft it, and practifed fecretly to open himfelf a way to the throne.

The undertaking was bold, and required long preparations. He thought it impoffible to fucceed without firft making ufe of the fear of the divinity, and the terrors of fuperftition, to amaze and fubdue the citizens into a more eafy difpofition to receive what he wanted to have them underftand; for he knew that at Sparta, as well as throughout all Greece, nothing of the leaft importance was determined, without the oracle's being previoufly confulted. He tempted with great prefents the prieffs and prieffeffes of Delpos, Dodona, and Ammon; though ineffectually at that time; and the latter even fent ambaffadors to Sparta, to accufe him of impiety and facrilege; but he extricated himfelf from that bad affair by his credit and addrefs.

It was neceffary to fet other engines at work. A woman in the kingdom of Pontus, affirming that fhe was with child by Apollo, had been delivered fome years before

before of a ſon, to whom the name of Silenus, was given, and the greateſt perſons of that nation had diſputed the honour of nurſing and educating him. Lyſander, taking this wonderous birth for the commencement, and in a manner the foundation of the piece he meditated, ſupplied the reſt himſelf, by employing a good number of perſons, and thoſe not inconſiderable, to diſperſe, by way of prologue to the performance, the miraculous birth of this infant; whereby, no affectation appearing in them, people were diſpoſed to believe it. This being done, they brought certain diſcourſes from Delphos to Sparta, which were induſtrioufly ſpread abroad every where, that the prieſts of the temple had in their cuſtody ſome books of very ancient oracles, which they kept concealed from all the world, and of which it was not permitted, either for them or any other perſons whatſoever, to have any knowledge; and that only a ſon of Apollo, who was to come in proceſs of time, after having given undoubted proofs of his birth to thoſe who had the books in their keeping, was to take and carry them away.

All this being well premiſed, Silenus was to preſent himſelf to the prieſts, and demand thoſe oracles as the ſon of Apollo; and the prieſts, who were in the ſecret, as actors well prepared and fully inſtructed in their parts, were on their ſide to make the moſt exact and circumſtantial enquiry into every thing, not without affecting great difficulty, and aſking endleſs queſtions for the full proof of his birth. At length, as abſolutely convinced, that this Silenus was the real ſon of Apollo, they were to produce the books, and deliver them to him; after which, this ſon of Apollo was to read the prophecies contained in them, in the preſence of all the world; and particularly that for which the whole contrivance had been cooked up. The ſenſe of this was, "That it was more expedient and advantageous for the Spartans to elect no king for the future but the moſt worthy of their citizens." Lyſander in conſequence was to mount the tribunal, to harangue the citizens, and induce them to make this alteration. Cleon of Helicarnaſſus, a celebrated

brated rhetorician, had compoſed a very eloquent diſcourſe for him upon this ſubject, which he had got by heart.

Silenus grew up, and repaired to Greece in order to play his part, when Lyſander had the mortification to ſee his piece miſcarry, by the timidity and deſertion of one of his principal actors, who broke his word, and diſappeared at the very inſtant it was to have been performed. Though this intrigue had been carried on a great while, it was tranſacted with ſo much ſecrecy to the time it was to have made its appearance, that nothing of it was known during the life of Lyſander. How it came to light after his death we ſhall ſoon relate, but muſt at preſent return to Tiſſaphernes.

SECT. III. *Expeditions of Ageſilaus in Aſia. Diſgrace and Death of Tiſſaphernes. Sparta gives Ageſilaus the command of its Armies by Sea and Land. He deputes Piſander to command the Fleet. Interview of Ageſilaus and Pharnabaſus.*

[i] WHEN Tiſſaphernes had received the troops aſſigned him by the king, and drawn together all his forces, he ſent to command Ageſilaus to retire out of Aſia, and declared war againſt him in caſe of refuſal. His officers were all alarmed, not believing him in a condition to oppoſe the great army of the Perſian king. For himſelf, he heard Tiſſaphernes's heralds with a gay and eaſy countenance, and bade them tell their maſter, that he was under a very great obligation to him *for having made the gods, by his perjury, the enemies of Perſia and the friends of Greece.* He promiſed himſelf great things from this expedition, and would have thought it an exceeding diſgrace for him, that ten thouſand Greeks, under the command of Xenophon, ſhould have paſſed through the heart of Aſia to the Grecian Sea, and beat the king of Perſia as often as he appeared againſt them; and that he, who commanded the Lace-

[i] Xenoph. Hiſt. Græc. l. iii. p. 497—502. Idem, de Ageſil. p. 652—656. Plut. in Ageſil. p. 600.

dæmonians,

dæmonians, whoſe empire extended all over Greece by ſea and land, ſhould not execute ſome exploit worthy of glory and remembrance.

At firſt, therefore, to revenge the perfidy of Tiſſaphernes by a juſt and allowable deceit, he made a feint of marching his army into Caria, the reſidence of that ſatrap; and as ſoon as the Barbarian had cauſed his troops to march that way, he turned ſhort and fell upon Phrygia, where he took many towns, and amaſſed immenſe treaſures, which he diſtributed amongſt the officers and ſoldiers: letting his friends ſee, ſays Plutarch, that to break a treaty, and violate an oath, is to deſpiſe the gods themſelves; and that, on the contrary, to deceive an enemy by the ſtratagems of war, is not only juſt and glorious, but a ſenſible delight, attended with the greateſt advantages.

The ſpring being come, he aſſembled all his forces at Epheſus; and to exerciſe his ſoldiers, he propoſed prizes both for the horſe and foot. This ſmall inducement ſet every thing in motion. The place for exerciſes was perpetually full of all kinds of troops, and the city of Epheſus ſeemed only a palæſtra, and a ſchool of war. The whole market-place was filled with horſes and arms, and the ſhops with different kinds of military equipage. Ageſilaus was ſeen returning from the exerciſes, followed by a crowd of officers and ſoldiers, all of them crowned with wreaths, which they were going to depoſit in the temple of Diana, to the great admiration and delight of all the world. For, ſays Xenophon, where piety and diſcipline are ſeen to flouriſh, the beſt hopes muſt be conceived.

To give his ſoldiers new valour from the contempt of their enemies, he made uſe of this contrivance. He ordered the commiſſaries, who had charge of the booty, to ſtrip the priſoners and expoſe them to ſale. There were abundance of buyers for their habits; but for themſelves, their bodies were ſo ſoft, white, and delicate, having been nurtured and brought up in the ſhade, that they laughed at them, as of neither ſervice nor value. Ageſilaus took this occaſion to approach

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and ſay to his ſoldiers, pointing to the men, "ſee there againſt whom you fight;" and ſhowing them their rich ſpoils, "and there for what you fight."

When the ſeaſon for taking the field returned, Ageſilaus gave out that he would march into Lydia. Tiſſaphernes, who had not forgot the firſt ſtratagem he had uſed in regard to him, and was not willing to be deceived a ſecond time, made his troops march directly for Caria; not doubting, but at this time, Ageſilaus would turn his arms that way; the rather, becauſe it was natural for him, as he wanted cavalry, to endeavour to make a rough and difficult country the ſeat of action, which might render the horſe of an enemy uſeleſs and unſerviceable. But he deceived himſelf: Ageſilaus entered Lydia and approached Sardis. Tiſſaphernes haſtened thither with his horſe, with intent to relieve the place. Ageſilaus knowing that his infantry had not had time to arrive, thought proper to take the advantage of ſo favourable an opportunity to give him battle, before he had reaſſembled all his troops. He drew up his army in two lines; the firſt he formed of his ſquadrons, whoſe intervals he filled up with platoons of the light-armed foot, and ordered them to begin the charge, whilſt he followed with the ſecond line, compoſed of his heavy-armed infantry. The Barbarians did not ſuſtain the firſt ſhock, but took to their heels immediately. The Greeks purſued them, and forced their camp, where they made a great ſlaughter, and a ſtill greater booty.

[k] After this battle the troops of Ageſilaus were at entire liberty to plunder and ravage the whole country of the Perſians, and at the ſame time had the ſatisfaction to ſee that prince inflict an exemplary puniſhment upon Tiſſaphernes, who was a very wicked man, and the moſt dangerous enemy of the Greeks. [l] The king had already received abundance of complaints againſt his conduct. Upon this occaſion he was accuſed of treaſon, as not having done his duty in the battle. Queen Paryſatis, always actuated by her hatred and

[k] Xenoph. p. 501, & 657. Plut. in Artax. p. 1022. & in Ageſil. p. 601. [l] Diod. l. xiv. p. 299. Polyæn. Stratag. l. vii.

revenge

revenge againſt thoſe who had any ſhare in the death of her ſon Cyrus, did not a little contribute to the death of Tiſſaphernes, by aggravating with all her power the charges againſt him; for ſhe had been entirely reſtored to favour by the king her ſon.

As Tiſſaphernes had a great authority in Aſia, the king was afraid to attack him openly, but thought it neceſſary to take ſuitable precautions in ſeizing ſo powerful an officer, who might have proved a dangerous enemy. He charged Tithrauſtes with that important commiſſion, and gave him two letters at the ſame time. The firſt was for Tiſſaphernes, and contained the king's orders in regard to the war with the Greeks, with full power to act as was requiſite. The ſecond was addreſſed to Ariæus, governor of Lariſſa; by which the king commanded him to aſſiſt Tithrauſtes with his council, and all his forces, in ſeizing Tiſſaphernes. He loſt no time, and ſent to deſire Tiſſaphernes would come to him, that they might confer together upon the operations of the enſuing campaign. Tiſſaphernes, who ſuſpected nothing, went to him with only a guard of three hundred men. Whilſt he was in a bath, without ſabre or other arms, he was ſeized, and put into the hands of Tithrauſtes, who cauſed his head to be ſtruck off, and ſent it immediately to Perſia. The king gave it to Paryſatis; an agreeable preſent to a princeſs of her violent and vindictive temper. Though this conduct of Artaxerxes ſeems little worthy of a king, nobody lamented the death of that ſatrap, who had no veneration for the gods, nor any regard for men; who looked upon probity and honour as empty names; who made a jeſt of the moſt ſacred oaths, and believed the whole ability and policy of a ſtateſman conſiſted in knowing how to deceive others by hypocriſy, fraud, perfidy, and perjury.

Tithrauſtes had a third writing from the king, whereby he was appointed to command the armies in the room of Tiſſaphernes. [m] After having executed his commiſſion, he ſent great preſents to Ageſilaus, to in-

[m] Xenoph. Hiſt. Græc. l. iii, p. 501. Plut. in Ageſil. p. 601.

duce

duce him to enter more readily into his views and intereſt; and ordered him to be told, that the cauſe of the war being removed, and the author of all differences put to death, nothing oppoſed an accommodation; that the king of Perſia conſented, that the cities of Aſia ſhould enjoy their liberty, paying him the cuſtomary tribute, provided he would withdraw his troops, and return into Greece. Ageſilaus replied, that he could conclude nothing without the orders of Sparta, upon whom alone depended the peace; that as for him, he was better pleaſed with enriching his ſoldiers than himſelf; that the Greeks beſides thought it more glorious and honourable to take ſpoils from their enemies, than to accept their preſents. However, as he was not unwilling to give Tithrauſtes the ſatisfaction of removing out of his province, and of expreſſing his gratitude to him for having puniſhed the common enemy of the Greeks, he marched into Phrygia, which was the province of Pharnabaſus. Tithrauſtes had himſelf propoſed that expedition to him, and paid him thirty talents for the charges of his journey.

Upon his march, he received a letter from the magiſtrates of Sparta, with orders to take upon him the command of the naval army, and power to depute whom he thought fit in his ſtead. By theſe new powers he ſaw himſelf abſolute commander of all the troops in that ſtate in Aſia both by ſea and land. This reſolution was taken, in order that all operations being directed by one and the ſame head, and the two armies acting in concert, the plans for the ſervice might be executed with more uniformity, and every thing conſpire to the ſame end. Sparta till then had never done the honour to any of their generals, to confide to him at the ſame time the command of the armies by ſea and land. So that all the world agreed, that he was the greateſt perſonage of his time, and beſt ſuſtained the high reputation he enjoyed. But he was a man, and had his failings.

The firſt thing he did was to eſtabliſh Piſander his lieutenant in the fleet; in which he ſeemed to have committed a conſiderable fault; becauſe having about him

many older and more experienced captains, without regard to the ſervice of the public, to do honour to an ally, and to pleaſe his wife, who was Piſander's ſiſter, he intruſted him with the command of the fleet; that employment being much above his abilities, though he was not without his merit.

This is the common temptation of perſons in power, who believe they poſſeſs it only for themſelves and their families; as if the advantage of relation to them were a ſufficient title and qualification for poſts which require great abilities. They do not reflect, that they not only expoſe the affairs of a ſtate to ruin by their private views, but ſacrifice beſides the intereſts of their own glory, which cannot be maintained but by ſucceſſes it were inconſiſtent to expect from inſtruments ſo ill choſen.

[n] Ageſilaus continued with his army in Phrygia, upon the lands of Pharnabaſus's government, where he lived in the abundance of all things, and amaſſed great ſums of money. From thence advancing as far as Paphlagonia, he made an alliance with king Cotis, who paſſionately deſired his amity, from the ſenſe of his faith in the obſervance of treaties, and his other virtues. The ſame motive had already induced Spithridates, one of the king's principal officers, to quit the ſervice of Pharnabaſus, and go over to Ageſilaus, to whom, from his revolt, he had rendered great ſervices; for he had a great body of troops, and was very brave. This officer, having entered Phrygia, had laid waſte the whole country under Pharnabaſus, who never dared to appear in the field againſt him, nor even rely upon his fortreſſes: but carrying away whatever was moſt valuable and dear to him, he kept flying continually before him, and retired from one place to another, changing his camp every day. Spithridates at length, taking with him ſome Spartan troops, with Herippidas, (the chief of the council of thirty, ſent, by the republic, to Ageſilaus the ſecond year) watched him one day ſo cloſely, and attack-

[n] A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394. Xenoph. Hiſt. Græc. l. iv. p. 507-519.

ed him so successfully, that he made himself master of his camp, and of all the rich spoils with which it abounded. But Herippidas, injudiciously setting himself up as an inexorable comptroller, was for bringing the booty that had been sunk to an account; forced even the soldiers of Spithridates to restore what they had taken, and by visiting their tents, and searching them with an unseasonable exactitude and severity, affronted Spithridates to such a degree, that he withdrew directly to Sardis with his Paphlagonians.

It is said that in this whole expedition nothing so sensibly affected Agesilaus as the retreat of Spithridates. For, besides his being very sorry for the loss of so good an officer, and such good troops, he apprehended being reproached with mean and sordid avarice: a vice equally dishonourable to himself and his country; and of which he had taken pains to avoid the slightest suspicion during his whole life. He did not think it consistent with the duty of his office to shut his eyes, through slothful ease and indolence, against all the malversations that were committed under him; but he knew, at the same time, that there is an exactitude and severity, that by being carried too far, degenerate into minuteness and petulancy, and which, through an extreme affectation of virtue, becomes a real and dangerous vice.

[a] Some time after, Pharnabasus, who saw his country ravaged, demanded an interview with Agesilaus, which was negociated by a common friend of them both. Agesilaus arrived first, with his friends, at the place agreed on, and sat down, in expectation of Pharnabasus, upon the turf, under the shade of a tree. When Pharnabasus arrived, his people spread skins upon the ground, of exceeding softness from the length of their hair, with rich carpets of various colours, and magnificent cushions. But when he saw Agesilaus sitting simply upon the ground, without any preparation, he was ashamed of his effeminacy, and sat down also upon the grass. On this occasion the Persian pride

[a] Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 510—512. Plut. in Agesil. p. 602.

was seen to pay homage to the Spartan modesty and simplicity.

After reciprocal salutations, Pharnabasus spoke to this effect: That he had served the Lacedæmonians in the Peloponnesian war to the utmost of his power, fought several battles for them, and supported their naval army without giving any room to reproach him with fraud or treachery, as Tissaphernes had done: that he was surprised at their coming to attack him in his government; burning the towns, cutting down the trees, and laying waste the whole country: that if it was the custom with the Greeks, who made profession of honour and virtue, to treat their friends and benefactors in such a manner, he did not know what they might mean by just and equitable. These complaints were not entirely without foundation, and were uttered with a modest, but pathetic air and tone of voice. The Spartans, who attended Agesilaus, not seeing how they could be answered, cast down their eyes, and kept a profound silence. Agesilaus, who observed it, replied almost in these terms: "Lord Pharnabasus, you are not ignorant, that war often arms the best friends against each other for the defence of their country. Whilst we were such to the king your master, we treated him as a friend; but as we are become his enemies, we make open war against him, as it is just we should, and endeavour to hurt him by what we act against you. However, from the instant you shall think fit to throw off the yoke of bondage, and prefer being called the friend and ally of the Greeks, before the name of the king of Persia's slave, you may reckon that all the troops you see before your eyes, our arms, our ships, our persons to the last man of us, are only here to defend your possessions, and secure your liberty, which of all blessings is the most precious and desirable."

Pharnabasus answered, that if the king sent another general in his place, and subjected him to the new comer, he should very willingly accept his offer; that otherwise he would not depart from the faith he had sworn to him, nor quit his service. Agesilaus then tak-

ing him by the hand, and rising with him, replied, "That it were the pleasure of the gods, lord Pharnabasus, with such noble sentiments, that you were rather our friend than our enemy." He promised to withdraw from his government, and never return into it, whilst he could subsist elsewhere.

SECT. IV. *League against the Lacedæmonians. Agesilaus, recalled by the Ephori to defend his County, obeys directly. Lysander's Death. Victory of the Lacedæmonians near Nemea. Their Fleet beaten by Conon at Cnidos. Battle gained by the Lacedæmonians at Coronæ.*

AGESILAUS had been two years at the head of the army, and had already made the most remote provinces of Asia tremble at his name, and resound with the fame of his great wisdom, disinterestedness, moderation, intrepid valour in the greatest dangers, and invincible patience in supporting the rudest fatigues. Of so many thousand soldiers under his command, not one was worse provided, or lay harder, than himself. He was so indifferent as to heat or cold, that he seemed formed * only to support the most rigorous seasons, and such as it pleased God to send: which are Plutarch's express words.

The most agreeable of all sights to the Greeks settled in Asia, was to see the lieutenants of the great king, his satraps, and other great lords, who were formerly so haughty and untractable, soften their note in the presence of a man meanly clad, and at his single word, however short and laconic, change their language and conduct, and, in a manner, transform themselves into different creatures. Deputies from all parts were sent by the people to form alliances with him, and his army increased every day by the troops of the Barbarians that came to join him.

[b] A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394. Plut. in Agesil. p. 603, 604. Xenoph. in Agesil. p. 657.

* Ὡςπερ μαγος και χρησθαι ταις υπο θεου κεκραμεναις αραις πεφυκως.

All

All Asia was already in motion, and most of the provinces ready to revolt. Agesilaus had already restored order and tranquillity in all the cities, had reinstated them in the possession of their liberty, under reasonable modifications, not only without shedding of blood, but without even banishing a single person. Not content with such a progress, he had formed the design of attacking the king of Persia in the heart of his dominions, to put him in fear for his own person and the tranquillity he enjoyed in Ecbatana and Susa, and to find him so much business as should make it impracticable for him to embroil all Greece from his cabinet, by corrupting the orators and persons of greatest authority in its cities with his presents.

[q] Tithraustes, who commanded for the king in Asia, seeing the tendency of Agesilaus's designs, and desiring to prevent their effects, had sent Timocrates of Rhodes into Greece, with great sums of money, to corrupt the principal persons in the cities, and by their means occasion defections against Sparta. He knew that the haughtiness of the Lacedæmonians (for all their generals did not resemble Agesilaus) and the imperious manner with which they treated their neighbours and allies, especially since they considered themselves as the masters of Greece, had universally disgusted the people, and excited a jealousy that waited only an occasion to break out against them. This severity of governing had a natural cause in their education. Accustomed from their infancy to obey without delay or reply, first to their tutors, and afterwards to their magistrates, they exacted a like submission from the cities in their dependence, were easily incensed by the least opposition, and by this excessive severity rendered themselves insupportable. Tithraustes therefore did not find it difficult to draw off the allies from their party. Thebes, Argos, Corinth, entered into his measures: the deputy did not go to Athens. These three cities, influenced by those that governed them, made a league against the Lacedæmo-

[q] Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 502—507. Plut. in Lysand. p. 449—451.

nians

nians who on their ſide prepared vigorouſly for the war. The Thebans, at the ſame time, ſent deputies to the Athenians to implore their aid, and that they would enter into the alliance. The deputies, after having ſlightly paſſed over their ancient diviſions, inſiſted ſtrongly upon the conſiderable ſervice they had rendered Athens, in refuſing to join its enemies, when they endeavoured its final deſtruction. They repreſented to them the favourable opportunity that offered for reinſtating themſelves in their ancient power, and to deprive the Lacedæmonians of the empire of Greece. That all the allies of Sparta, either without or within Greece, were weary of their ſevere and unjuſt ſway, and waited only the ſignal to revolt. That the moment the Athenians ſhould declare themſelves, all the cities would rouſe up at the ſound of their arms, and that the king of Perſia, who had ſworn the ruin of Sparta, would aid them with all his forces both by ſea and land.

Thraſybulus, whom the Thebans had ſupplied with arms and money, when he undertook the re-eſtabliſhment of the Athenian liberty, ſeconded their demand with great vigour, and the aid was unanimouſly reſolved. The Lacedæmonians, on their ſide, took the field without loſs of time, and entered Phocis. Lyſander wrote to Pauſanias, who commanded one of the two armies, to give him notice to march early the next day to Haliartus, which he deſigned to beſiege, and that he ſhould be there himſelf at ſun-riſe. The letter was intercepted. Lyſander, after having waited his coming up a great while, was obliged to engage, and was killed in the battle. Pauſanias received this bad news on his way; but, however, continued his march to Haliartus, and called a council of war to conſider upon a ſecond battle. He did not think it conſiſtent with prudence to hazard it, and contented himſelf with making a truce, to remove the bodies of thoſe who had fallen in the former fight. Upon his return to Sparta, he was cited to give an account of his conduct, and, refuſing to appear, was condemned to die. But he avoided the execution of that ſentence by flight, and retired to Tegeum, where

where he paſſed the remainder of his life under the ſhelter and protection of Minerva, to whom he had rendered himſelf a ſuppliant, and died of diſeaſe.

Lyſander's poverty, having been diſcovered after his death, did great honour to his memory; when it was known, that of all the gold and riches which had paſſed through his hands, of a power ſo extenſive as his had been, of ſo many cities under his government, and which made their court to him, in a word, of that kind of dominion and ſovereignty always exerciſed by him, he had made no manner of advantage for the advancement and enriching of his houſe.

Some days before his death, two of the principal citizens of Sparta had contracted themſelves to his two daughters; but when they knew in what condition he had left his affairs, they refuſed to marry them. The republic did not ſuffer ſo ſordid a baſeneſs to go unpuniſhed, nor Lyſander's poverty, which was the ſtrongeſt proof of his juſtice and virtue, to be treated as an obſtacle to allying into his family. They were fined in a great ſum, publicly diſgraced, and expoſed to the contempt of all perſons of honour. For at Sparta there were penalties eſtabliſhed, not only for ſuch as refuſed to marry, or married too late; but alſo for thoſe who married amiſs: and thoſe eſpecially were reckoned of this number, who inſtead of allying into houſes of virtue, and with their own relations, had no motive but wealth and lucre in marriage. An admirable law, and highly tending to perpetuate probity and honour in families, which an impure mixture of blood *and manners* ſeldom fails to alter and efface.

It muſt be owned, that a generous diſintereſtedneſs in the midſt of all that could inflame and gratify the luſt of gain is very rare, and well worthy of admiration; but in Lyſander it was attended with great defects, which entirely obſcure its luſtre. Without ſpeaking of his imprudence in introducing gold and ſilver into Sparta, which he deſpiſed himſelf, though he rendered it eſtimable to his country, and thereby occaſioned its ruin, what opinion can we have of a man, brave indeed,

well

well read in men, ſkilful in affairs, and of great ability in the arts of government, and what is commonly called policy, but who regards probity and juſtice as nothing; to whom falſehood, fraud, and perfidy, appear legal methods for the attainment of his ends; who does not fear, for the advancement of his friends, and the augmenting of his creatures, to commit the moſt flagrant injuſtice and oppreſſions, and is not aſhamed to profane whatever is moſt ſacred in religion, even to the corrupting of prieſts, and forging of oracles to ſatiate the empty ambition of being equal to a king, and of aſcending the throne?

[r] When Ageſilaus was upon the point of leading his troops into Perſia, the Spartan Epicydidas arrived to let him know that Sparta was threatened with a furious war; that the Ephori recalled him, and ordered him to return immediately for the defence of his country. Ageſilaus did not deliberate a moment, but returned this anſwer immediately to the Ephori, which Plutarch has tranſmitted to us. "[s] Ageſilaus to the Ephori, greeting. We have reduced part of Aſia, put the Barbarians to flight, and made great preparations for war in Ionia; but as you order me to return, I am not far behind this letter, and ſhould prevent it if poſſible. I received the command not for myſelf, but my country and its allies. I know that a general does not deſerve, or poſſeſs that name really, but as he ſubmits to the laws and the Ephori, and obeys the magiſtrates."

This ready obedience of Ageſilaus has been much admired and applauded, and not without reaſon. Hannibal, though depreſſed with misfortunes, and driven almoſt entirely out of Italy, obeyed his citizens with great reluctance, when they recalled him to deliver Carthage from the dangers that threatened it. Here a victorious prince, ready to enter the enemy's country, and to attack the king of Perſia even upon his throne, almoſt aſſured of the ſucceſs of his arms, on the firſt order of the Ephori, renounces the moſt ſoothing hopes, and the

[r] Xenoph. Hiſt. Græc. l. iv. p. 513. Idem in Ageſil. p. 657. Plut. in Ageſil. p. 603. 604. [s] Plut. in Apoph. Laconic. p. 211.

moſt

moſt exalted expectations. He demonſtrates the truth of what was ſaid, "That at Sparta the laws ruled men, and not men the laws."

On his departure he ſaid, "that thirty thouſand of the king's archers drove him out of Aſia;" alluding in thoſe words to a ſpecies of Perſian coin, which had on one ſide the figure of an archer, thirty thouſand of which pieces of money had been diſperſed in Greece, to corrupt the orators and perſons of greateſt power in the cities.

[t] Ageſilaus in quitting Aſia, where he was regretted as the common father of the people, appointed Euxenes his lieutenant, and gave him four thouſand men for the defence of the country. Xenophon went with him. He left at Epheſus, with Megabyzus the guardian of Diana's temple, half the gold he had brought with him from his expedition into Perſia with Cyrus, to keep it for him in truſt, and in caſe of death to conſecrate it to the goddeſs.

[u] In the mean time the Lacedæmonians had raiſed an army, and given the command of it to Ariſtodemus, tutor to king Ageſipolis, then an infant. Their enemies aſſembled to concert the operations of the war. Timolaus of Corinth ſaid, the Lacedæmonians were like a river that grew larger as it removed from its ſource; or to a ſwarm of bees, which it is eaſy to burn in their hive, but diſperſe themſelves a great way when they fly abroad, and become formidable by their ſtings. He was therefore of opinion, that it was proper to attack them in their capitol; which was approved and reſolved. But the Lacedæmonians did not give them time. They took the field, and found the enemy near Nemæa, a city not very remote from Corinth, where a rude battle enſued. The Lacedæmonians had the advantage, which was very conſiderable. Ageſilaus having received this news at Amphipolis, as he was haſtening to the relief of his country, ſent it directly to the cities of Aſia for their encouragement, and to give them hopes of his ſpeedy return, if the ſucceſs of affairs would admit it.

[t] Xenoph. Hiſt. Græc. l. iv. p. 513. Xenoph. de Exped. Cyr. l. v. p. 350. [u] Xenoph. p. 514—517.

[x] When the approach of Agesilaus was known at Sparta, the Lacedæmonians who remained in the city, to do him honour for the ready obedience he had paid to their orders, caused proclamation to be made by sound of trumpet, that all young persons who were willing to aid their king, might come and list themselves for that purpose. Not one of them failed to enter himself immediately with the utmost joy. But the Ephori chose only fifty of the bravest and most robust, whom they sent to him, and desired that he would enter Bœotia with the utmost expedition; which he did accordingly.

[y] About the same time the two fleets came up with each other near Cnidos, a city of Caria. That of the Lacedæmonians was commanded by Pisander, Agesilaus's brother-in-law, and that of the Persians by Pharnabasus and Conon the Athenian. The latter, observing that the king of Persia's supplies came slowly, and occasioned the loss of many opportunities, had resolved to go in person to the court, to solicit the king's assistance. As he would not prostrate himself before him, according to the Persian custom, he could not explain himself but by the intervention of others. He represented to him, with a force and spirit seldom pardoned in those who treat with princes, that it was equally shameful and astonishing, that his ministers, contrary to his intention, should suffer his affairs to be disconcerted and ruined for want of the necessary expences; that the richest king in the world should give place to his enemies in the very point he was so infinitely superior to them; that is, in riches; and that for want of remitting the sums his service required to his generals, all their designs were rendered abortive. These remonstrances were free, but just and solid. The king received them perfectly well, and showed, by his example, that truth may often be spoke to princes with success, if courage were not wanting. Conon obtained all he demanded, and the king made him admiral of his fleet.

[x] Plut. in Agesil. p. 605. [y] Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 518. Diod. l. xiv. p. 302. Justin. l. vi. c. 2 & 3.

It

It was compoſed of more than fourſcore and ten galleys, to which the enemy's was ſomewhat inferior in number. They came in view of each other near Cnidos, a maritime city of Aſia Minor. Conon, who had in ſome meaſure occaſioned the taking of Athens by the loſs of the ſea fight near Ægoſpotamos, uſed extraordinary efforts in this to retrieve his misfortune, and to obliterate, by a glorious victory, the diſgrace of his former defeat. * He had this advantage, that in the battle he was going to give, the Perſians would be at the whole expence, and bear all the loſs themſelves; whereas the entire fruits of the victory would redound to the Athenians, without hazarding any thing of their own. Piſander had alſo ſtrong motives to ſhow his valour upon this occaſion, that he might not degenerate from the glory of his brother-in-law, and to juſtify the choice he had made in appointing him admiral. In effect, he behaved with extreme valour, and had at firſt ſome advantage; but the battle growing warm, and the allies of Sparta betaking themſelves to flight, he could not reſolve to follow them, and died ſword in hand. Conon took fifty galleys, and the reſt eſcaped to Cnidos. The conſequence of this victory was the revolt of almoſt all the allies of Sparta; ſeveral of whom declared for the Athenians, and the reſt reſumed their ancient liberty. After this battle, the affairs of the Lacedæmonians daily declined. All their actions in Aſia were no more than the feeble efforts of an expiring power, till the defeats of Leuctra and Mantinea completed their downfal.

[2] Iſocrates makes a very juſt reflection upon the revolutions of Sparta and Athens, which had always their ſource and origin in the inſolent proſperity of both thoſe republics. The Lacedæmonians, who were at firſt acknowledged maſters of Greece without oppoſition, fell from their authority only by their enormous abuſe of it;

[2] Iſocrat. in Orat. Ariop. p. 278—280.

* *Eo ſpecioſius quod ne ipſorum quidem Athenienſium ſed alieni imperii viribus dimicet, pugnaturus periculo regis, victurus præmio patriæ.* JUSTIN.

The

The Athenians ſucceeded them in power, and at the ſame time in pride; and we have ſeen into what an abyſs of misfortunes it precipitated them. Sparta having gained the ſuperiority by the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily, and the taking of their city, might have improved in their meaſures from the double experience of the paſt; as well in regard to what had befallen themſelves, as from the recent example of their rival; but the moſt affecting examples and events ſeldom or ever occaſion a people to change their conduct. Sparta became as haughty and untractable as before; and ſo experienced the ſame deſtiny again.

To warn the Athenians againſt this misfortune, Iſocrates puts them in mind of the paſt, and of the times wherein they were ſucceſsful in every thing. "You imagine," ſays he, "that provided with a numerous fleet, abſolute maſters at ſea, and ſupported by powerful allies, always ready to give you aid, you have nothing to fear, and may enjoy in repoſe and tranquillity the fruits of your victories: for my part, indulge me to ſpeak with truth and freedom, I think quite otherwiſe. The cauſe of my apprehenſion is, my having obſerved, that the decline of the greateſt republics has always been at the time they believed themſelves moſt powerful, and that their very ſecurity has prepared the precipice into which they have fallen. The reaſon of this is evident. Proſperity and adverſity never come alone, but have each their train of very different effects. The firſt is attended with vain glory, pride, and inſolence, which dazzle the mind; and inſpire raſh and extravagant meaſures: on the contrary, the companions of adverſity, are modeſty, ſelf diffidence and circumſpection, which naturally render men prudent, and apt to amend from their own failings. So that it is hard to judge which of the two conditions we ought to deſire for a city; as that which appears unhappy, is an almoſt certain path to proſperity; and the other, ſo flattering and ſplendid, generally leads on to the greateſt misfortunes." The blow which the Lacedæmonians received

received at the battle of Cnidos is a mournful proof of what he says.

[a] Agesilaus was in Bœotia, and upon the point of giving battle when this bad news was brought him. Apprehending that it might discourage and deter his troops, he caused it to be reported in the army, that the Lacedæmonians had gained a considerable victory at sea; and appearing in public with a wreath of flowers upon his head, he offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving for the good news, and sent part of it in presents to his officers[b]. The two armies, almost equal in strength, were in view of each other upon the plains of Coronæa, when they drew up in battle. Agesilaus gave the left wing to the Orchomenians, and took the right himself. On the other side the Thebans were upon the right, and the Argives on the left. Xenophon says, that this was the most furious battle in his time, and may be believed, as he was present in it, and fought near the person of Agesilaus, with whom he had returned from Asia.

The first charge was not very obstinate, nor of long continuance. The Thebans soon put the Orchomenians to flight, and Agesilaus overthrew and routed the Argives. But both parties having learned, that their left wing had been very severely handled and fled, returned immediately; Agesilaus to oppose the Thebans, and to wrest the victory out of their hands, and the Thebans to follow their left wing, which was retired to Helicon. Agesilaus at that moment might have assured himself of a complete victory, if he would have let the Thebans pass on, and had charged them after in the rear; but carried away by the ardour of his courage, he resolved to stop them with an attack in front, and to beat them by pure force. In which, says Xenophon, he showed more valour than prudence.

The Thebans, seeing Agesilaus advance against them, drew all their foot immediately into one body, formed a hollow square, and waited his coming up in good or-

[a] Plut. in Agesil. p. 605.

[b] Ibid. Xenoph. Hist. in Græc. p. 518—520. & in Agesil. p. 659, 660.

der,

der. The engagement was ſharp and bloody on all ſides, but particularly where Ageſilaus fought at the head of the fifty young Spartans ſent him by the city. The valour and emulation of thoſe young men were of great ſervice to Ageſilaus, and may be ſaid to have ſaved his life; for they fought around him with exceeding ardour, and expoſed themſelves foremoſt in all dangers for the ſafety of his perſon. They could not however prevent his receiving ſeveral wounds through his armour from pikes and ſwords. Notwithſtanding, after an exceeding warm diſpute, they brought him off alive from the enemy, and making their bodies a rampart for him, ſacrificed a great number of Thebans to his defence; many of thoſe young men were alſo left upon the field. At length, finding it too difficult to break the Thebans in front, they were forced to have recourſe to what they had at firſt rejected. They opened their phalanx to let them paſs; which when they had done, as they marched afterwards in more diſorder, they charged them again upon the flanks and rear. They could, however, neither break them nor put them to flight. Thoſe brave Thebans made their retreat continually fighting, and gained Helicon, elate with the ſucceſs of the battle, wherein on their ſide they had always remained invincible.

Ageſilaus, though very much weakened by the great number of his wounds, and the quantity of blood he had loſt, would not retire to his tent, till he had been carried to the place where his phalanx was drawn up, and had ſeen all the dead bodies removed even upon their own arms. He was informed there, that many of the enemy had taken refuge in the temple of Minerva Itonienſis, which was not very diſtant from the field of battle, and aſked what he would have done with them. As he was full of veneration for the gods, he gave orders to let them go, and even ſent them a guard to eſcort them in ſafety wherever they thought fit.

The next morning Ageſilaus, to try whether the Thebans would have the courage to renew the battle, commanded his troops to crown themſelves with flowers,

ers, and the music of the army to play, whilst a trophy was erected and adorned in honour of his victory. At the same instant the enemy sent heralds to demand his permission to bury their dead; which he granted, with a truce; and having confirmed his victory by that act of a conqueror, he caused himself to be carried to Delphos, where the Pythian games were then celebrated. He made there a solemn procession, which was followed by a sacrifice, and consecrated the tenth part of the booty taken in Asia to the god, which amounted to a hundred talents*. These great men, no less religious than brave, never failed to express by presents their gratitude to the gods for their successes in arms; declaring, by that public homage, that they believed themselves indebted for their victories to their protection.

SECT. V. *Agesilaus returns victorious to Sparta. He always retains his Simplicity and ancient Manners. Conon rebuilds the Walls of Athens. A Peace, shameful to the Greeks, concluded by Antalcides the Lacedæmonian.*

[c] AFTER the festival, Agesilaus returned to Sparta. His citizens received him with all the marks of the most real joy, and beheld him with admiration, when they observed the simplicity of his manners, and the constant frugality and temperance of his life. At his return from foreign countries, where pomp, luxury, sloth, and the love of pleasures entirely prevailed, he was not infected with the manners of the Barbarians, as most of the other generals had been: he made no alteration in his diet, baths, equipage of his wife, ornaments of his arms, or furniture of his house. In the midst of so shining a reputation, and the universal applause, always the same, or rather more modest than before, he distinguished himself from the rest of the citizens, only by a greater submission to the laws, and a more

[c] Plut. in Agesil. p. 606.

* A hundred thousand crowns, or, about 22,500l. sterling.

inviolable

inviolable attachment to the cuſtoms of his country; convinced, that he was only king, to be the brighter example of thoſe virtues to others.

[d] He made greatneſs conſiſt in virtue only. Hearing the Great King (ſo the kings of Perſia uſed to call themſelves) ſpoken of in magnificent terms, and his power extremely extolled; * "I cannot conceive," ſaid he, "wherein he is greater than me, unleſs he be more virtuous."

There were at Sparta ſome citizens, who, vitiated by the prevailing taſte of Greece, made their merit and glory conſiſt in keeping a great number of horſes for the race. He perſuaded his ſiſter Cyniſca to diſpute the prize in the Olympic games, in order to ſhow the Greeks, that thoſe victories on which they ſet ſo high a value, were not the effects of valour and bravery, but of riches and expence. She was the firſt of her ſex who ſhared in this honour. He had not the ſame opinion of the exerciſes, which contributed to render the body more robuſt, and inure it to labour and fatigue; and to place them in greater eſtimation, would often honour them with his preſence.

Some time after Lyſander's death, he diſcovered the conſpiracy formed by that captain againſt the two kings, which till then had not been heard of, and came to light by a kind of accident, in the following manner: [e] upon ſome affairs, which related to the government, it was neceſſary to conſult Lyſander's papers, and Ageſilaus went to his houſe for that purpoſe. In running them over, he fell upon the ſheets, which contained at large the harangue of Cleon, for the new method of proceeding in the election of kings. Surpriſed at peruſing it, he gave over his ſearch, and went away abruptly, to communicate that oration to the citizens, and to let them ſee what manner of man Lyſander was, and how much they had been deceived in regard to him. But Lacratidas, a wiſe and prudent perſon, and preſident of the Ephori, interpoſed, by telling him, that it was highly improper to

[d] Plut. de ſui laud. p. 555. [e] Plut. in Ageſil. p. 606.

* Τι δ' εμε γε μειζον ειρειγος, ει μη χ δικαιοτερος.

raiſe

raiſe Lyſander from the dead; on the contrary, that it was neceſſary to bury his harangue in the ſame grave with him, as of dangerous tendency, from the great art with which it was compoſed, and the force of perſuaſion that univerſally prevailed in it, againſt which it might prove no caſy matter to reſiſt. Ageſilaus was of the ſame opinion, and the piece was conſigned to ſilence and oblivion, as the beſt uſe that could be made of it.

[f] As his credit was very high in the city, he cauſed Telutias, his brother by his mother's ſide, to be declared admiral of the fleet. It were to be wiſhed that hiſtory, to juſtify this choice, had mentioned any other qualities in that commander, than his nearneſs of blood to the king.

Ageſilaus ſoon after ſet out with his land-army to beſiege Corinth, and took the long walls as they were called, whilſt his brother Telutias attacked it by ſea. He did ſeveral other exploits againſt the people of Greece at war with Sparta, which always argue indeed the valour and experience of the general, but are neither very important nor deciſive, and which we thought, for that reaſon, might be omitted.

[g] At the ſame time Pharnabaſus and Conon, having made themſelves maſters at ſea, ravaged the whole coaſt of Laconia. That ſatrap, returning to his government of Phrygia, left Conon the command of the naval army, with very conſiderable ſums for the re-eſtabliſhment of Athens. Conon victorious, and crowned with glory, repaired thither, where he was received with univerſal applauſe. The ſad proſpect of a city formerly ſo flouriſhing, and at that time reduced to ſo melancholy a condition, gave him more grief than he felt joy in ſeeing his beloved country again, after ſo many years abſence. He loſt no time, but fell immediately to work, employing, beſides maſons and the uſual artizans, the ſoldiers, mariners, citizens, allies, in a word, all who were well inclined to Athens; Providence decreeing that this city, formerly deſtroyed by the Perſians, ſhould be re-

[f] Plut. in Ageſil. p. 606. [g] A. M. 3611. Ant. J. C. 393. Xenoph. Hiſt. Græc. l. iv. p. 534—537. Diod. l. xiv. p. 303. Juſtin. l. vi. c. 5.

built

built by their own hands, and that having been dismantled and demolished by the Lacedæmonians, it should be reinstated at their own cost, and by the spoils taken from them. What a vicissitude and alteration was this! Athens at this time had those for its allies, which had formerly been its most violent enemies, and for enemies, those with whom before it had contracted the most strict and most confirmed union. Conon, seconded by the zeal of the Thebans, soon rebuilt the walls of Athens, restored the city to its ancient splendor, and rendered it more formidable than ever to its enemies. [h] After having offered to the gods a whole hecatomb, that is to say, a sacrifice of a hundred oxen, as a thanksgiving for the happy re-establishment of Athens, he made a feast, to which all the citizens, without exception, were invited.

[i] Sparta could not see without extreme affliction so glorious a revolution. It looked upon the grandeur and power of a city, its ancient rival and almost continual enemy, as its own ruin, which made the Lacedæmonians take the mean resolution of avenging themselves at once upon Athens, and Conon its restorer, by making peace with the king of Persia. With this view they dispatched Antalcides to Tiribasus. His commission consisted of two principal articles. The first was, to accuse Conon to that satrap of having defrauded the king of the money, which he had employed in the re-establishment of Athens; and of having formed the design of depriving the Persians of Æolia and Ionia, and to subject them anew to the republic of Athens, upon which they had formerly depended. By the second, he had orders to make the most advantageous proposals to Tiribasus his master could desire. Without giving himself any manner of trouble in regard to Asia, he stipulated only, that all the islands and other cities, should enjoy their laws and liberty. The Lacedæmonians thus gave up to the king, with the greatest injustice and the utmost baseness, all the Greeks settled in Asia; for whose liberty Agesilaus had so long fought.

[h] Athen. l. i. p. 3.

[i] Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 537, 538. Plut. in Agesil. p. 608.

It

It is true he had no share in this most infamous negotiation; the whole reproach of which ought to fall on Antalcides, who being the sworn enemy of the king of Sparta, hastened the peace by all manner of means, because the war augmented the authority, glory, and reputation of Agesilaus.

The most considerable cities of Greece had sent deputies at the same time to Tiribasus, and Conon was at the head of those from Athens. All of them were unanimous in rejecting such propoſals. Without speaking of the interests of the Greeks of Asia, with which they were extremely affected, they saw themselves exposed by this treaty; the Athenian, to the loss of the isles of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; the Thebans, to abandon the cities of Bœotia, of which they were in possession, and which would thereby regain their independence; and the Argives to renounce Corinth, with the loss of which Argos itself would soon, in all probability, be attended. The deputies therefore withdrew without concluding any thing.

Tiribasus seized Conon, and put him in prison. Not daring to declare openly for the Lacedæmonians, without an express order for that purpose, he contented himself with supplying them underhand with considerable sums of money for fitting out a fleet, in order that the other cities of Greece might not be in a condition to oppose them. After having taken these precautions, he set out directly for the court, to give the king an account of the state of his negotiation. That prince was well satisfied with it, and directed him in the strongest terms to put the last hand to it. Tiribasus also laid before him the Lacedæmonians accusation of Conon. Some authors, according to Cornelius Nepos, have written that he was carried to Susa, and there executed by the king's order. The silence of Xenophon, who was his contemporary, in regard to his death, makes it doubtful whether he did not escape from prison, or suffer, as has been said.

Whilst this treaty was negociating, several actions little considerable passed between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.

Lacedæmonians. It was also at the same time, that Evagoras extended his conquests in the island of Cyprus, of which we shall soon treat.

[k] Tiribasus at length, upon his return, summoned the deputies of the Grecian cities to be present at the reading of the treaty. It imported, that all the Grecian cities of Asia should remain dependent on the king, and that the rest, as well small as great, should have full possession of their liberty. The king further reserved to himself the isles of Cyprus and Clazomena, and left those of Scyros, Lemnos, and Imbros, to the Athenians, to whom they had long appertained. By the same treaty he engaged to join with such people as came into it, in order to make war by sea and land against all who should refuse to agree to it. We have already said it was Sparta itself proposed these conditions.

All the other cities of Greece, or at least the greatest part of them, rejected so infamous a treaty with horror. However as they were weakened and exhausted by domestic divisions, and not in a condition to support a war against so powerful a prince, who threatened to fall with all his forces upon those who should refuse to come into this peace, they were obliged against their will to comply with it, except the Thebans, who had the courage to oppose it openly at first, but were at length reduced to accept it with the others, by whom they found themselves universally abandoned.

Such was the fruit of the jealousy and divisions, which armed the Grecian cities against each other, and was the end proposed by the policy of Artaxerxes, in distributing sums of money amongst the several estates; invincible in arms, and to the sword, but not to the gold and presents of the Persians; so remote were they in this respect from the character of the ancient Greeks their forefathers.

To comprehend aright how much Sparta and Athens differed from what they had been in former times, we have only to compare the two treaties concluded between the Greeks and Persians; the former by Cimon

[k] A. M. 3617. Ant. J. C. 387. Xenoph. l. v. p. 548—551.

the

the Athenian [l] under Artaxerxes Longimanus above sixty years before, and the latter by Antalcides the Lacedæmonian under Artaxerxes Mnemon. In the first, Greece victorious and triumphant, assures the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks, gives the law to the Persians, imposes what conditions it pleases, and prescribes bounds and limits, by prohibiting them to approach nearer to the sea with their troops than the distance of three days march; or to appear with long vessels in any of the seas between the Cyanæan and Chalidonian islands, that is to say, from the Euxine to the coasts of Pamphilia. In the second, on the contrary, Persia, grown haughty and imperious, takes pleasure in humbling its conquerors, in depriving them, with the single stroke of a pen, of their empire in Asia Minor, in compelling them to abandon basely all the Greeks established in those rich provinces, to subscribe to their own subjection, and to confine themselves in their turn within the narrow bounds of Greece.

From whence can so strange an alteration arise? Are there not on both sides the same cities, the same people, the same forces, and the same interest? No doubt there are; but they are not the same men, or rather, they have no longer the same principles of policy. Let us recal those happy times of Greece, so glorious for Athens and Sparta, when Persia came pouring like a deluge upon this little country with all the forces of the East. What was it that rendered the two cities invincible, and superior to such numerous and formidable armies? Their union and good understanding. No dissension between the two states, no jealousy of command, no private view of interest; in fine, no other contests between them, but of honour, glory, and the love of their country.

To so laudable an union may be added an irreconcileable hatred for the Persians; which became a kind of nature in the Greeks, and was the most distinguishing character of that nation. [m] It was a capital crime, and punished with death, only to mention peace, or

[l] Diod. l. xii. p. 74, 75. [m] Isoc. in Panegyr. p. 143.

purpose

propoſe any accommodation with them; and an Athenian mother was ſeen to throw the firſt ſtone at her ſon, who had dared to make ſuch a motion, and to ſet others the example of ſtoning him.

The ſtrict union of the two ſtates, and declared abhorrence of the common enemy, were a long time the potent barriers of their ſecurity, rendered them invincible, and may be ſaid to have been the ſource and principle of all the glorious ſucceſſes which raiſed the reputation of Greece to ſo high a pitch. But by a misfortune common to the moſt flouriſhing ſtates, thoſe very ſucceſſes became the cauſe of its ruin, and prepared the way for the diſgraces it experienced in the ſequel.

[n] Theſe two ſtates, which might have carried their victorious arms into the heart of Perſia, and have attacked in their turn the great king upon his throne itſelf; inſtead of forming in concert ſuch an enterpriſe, which would at once have crowned them with glory, and laden them with riches, have the folly to leave their common enemy at repoſe, to embroil themſelves with each other upon trivial points of honour, and intereſts of little importance, and to exhauſt the forces ineffectually againſt themſelves, which ought to have been employed ſolely againſt the Barbarians, who could not have reſiſted them. For it is remarkable, that the Perſians never had any advantage over the Athenians or Lacedæmonians, whilſt they were united with each other, and that it was their own diviſions only, which ſupplied them with the means to conquer both alternately, and always the one by the other.

Theſe diviſions induced them to take ſuch meaſures, as neither Sparta nor Athens would ever have otherwiſe been capable of. We ſee both the one and the other diſhonour themſelves by their mean and abject flatteries, not only of the king of Perſia, but even of his ſatraps; pay their court to them, earneſtly ſolicit their favour, cringe to them, and even ſuffer their ill humour; and all this to obtain ſome aid of troops or money, forgetting that the Perſians, haughty and inſolent

[n] Iſoc. in Panegyr. p. 132—137. In Panath p. 524, 525.

to

to such as seemed afraid of them, became timorous and little to those who had the courage to despise them. But in fine, what did they gain by all these mean condescensions? The treaty, which gave occasion for these reflections, and will ever be the reproach of Sparta and Athens.

SECT. VII. *War of Artaxerxes against Evagoras King of Salamin. Eulogy and Character of that Prince. Tiribasus falsely accused. His Accuser punished*

WHAT I have said upon the facility with which the Greeks might have rendered themselves formidable to their enemies, will be more evident if we consider, on one side, the diversity of people, and extent of country, which composed the vast empire of the Persians, and on the other, the weakness of the government, incapable of animating so great a mass, and of supporting the weight of so much business and application. At the court every thing was determined by the intrigues of women, and the cabals of favourites, whose whole merit often consisted in flattering their prince, and soothing his passions. It was upon their credit officers were chosen and the first dignities disposed of; by their opinion the services of the generals of armies were judged, and their rewards decided. The sequel will show, that from the same source arose the insurrection of provinces, the distrust of the greatest part of the governors, the discontent and consequential revolt of the best officers, and the ill success of almost all the enterprises that were formed.

Artaxerxes having got rid of the care and perplexity which the war with the Greeks had occasioned, applied himself to the terminating that of Cyprus, which had lasted several years, but had been carried on with little vigour, and turned the greatest part of his forces that way.

[a] Evagoras reigned at that time in Salamin, the capital city of the isle of Cyprus. He was descended from

[a] Isocrat. in Evag. p. 380.

Teucer

Teucer of * Salamin, who at his return from Troy built this city, and gave it the name of his country. His deſcendants had reigned there from that time; but a ſtranger of Phœnicia, having diſpoſſeſſed the lawful king, had taken his place, and to maintain himſelf in the uſurpation, had filled the city with Barbarians, and ſubjected the whole iſland to the king of Perſia.

Under this tyrant Evagoras was born, of whoſe education great care was taken. He was diſtinguiſhed amongſt the youth by the beauty of his aſpect, the vigour of his body, and more by the modeſty and innocence of his manners †, which are the greateſt ornaments of that age. As he advanced in years, the greateſt virtues, valour, wiſdom, and juſtice, were obſerved to brighten in him. He afterwards carried theſe virtues to ſo conſpicuous a height, as to give jealouſy to thoſe that governed; who perceived juſtly that ſo ſhining a merit could not continue in the obſcurity of a private condition; but his modeſty, probity, and integrity, reaſſured them, and they repoſed an entire confidence in him, to which he always anſwered by an inviolable fidelity, without ever meditating their expulſion from the throne by violence or treachery.

A more juſtifiable means conducted him to it, Divine Providence, as Iſocrates ſays, preparing the way for him. One of the principal citizens murdered the perſon upon the throne, and had contrived to ſeize Evagoras, and to rid himſelf of him, in order to ſecure the crown to himſelf; but that prince eſcaping his purſuit retired, to Solos, a city of Cilicia. His baniſhment was ſo far from abating his courage, that it gave him new vigour. Attended only with fifty followers, determined like himſelf to conquer or die, he returned to Salamin, and expelled the uſurper, though ſupported by the credit and protection of the king of Perſia. Having re-eſtabliſhed himſelf in Salamin, he ſoon rendered his little kingdom moſt flouriſhing, by his appli-

* This Teucer was of Salamin, a little iſland near Athens, celebrated for the famous battle under Xerxes.

† *Et qui ornat ætatem, pudor.* Cic.

cation

cation to the relief of his subjects, and by protecting them in all things; by governing them with justice and benevolence; by making them active and laborious; by inspiring them with a taste for the cultivation of lands, the breeding of cattle, commerce, and navigation. He formed them also for war, and made them excellent soldiers.

He was already very powerful, and had acquired great reputation, when Conon, the Athenian general, after his defeat at Ægospotamos, took refuge with him; [p] not thinking it possible to find a safer asylum for himself, nor a more powerful support of his country. The resemblance of their manners and sentiments soon made them contract a strict amity with each other, which continued ever after, and proved equally advantageous to both. [q] Conon was in great credit at the king of Persia's court, which he employed with that prince, by the means of Ctesias the physician, to accommodate his differences with his host Evagoras, and happily effected it.

Evagoras and Conon, with the great design of subverting, or at least reducing, the great power of Sparta, which had rendered itself formidable to all Greece, concerted together the means for the attainment of that end. They were both citizens of Athens; the latter by birth, and the other by right of adoption; which his great services and zeal for that republic had deserved. [r] The satraps of Asia saw with pain their country ravaged by the Lacedæmonians, and found themselves in great difficulties, from not being in a condition to make head against them. Evagoras remonstrated to them, that it was necessary to attack the enemy as well by sea as land; and he did not contribute a little by his credit with the king of Persia to Conon's being appointed general of his fleet. [s] The celebrated victory over the Lacedæmonians at Cnidos was the consequence, and gave the mortal wound to that republic.

[p] A. M. 3599. Ant. J. C. 405. Isocrat. in Evag. p. 393—395.
[q] A. M. 3605. Ant. J. C. 399. [r] A. M. 3606. Ant. J. C. 398.
[s] A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394.

[t] The Athenians, in acknowledgment of the important ſervices Evagoras and Conon had rendered them with Artaxerxes, erected ſtatues in honour of them.

[u] Evagoras, on his ſide, extended his conqueſts from city to city, endeavouring to make himſelf maſter of the whole iſland. The Cypriots had recourſe to the king of Perſia. That prince, alarmed by the rapid progreſs of Evagoras, of which he apprehended the effects, and conſcious of what importance it was to him to prevent an iſland's falling into the hands of an enemy, ſo favourably ſituated for holding Aſia Minor in awe, promiſed them an immediate and powerful ſupport, without declaring openly however againſt Evagoras.

[x] Being employed elſewhere by more important affairs, he could not keep his word with them ſo ſoon as he expected, and had engaged. That war of Cyprus continued ſix years, and the ſucceſs with which Evagoras ſupported it againſt the great king, ought to have baniſhed from the Greeks all terror of the Perſian name, and united them againſt the common enemy. It is true, the ſuccours ſent by Artaxerxes till then were little conſiderable, as they alſo were the two following years. During all that time it was leſs a real war, than a preparation for war: [y] but when he had diſengaged himſelf from the Greeks, he applied to it vigorouſly, and attacked Evagoras with all his forces.

The army by land, commanded by Orontes his ſon-in-law, conſiſted of three hundred thouſand men, and the fleet of three hundred galleys; of which Tirabaſus, a Perſian of the higheſt rank and greateſt reputation, was admiral. Gaos, his ſon-in-law, commander under him. Evagoras, on his ſide, aſſembled as many troops and ſhips as he could; but they were a handful in compariſon with the formidable preparation of the Perſians. He had a fleet of only fourſcore and ten galleys, and

[t] Pauſan. l. i. p. 5. [u] Diod. l. xiv. p. 311.
[x] A. M. 3614. Ant. J. C. 390. Iſocrat. in Paneg. p. 135, 136.
[y] A. M. 3618. Ant. J. C. 386. Diod. l. xv. p. 328—333.

his

his army ſcarce amounted to twenty thouſand men. As he had abundance of light veſſels, he laid ſnares for thoſe that carried the proviſions of the enemy, of which he ſunk a great number, took many, and prevented the reſt from arriving; which occaſioned a famine amongſt the Perſians, attended with violent ſeditions, which could only be appeaſed by the coming of freſh convoys from Cilicia. Evagoras ſtrengthened his fleet with ſixty galleys, which he cauſed to be built, and fifty ſent him by Achoris king of Egypt, with all the money and corn he could have occaſion for.

Evagoras, with his land forces, attacked immediately a part of the enemy's army, which was ſeparate from the reſt, and entirely routed it. This firſt action was ſoon followed by another at ſea, in which the Perſians were worſted for ſome time, till animated by the warm reproaches and remonſtrances of their admiral, they reſumed courage, and obtained a complete victory. Salamin was immediately beſieged by ſea and land. Evagoras, leaving the defence of the city to his ſon Pythagoras, quitted it in the night with ten galleys, and ſailed for Egypt, to engage the king to ſupport him vigorouſly againſt the common enemy. He did not obtain from him all the aid he expected. At his return he found the city in exceeding diſtreſs; and finding himſelf without reſource or hope, he was obliged to capitulate. The propoſals made to him were, that he ſhould abandon all the cities of Cyprus, except Salamin, where he ſhould content himſelf to reign; that he ſhould pay an annual tribute to the king, and remain in obedience to him as a ſervant to a maſter. The extremity to which he was reduced obliged him to accept the other conditions, hard as they were, but he could never reſolve to comply with the laſt, and perſiſted always in declaring, that he could only treat as a king with a king. Tiribaſus, who commanded the ſiege, would abate nothing of his pretenſions.

Orontes, the other general, jealous of his colleague's glory, had written ſecretly to court againſt him, accuſing him, among other things, of forming deſigns againſt

the king, and ſtrengthened his accuſation from his continuing to hold a ſecret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, and his manifeſt endeavours to make the chiefs of the army his creatures, by the force of preſents, promiſes, and a complacency of manners not natural to him. Artaxerxes, upon theſe letters, believed he had no time to loſe, and that it was neceſſary to prevent a conſpiracy ready to break out. He diſpatched orders immediately to Orontes, to ſeize Tiribaſus, and ſend him to court in chains, which was inſtantly put in execution. Tiribaſus, upon his arrival, demanded to be brought to trial in form; that the heads of the accuſation ſhould be communicated to him, and the proofs and witneſſes produced. The king, employed in other cares, had no leiſure at that time to take cognizance of the affair.

Orontes, in the mean time, ſeeing that the beſieged made a vigorous defence, and that the ſoldiers of the army, diſcontented with the removal of Tiribaſus, quitted the ſervice and refuſed to obey him, was afraid affairs would take a bad turn with regard to him. [z] He therefore cauſed Evagoras to be ſpoke to underhand; the negociation was reſumed, the offers made at firſt by the latter were accepted, and the mortifying article, which had prevented the concluſion of the treaty, retrenched. The ſiege was raiſed in conſequence. Evagoras continued king of Salamin only, and engaged to pay an annual tribute.

It appears that this prince lived twelve or thirteen years after the concluſion of the treaty, for his death is dated in the year of the world 3632. His old age was attended with a happineſs and tranquillity never interrupted with ſickneſs or diſeaſe, the uſual effect of a ſober and temperate life. Nicocles, his eldeſt ſon, ſucceeded him, and inherited his virtues as well as throne. He celebrated his funeral with the utmoſt magnificence. The diſcourſe, entitled Evagoras, compoſed by Iſocrates, to inſpire the young king with the deſire of treading in the ſteps of his father, and from which I

[z] A. M. 3619. Ant. J. C. 385.

have

have extracted the subsequent eulogium, served for his funeral oration. He also addressed another tract to Nicocles, which bears his name, wherein he gives him admirable precepts for governing well. I shall, perhaps, have occasion to speak further of them in the ensuing volume.

Eulogy and Character of Evagoras.

[a] Though Evagoras was only king of a little state, Isocrates, who was well able to judge of virtue and merit, compares him with the most powerful monarchs, and proposes him as the perfect model of a good king, convinced that not the extent of provinces, but extent of mind and greatness of soul, constitute great princes. He does in effect point out to us many qualities truly royal in him, and which ought to give us a very high idea of his merit.

Evagoras was not of the number of those princes who believe, that to reign, it is sufficient to be of the blood royal, and that the birth which gives a right to the crown, gives also the merit and qualities necessary for wearing it with honour. He did not fancy, that it could be supposed as every other condition and station of life made a kind of apprenticeship necessary to its success, the art of reigning, the most difficult and important of all, should require no pains and preparation for its attainment. He came into the world with the most happy dispositions; a great fund of genius, an easy conception, a lively and instant penetration, which nothing escaped, a solidity of judgment, that immediately resolved what it was necessary to act; qualities which might seem to dispense with all study and application; and yet, as if he had been born without talents, and found himself obliged to supply by study what he might want by nature, he neglected no means for the embellishment of his mind, and devoted a * considerable part of his time in instructing himself, in reflecting, meditating, and consulting the judgment and merit of others.

[a] Isocrat. in Evag.

* Εν τω ζητειν, η φροντιζειν, η βυλευεσθαι, τον πλειστον χρονον διετριβεν.

When

When he aſcended the throne, his greateſt care and application was to know mankind, in which the ability of a prince, and of thoſe who are at the head of affairs, principally conſiſts. He had, no doubt, prepared himſelf for that ſcience by the ſtudy of hiſtory, which gives a kind of anticipation of it, ſupplies the place of experience, and teaches us what the men are with whom we live, by what they have been in other ages. But we ſtudy men quite differently in themſelves; by their manners, characters, conduct, and actions. The love of the commonwealth rendered him attentive to all perſons who were capable of ſerving or hurting it. He applied himſelf to the diſcovery of their moſt ſecret inclinations and principles of action, and to the knowledge of their different talents and degrees of capacity, in order to aſſign each his proper poſt, to beſtow authority according to merit, and to make the private and public good promote each other. He neither rewarded nor puniſhed his ſubjects, ſays Iſocrates, from the report of others; but ſolely upon his own knowledge and experience of them; and neither the virtues of the good, nor the vices of the bad, eſcaped his enquiry and penetration.

He had one quality very ſeldom found in thoſe who poſſeſs the firſt rank in authority, eſpecially when they believe themſelves capable of governing alone: I mean a wonderful docility and attention to the ſenſe of others, which aroſe from a diffidence in his own abilities. With his great qualities, he did not ſeem to have occaſion for recourſe to the counſel of others, and nevertheleſs made no reſolution, and formed no enterpriſe, without having firſt conſulted the wiſe perſons he had placed about him in his court; inſtead of which, pride and preſumption, the latent poiſons of ſovereign power, incline the greateſt part of thoſe who arrive at thrones, either to aſk no counſel at all, or not to follow it when they do.

Intent upon diſcovering the excellent in every form of government and private condition of life, he propoſed the uniting of all their high qualities and great advantages in himſelf; affable and popular as in a republican

lican ſtate; grave and ſerious as in the councils of the aged and the ſenate; ſteady and deciſive as monarchy after mature deliberation; a profound politician, by the extent and rectitude of his views; an accompliſhed warrior, from intrepid valour in battle directed by a wiſe moderation; a good father, a good relation, a good friend, and what crowns all his praiſe * in every circumſtance of his character, always great, and always himſelf.

He ſupported his dignity and rank, not with an air of pride and haughtineſs, but by a ſerenity of aſpect, and a mild and eaſy majeſty, reſulting from innate virtue, and the evidence of a good conſcience. He won the hearts of his friends by his liberality, and conquered others by a greatneſs of ſoul, to which they could not refuſe their eſteem and admiration.

But what was moſt royal in him, and attracted the entire confidence of his ſubjects, neighbours, and even enemies, was his ſincerity, faith, and regard to all his engagements; and his hatred, or rather deteſtation, for all diſguiſes, falſehood, and fraud. A ſingle word on his ſide had as much regard paid to it as the moſt ſacred oath; and it was univerſally known, that nothing was capable of inducing him to violate it in the leaſt circumſtance whatſoever.

It was by all theſe excellent qualities, that he effectually reformed the city of Salamin, and entirely changed the face of its affairs in a very ſhort time. He found it groſs, ſavage, and barbarous, without any taſte either for learning, commerce, or arms. What cannot a prince do who loves his people, and is beloved by them; who believes himſelf great and powerful only to render them happy; and knows how to ſet a juſt value upon, and do honour to, their labours, induſtry, and merit of every kind? He had not been many years upon the throne before arts, ſciences, commerce, navigation, and military diſcipline, were ſeen to flouriſh at Salamin; inſomuch that that city did not give place to the moſt opulent of Greece.

* Τυχηικὸς, ἃ τῷ πᾶσι τοῦτοις διαφέρειν.

Iſocrates

Iſocrates often repeats, that in the praiſes he gives Evagoras, of which I have only extracted a part, far from exaggerating any thing, he always falls ſhort of truth. To what can we attribute a reign ſo wiſe, ſo juſt, ſo moderate, ſo conſtantly employed in rendering his ſubjects happy, and in promoting the public good? The condition of Evagoras, before he came to govern, ſeems to me to have contributed very much to it. The being born a prince, and the having never experienced any other condition but that of maſter and ſovereign, are, in my opinion, great obſtacles to the knowledge and practice of the duties of that high ſtation. Evagoras, who came into the world under a tyrant, had long obeyed before he commanded. He had borne in a private and dependent life the yoke of an abſolute and deſpotic power. He had ſeen himſelf expoſed to envy and calumny, and had been in danger for his merit and virtue. Such a prince had only to be told upon his aſcending the throne, what was ſaid to a great *emperor, "†You have not always been what you now are. Adverſity has prepared you to make a good uſe of power. You have lived long amongſt us, and like us. You have been in danger under bad princes. You have trembled for yourſelf, and known by experience how virtue and innocence have been treated." What he had perſonally ſuffered, what he had feared for himſelf or others, what he had ſeen unjuſt or unreaſonable in the conduct of his predeceſſors, had opened his eyes, and taught him all his duty. It ſufficed to tell him, what the emperor Galba told Piſo, when he adopted him his aſſociate in the empire, "‡Remember what you condemned or applauded in princes, when you were a private man. You have only to conſult the judgment you then paſſed upon them, and to act conformably to it, for your inſtruction in the art of reigning well."

* Trajan.

† *Quam utile eſt ad uſum ſecundorum per adverſa veniſſe! Vixiſti nobiſcum, perichitatus es, timuiſti. Quæ tunc erat innocentium vita ſcis, et expertus es.* PLIN. in Panegyr.

‡ *Utiliſſimus quidam ac breviſſimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus, cogitare quid aut nolueris ſub alio principe, aut volueris.* TACIT. Hiſt. l. i. c. 16.

Trial

TRIAL OF TIRIBASUS.

We have already said, that Tiribasus, having been accused by Orontes of forming a conspiracy against the king, had been sent to court in chains. Gaos, admiral of the fleet, who had married his daughter, apprehending that Artaxerxes would involve him in the affair with his father-in-law, and cause him to be put to death upon mere suspicion, conceived he had no other means for his security than an open revolt. He was very well beloved by the soldiers, and all the officers of the fleet were particularly at his devotion. Without loss of time he sent deputies to Achoris king of Egypt, and concluded a league with him against the king of Persia. On another side, he solicited the Lacedæmonians warmly to come into that league, with assurances of making them masters of all Greece, and of establishing universally their form of government; at which they had long seemed to aspire. They hearkened favourably to these propoſals, and embraced with joy this occasion of taking arms against Artaxerxes; the rather, because the peace they had concluded with him, by which they had given up the Greeks of Asia, had covered them with shame, and filled them with remorse.

As soon as Artaxerxes had put an end to the war of Cyprus*, he thought of concluding also the affair of Tiribasus. He was so just as to appoint for that purpose three commissioners, who were great lords of Persia of distinguished probity, and of the highest reputation in his court. The affair came to an examination, and a hearing on both sides. For so considerable a crime, as that of having conspired against the king's person, no other proofs were produced than the letter of Orontes; that is to say, of a declared enemy, studious to supplant his rival. Orontes was in hopes, from his credit at court, that the affair would not have been

* Diodorus refers the decision of this affair, till after the war with the Cadusians, of which we shall soon speak; this seems very improbable.

diſcuſſed in the uſual forms, and that upon the memorial ſent by him, the accuſed would have been condemned without further examination. But that was not the cuſtom with the Perſians. By an ancient eſtabliſhed regulation, to which amongſt other privileges they had a right by birth, no perſon was ever to be condemned, without being firſt heard and confronted with his accuſers. This was granted to Tiribaſus, who anſwered to all the articles of the letter. As to his connivance with Evagoras, the treaty itſelf concluded by Orontes was his apology; as it was abſolutely the ſame that prince had propoſed to him, except a condition, which would have done honour to his maſter. As to his intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, the glorious treaty he had made them ſign ſufficiently explained, whether his own, or the king's intereſts were his motives for it. He did not deny his credit in the army; but apprehended, it had not been long a crime to be beloved by the officers and ſoldiers; and concluded his defence, in repreſenting the long ſervices he had rendered the king with inviolable fidelity; and eſpecially his good fortune in having formerly ſaved his life, when he was hunting, and in great danger of being devoured by two lions. The three commiſſioners were unanimous in declaring Tiribaſus innocent. The king reſtored him to his former favour, and juſtly enraged at the black deſign of Orontes, let the whole weight of his indignation fall upon him. A ſingle example of this kind againſt informers convicted of falſehood, would for ever ſhut the door againſt calumny. How many innocents have been deſtroyed for want of obſerving this rule, which even the Pagans conſidered as the baſis of all juſtice, and the guardian of the public tranquillity!

SECT. VII. *The Expedition of Artaxerxes againſt the Caduſians. Hiſtory of Datames the Carian.*

WHEN Artaxerxes had determined the Cyprian war, he entered upon another againſt the Caduſians, who, it is probable had revolted, and refuſed

[b] Plut. in Artax. p. 1023, 1024.

to

to pay the cuſtomary tribute; for authors ſay nothing as to the occaſion of this war. Thoſe people inhabited part of the mountains, ſituate between the Euxine and Caſpian ſeas in the north of Media. The ſoil is there ſo ungrateful, and ſo little proper for cultivation, that no corn is ſowed upon it. The people ſubſiſt almoſt entirely upon apples, pears, and other fruits of that kind. Inured from their infancy to a hard and laborious life, they looked upon dangers and fatigues as nothing; and for that reaſon made excellent ſoldiers. The king marched againſt them in perſon at the head of an army of three hundred thouſand foot, and ten thouſand horſe. Tiribaſus was with him in this expedition.

Artaxerxes had not advanced far into the country, when his army ſuffered greatly by famine. The troops could find nothing to ſubſiſt upon, and it was impoſſible to bring proviſions from other places, the ways being difficult and impracticable. The whole camp were reduced to eat their carriage beaſts; which ſoon became ſo ſcarce, that an aſs's head was valued at ſixty drachmas*, and was very hard to be got at that price. The king's table itſelf began to fall ſhort, and only a few horſes remained, the reſt having been entirely conſumed.

In this melancholy conjuncture, Tiribaſus contrived a ſtratagem which ſaved the king and army. The Caduſians had two kings who were encamped ſeparately with their troops. Tiribaſus, who took care to be informed of all that paſſed, had been apprized, that there was ſome miſunderſtanding between them, and that their jealouſy of each other prevented their acting in concert, as they ought to have done. After having communicated his deſign to Artaxerxes, he went himſelf to one of the kings, and diſpatched his ſon to the other. They each of them informed the king to whom they applied, that the other had ſent ambaſſadors to treat with Artaxerxes privately, and adviſed him to loſe no time, but to make his peace directly, in order that the conditions of it might be the more advantageous; promiſ-

* Thirty livres.

ing

ing to assist them with their whole credit. The fraud succeeded. The * Pagans thought it no crime to use it with enemies. Ambassadors set out from both parties with Tiribasus and his son in their company.

As this double negociation lasted some time, Artaxerxes began to suspect Tiribasus; and his enemies taking that opportunity, forgot nothing to his prejudice that might ruin him in the king's opinion. That prince already repented the confidence he had reposed in him, and thereby gave room for those who envied him, to vent their calumnies and invectives. Upon what does the fortune of the most faithful subjects depend with a credulous and suspicious prince! Whilst this passed, arrived Tiribasus on his side, and his son on the other, each with ambassadors from the Cadusians. The treaty being concluded with both parties, and the peace made, Tiribasus became more powerful than ever in his master's favour, and returned with him.

The king's behaviour in this march was much admired. Neither the gold with which he was covered, his purple robes, nor the jewels that glittered all over him, and were worth six-and-thirty millions of livres †, prevented his having an equal share in the whole fatigue with the meanest soldier. He was seen with his quiver at his back, and his shield on his arm, to dismount from his horse, and march foremost in those rugged and difficult countries. The soldiers observing his patience and fortitude, and animated by his example, became so light, that they seemed rather to fly than walk. At length he arrived at one of his palaces, where the gardens were in admirable order, and there was a park of great extent and well planted, which was the more surprising as the whole country about it was entirely naked, and bore no kind of trees. As it was the depth of winter, and excessive cold, he gave the soldiers permission to cut down the wood in this park, without excepting the finest trees, either pines or cypresses. But the soldiers not being able to resolve to

* *Dolus, an virtus, quis in hoste requirat?* VIRGIL.

† Twelve thousand talents.

fell

fell timber of such exceeding beauty and stateliness, the king took an ax, and began by cutting the finest and largest tree himself; after which the troops spared none, cut down all the wood they wanted, and kindled as many fires as were necessary to their passing the night without any inconvenience. When we reflect how much value great persons generally set upon their gardens and houses of pleasure, we must confess Artaxerxes's generosity in making this sacrifice, which argued a very laudable goodness of heart, and a sensibility for the distresses and sufferings of his soldiers. But he did not always support that character.

The king had lost in this enterprise a great number of his best troops, and almost all his horses: and as he imagined that he was despised upon that account, and the ill success of his expedition, he became very much out of humour with the grandees of his court, and put to death a great number of them in the emotions of his wrath, and more out of distrust, and the fear of their attempting something against him. For fear in a suspicious prince is a very destructive and bloody passion; whereas true courage is gentle, humane, and averse to all jealousy and suspicion.

[c] One of the principal officers that perished in this expedition against the Cadusians was Camisares, by nation a Carian, and governor of Leuco-Syria, a province inclosed between Cilicia and Cappadocia. His son Datames succeeded him in that government, which was given him in consideration of the good services he had also rendered the king in the same expedition. He was the greatest captain of his time; and Cornelius Nepos, who has given us his life, does not prefer Amilcar and Hannibal to him amongst the Barbarians. It appears from his history of it, that no one ever excelled him in boldness, valour, and ability, in inventing schemes and stratagems, in activity in the execution of his designs, in presence of mind to resolve in the heat of action, and to find resources upon the most desperate occasions; in a word, in every thing that regards military

[c] Corn. Nep. in vit. Datamis.

knowledge.

knowledge. It seems that nothing was wanting to his having acquired a more illustrious name, than a noble theatre, and more exalted occasions; and perhaps an historian to have given a more extensive narration of his exploits. For Cornelius Nepos, according to his general plan, could not relate them but in a very succinct manner.

He began to distinguish himself particularly by the execution of a commission that was given him to reduce Thyus, a very powerful prince, and governor of Paphlagonia, who had revolted against the king. As he was his near relation, he thought it incumbent on him at first to try the methods of lenity and reconciliation, which almost cost him his life, through the treachery of Thyus, by the ambuscades he had laid for him. Having escaped so great a danger, he attacked him with open force; though he saw himself abandoned by Ariobarzanes, satrap of Lydia, Ionia, and all Phrygia, whom jealousy prevented from giving him aid. He took his enemy prisoner, with his wife and children; and knowing with what joy the king would receive the news, he endeavoured to make it the more sensible by the pleasure of a surprise. He set out with his illustrious prisoner, without giving the court any advice, and made great marches, to prevent its being known from rumour before his arrival. When he came to Susa, he equipped Thyus in a very singular manner. He was a man of a very tall stature, of a haggard and terrible aspect, a black complexion, with the hair of his head and beard very long. He dressed him in a magnificent habit, put a collar and bracelets of gold about his neck and arms, and added to this equipage all the ornaments of a king, as he was in effect. For himself, in the gross habit of a peasant, and clad like a hunter, he led Thyus upon the left in a leash, like a wild beast that had been taken in the toils. The novelty of the sight drew the whole city after it, but nobody was so much surprised and pleased as the king, when he saw them approach in that pleasant masquerade. The rebellion of a prince, very powerful in his country, had given

Artaxerxes

Artaxerxes great and juſt alarm, and he did not expect to have ſeen him ſo ſoon in his hands. So ſudden and ſucceſsful an excution gave him a higher opinion than ever of the merit of Datames.

To expreſs his ſenſe of it, he gave him an equal ſhare in the command of the army, deſtined againſt Egypt, with Pharnabaſus and Tithrauſtes, the two principal perſons in the ſtate, and even appointed him general in chief, when he recalled Pharnabaſus.

When he was upon the point of ſetting out for that expedition, Artaxerxes ordered him to march directly againſt Aſpis, who had made the country revolt, which he commanded in the neighbourhood of Cappadocia. The commiſſion was little important for an officer who had been appointed general, and beſides very dangerous, becauſe it was neceſſary to go in queſt of the enemy into a very remote country. The king ſoon perceived his error, and countermanded him: but Datames had ſet out directly with a handful of men, and marched night and day; judging that diligence, without a great number of troops, was all that was neceſſary to ſurpriſe and vanquiſh the enemy. It happened according to his expectation, and the couriers diſpatched by the king, met Aſpis in chains on the road to Suſa.

Nothing was talked of at the court but Datames. It was not known which to admire moſt, his ready obedience, his wiſe and enterpriſing bravery, or his extraordinary ſucceſs. So glorious a reputation gave offence to the courtiers in power. Enemies in ſecret to each other, and divided by a contrariety of intereſts, and a competition in their pretenſions, they united together againſt a ſuperior merit which reproached their defects, and was therefore a crime in their acceptation. They conſpired to ruin him in the king's opinion, and ſucceeded but too well. As they beſieged him perpetually; and he was not upon his guard againſt perſons who appeared ſo well affected to his ſervice, they inſpired him with jealouſy and ſuſpicion to the prejudice of the moſt zealous and faithful of his officers.

An intimate friend of Datames, who held one of the higheſt poſts at court, apprized him of what paſſed, and of the conſpiracy which had been formed againſt him, and had already ſunk his credit conſiderably with the king. * He repreſented to him, that if the Egyptian expedition, with which he was charged, ſhould take a bad turn, he would find himſelf expoſed to great dangers: that it was the cuſtom with kings to attribute good ſucceſſes to themſelves and their auſpicious fortune only, and to impute the bad to the faults of their generals, for which they were reſponſible at the peril of their heads: that he ran the greater riſk, as all that were about the king's perſon, and had any aſcendant over him, were his declared enemies, and had ſworn his deſtruction.

Upon this advice, Datames reſolved to quit the king's ſervice, though without doing any thing hitherto contrary to the fidelity he owed him. He left the command of the army to Mandrocles of Magneſia, departed with his own troops for Cappadocia, ſeized Paphlagonia, which joined it, allied himſelf ſecretly with Ariobarzanes, raiſed troops, took poſſeſſion of fortreſſes, and put good garriſons in them. He received advice, that the Piſidians were arming againſt him. He did not wait their coming on, but made his army march thither under the command of his youngeſt ſon, who had the misfortune to be killed in a battle. However lively his affliction might be upon that occaſion, he concealed his death, leſt the bad news ſhould diſcourage his troops. When he approached near the enemy, his firſt care was to take poſſeſſion of an advantageous poſt. [d] Mithrobarzanes, his father-in-law, who commanded the horſe, believing his ſon entirely ruined, determined to go over to the enemy. Datames, without concern

[d] Diod. l. xv. p. 399.

* *Docet eum magno fore in periculo, ſiquid, illo imperante, in Ægypto adverſi accidiſſet. Namque eam eſſe conſuetudinem regum, ut caſus adverſos hominibus tribuant, ſecundos fortunæ ſuæ; quo facile fieri, ut impellantur ad eorum perniciem, quorum ductu res malè geſtæ nuncientur. Illum hoc majore fore in diſcrimine, quòd, quibus rex maxime obediat, eos habeat inimiciſſimos.* CORN. NEP.

or

or emotion, caused a rumour to be spread throughout the army, that it was only a feint concerted between him and his father-in-law, and followed him close, as if he designed to put his troops into a disposition for charging the enemy in two different attacks. The stratagem had all the success he expected from it. When they joined battle, Mithrobarzanes was treated as an enemy on both sides, and cut to pieces with his troops. The army of the Pisidians was put to flight, and left Datames master of the field, and of all the rich booty found in the camp of the conquered.

Datames had not till then declared openly against the king, the actions we have related being only against governors, with whom he might have particular differences, which we have observed before was common enough. His own eldest son, called Scismas, made himself his accuser, and discovered his whole designs to the king. Artaxerxes was highly apprehensive of the consequence. He knew all the merit of this new enemy, and that he did not engage in any enterprise, without having maturely considered all its consequences, and taken the necessary measures to secure its success; and that hitherto the execution had always answered the wisdom of his projects. He sent an army against him into Cappadocia of almost two hundred thousand men, of which twenty thousand were horse, all commanded by Autophradates. The troops of Datames did not amount to the twentieth part of the king's; so that he had no resource but in himself, the valour of his soldiers, and the happy situation of the post he had chosen. For in that consisted his chief excellence; never captain having better known how to take his advantages and choose his ground, when he was to draw up an army in battle.

His post, as I have observed, was infinitely superior to that of the enemy. He had pitched upon a situation, where they could not surround him; where, upon the least movement they made they could come to blows with them with very considerable advantage; and where, had they resolved to fight, their odds in number would

would have been abſolutely uſeleſs to them. Autophradates well knew, that according to all the rules of war, he ought not to hazard a battle in ſuch a conjuncture: but he obſerved at the ſame time, that it was much to his diſhonour, with ſo numerous an army to make choice of a retreat, or to continue any longer in inaction before a handful of enemies. He therefore gave the ſignal. The firſt attack was rude; but the troops of Autophradates ſoon gave way and were entirely routed. The victor purſued them for ſome time with great ſlaughter. There were only a thouſand men killed on the ſide of Datames.

Several battles, or rather ſkirmiſhes, were fought afterwards, in which the latter was always victorious; becauſe, perfectly knowing the country, and ſucceeding eſpecially in the ſtratagems of war, he always poſted himſelf advantageouſly, and engaged the enemy in difficult ground, from whence they could not extricate themſelves without loſs. Autophradates ſeeing all his endeavours ineffectual, and his ſupplies entirely exhauſted, and deſpairing of ever being able to ſubject by force ſo artful and valiant an enemy, entreated an accommodation, and propoſed to him the being reſtored to the king's favour upon honourable conditions. Datames was not ignorant that there was little ſecurity for him in ſuch a choice, becauſe princes are ſeldom reconciled in earneſt with a ſubject who has failed in his obedience, and to whom they ſee themſelves in ſome ſort obliged to ſubmit. However, as only deſpair had hurried them into the revolt, and he had always retained at heart the ſentiments of zeal and affection for his prince, he accepted the offers with joy, which would put an end to the violent condition his misfortune had engaged him in, and afforded him the means of returning to his duty, and of employing his talents for the ſervice of the prince to whom they were due. He promiſed to ſend deputies to the king; upon which enſued a ceſſation of arms, and Autophradates retired into Phrygia, which was his government.

Datames

Datames was not deceived. Artaxerxes, furiously enraged against him, had changed the esteem and affection he formerly professed for him, into an implacable hatred. Finding himself incapable of conquering him by the force of arms, he was not ashamed to employ artifice and treachery; means unworthy every man of honour, and how much more so of a prince! He hired several murderers to assassinate him; but Datames was so happy as to escape their ambuscades. At length Mithridates, the son of Ariobarzanes, to whom the king had made magnificent promises, if he could deliver him from so formidable an enemy, having insinuated himself into his friendship, and having long treated him with all the marks of the most entire fidelity to acquire his confidence, took the advantage of a favourable opportunity, when he was alone, and stabbed him with his sword, before he was in a condition to defend himself.

Thus * fell this great captain in the snares of a pretended friendship, who had always thought it his honour to observe the most inviolable fidelity, in regard to those with whom he had any engagements. Happy, had he always piqued himself also upon being as faithful a subject as he was a true friend; and if he had not, in the latter part of his life, sullied the lustre of his heroic qualities, by the ill use he made of them; which neither the fear of disgrace, the injustice of those who envied him, the ingratitude of his master for the services he had rendered him, nor † any other pretext could sufficiently authorize.

I am surprised that, comparable as he was to the greatest persons of antiquity, he has remained in a manner buried in silence and oblivion. His great actions

* *Ita vir, qui multos consilio, neminem perfidia ceperat, simulata captus est amicitia.* Corn. Nep.

† This doctrine of Mr. Rollin's may do very well in France, where implicit obedience to the grand monarch is the law of the land; but it has too much of that exploded absurdity, passive obedience (founded in an erroneous acceptation of religion) to be admitted in a free nation; where, by the maxims of the law, and the constitution of the government, the subject in many instances is dispensed from his obedience, and may defend himself (even in arms) against his prince, viz. in cases of life and liberty.

and

and exploits are however worthy of being preſerved in hiſtory. For it is in ſuch ſmall bodies of troops as thoſe of Datames, that the whole ſoul is exerted, in which the higheſt prudence is ſhown, in which chance has no ſhare, and the abilities of a general appear in in their full light.

CHAP. IV.

Hiſtory of Socrates abridged.

AS the death of Socrates is one of the moſt conſiderable events of antiquity, I thought it incumbent on me to treat that ſubject with all the extent it deſerves. In this view I ſhall premiſe ſome things which are neceſſary to the reader's having a juſt idea of this prince of the philoſophers.

Two authors will ſupply me principally with what I have to ſay upon this ſubject, Plato and Xenophon, both diſciples of Socrates. It is to them poſterity is indebted for many of his diſcourſes (*that philoſopher having left nothing in writing) and for an ample account of all the circumſtances of his condemnation and death. Plato was an eye-witneſs of the whole, and relates, in his Apology, the manner of Socrates's accuſation and defence; in his Criton, his refuſal to make his eſcape out of priſon; in his Phædon, his admirable diſcourſe upon the Immortality of the Soul, which was immediately followed by his death. Xenophon was abſent at that time, and upon his return, after the expedition of young Cyrus againſt his brother Artaxerxes: ſo that he wrote his Apology of Socrates only upon the report of others, but his actions and diſcourſes, in his four books of memorable things, he repeats from his own knowledge. Diogenes Laertius has given us the life of Socrates, but in a very dry and abridged manner.

* *Socrates, cujus ingenium varieſque ſermones immortalitati ſcriptis ſuis Plato tradidit, literam nullam reliquit.* Cic. de Orat. l. iii. n. 57.

SECT.

SECT. I. *Birth of Socrates. He applies at first to Sculpture; then to the Study of the Sciences: his wonderful Progress in them. His Taste for moral Philosophy. His Manner of living, and Sufferings from the Ill-humour of his Wife.*

[e] SOCRATES was born at Athens in the fourth year of the seventy-seventh Olympiad. His father Sophronifcus was a sculptor, and his mother Phanarete a midwife. Hence we may observe, that meanness of birth is no obstacle to true merit, in which alone solid glory and real nobility consist. It appears from the comparisons Socrates often used in his discourses, that he was neither ashamed of his father's or mother's profession. [f] He was surprised that a sculptor should employ his whole attention to mould an insensible stone into the likeness of a man, and that a man should take so little pains not to resemble an insensible stone. [g] He would often say, that he exercised the function of a midwife with regard to the mind, in making it bring forth all its thoughts, which was indeed the peculiar talent of Socrates. He treated subjects in so simple, natural, and pure an order, that he made those with whom he disputed say what he would, and find an answer themselves to all the questions he proposed to them. He at first learned his father's trade, in which he made himself very expert. [h] In the time of Pausanias, there was a Mercury and the Graces to be seen at Athens of his workmanship; and it is to be presumed these statues would not have found place amongst those of the greatest masters in the art, if they had not been thought worthy of it.

[i] Criton is reported to have taken him out of his father's shop, from the admiration of his fine genius, and the opinion that it was inconsistent for a young man, capable of the greatest things, to continue perpetually employed upon stone with a chisel in his hand. He

[e] A. M. 3533. Ant. J. C. 471. Diog Laert. in Socrat. p. 100.
[f] Ibid. p. 110. [g] Plat. in Theatet. p. 149, &c.
[h] Paus. l. ix. p 596. [i] Diog. p. 101.

was

was the disciple of Archelaus, who conceived a great affection for him. Archelaus had been pupil to Anaxagoras, a very celebrated philosopher. His first study was physics, the works of nature, and the movement of the heavens, stars, and planets; according to the custom of those times, wherein only that part of philosophy was known, and Xenophon [k] assures us of his being very learned in it. But * after having found by his own experience, how difficult, abstruse, intricate, and at the same time how little useful that kind of learning was to the generality of mankind, he was the first, according to Cicero, who conceived the thought of bringing down philosophy from heaven to place it in cities, and introduce it into private houses; humanizing it, to use that expression, and rendering it more familiar, more useful in common life, more within the reach of man's capacity, and applying it solely to what might make them more rational, just, and virtuous. [l] He found there was a kind of folly in devoting the whole vivacity of his mind, and employing all his time in enquiries merely curious, involved in impenetrable darkness, and absolutely incapable of contributing to human happiness; whilst he neglected to inform himself in the ordinary duties of life, and in learning what is conformable, or opposite, to piety, justice, and probity: in what fortitude, temperance, and wisdom consist; what is the end of all government, what the rules of it, and what qualities are necessary for commanding and ruling well. We shall see in the sequel the use he made of this study.

It was so far from preventing him to discharge the duties of a good citizen, that it was the means of mak-

[k] Lib. iv. Memorab. b. 710. [l] Xenoph. Memorab. l. i. p. 710.

* *Socrates primus philosophiam devocavit e cœlo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus, rebusque bonis et malis quærere.* Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. v. n. 10.

Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus à rebus occultis; et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxisse; ut de virtutibus et vitiis, omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quæreret; cœlestia autem vel procul esse à nostra cognitione censeret, vel si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum conferre. Cic. Acad. Quæst. l. i. n. 15.

ing

ing him the more observant of them. He bore arms, as did all the people of Athens; but with more pure and elevated motives. He made many campaigns, was present in many actions, and always distinguished himself by his valour and fortitude. He was seen, towards the end of his life, giving in the senate, of which he was a member, the most shining proofs of his zeal for justice, without being intimidated by the greatest present dangers.

He had accustomed himself early to a sober, severe, laborious life; without which it seldom happens, that men are capable of discharging the greatest part of the duties of good citizens. It is difficult to carry the contempt of riches and the love of poverty farther than he did. [m] He looked upon it as a divine perfection to be in want of nothing; and believed, the less we are contented with, the nearer we approach to the Divinity. [*] Seeing the pomp and show displayed by luxury in certain ceremonies, and the infinite quantity of gold and silver employed in them: "How many things," said he, congratulating himself on his condition, "do I not want." *Quantis non egeo!*

[n] His father left him fourscore minæ, that is to say, four thousand livres, which he lent to one of his friends who had occasion for that sum. But the affairs of that friend having taken an ill turn, he lost the whole, and suffered that misfortune with such indifference and tranquillity, that he did not so much as complain of it. [o] We find in Xenophon's Œconomics, that his whole estate amounted to no more than five minæ, or two hundred and fifty livres. The richest persons of Athens were his friends, who could never prevail upon him to accept any share of their wealth. When he was in want of any thing, he was not ashamed to declare it: "[+] If I

[m] Xenoph. Memorab. l. i. p. 731.
[n] Liban. in Apolog. Socrat. p. 640. [o] Xenoph. Œcon. p. 822.

[*] *Socrates in pompa, cum magna vis auri argentique ferretur: Quam multa non desidero, inquit!* Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. v.

[+] *Socrates amicis audientibus:* Emissem, *inquit*, pallium, si nummos haberem. *Neminem popposcit, omnes admonuit. A quo acciperet, ambitus fuit— Post hoc quisquis properaveret, sero dat; jam Socrati defuit.* Senec. de Benef. l. vii. c. 24.

had money," said he one day in an assembly of his friends, "I should buy me a cloak." He did not address himself to any body in particular, but contented himself with that general information. His disciples contended for the honour of making him this small present; which was being too slow, says Seneca; their own observation ought to have prevented both the want and the demand.

He generously refused the offers and presents of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, who was desirous of having him at his court; adding, "that he could not go to a man who could give him more than it was in his power to return." Another philosopher does not approve this answer. "Was it making a prince a small return," says Seneca, "to undeceive him in his false ideas of grandeur and magnificence; to inspire him with a contempt for riches; to show him the right use of them; to instruct him in the great art of reigning; in a word, to teach him how to live and how to die? But," continues Seneca, "the true reason which prevented his going to the court of that prince, was, that he did not think it consistent for him to seek a voluntary servitude, whose liberty a free city could not suffer him to enjoy." *Noluit ire ad voluntariam servitutem is cujus libertatem civitas libera ferre non potuit* [p].

[q] The peculiar austerity of his life did not render him gloomy and morose, as was common enough with the philosophers of those times. [r] In company and conversation he was always gay and facetious, and the sole joy and spirit of the entertainment. Though he was very poor, he piqued himself upon the neatness of his person and house, and could not suffer the ridiculous affectation of Antisthenes, who always wore dirty and ragged clothes. He told him once, that through the holes in his cloak, and the rest of his tatters, abundance of vanity might be discerned.

One of the most distinguishing qualities of Socrates

[p] Senec. de Benef. l. v. c. 6. [q] Xenoph. in conviv.
[r] Ælian. l. iv. c. 11. & l. ix. c. 35.

was a tranquillity of soul, that no accident, no loss, no injury, no ill treatment, could ever alter. Some have believed, that he was by nature hasty and passionate, and that the moderation to which he attained was the effect of his reflections and endeavours to subdue and correct himself; which would still add to his merit. [s] Seneca tells us, that he had desired his friends to apprize him whenever they saw him ready to fall into a passion, and that he had given them that privilege over him, which he took himself with them. * Indeed the best time to call in aid against rage and anger, that have so violent and sudden a power over us, is when we are yet ourselves, and in cool blood. At the first signal, the least animadversion, he either softened his tone, or was silent. Finding himself in great emotion against a slave, "I would beat you," says he, "if I were not angry: [t] *Cæderem te, nisi irascerer.* Having received a box on the ear, he contented himself with only saying, with a smile, "[u] 'Tis a misfortune not to know when to put on an helmet."

Without going out of his own house, he found enough to exercise his patience in all its extent. Xantippe, his wife, put it to the severest proofs by her capricious, passionate, violent disposition. It seems, before he took her for his companion, that he was not ignorant of her character; and he says himself in Xenophon [x], that he had expressly chosen her, from the conviction that if he should be capable of bearing her insults, there would be nobody, though ever so difficult to endure, with whom he could not live. Never was woman of so violent and fantastical a spirit, and so bad a temper. There was no kind of abuse, or injurious treatment, which he had not to experience from her. She would sometimes be transported with such an excess of rage, as to tear off his cloak in the open street; [y] and even one day, after having vented all the reproaches her fury

[s] Senec. de Ira, l. iii. c. 15. [t] Ibid. l. i. c. 15.
[u] Ibid. l. iii. c. 11. [x] Xenoph. in conviv. p. 876.
[y] Diog. in Socrat. p. 112.

* *Contra potens malum et apud nos gratiosum, dum conspicimus, et nostri sumus, advocemus.*

could ſuggeſt, ſhe emptied a pot upon his head; at which he only laughed, and ſaid, "That ſo much thunder muſt needs produce a ſhower."

[z] Some ancient authors write, that Socrates married a ſecond wife, named Myrta, who was the grand-daughter of Ariſtides the Juſt, and that he ſuffered exceedingly from them both, who were continually quarrelling with each other, and never agreed, but in loading him with reproaches, and doing him all the offence they could invent. They pretend, that during the Peloponneſian war, after the peſtilence had ſwept off great part of the Athenians, a decree was made, whereby, to retrieve the ſooner the ruins of the republic, each citizen was permitted to have two wives at the ſame time, and that Socrates took the benefit of this new law. Thoſe authors found this circumſtance ſolely upon a paſſage in a treatiſe on nobility, aſcribed to Ariſtotle. But, beſides that, according to Plutarch himſelf, Panetius, a very grave author, has fully refuted this opinion, neither Plato nor Xenophon, who were well acquainted with all that related to their maſter, ſay any thing of this ſecond marriage of Socrates; and on another ſide, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus Siculus, who have treated at large all the particulars of the Peloponneſian war, are alike ſilent in regard to the pretended decree of Athens, which permitted bigamy. We may ſee in the firſt volumes of the Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres, a diſſertation of Monſieur Hardion's upon this ſubject, wherein he demonſtrates, that the ſecond marriage of Socrates, and the decree upon bigamy, are ſuppoſititious facts.

SECT. II. *Of the Dæmon, or familiar Spirit of Socrates.*

OUR knowledge of Socrates would be defective if we knew nothing of the genius, which, he ſaid, had aſſiſted him with its counſel and protection in the

[z] Plut. in Ariſtid. p. 335. Athen. l. xiii. p. 555. Diog. Laert. in Socrat. p. 105.

greateſt

greateſt part of his actions. It is not agreed amongſt authors, what this genius was, commonly called *The Dæmon of Socrates*, from the Greek word Δαιμονιον, that ſignifies ſomething of a divine nature, conceived as a ſecret voice, a ſign, or ſuch an inſpiration as diviners are ſuppoſed to have had: this genius diverted him from the execution of his deſigns when they have been prejudicial to him, without ever inducing him to act any thing: [a] *Eſſe divinum quoddam, quod Socrates dæmonium appellat, cui ſemper ipſe paruerit, nunquam impellenti, ſæpe revocanti.* Plutarch, in his treatiſe intituled, *Of the Genius of Socrates*, repeats the different ſentiments of the ancients upon the exiſtence and nature of this genius. [b] I ſhall confine myſelf to that of them, which ſeems the moſt natural and reaſonable, though he does not lay much ſtreſs upon it.

We know that the divinity has a clear and unerring knowledge of futurity: that man cannot penetrate into its darkneſs but by uncertain and confuſed conjectures: that thoſe who ſucceed beſt in that reſearch, are ſuch, who by a more exact and ſtudied compariſon of the different cauſes capable of influencing future events, diſtinguiſh with greater force and perſpicuity, what will be the reſult and iſſue of the conflict of thoſe different cauſes in conducing to the ſucceſs or miſcarriage of an effect or enterpriſe. This foreſight and diſcernment has ſomething of divine in it, exalts us above the reſt of mankind, approaches us to the divinity, and makes us participate, in ſome meaſure, in his counſels and deſigns, by giving us an inſight and preſcience, to a certain degree, of what he has ordained concerning the future. Socrates had a juſt and piercing judgment, joined with the moſt exquiſite prudence. He might call this judgment and prudence Δαιμονιον, *ſomething divine*, uſing indeed a kind of equivocality in the expreſſion, without attributing to himſelf, however, the merit of his wiſdom in conjecturing upon the future. The Abbe Fraguier comes very near the ſame opinion in

[a] Cic. de Divin. l. i. n. 122. [b] Page 589.

the dissertation he has left us upon this subject in the [c] Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres.

[d] The effect, or rather function of this genius, was to stop and prevent his acting, without ever inducing him to act. He received also the same impulse, when his friends were going to engage in any bad affair, and communicated it to him; and several instances are related, wherein they found themselves very unfortunate from not having believed him. Now what other signification can be given to this, than that it implies, under mysterious terms, a mind which, by its own lights, and the knowledge of mankind, has attained a sort of insight into futurity? And if Socrates had not intended to lessen in his own person the merit of an unerring judgment, by attributing it to a kind of instinct, if at bottom he had desired any thing to be understood, besides the general aid of the divine wisdom, which speaks in every man by the voice of reason, would he have escaped, says Xenophon [e], the censure of arrogance and falsehood?

[f] God has always prevented me from speaking to you, says he to Alcibiades, whilst the weakness of your age would have rendered my discourses ineffectual to you. But I conceive I may now enter into dispute with you, as an ambitious young man, for whom the laws open a way to the dignities of the republic. Is it not visible here that prudence prevented Socrates from treating Alcibiades seriously, at a time when grave and severe conversation would have given him a disgust, of which, perhaps, he might never have got the better? [g] And when, in his dialogue upon the commonwealth, Socrates ascribes his avoiding public business to inspiration from above, does he mean any thing more than what he says in his Apology, that a just and good man, who intermeddles with the government in a corrupt state, is not long without perishing? If [h] when he appears before the judges who were to condemn him,

[c] Tom. IV. p. 368.
[d] Plat. in Theag. p. 128.
[e] Memorab. l. i. p. 708.
[f] Plat. in Alcib. p. 150.
[g] Lib. vi. de Rep. p. 496. Apolog. Soc. p. 31, 32.
[h] Apolog. Soc. p. 40.

that

that divine voice is not heard to prevent him, as it was upon dangerous occasions, the reason is, that he did not deem it a misfortune for him to die, especially at his age, and in his circumstances. Every body knows what his prognostication had been long before, upon the unfortunate expedition of Sicily. He attributed it to his dæmon, and declared it to be the inspiration of that spirit. A wise man, who sees an affair ill concerted, and conducted with passion, may easily prophesy upon the event of it, without the aid of a dæmon's inspiration.

It must be allowed, however, that the opinion which gives men genii and angels to direct and guard them, was not unknown, even to the pagans. [i] Plutarch cites the verses of Menander, in which that poet expressly says, "That every man at his birth has a good genius given him, which attends him during the whole course of his life as a guide and director.

Αγαθὸν δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαραλαμβάνει
Εὐθὺς γενομένῳ, μυσαγωγὸς τοῦ βίου
Ἀγαθός.

It may be believed, with probability enough, that the dæmon of Socrates, which has been so differently spoken of, and thereby made it a question, whether it was a good or bad angel, was no more than the force and rectitude of his judgment, which acting according to the rules of prudence, and with the aid of a long experience, supported by wise reflections, made him foresee the events of those things, upon which he was either consulted, or deliberated himself.

I conceive, at the same time, that he was not sorry the people should believe him inspired, or that he knew futurity by any effect of the divinity whatsoever. That opinion might exalt him very much in the sense of the Athenians, and gave him an authority, of which the greatest * persons of the pagan world were very fond, and

[i] De anim. tranquil. p. 474.

*Lycurgus and Solon had recourse to the authority of oracles to advance their credit. Zeleucus pretended, that his laws had been dictated to him by Minerva. Numa Pompilius boasted his conferences with the

and which they endeavoured to acquire by ſecret communications, and pretended conferences, with ſome divinity: but it drew the jealouſy of many of the citizens upon him.

SECT. III. *Socrates declared the wiſeſt of Mankind by the Oracle of Delphos.*

[k] THIS declaration of the oracle, ſo advantageous in appearance for Socrates, did not a little contribute to the enflaming envy, and ſtirring up of enemies againſt him, as he tells us himſelf in his Apology, wherein he recounts the occaſion, and true ſenſe of that oracle.

Chærephon, a zealous diſciple of Socrates, happening to be at Delphos, demanded of the oracle, whether there was a wiſer man than Socrates in the world: the prieſteſs replied there was none. This anſwer puzzled Socrates extremely, who could ſcarce comprehend the ſenſe of it. For on the one ſide, he well knew, ſays he of himſelf, that there was neither much nor little wiſdom in him; and on the other, he could not ſuſpect the oracle of falſehood, the divinity being incapable of telling a lie. He therefore conſidered it attentively, and took great pains to penetrate the ſenſe of it. At firſt he applied himſelf to a powerful citizen; a ſtateſman, and a great politician, who paſſed for one of the wiſeſt men of the city, and who was himſelf as much convinced of his own merit as any body. He found by his converſation that he knew nothing, and inſinuated as much to himſelf in terms ſufficiently intelligible; which made him extremely odious to that citizen, and all who were preſent. He did the ſame by ſeveral others of the ſame profeſſion; and all the fruit of his enquiry was, to draw upon himſelf a greater number of enemies. From the ſtateſman he addreſſed himſelf to the poets, whom he found ſtill fuller of ſelf-eſteem, but really more void

[k] Plut. in Apolog. p. 21, 22.

the goddeſs Egeria. The firſt Scipio Africanus made the people believe that the gods gave him ſecret counſels. Even Sertorius's hind had ſomething divine in it.

of

of knowledge and wiſdom. He purſued his enquiries to the artizans, and could not meet with one, who, becauſe he ſucceeded in his own art did not believe himſelf very capable, and fully informed in all that was great beſides; which preſumption was the almoſt univerſal failing of the Athenians. As they had naturally abundance of wit, they pretended to be knowing in every thing, and believed themſelves capable of pronouncing upon all things. His enquiries amongſt ſtrangers were not more ſucceſsful.

Socrates, afterwards entering into and comparing himſelf with all thoſe he had queſtioned*, diſcovered that the difference between him and them was, that they all believed they knew what they did not know, and that for his part, he ſincerely profeſſed his ignorance. From thence he concluded, that only God is truly wiſe, and that the true meaning of the oracle was to ſignify, that all human wiſdom was no great matter, or, to ſpeak more properly, was nothing at all. And as to the oracle's naming me, it no doubt did ſo, ſays he, by way of ſetting me up for an example, as if it intended to declare to all men, The wiſeſt amongſt you is he, who knows, like Socrates, that there is no real wiſdom in him.

SECT. IV. *Socrates devotes himſelf entirely to the Inſtruction of the Youth of Athens. Affection of his Diſciples for him. The admirable Principles with which he inſpires them either for Government or Religion.*

AFTER having related ſome particularities in the life of Socrates, it is time to proceed to that in which his character principally and peculiarly conſiſted; I mean the pains he took to inſtruct mankind, and particularly informing the youth of Athens.

* *Socrates in omnibus fere ſermonibus ſic diſputat, ut nihil affirmet ipſe, refellat alios: nihil ſe ſcire dicat, niſi id ipſum, eoque præſtare cæteris, quod illi, quæ neſciant, ſcire ſe putent; ipſe ſe nihil ſcire id unum ſciat, ob eamque rem ſe arbitrari ab Apolline omnium ſapientiſſimum eſſe dictum, quod hæc eſſet una omnis ſapientia, non arbitrari ſe ſcire quod neſciat.* Cic. Acad. Quæſt. l. i. n. 15, 16.

He

[l] He seemed, says Libanius, the common father of the republic, so attentive was he to the happiness and advantage of his whole country. But as it is very difficult to correct the aged, and to make people change principles, who revere the errors in which they have grown grey, he devoted his labours principally to the instruction of youth, in order to sow the seeds of virtue in a soil more fit to produce the fruits of it.

[m] He had no open school, like the rest of the philosophers, nor set times for his lessons. He had no benches prepared, nor even mounted a professor's chair. He was the philosopher of all times and seasons. He taught in all places, and upon all occasions; in walking, conversation, at meals, in the army, and in the midst of the camp, in the public assemblies of the senate or people, in prison itself, and when he drank the poison he philosophised, says Plutarch, and instructed mankind. And from thence the same judicious author takes occasion to establish a great principle in point of government, which Seneca *before him had placed in all its light. To be a public man, says he, it is not necessary to be actually in office, to wear the robe of judge and magistrate, and to sit in the highest tribunals for the administration of justice. Many do this, who, though honoured with the fine names of orators, prætors, and senators, if they want the merit of those characters, ought to be regarded as private persons, and often confounded with the lowest and vilest of the populace. But whoever knows to give wise counsel to those who consult him, to animate the citizens to virtue, and to in-

[l] In Apol. Socrat. p. 641. [m] Plut. an seni sit. ger. resp. p 796.

* *Habet ubi se etiam in privato late explicet magnus animus—Ita delituerit (vir ille) ut ubicunque totium suum absconderit, prodesse velit et singulis et universis, ingenio, voce, consilio. Nec enim is solus reip. prodest, qui candidatos extrahit, et tuetur reos, et de pace belloque censet, sed qui juventutem exhortatur, qui in tanta bonorum præceptorum inopia virtute instruit animos, qui ad pecuniam luxuriamque cursu ruentes prensat, ac retrahit, et si nihil aliud certe moratur, in privato publicum negotium agit. An ille plus præstat, qui inter peregrinos et cives, aut urbanus prætor alicuntibus adsessoris verba pronunciat; quam qui docet, quid sit justitia, quid pietas, quid patientia, quid fortitudo, quid mortis contemptus, quid deorum intellectus, quam gratuitum bonum sit conscientia?* Senec. de tranquil. anim. c. iii.

spire

ſpire them with ſentiments of probity, equity, generoſity and love of their country; that is, ſays Plutarch, the true magiſtrate and ruler, in whatever condition of place he be.

Such was Socrates. The ſervices he did the ſtate, by the inſtructions he gave their youth, and the diſciples he formed, are inexpreſſibly great. Never had maſter a greater number, or ſo illuſtrious. Plato, though alone, were worth a multitude. [n] Upon the point of death he bleſſed and thanked God for three things; that he had endued him with a rational ſoul, that he was born a Greek and not a Barbarian, and that he had placed his birth in the lifetime of Socrates. Xenophon [o] had the ſame advantage. It is ſaid, that one day Socrates met him in the ſtreet, and ſtopping him with his ſtaff, aſked him whether he knew where proviſions were ſold? It was not difficult to anſwer this queſtion. But Socrates having demanded in what place men learned virtue, and ſeeing this ſecond queſtion put him to a ſtand: "If you deſire to know it," continued the philoſopher, "follow me, and you ſhall be informed." Which he did immediately, and was afterwards the firſt who collected and publiſhed his maſter's diſcourſes.

[p] Ariſtippus, upon a converſation with Iſchomachus, in which he had introduced ſome ſtrokes of Socrates's doctrine, conceived ſo ardent a paſſion to become his diſciple, that he grew lean and wan in effect of it, till he could go the fountain-head, and imbibe his fill of a philoſophy, that taught the knowledge and cure of evil.

What is reported of Euclid the Megarian, explains ſtill better how high the paſſion of Socrates's diſciples ran, to receive the benefit of his inſtructions [q]. There was at that time an open war between Athens and Megara, which was carried on with ſo much animoſity, that the Athenians obliged their generals to take an oath to lay waſte the territory of Megara twice a year, and prohibited the Megarians to ſet foot in Attica upon

[n] Plut. in Mario, p. 433.
[o] Diog. in Xenoph. p. 120.
[p] Plut. de Curioſ. p. 516.
[q] Plut. in Pericl. p. 168.

pain of death. This decree could not extinguish nor suspend the zeal of Euclid. [r] He left his city in the evening in the disguise of a woman, with a veil upon his head, and came to the house of Socrates in the night, where he continued till the approach of day, when he returned in the same manner he came.

The ardour of the young Athenians to follow him was incredible. They left father and mother, and renounced all parties of pleasure, to attach themselves to him, and to hear his discourses. We may judge of this in the example of Alcibiades, the most ardent and fiery of all the Athenians. The philosopher however never spared him, and was always ready to calm the sallies of his passions, and to rebuke his pride, which was his great disease. I have before related some instances of this temper of his. [s] One day when Alcibiades was boasting of his wealth, and the great estates in his possession (which generally blow up the pride of young people of quality) he carried him to a geographical map, and asked him to find Attica. It was so small it could scarce be discerned upon that draught; he found it, however, though with some difficulty: but upon being desired to point out his own estate there: "It is too small," says he, "to be distinguished in so little a space."—"See then," replied Socrates, "how much you are affected about an imperceptible point of land." This reasoning might have been urged much farther still: for what was Attica, compared to all Greece, Greece to Europe, Europe to the whole world, and the world itself to the vast extent of the infinite orbs which surround it? What an insect, what a nothing, is the most powerful prince of the earth in the midst of this abyss of bodies and immense spaces, and how much of it does he occupy!

The young people of Athens, dazzled with the glory of Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles, and full of a wild ambition, after having received for some time the lessons of the sophists, who promised to make them very great politicians, conceived themselves capable of

[r] Aul. Gel. Noct. Att. l. vi. c. 10. [s] Ælian. l. iii. c. 28.

every

every thing, and aſpired at the higheſt employments. [t] One of theſe, named Glauco, had taken it ſo ſtrongly into his head, to enter upon the adminiſtration of the public affairs, though not twenty years old, that none of his family or friends were able to divert him from a deſign ſo little conſiſtent with his age and capacity. Socrates, who had an affection for him upon account of Plato his brother, was the only perſon that could prevail upon him to change his reſolution.

Meeting him one day, he accoſted him ſo happily with diſcourſe, that he engaged him to give him the hearing. "You are deſirous then to govern the republic," ſaid he to him. "True," replied Glauco. "You cannot have a more noble deſign," anſwered Socrates, "for, if you ſucceed, you will have it in your power to ſerve your friends effectually, to aggrandize your family, and to extend the confines of your country. You will make yourſelf known not only to Athens, but throughout all Greece, and perhaps your renown, like that of Themiſtocles, may ſpread abroad amongſt the barbarous nations. In ſhort, wherever you are, you will attract the reſpect and admiration of the whole world."

So ſmooth and inſinuating a prelude was extremely pleaſing to the young man, who was taken by his blind ſide. He ſtaid willingly, gave no occaſion to preſs him on that account, and the converſation continued. "Since you deſire to be eſteemed and honoured, no doubt your view is to be uſeful to the public?"—"Certainly."—"Tell me then, I beg you, in the name of the gods, what is the firſt ſervice you propoſe to render the ſtate?" As Glauco ſeemed at a loſs, and meditated upon what he ſhould anſwer: "I preſume," continues Socrates, "it to enrich it, that is to ſay, to augment its revenues."—"My very thought."—"You are well verſed then undoubtedly in the revenues of the ſtate, and know perfectly to what they may amount, you have not failed to make them your particular ſtudy,

[t] Xenoph. memorab. l. iii. p. 772—774.

in

in order that if a fund ſhould happen to fail by any unforeſeen accident, you might be able to ſupply the deficiency by another."—"I proteſt," replied Glauco, "that never entered into my thoughts,"—"At leaſt you will tell me to what the expences of the republic amount; for you muſt know the importance of retrenching ſuch as are ſuperfluous."—"I own I am as little informed in this point as the other."—"You muſt therefore refer your deſign of enriching the ſtate till another time; for it is impoſſible you ſhould do it, whilſt you are unacquainted with its revenue and expences."

"But," ſaid Glauco, "there is ſtill another means which you have not mentioned: a ſtate may be enriched by the ruin of its enemies."—"You are in the right," replied Socrates, "but that depends upon its being the ſtrongeſt; otherwiſe it incurs the danger of loſing what it has: for which reaſon, he who talks of engaging in a war, ought to know the forces on both ſides; that if he finds his own party ſtrongeſt, he may boldly adviſe the war; and, if weakeſt, diſſuade the people from undertaking it. Now, do you know the ſtrength of our republic, and that of our enemies by ſea and land? Have you a ſtate of them in writing? Be ſo kind as to let me ſee it."—"I have it not at preſent," ſaid Glauco.—"I ſee then," ſaid Socrates, "that we ſhall not preſently enter into a war, if you are charged with the government; for you have abundance of enquiries to make, and much pains to go through, before you will reſolve upon it."

He ran over, in this manner, ſeveral other articles no leſs important, with which Glauco appeared equally unacquainted; till he brought him to confeſs, how ridiculous thoſe people were, who have the raſhneſs to intrude into government; without any other preparation for the ſervice of the public, than that of a high eſteem for themſelves, and an immoderate ambition of riſing to the firſt places and dignities. "Have a care," dear Glauco," ſaid he to him, "leſt a too warm deſire

of

of honours ſhould deceive you into purſuits that may cover you with ſhame, by ſetting your incapacity and ſlender abilities in full light."

Glauco improved from the wiſe admonitions of Socrates, and took time to inform himſelf in private, before he ventured to appear in public. This is a leſſon for all ages, and may be very uſeful to perſons in all ſtations and conditions of life.

"Socrates did not urge his friends to enter early into public employments; but firſt to take pains for the attainment of the knowledge neceſſary to their ſucceſs in them. "[x] A man muſt be very ſimple," ſaid he, "to believe that the mechanic arts are not to be acquired without the help of proper maſters, and that the knowledge requiſite in governing ſtates, which is the higheſt degree of human prudence, demands no previous labour and application." His great care in regard to thoſe who aſpired at public employments, was to form their manners upon the ſolid principles of probity and juſtice; and eſpecially to inſpire them with a ſincere love of their country, with the moſt ardent paſſion for the public good, and a high idea of the power and goodneſs of the gods: becauſe, without theſe qualities, all other abilities ſerve only to render men more wicked, and more capable of doing evil. Xenophon has tranſmitted to us a converſation of Socrates with Euthydemus, upon Providence, which is one of the fineſt paſſages to be found in the writings of the ancients.

"Did you never reflect within yourſelf," ſays Socrates to Euthydemus, "how much care the gods have taken to beſtow upon man all that is neceſſary to his nature?"—"Never, I aſſure you," replied he. "You ſee," continued Socrates, "how neceſſary light is, and how precious that gift of the gods ought to appear to us."—"Without it," added Euthydemus, "we ſhould be like the blind, and all nature as if it were not, or were dead: but becauſe we have occaſion for ſuſpence and relaxation, they have alſo given us the night for

[x] Xenoph. memorab. l. iv. p. 800. [y] Idem, p. 792.

our

our repoſe."—"You are in the right, and for this we ought to render them continual praiſes and thankſgiving. They have ordained that the ſun, that bright and luminous ſtar, ſhould preſide over the day to diſtinguiſh its different parts, and that its light ſhould not only ſerve to diſcover the wonders of nature, but to diſpenſe univerſal light and heat; and at the ſame time they have commanded the moon and ſtars to illuminate the night, of itſelf dark and obſcure. Is there any thing more admirable than this variety and viciſſitude of day and night, of light and darkneſs, of labour and reſt; and all this for the convenience and good of man?" Socrates enumerates in like manner the infinite advantages we receive from fire and water in the occaſions of life; and continuing to obſerve upon the wonderful attention of Providence in all that regards us. "What ſay you," purſued he, "upon the ſun's return after winter to reviſit us, and that as the fruits of one ſeaſon wither and decay, he ripens new ones to ſucceed them? That having rendered man this ſervice, he retires, leſt he ſhould incommode him by exceſs of heat; and then, after having removed to a certain point, which he could not paſs without putting us in danger of periſhing with cold, that he returns in the ſame track to reſume his place in thoſe parts of the heavens, where his preſence is moſt beneficial to us? And becauſe we could neither ſupport the cold nor heat, if we were to paſs in an inſtant from the one to the other, do you not admire, that whilſt this ſtar approaches and removes ſo ſlowly, the two extremities arrive by almoſt inſenſible degrees? * Is it poſſible not to diſcover, in this diſpoſition of the ſeaſons of the year, a providence and goodneſs, not only attentive to our neceſſities, but even our delights and enjoyments?"

"All theſe things," ſaid Euthydemus, "make me doubt whether the gods have any other employment

* Ωρας αρμοτθσας προς τατο παρεχειν, αι ημιν α μονον ων δεομεθα πολλα κ παντοια παρασκευαζουσι, αλλα κ οις ευφραινομεθα.

than

than to ſhower down their gifts and graces upon mankind. There is one point, however, that puts me to a ſtand, which is, that the brute animals partake of all theſe bleſſings as well as ourſelves."—"Yes," replied Socrates, "but do you but obſerve, that all theſe animals ſubſiſt only for man's ſervice? The ſtrongeſt and moſt vigorous of them he ſubjects at his will, he makes them tame and gentle, and uſes them ſucceſsfully in his wars, his labours, and the other occaſions of life."

"What if we conſider man in himſelf." Here Socrates examines the diverſity of the ſenſes, by the miniſtry of which man enjoys all that is beſt and moſt excellent in nature; the vivacity of his wit, and the force of his reaſon, which exalt him infinitely above all other animals; the wonderful gift of ſpeech, by the means of which we communicate our thoughts reciprocally, publiſh our laws, and govern ſtates.

"From all this," ſays Socrates, "it is eaſy to diſcern that there are gods, and that they have man in their particular care, though he cannot diſcover them by his ſenſes. Do we perceive the thunder, whilſt it ſtrikes through all things which oppoſe it? Do we diſtinguiſh the winds, whilſt they are tearing up all before them in our view? Our ſoul itſelf, with which we are ſo intimate, which moves and acts us, is it viſible, can we behold it? It is the ſame with regard to the gods, of whom none are viſible in the diſtribution of their favours. The GREAT GOD himſelf," (theſe words are remarkable, and demonſtrate that Socrates acknowledged one ſupreme God, the author of all being, and ſuperior to all others, who were only the miniſters of his will) "this Great God, who has formed the univerſe, and ſupports the ſtupendous work, whoſe every part is finiſhed with the utmoſt goodneſs and harmony; he who preſerves them perpetually in immortal vigour, and cauſes them to obey him with a never-failing punctuality, and a rapidity not to be followed by our imagination; this makes God himſelf ſufficiently viſible by the endleſs wonders of which he is author;

but continues always invisible in himself. Let us not then refuse to believe even what we do not see, and let us supply the defects of our corporeal eyes, by using those of the soul; but especially let us learn to render the just homage of respect and veneration to the divinity, whose will it seems to be, that we should have no other perception of him than by his effects in our favour. Now this adoration, this homage, consists in pleasing him, and we can only please him in doing his will."

[y] In this manner Socrates instructed youth; these are the principles and sentiments he inspired into them; on the one side, a perfect submission to the laws and magistrates, in which he made justice consist: on the other, a profound regard for the divinity; which constitutes religion. In things surpassing our understanding, he advises us to consult the gods; and as they impart themselves only to those that please them, he recommends above all things the making of them propitious by a wise regularity of conduct. "[*] The gods are wise," says he, "and it depends upon them either to grant what we ask, or to give us directly the reverse of it." He cites an excellent prayer from an anonymous poet: "Great God, give us, we beseech thee, those good things of which we stand in need, whether we crave them or not; and remove from us all those which may be hurtful to us, though we implore them of you." The vulgar imagined that there are things which the gods observe, and others of which they take no notice: but Socrates taught that the gods observe all our actions and words; that they penetrate into our most secret thoughts, are present in all our deliberations, and that they inspire us in all our actions.

[y] Xenoph. Memorab. l. iv. p. 803, & 805.

[*] Ἐπὶ θεοῖς ἐστιν, οὕτως ὡς ἐγὼ εἰδέναι αὖτ' ἂν τις εὐχοιτο καὶ τύχοι, καὶ ταῦτα τιθῶ. Plut. Alcib. l. ii. p. 148.

SECT.

SECT. V. *Socrates applies himself to discredit the Sophists in the Opinion of the young Athenians. What is to be understood of the ironical Character ascribed to him.*

SOCRATES found it necessary to prejudice the young people against a bad taste, which had prevailed for some time in Greece. A sect of assuming men arose, who ranking themselves as the first sages of Greece, were entirely the reverse in their conduct. For instead of being infinitely remote from all avarice and ambition, like Pittacus, Bias, Thales, and the others who made a study of wisdom their principal occupation, these men were ambitious and covetous, entered into the intrigues and affairs of the world, and made a trade of their pretended knowledge*. [2] They were called sophists, and wandered from city to city. They caused themselves to be cried up as oracles, and walked about attended by crowds of disciples, who, through a kind of enchantment, abandoned the embraces of their parents to follow these proud teachers, whom they paid a great price for their instruction. There was nothing these masters did not profess: theology, physics, ethics, arithmetic, astronomy, grammar, music, poetry, rhetoric, and history. They knew every thing, and could teach every thing. Their greatest supposed skill lay in philosophy and eloquence. Most of them, like Gorgias, valued themselves upon giving immediate answers to all questions that could be proposed to them. Their young disciples acquired nothing from their precepts but a silly esteem for themselves, and an universal contempt for every body else; so that not a scholar quitted these schools, but was more impertinent than when he first entered them.

It was necessary to decry the false eloquence and bad logic of these proud teachers in the sense of the young Athenians. To attack them in front, and dispute with

[2] Plat. in Apolog, p. 19, 20.

* *Sic enim apellantur hi, qui ostentationis aut quæstûs causâ philosophantur.* Cic. in Lucul. n. 129.

them

them in a direct manner by a continued discourse, was what Socrates could well have done, for he possessed in an extreme degree the talents of speaking and reasoning; but this was no means to succeed against great haranguers, whose sole aim was to dazzle their auditors with a vain glitter and rapid flow of words. He therefore took another course, and * employing the turns and address of irony, which he knew how to apply with wonderful art and delicacy, he chose to conceal, under the appearance of simplicity and the affectation of ignorance, all the beauty and great force of his genius. Nature, which had given him so fine a soul, seemed to have formed his outside expressly for supporting the ironic character. He was very ugly, and besides that, † had something very blockish and stupid in his physiognomy. The whole air of his person, which had nothing but what was very common and very poor in it, perfectly corresponded with that of his countenance.

When ‡ he happened into the company of some one of the sophists, he proposed his doubts with a diffident and modest air, asked simple questions in a plain manner, and, as if he had been incapable of expressing himself otherwise, made use of trivial comparisons, and allusions taken from the meanest employments. The sophist heard him with a scornful attention, and instead of giving him a precise answer, fell into his common places, and talked a great deal without saying any thing to the purpose. Socrates, after having praised (not to enrage) his adversary, intreated him to adapt himself to his weakness, and to descend so low as him, by sa-

* *Socrates in ironia dissimulantiaque longè omnibus lepore atque humanitate præstitit.* Cic. l. ii. de Orat. n. 270.

† *Zopyrus physiognomon—stupidum esse Socratem dixit et hardum.* Cic. de Fat. n. 10.

‡ *Socrates de se ipse detrahens in disputatione, plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est illa dissimulatione, quam Græci εἰρωνειαν vocant.* Cic. Acad. Quæst. l. iv. n. 15. *Sed et illum quem nominavi (Gorgiam) et exteros sophistas, ut è Platone intelligi potest, lusos videmus a Socrate. Is enim percontando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones quibuscum differebat, ut ad ea, quæ ii respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret.* Cic. de Finib. l. ii. n. 2.

tisfying

tisfying his queſtions in a few words; becauſe neither his wit nor his memory were capable of comprehending or retaining ſo many fine and exalted notions, and that all his knowledge was confined to queſtion and anſwer.

This paſſed in a numerous aſſembly, and the ſcientific perſon could not recede. When Socrates had once got him out of his intrenchment, by obliging him to anſwer his queſtions ſuccinctly; he carried him on from one to another to the moſt abſurd conſequences; and after having reduced him either to contradict himſelf or be ſilent, he complained that the learned man would not vouchſafe to inſtruct him. The young people, however, perceived the incapacity of their maſter, and changed their admiration for him into contempt. Thus the name of ſophiſt became odious and ridiculous.

It is eaſy to judge, that men of the ſophiſt's character, of which I have now ſpoken, who were in high credit with the great, who lorded it amongſt the youth of Athens, and had been long celebrated for their wit and learning, could not be attacked with impunity; and the rather, becauſe they had been taken in the two moſt ſenſible points, their fame, and their intereſt. [a] Socrates, for having endeavoured to unmaſk their vices, and diſcredit their falſe eloquence, experienced, from theſe corrupt and haughty men, all that could be feared or expected from the moſt malignant envy, and the moſt envenomed hatred; to which it is now time to proceed.

SECT. VI. *Socrates is accuſed of holding bad Opinions in regard to the Gods, and of corrupting the Athenian Youth. He defends himſelf without Art or Fear. He is condemned to die.*

[b] SOCRATES was accuſed a little before the firſt year of the 95th Olympiad, ſoon after the expulſion of the thirty tyrants out of Athens, in the ſixty-ninth year of his life; but the proſecution had been projected long before. The oracle of Delphos, which

[a] Plat. in Apolog. p. 23. [b] A. M. 3602. Ant. J. C. 402.

had

had declared him the wiſeſt of mankind; the contempt into which he had brought the doctrine and morals of the ſophiſts of his time, who were then in high reputation; the liberty with which he attacked all vice; the ſingular attachment of his diſciples for his perſon and maxims, had all concurred in alienating people againſt him, and had drawn abundance of envy upon him.

[c] His enemies having ſworn his deſtruction, and perceiving the difficulty of the attempt, prepared the way for it at a diſtance, and at firſt attacked him in the dark, and by obſcure and ſecret methods. It is ſaid, that to ſound the people's diſpoſition in regard to Socrates, and to try whether it would ever be ſafe to cite him before the judges, they engaged Ariſtophanes to bring him into the theatre in a comedy, wherein the firſt ſeeds of the accuſation meditated againſt him were ſown. It is not certain whether Ariſtophanes was ſuborned by Anytus, and the reſt of Socrates's enemies, to compoſe that ſatirical piece againſt him. It is very likely, that the declared contempt of Socrates for all comedies in general, and for thoſe of Ariſtophanes in particular, whilſt he profeſſed an extraordinary eſteem for the tragedies of Euripides; might be the poet's true motive for taking his revenge of the philoſopher. However, it were, Ariſtophanes, to the diſgrace of poetry, lent his pen to the malice of Socrates's enemies, or his own reſentment, and employed his whole genius and capacity to depreciate the beſt and moſt excellent man that ever the pagan world produced.

He compoſed a piece called *The Clouds*, wherein he introduced the philoſopher, perched in a baſket, and hoiſted up amidſt the air and clouds, from whence he vents maxims, or rather the moſt ridiculous ſubtletics. A very aged debtor, who deſires to eſcape the cloſe purſuits of his creditors, comes to him to be taught the art of tricking them at law; to prove by unanſwerable reaſons that he owes them nothing; and, in a word, of a very bad, to make a very good cauſe. But finding himſelf incapable of any improvements from the ſub-

[c] Ælian. l. ii. c. 13. Plat. in. Apolog. Socrat. p. 19.

lime

lime leſſons of his new maſter, he brings his ſon to him in his ſtead. This young man ſoon after quits his learned ſchool ſo well inſtructed, that at their firſt meeting he beats his father, and proves to him by ſubtle, but invincible arguments, that he has reaſon for treating him in that manner. In every ſcene where Socrates appears, the poet makes him utter a thouſand impertinencies, and as many impieties againſt the gods; and in particular againſt Jupiter. He makes him talk like a man of the greateſt vanity and opinion of himſelf; with an equal contempt for all others, who, out of a criminal curioſity, is for penetrating what paſſes in the heavens, and for diving into the abyſſes of the earth; who boaſts of having always the means to make injuſtice triumph; and who is not contented with keeping thoſe ſecrets for his own uſe, but teaches them to others, and thereby corrupts youth. All this is attended with a refined raillery, and a ſalt, which could not fail of pleaſing a people of ſo quick and delicate a taſte as the Athenians, who were beſides naturally invidious to all tranſcendent merit. They were ſo much charmed with it, that without waiting the concluſion of the repreſentation, they ordered the name of Ariſtophanes to be ſet down above thoſe of all his competitors.

Socrates, who had been informed that he was to be acted in the theatre, went thither upon the day to ſee the comedy, contrary to his cuſtom; for it was not common for him to go to thoſe aſſemblies, unleſs when ſome new tragedy of Euripides was to be performed, who was his intimate friend, and whoſe pieces he eſteemed, upon account of the ſolid principles of morality he took care to interſperſe in them. It was however obſerved, that he had not patience to wait the concluſion of one of them, wherein the actor had begun with a dangerous maxim, and went out immediately, without conſidering the injury his withdrawing might do his friend's reputation. He never went to comedies, unleſs when Alcibiades and Critias forced him thither againſt his will, offended at the unbounded licence which reigned in them, and incapable of ſeeing the re-

putation of his fellow citizens publicly torn in pieces. He was preſent at this without the leaſt emotion, and without expreſſing any diſcontent; and ſome ſtrangers being in pain to know who the Socrates [d] intended by the play was, he roſe up from his ſeat and ſhowed himſelf during the whole repreſentation. He told thoſe who were near him, and were amazed at his indifference and patience, that he imagined himſelf at a great entertainment, where he was agreeably laughed at, and that it was neceſſary to let raillery paſs.

There is no appearance, as I have already obſerved, that Ariſtophanes, though he was not Socrates's friend, had entered into the black conſpiracy of his enemies, and had any thought of occaſioning his deſtruction. It is more probable that a poet, who diverted the public at the expence of the principal magiſtrates and moſt celebrated generals, was alſo willing to make them laugh at the expence of a philoſopher. All the guilt was on the ſide of thoſe who envied him, and his enemies, who were in hopes of making great uſe of the repreſentation of this comedy againſt him. The artifice was indeed profound, and conceived with ſkill. In acting a man upon the ſtage, he is only repreſented on his bad, weak, or ambiguous ſides. That view of him is followed with ridicule, ridicule accuſtoms people to the contempt of his perſon, and contempt proceeds to injuſtice. For the world are naturally bold in inſulting, abuſing, and injuring a man, when once he becomes the object of their general contempt.

Theſe were the firſt blows ſtruck at him, and ſerved as an eſſay and trial of the great affair meditated againſt him. It lay dormant a long while, and did not break out in twenty years afterwards. The troubles of the republic might well occaſion that long delay: for it was in that interval the enterpriſe againſt Sicily happened, the event of which was ſo unfortunate, that Athens was beſieged and taken by Lyſander, who changed its form of government, and eſtabliſhed the

[d] Plut. de educ. liber. p. 10.

thirty

thirty tyrants, that were not expelled till a very ſmall time before the affair we ſpeak of.

[e] Melitus then appeared as accuſer, and entered a proceſs in form againſt Socrates. His accuſation conſiſted of two heads. The firſt was, that he did not admit the gods acknowledged by the republic, and introduced new divinities: the ſecond, that he corrupted the youth of Athens; and concluded with inferring, that ſentence of death ought to paſs againſt him.

Never had accuſation ſo little probability, pretext, or foundation as this. It was now forty years that Socrates had made it his profeſſion to inſtruct the Athenian youth. He had advanced no opinions in ſecret, and in the dark. His leſſons were given publicly, and in the view of great numbers of auditors. He had always obſerved the ſame conduct, and taught the ſame principles. What then could be Melitus's motive for this accuſation, after ſuch a length of time? How came his zeal for the public good, after having been languid and drowſy for ſo many years, to awake on a ſudden, and become ſo violent? Is it pardonable, for ſo warm and worthy a citizen as Melitus would appear, to have continued mute and inactive, whilſt any one corrupted the whole youth of that city, by inſtilling ſeditious maxims into them, and by inſpiring them with a diſguſt and contempt for the eſtabliſhed government? For he who does not prevent an evil, when it is in his power, is equally criminal with him that commits it.

[f] Libanius ſpeaks thus in a declamation of his, called the Apology of Socrates. But, continues he, though Melitus, whether out of diſtraction, indifference, or real avocation of his affairs, never thought for ſo many years of entering an accuſation againſt Socrates; how came it to paſs, that in a city like Athens, which abounded with wiſe magiſtrates, and, what is more, with bold informers, ſo public a conſpiracy as that imputed to Socrates, ſhould eſcape the eyes of thoſe, whom either the love of their country, or invidious malignity,

[e] A. M. 3603. Ant. J. 401.
[f] Liban. in Apolog. Socrat. p. 645—648.

render

render so vigilant and attentive? Nothing was ever less feasible, or more void of all probability.

[g] As soon as the conspiracy broke out, the friends of Socrates prepared for his defence. Lysias, the most able orator of his time, brought him an elaborate discourse of his composing; wherein he had set forth the reasons and measures of Socrates in all their light, and interspersed the whole with tender and pathetic strokes, [h] capable of moving the most obdurate hearts. Socrates read it with pleasure, and approved it very much; but as it was more conformable to the rules of rhetoric than the sentiments and fortitude of a philosopher, he told him frankly, that it did not suit him. Upon which Lysias, having asked how it was possible to be well done, and at the same time not suit him; in the same manner, said he, using according to his custom a vulgar comparison, that an excellent workman might bring me magnificent apparel, or shoes embroidered with gold, to which nothing would be wanting on his part, but which however would not fit me. He persisted therefore inflexibly in the resolution, not to demean himself by begging suffrages in the low abject manner common at that time. He employed neither artifice nor the glitter of eloquence. He had no recourse either to solicitation or entreaty. He brought neither his wife nor children to incline the judges in his favour by their sighs and tears. Nevertheless, * though he firmly refused to make use of any voice but his own in his defence, and to appear before his judges in the submissive posture of a suppliant, he did not behave in that manner out of pride, or contempt of the tribunal. It was from a noble and intrepid assurance, resulting from greatness of soul, and the consciousness of his truth and innocence. So that his defence had nothing timorous or weak in it. His discourse was bold, manly, generous, without passion, without

[g] Cicer. l. i. de Orat. n. 231, 233. [h] Quint. l. xi. c. i.

* *His et talibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quæsivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit; adhibuitque liberam contumaciam à magnitudine animi ductam, non à superbia.* Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. i.

emotion,

emotion, full of the noble liberty of a philoſopher, with no other ornament but that of truth, and brightened univerſally with the character and language of innocence. Plato, who was preſent, tranſcribed it afterwards, and, without any additions, compoſed from it the work, which he calls *The Apology of Socrates*; one of the moſt conſummate maſter-pieces of antiquity. I ſhall here make an extract from it.

[i] Upon the day aſſigned, the proceeding commenced in the uſual forms: the parties appeared before the judges, and Melitus ſpoke. The worſe his cauſe, and the leſs provided it was with proofs, the more occaſion he had for addreſs and art to cover its weakneſs. He omitted nothing that might render the adverſe party odious; and inſtead of reaſons, which could not but fail him, he ſubſtituted the deluſive ſhine of a lively and pompous eloquence. Socrates, in obſerving that he could not tell what impreſſion the diſcourſe of his accuſers might make upon the judges, owns, that for his part, he ſcarce knew himſelf, they had given ſuch artful colouring and likelihood to their arguments, though there was not the leaſt word of truth in all they had advanced.

[k] I have already ſaid that their accuſation conſiſted of two heads. The firſt regards religion. Socrates enquires, out of an impious curioſity, into what paſſes in the heavens, and in the bowels of the earth. He denies the gods adored by his country. He endeavours to introduce a new worſhip, and, if he may be believed, an unknown god inſpires him in all his actions. To make ſhort, he believes there are no gods.

The ſecond head relates to the intereſt and government of the ſtate. Socrates corrupts the youth by inſtilling bad ſentiments concerning the divinity into them, by teaching them a contempt of the laws, and the order eſtabliſhed in the republic; by declaring openly

[i] Plat. in Apolog. Socrat. Xenoph. in Apolog. Socrat. & in Memor.
[k] Plat. in Apolog. p. 24.

againſt the choice of the magiſtrates by * lot; by exclaiming againſt the public aſſemblies, where he is never ſeen to appear; by teaching the art of making the worſt of cauſes good; by attaching the youth to himſelf out of a ſpirit of pride and ambition, under the pretence of inſtructing them; and by proving to children, that they may abuſe their parents with impunity. He glories in a pretended oracle, and believes himſelf the wiſeſt of mankind. He taxes all others with folly, and condemns without reſerve all their maxims and actions; conſtituting himſelf, by his own authority, the general cenſor and reformer of the ſtate. Notwithſtanding which the effects of his leſſons may be ſeen in the perſons of Critias and Alcibiades, his moſt intimate friends, who have done great miſchiefs to their country, and have been the moſt wicked of citizens, and the moſt abandoned of men.

This concluded with recommending to the judges, to be very much upon their guard againſt the dazzling eloquence of Socrates, and to ſuſpect extremely the inſinuating and artificial turns of addreſs, which he would employ to deceive them.

[l] Socrates began his diſcourſe with this point, and declared that he would ſpeak to the judges as it was his cuſtom to talk in his common converſation, that is to ſay, with much ſimplicity, and no art.

[m] He then proceeds to particulars. Upon what foundation can it be alleged, that he does not acknowledge the gods of the republic; he, who has been often ſeen to ſacrifice in his own houſe, and in the temples? Can it be doubted whether he uſes divination or not, whilſt it is made a crime in him to report, that he received counſels from a certain divinity, and thence con-

[l] Plat. p. 17. [m] Plat. p. 27. Xenoph. p. 703.

* Socrates in reality did not approve this manner of electing the magiſtrates. He obſerved, that when a pilot, a muſician, or an architect is wanted, nobody is willing to take him at a venture; though the faults of theſe people are far from being of the great importance of thoſe errors, which are committed in the adminiſtration of the republic. Xenoph. Memorab. l. i, p. 712.

cluded

cluded that he aims at introducing new deities? But in this he innovates nothing more than others, who, putting their faith in divination, obſerve the flight of birds, conſult the entrails of victims, and remark even words and accidental encounters: different means, which the gods employ to give mankind a foreknowledge of the future. Old or new, it is ſtill evident that Socrates acknowledges divinities, by the confeſſion of even Melitus himſelf, who in his information avers that he believes dæmons, that is to ſay, ſubaltern ſpirits, the offſpring of the gods. Now every man who believes the offſpring of the gods, believes the gods.

[n] As to what relates to the impious enquiries into natural things imputed to him; without deſpiſing or condemning thoſe who apply themſelves to the ſtudy of phyſics, he declares, that as for him, he had entirely devoted himſelf to what concerns moral virtue, the conduct of life, and the rules of government, as to a knowledge infinitely more uſeful than any other; and he calls upon all thoſe who have been hearers, to come forth and belie him if he does not ſay what is true.

"I am accuſed of corrupting the youth, and of inſtilling dangerous maxims into them, as well in regard to the worſhip of the gods, as the rules of government. You know, Athenians, that I never made it my profeſſion to teach, nor can envy, however violent againſt me, reproach me with having ever ſold my inſtructions. I have an undeniable evidence for me in this reſpect, which is my poverty. Always equally ready to communicate my thoughts either to the rich or poor, and to give them entire leiſure to queſtion or anſwer me, I lend myſelf to every one who is deſirous of becoming virtuous; and if, amongſt thoſe who hear me, there are any who prove either good or bad, neither the virtues of the one, nor the vices of the other, to which I have not contributed, are to be aſcribed to me. My whole employment is to perſuade the young and old againſt too much love for the body, for riches, and all other

[n] Xenoph. p. 710.

precarious things, of whatsoever nature they be, and against too little regard for the soul, which ought to be the object of their affection: for I incessantly urge to you, that virtue does not proceed from riches, but on the contrary riches from virtue; and that all the other goods of human life, as well public as private, have their source in the same principle.

"If to speak in this manner be to corrupt youth, I confess, Athenians, that I am guilty, and deserve to be punished. If what I say be not true, it is most easy to convict me of my falsehood. I see here a great number of my disciples; they have only to appear. But, perhaps, the reserve and consideration for a master, who has instructed them, will prevent them from declaring against me: at least their fathers, brothers, and uncles cannot, as good relations and good citizens, dispense with their not standing forth to demand vengeance against the corrupter of their sons, brothers, and nephews. But these are the persons who take upon them my defence, and interest themselves in the success of my cause.

"[o] Pass on me what sentence you please, Athenians; but I can neither repent nor change my conduct. I must not abandon or suspend a function, which God himself has imposed on me. Now he has charged me with the care of instructing my fellow citizens. If after having faithfully kept all the posts, wherein I was placed by our generals at Potidæa, Amphipolis, and Delium, the fear of death should at this time make me abandon that in which the Divine Providence has placed me, by commanding me to pass my life in the study of philosophy for the instruction of myself and others; this would be a most criminal desertion indeed, and make me highly worthy of being cited before this tribunal, as an impious man who does not believe the gods. Should you resolve to acquit me for the future, I should not hesitate to make answer, Athenians, I honour and love you, but I shall choose rather to obey

[o] Plat. p. 28, 29.

God

* God than you, and to my lateſt breath ſhall never renounce my philoſophy, nor ceaſe to exhort and reprove you according to my cuſtom, by telling each of you, when you come in my way, *My † good friend, and citizen of the moſt famous city in the world for wiſdom and valour, are you not aſhamed to have no other thoughts than that of amaſſing wealth, and of acquiring glory, credit, and dignities, whilſt you neglect the treaſures of prudence, truth, and wiſdom, and take no pains in rendering your ſoul as good and perfect as it is capable of being?*

" P I am reproached with abject fear and meanneſs of ſpirit, for being ſo buſy in imparting my advice to every one in private, and for having always avoided to be preſent in your aſſemblies to give my counſels to my country. I think I have ſufficiently proved my courage and fortitude both in the field, where I have borne arms with you, and in the ſenate, when I alone oppoſed the unjuſt ſentence you pronounced againſt the ten captains, who had not taken up and interred the bodies of thoſe who were killed or drowned in the ſea fight near the iſland Arginuſæ; and when, upon more than one occaſion, I oppoſed the violent and cruel orders of the thirty tyrants. What is it then that has prevented me from appearing in your aſſemblies? It is that dæmon, that voice divine, which you have ſo often heard me mention, and Miletus has taken ſo much pains to ridicule. That ſpirit has attached itſelf to me from my infancy: it is a voice, which I never hear, but when it would prevent me from perſiſting in ſomething I have reſolved, for it never exhorts me to undertake any thing. It is the ſame being, that has always oppoſed me, when I would have intermeddled in the affairs of the republic; and that with the greateſt reaſon; for I ſhould have been amongſt the dead long ago, had I been concerned in the meaſures of the

P Plat. p. 31.

* Πεισομαι τω Θεω μαλλον η υμιν.

† The Greek ſignifies, *O beſt of men*, ω αριστε ανδρων; which was an obliging manner of accoſting.

ſtate,

ſtate, without effecting any thing to the advantage of myſelf, or our country. Do not take it ill, I beſeech you, if I ſpeak my thoughts without diſguiſe, and with truth and freedom. Every man who would generouſly oppoſe a whole people, either amongſt us or elſewhere, and who inflexibly applies himſelf to prevent the violation of the laws, and the practice of iniquity in a government, will never do ſo long with impunity. It is abſolutely neceſſary for him, who would contend for juſtice, if he has any thoughts of living, to remain in a private ſtation, and never to have any ſhare in public affairs.

"[1] For the reſt, Athenians, if, in the extreme danger I now am, I do not imitate the behaviour of thoſe, who upon leſs emergencies have implored and ſupplicated their judges with tears, and have brought forth their children, relations, and friends, it is not through pride and obſtinacy, or any contempt for you, but ſolely for your honour, and for that of the whole city. You ſhould know, that there are amongſt our citizens, thoſe who do not regard death as an evil, and who give that name only to injuſtice and infamy. At my age, and with the reputation, true or falſe, which I have, would it be conſiſtent for me, after all the leſſons I have given upon the contempt of death, to be afraid of it myſelf, and to belie in my laſt action all the principles and ſentiments of my paſt life.

"But without ſpeaking of my fame, which I ſhould extremely injure by ſuch a conduct, I do not think it allowable to entreat a judge, nor to be abſolved by ſupplications: he ought to be perſuaded and convinced. The judge does not ſit upon the bench to ſhow favour by violating the laws, but to do juſtice in conforming to them. He does not ſwear to diſcharge with impunity whom he pleaſes; but to do juſtice where it is due. We ought not therefore to accuſtom you to perjury, nor you to ſuffer yourſelves to be accuſtomed to it; for in ſo doing, both the one and the

[1] Plat. p. 34, 35.

other

other of us equally injure juſtice and religion, and both are criminals.

"Do not, therefore, expect from me, Athenians, that I ſhould have recourſe amongſt you to means which I believe neither honeſt nor lawful; eſpecially upon this occaſion, wherein I am accuſed of impiety by Melitus. For, if I ſhould influence you by my prayers, and thereby induce you to violate your oaths, it would be undeniably evident, that I teach you not to believe in the gods; and even in defending and juſtifying myſelf, ſhould furniſh my adverſaries with arms againſt me, and prove that I believe no divinity. But I am very far from ſuch bad thoughts. I am more convinced of the exiſtence of God than my accuſers, and ſo convinced, that I abandon myſelf to God and you, that you may judge of me as you ſhall deem beſt for yourſelves and me."

Socrates * pronounced this diſcourſe with a firm and intrepid tone. His air, his action, his viſage, expreſſed nothing of the accuſed: he ſeemed the maſter of his judges, from the aſſurance and greatneſs of ſoul with which he ſpoke, without, however loſing any thing of the modeſty natural to him. So noble and majeſtic a deportment diſpleaſed and gave offence. It is common for judges †, who look upon themſelves as the abſolute diſpenſers of life and death to ſuch as are before them, to expect, out of a ſecret tendency of mind, that they ſhould appear in their preſence with humble ſubmiſſion and reſpectful awe: an homage which they think due to their ſupreme authority.

This was what happened now. Melitus, however, had not at firſt the fifth part of the voices. We have reaſon to ſuppoſe that the judges aſſembled upon this occaſion might amount to five hundred, without reckoning the preſident. The law condemned the accuſer to pay a fine

* *Socrates ita in judicio capitis pro ſe ipſe dixit, ut non ſupplex aut reus, ſed magiſter aut dominus videretur eſſe judicum.* Cic. l. i. de Orat. n. 231.

† *Odit judex fere litigantis ſecuritatem; cumque jus ſuum intelligat, tacitus reverentiam poſtulat.* Quint. l. iv. c. 1.

of

of a thouſand drachmas *, if he had not the fifth part of the ſuffrages. This law had been wiſely eſtabliſhed, to check the boldneſs and impudence of calumniators. Melitus had been obliged to pay this fine, if Anytus and Lycon had not joined him, and preſented themſelves alſo as the accuſers of Socrates. Their credit drew over a great number of voices, and there were two hundred and fourſcore againſt Socrates, and, in conſequence, only two hundred and twenty for him. He wanted no more than thirty-one † to have been acquitted; for he would then have had two hundred and fifty-one, which would have been the majority.

By this firſt ſentence the judges only declared Socrates guilty, without decreeing him any ‡ penalty. For when the law did not determine the puniſhment, and when a crime againſt the ſtate was not in queſtion (in which manner I conceive Cicero's terms, *fraus capitalis*, may be underſtood) the perſon found guilty had a right to chooſe the penalty he thought he deſerved. Upon his anſwer the judges deliberated a ſecond time, and afterwards paſſed their final ſentence. Socrates was informed that he might demand an abatement of the penalty, and change the condemnation of death into baniſhment, impriſonment, or a fine. He replied generouſly, that he would chooſe neither of thoſe puniſhments, becauſe that would be to acknowledge himſelf guilty. "Athenians," ſaid he, "to keep you no longer in ſuſpenſe, as you oblige me to ſentence myſelf according to what I deſerve, I condemn myſelf for having paſſed my life in inſtructing yourſelves and your children; for having neglected with that view my domeſtic affairs, and all public employments, and dignities; for having devoted myſelf entirely to the ſervice

* 500 livres.

† The text varies in Plato; it ſays, thirty-three or thirty, whence it is probably defective.

‡ *Primis ſententiis ſtatuebant tantùm judices damnarent an abſolverent. Erat autem Athenis, reo damnato, ſi fraus capitalis non eſſet, quaſi pœnæ æſtimatio. Ex ſententia, cum judicibus daretur, interrogabatur reus, quam quaſi æſtimationem commeruiſſe ſe maximè confiteretur.* Cic. l. i. de Orat. n. 231, 232.

of

of my country, in labouring inceſſantly to render my fellow-citizens virtuous. I condemn myſelf, I ſay, to be maintained in the Prytaneum at the expence of the republic for the reſt of my life." * This laſt anſwer ſo † much offended the judges, that they condemned him to drink the hemlock, a puniſhment very much in uſe amongſt them.

[r] This ſentence did not ſhake the conſtancy of Socrates in the leaſt. "I am going," ſaid he, addreſſing himſelf to his judges with a noble tranquillity, "to ſuffer death by your order, to which nature had condemned me from the firſt moment of my birth; but my accuſers will ſuffer no leſs from infamy and injuſtice by the decrees of truth. Did you expect from me, that to extricate myſelf out of your hands, I ſhould have employed, according to the cuſtom, flattery, and pathetic expreſſions, and the timorous and creeping behaviour of a ſuppliant? But in trials, as well as war, an honeſt man ought not to uſe all ſorts of means for the preſervation of his life. It is equally diſhonourable both in the one and the other, to ranſom it only by prayers and tears, and all thoſe other abject methods, you ſee every day practiſed by people in my preſent condition."

Apollodorus, who was one of his friends and diſciples, having advanced to him to expreſs his grief for his dying innocent: "What," replied he with a ſmile, "would you have had me die guilty?"

[s] Plutarch, to ſhow, that only our weakeſt part, the body, is in the power of man; but that there is

[r] Plat. p. 29. [s] De Anim. Tranquil. p. 475.

* It appears in Plato, that after this diſcourſe, Socrates, without doubt to remove from him all imputation of pride and contumacy, modeſtly offered to pay a fine proportionate to his indigence, that is to ſay, one mina (fifty livres) and that at the inſtances of his friends, who had bound themſelves for him, he roſe in his offer to thirty minæ. PLAT. *in Apolog. Socrat.* p. 38. But Xenophon poſitively aſſerts the contrary, p. 705. This difference may be reconciled, perhaps, by ſuppoſing that Socrates refuſed at firſt to make any offer, and that he ſuffered himſelf at length to be overcome by the earneſt ſolicitations of his friends.

† *Cujus reſponſo ſic judices exarſerunt, ut capitis hominem innocentiſſimum condemnarent.* CIC. l. i. de Orat. n. 233.

another infinitely more noble part of us entirely superior to their threats, and inacceſſible to their inflictions, cites theſe admirable words of Socrates which are more applicable to his judges than his accuſers, "Anytus and Melitus may kill me, but they cannot hurt me." As if he had ſaid, in the language of the Pagans, Fortune may deprive me of my goods, my health, and my life; but I have a treaſure within me, of which no violence can deprive me, I mean virtue, innocence, fortitude, and greatneſs of mind.

This great man*, fully convinced of the principle he had ſo often inculcated to his diſciples, that guilt is the only evil a wiſe man ought to fear, choſe rather to be deprived of ſome years, which he might have to live, than to forfeit in an inſtant the glory of his whole paſt life, in diſhonouring himſelf for ever by the ſhameful behaviour he was adviſed to obſerve with his judges. Seeing that his own times had but a ſlight knowledge of him, he referred himſelf from it to the judgment of poſterity, and by the generous ſacrifice of a very advanced life, acquired and aſſured to himſelf the eſteem and admiration of all ſucceeding ages.

SECT. VII. *Socrates refuſes to eſcape out of Priſon. He paſſes the laſt Day of his Life in diſcourſing with his Friends upon the Immortality of the Soul. He drinks the Poiſon. Puniſhment of his Accuſers. Honours paid to his Memory.*

AFTER the ſentence had been paſſed upon him, † Socrates with the ſame intrepid aſpect with which he had held the tyrants in awe, went forward

* *Maluit vir ſapientiſſimus quod ſupereſſet ex vita ſibi perire, quam quod præteriſſet: et quando ab hominibus ſui temporis parum intelligebatur, poſterorum ſe judiciis reſervavit, brevi detrimento jam ultimæ ſenectutis ævum ſeculorum omnium conſecutus.* QUINT. l. i. c. 1.

† *Socrates eodem illo vultu, quo aliquando ſolus triginta tyrannos in ordinem redegerat, carcerem intravit, ignominiam ipſi loco detracturus. Neque enim poterat carcer videri, in quo Socrates erat.* SENEC. de Conſol. ad Helvet. c. xiii.

Socrates carcerem intrando purgavit, omniquc honeſtiorem curia reddidit. Id. de vit. beat. c. xxvii.

towards

towards the prison, which lost that name, says Seneca, when he entered it, and became the residence of virtue and probity. His friends followed him thither, and continued to visit him during thirty days, which passed between his condemnation and death. The cause of that long delay was, the Athenians sent every year a ship to the isle of Delos, to offer certain sacrifices; and it was prohibited to put any person to death in the city, from the time the priest of Apollo had crowned the poop of this vessel, as a signal of its departure, till the same vessel should return. So that sentence having been passed upon Socrates the day after that ceremony began, it was necessary to defer the execution of it for thirty days, during the continuance of this voyage.

In this long interval death had sufficient opportunity to present itself before his eyes in all its terrors, and to put his constancy to the proof, not only by the severe rigour of a dungeon, and the irons upon his legs, but by the continual prospect and cruel expectation of an event, of which nature is always abhorrent. [1] In this sad condition he did not cease to enjoy that profound tranquillity of mind, which his friends had always admired in him. He entertained them with the same temper he had always expressed, and Crito observes, that the evening before his death, he slept as peaceably as at any other time. He composed also a hymn, in honour of Apollo and Diana, and turned one of Æsop's fables into verse.

The day before, or the same day that the ship was to arrive from Delos, the return of which was to be followed by the death of Socrates, Crito, his intimate friend, came to him early in the morning to let him know that bad news, and at the same time that it depended only upon himself to quit the prison; that the gaoler was gained; that he would find the doors open, and offered him a safe retreat in Thessaly. Socrates laughed at this proposal, and asked him, "whether he knew any place out of Attica, where people did not die?" Crito urged the thing very seriously, and pressed

[1] Plat. in Criton.

him

him to take the advantage of ſo precious an opportunity, adding arguments upon arguments to induce his conſent, and to engage him to reſolve upon his eſcape. Without mentioning the inconſolable grief he ſhould ſuffer for the death of ſuch a friend, how ſhould he ſupport the reproaches of an infinity of people, who would believe that it was in his power to have ſaved him, but that he would not ſacrifice a ſmall part of his wealth for that purpoſe? Can the people ever be perſuaded that ſo wiſe a man as Socrates would not quit his priſon, when he might do it with all poſſible ſecurity? Perhaps he might fear to expoſe his friends, or to occaſion the loſs of their fortunes, or even of their lives or liberty. Ought there to be any thing more dear and precious to them than the preſervation of Socrates? Even ſtrangers themſelves diſpute that honour with them; many of whom have come expreſsly with conſiderable ſums of money to purchaſe his eſcape; and declare, that they ſhould think themſelves highly honoured to receive him amongſt them, and to ſupply him abundantly with all he ſhould have occaſion for. Ought he to abandon himſelf to enemies, who have occaſioned his being condemned unjuſtly, and can he think it allowable to betray his own cauſe? Is it not eſſential to his goodneſs and juſtice to ſpare his fellow-citizens the guilt of innocent blood? But if all theſe motives cannot alter him, and he is not concerned in regard to himſelf, can he be inſenſible to the intereſts of his children? In what a condition does he leave them? And can he forget the father, to remember only the philoſopher?

Socrates, after having heard him with attention, praiſed his zeal, and expreſſed his gratitude; but before he could give into his opinion, was for examining whether it was juſt for him to depart out of priſon without the conſent of the Athenians. The queſtion therefore here, is to know whether a man condemned to die, though unjuſtly, can without a crime eſcape from juſtice and the laws? I do not know, whether, even amongſt us, there are not many perſons to be found who believe that this may be made a queſtion.

Socrates begins with removing every thing foreign to the ſubject, and comes immediately to the bottom of the affair. "I ſhould certainly rejoice extremely, moſt dear Crito, that you could perſuade me to quit this place, but cannot reſolve to do ſo, without being firſt perſuaded. We ought not to be in pain upon what the people ſay, but for what the ſole Judge of all that is juſt or unjuſt ſhall pronounce upon us, and that alone is truth. All the conſiderations you have alleged, as to money, reputation, family, prove nothing, unleſs you ſhow me, that what you propoſe is juſt and lawful. It is a received and conſtant principle with us, that all injuſtice is ſhameful and fatal to him who commits it, whatever men may ſay, or whatever good or evil may be conſequential of it. We have always reaſoned from this principle even to our lateſt days, and have never departed in the leaſt from it. Would it be poſſible, dear Crito, that at our age our moſt ſerious diſcourſes ſhould reſemble thoſe of infants, who ſay yes and no almoſt in the ſame breath, and have nothing of fixed and determinate?" At each propoſition he waited Crito's anſwer and aſſent.

"Let us therefore reſume our principles, and endeavour to make uſe of them at this time. It has always been a maxim with us, that it is never allowable upon any pretence whatſoever to commit injuſtice, not even in regard to thoſe who injure us, nor to return evil for evil, and that when we have once engaged our word, we are bound to keep it inviolably; no intereſt being capable to diſpenſe with it. Now, if at the time I ſhould be ready to make my eſcape, the laws and republic ſhould preſent themſelves in a body before me, what could I anſwer to the following queſtions which they might put to me? What are you going to do, Socrates? To fly from juſtice in this manner, is it aught elſe but ruining entirely the laws and the republic? Do you believe, that a ſtate ſubſiſts, after juſtice is not only no longer in force in it, but is even corrupted, ſubverted, and trod under foot by particulars? But, ſay I, the republic has done me injuſtice, and has ſentenced

tenced me wrongfully. Have you forgot, the laws would reply that you are under an agreement with us to submit your private judgment to the republic? You were at liberty, if our government and conſtitutions did not ſuit you, to retire and ſettle yourſelf elſewhere: but a reſidence of ſeventy years in our city, ſufficiently denotes, that our plan has not diſpleaſed you, and that you have complied with it from an entire knowledge and experience of it, and out of choice. In effect you owe all you are, and all you poſſeſs, to it: birth, nurture, education, and eſtabliſhment; for all theſe proceed from the tuition and protection of the republic. Do you believe yourſelf free to break through engagements with her, which you have confirmed by more than one oath? Though ſhe ſhould intend to deſtroy you, can you render her evil for evil, and injury for injury? Have you a right to act in that manner with your father and mother; and do you not know, that your country is more conſiderable, and more worthy of reſpect, before God and man, than either father or mother, or all the relations in the world together; that your country is to be honoured and revered, to be complied with in her exceſſes, and to be treated with tenderneſs and kindneſs, even in her moſt violent proceedings? In a word, that ſhe is either to be reclaimed by wiſe counſels and reſpectful remonſtrances, or to be obeyed in her commands, and ſuffered without murmuring in all ſhe ſhall decree? As for your children, Socrates, your friends will render them all the ſervices in your power; at leaſt the Divine Providence will not be wanting to them. Reſign yourſelf therefore to our reaſons, and take the counſel of thoſe who have given you birth, nurture, and education. Set not ſo high a value upon your children, your life, or any thing in the world as juſtice; ſo ſhall it come to paſs, that when you appear before the tribunal of Pluto, you will not be at a loſs to defend yourſelf in the preſence of your judges. But if you demean yourſelf otherwiſe, we ſhall continue your enemies as long as you live, without ever affording you relaxation or repoſe;

poſe; and when you are dead, our ſiſters, the laws in the regions below, will be as little favourable to you; knowing that you have been guilty of uſing your utmoſt endeavours to deſtroy us."

Socrates obſerved to Crito, that he ſeemed to have a perfect ſenſe of all he had ſaid, and that the force of his reaſons had made ſo ſtrong and irreſiſtible an impreſſion upon his mind, that they entirely engroſſed him, and left him neither thoughts nor words to object. Crito agreeing in effect that he had nothing to reply, continued ſilent, and withdrew with his friend. [u] At length the fatal ſhip returned to Athens, which was in a manner the ſignal for the death of Socrates. The next day all his friends, except Plato, who was ſick, repaired to the priſon early in the morning. The gaoler deſired them to wait a little, becauſe the eleven magiſtrates (who had the direction of the priſons) were at that time ſignifying to the priſoner, that he was to die the ſame day. Preſently after they entered, and found Socrates, whoſe * chains had been taken off, ſitting by Xantippe his wife, who held one of his children in her arms. As ſoon as ſhe perceived them, ſetting up great cries, ſobbing, and tearing her face and hair, ſhe made the priſon reſound with her complaints, "O my dear Socrates, your friends are come to ſee you this day for the laſt time!" He deſired that ſhe might be taken away, and ſhe was immediately carried home.

Socrates paſſed the reſt of the day with his friends, and diſcourſed with them with his uſual cheerfulneſs and tranquillity. The ſubject of converſation was the moſt important and beſt adapted to the preſent conjuncture, that is to ſay, the immortality of the ſoul. What gave occaſion to this diſcourſe, was a queſtion introduced in a manner by chance, whether a true philoſopher ought not to deſire and take pains to die? This propoſition, taken too literally, implied an opinion,

[u] Plat. in Phæd. p. 59, &c.

* At Athens, as ſoon as ſentence was pronounced upon a criminal, he was unbound, and conſidered as the victim of death, whom it was no longer lawful to keep in chains.

that a philoſopher might kill himſelf. Socrates ſhows that nothing is more unjuſt than this notion, and that man, appertaining to God, who formed and placed him with his own hand in the poſt he poſſeſſes, cannot abandon it without his permiſſion, nor depart from life without his order. What is it then that can induce a philoſopher to entertain this love for death? It can be only the hope of that happineſs which he expects in another life, and that hope can be founded only upon the opinion of the ſoul's immortality.

Socrates employed the laſt day of his life in entertaining his friends upon this great and important ſubject, from which converſation Plato's admirable dialogue, intitled *The Phædon*, is wholly taken. He explains to his friends all the arguments for believing the ſoul immortal, and refutes all the objections againſt it, which are very near the ſame as are made at this day. This treatiſe is too long for me to attempt an abſtract of it.

* Before he anſwers any of theſe objections, he deplores a misfortune common enough amongſt men, who, in conſequence of hearing ignorant perſons, who contradict and doubt every thing, diſpute, and believe there is nothing certain. "Is it not a great misfortune, dear Phædon, that having reaſons which are true, certain, and very eaſy to be underſtood, there ſhould, however be thoſe in the world, who are not at all affected with them, from their having heard thoſe frivolous diſputes, wherein all things appear ſometimes true and ſometimes falſe. Theſe unjuſt and unreaſonable men, inſtead of blaming themſelves for theſe doubts, or charging the narrowneſs of their ſenſe with them, from aſcribing the defect to the reaſons themſelves, proceed at length to a deteſtation of them; and believe themſelves more knowing and judicious than all others, becauſe they imagine they are the only perſons, who comprehend, that there is nothing true or certain in the nature of things."

Socrates demonſtrates the injuſtice of this proceeding. He obſerves, that of two things equally uncertain, it

* Plut. p. 90, 91.

conſiſts

conſiſts with wiſdom to chooſe that which is moſt advantageous with leaſt hazard. "If what I advance," ſays he, "upon the immortality of the ſoul, proves true, it is good to believe it; and if, after my death, it proves falſe, I ſhall always have the advantage from it, to have been leſs ſenſible here of the evils which generally attend human life." This reaſoning * of Socrates (which, *we are to ſuppoſe*, can be only real and true in the mouth of a Chriſtian) is very remarkable. If what I ſay is true, I gain all things, whilſt I hazard very little; and if falſe I loſe nothing; on the contrary, I am ſtill a great gainer.

Socrates does not confine himſelf to the mere ſpeculation of this great truth, that the ſoul is immortal; he draws uſeful and neceſſary concluſions from it for the conduct of life; in explaining what the hope of a happy eternity demands from man, that it be not fruſtrated, and that inſtead of attaining the rewards prepared for the good, they do not experience the puniſhments allotted for the wicked. The philoſopher here ſets forth theſe great truths, which a conſtant tradition, though very much obſcured by fiction and fable, had always preſerved amongſt the Pagans. The laſt judgment of the righteous and wicked; the eternal puniſhments to which great criminals are condemned; a place of peace and joy without end for the ſouls that retain their purity and innocence, or which, during this life, have expiated their offences by repentance and ſatisfaction; and an intermediate ſtate, in which they purify themſelves, for a certain time, from leſs conſiderable crimes, that have not been atoned for during this life.

[y] "My friends, there is ſtill one thing, which it is very juſt to believe; if the ſoul be immortal, it requires to be cultivated with attention, not only for what we call the time of life, but for that which is to

[y] Plat. p. 107.

* Monſieur Paſcal has expatiated upon this reaſoning in his ſeventh article, and deduced from it a demonſtration of infinite force.

follow,

follow, I mean eternity; and the leaſt neglect in this point may be attended with endleſs conſequences. If death were the final diſſolution of being, the wicked would be great gainers in it, by being delivered at once from their bodies, their ſouls, and their vices: but as the ſoul is immortal, it has no other means of being freed from its evils, nor any ſafety for it but in becoming very good and very wiſe; for it carries nothing away with it, but its good or bad deeds, its virtues or vices, which are commonly the conſequences of the education it has received, and the cauſes of eternal happineſs or miſery.

" [z] When the dead are arrived at the fatal rendezvous of departed ſouls, whither their * dæmon conducts them, they are all judged. Thoſe, who have paſſed their lives in a manner neither entirely criminal nor abſolutely innocent, are ſent into a place where they ſuffer pains proportioned to their faults, till being purged and cleanſed of their guilt, and afterwards reſtored to liberty, they receive the reward of the good actions they have done in the body. Thoſe who are judged to be incurable upon account of the greatneſs of their crimes, who from deliberate will have committed ſacrileges and murders, and other ſuch great offences, the fatal deſtiny that paſſes judgment upon them, hurls them into Tartarus, from whence they never depart. But thoſe who are found guilty of crimes, great indeed, but worthy of pardon; who have committed violences in the tranſports of rage againſt their father and mother, or have killed ſome one in a like emotion, and afterwards repented, theſe ſuffer the ſame puniſhment, and in the ſame place with the laſt; but for a time only, till by their prayers and ſupplications they have obtained pardon from thoſe they have injured.

" But for thoſe who have paſſed through life with

[z] Plat. p. 113, 114.

* Dæmon is a Greek word, which ſignifies ſpirit, genius, and with us, angel.

peculiar

peculiar ſanctity of manners, delivered from their baſe earthly abodes as from a priſon, they are received on high in a pure region, which they inhabit; and as philoſophy has ſufficiently purified them, they live * without their bodies through all eternity in a ſeries of joys and delights it is not eaſy to deſcribe, and which the ſhortneſs of my time will not permit me to explain more at large.

"What I have ſaid will ſuffice, I conceive, to prove that we ought to endeavour ſtrenuouſly, throughout our whole lives, to acquire virtue and wiſdom: for you ſee how great a reward, and how high a hope is propoſed to us. And though the immortality of the ſoul were dubious, inſtead of appearing a certainty as it does, every wiſe man ought to aſſure himſelf, that it is well worth his trouble to riſk his belief of it in this manner. And indeed can there be a more glorious hazard? We ought to enchant ourſelves with this bleſſed hope; for which reaſon I have lengthened this diſcourſe ſo much."

Cicero expreſſes theſe noble ſentiments of Socrates with his uſual delicacy. † Almoſt at the very momen that he held the deadly draught in his hand, he talked in ſuch a manner, as ſhowed that he looked upon death not as a violence done to him, but as a means beſtowed upon him of aſcending to heaven. He declared, that upon departing out of this life, two ways are open to us; the one leads to the place of eternal miſery, ſuch ſouls as have ſullied themſelves here below in ſhameful pleaſures and criminal actions; the other conducts

* The reſurrection of the body was unknown to the Pagans.

† *Cum penè in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum, locutus ita eſt, ut non ad mortem trudi verùm in cœlum videretur aſcendere. Ita enim cenſebat, itâque diſſeruit: duas eſſe vias dupliceſque curſus animorum è corpore excedentium. Nam, qui ſe humanis vitiis contaminaſſent, et ſe totos libidinibus, dediſſent quibus coarctati velut domeſticis vitiis atque flagitiis ſe inquinaſſent, iis devium quoddam iter eſſe, ſeclusum à concilio deorum: qui autem ſe integros caſtoſque ſervaviſſent, quibuſque fuiſſet minima cum corporibus contagio ſeſeque ab his ſemper ſevocaſſent, eſſentque in corporibus humanis vitam imitati deorum, his ad illos, à quibus eſſent profecti, reditum facilem patere.* Cic. Tuſc. Quæſt. l. i. n. 71, 72.

thoſe

thoſe to the happy manſions of the gods, who have retained their purity upon earth, and have led in human bodies a life almoſt divine.

[a] When Socrates had done ſpeaking, Crito deſired him to give him and the reſt of his friends his laſt inſtructions in regard to his children, and other affairs, that by executing them, they might have the conſolation of doing him ſome pleaſure. "I ſhall recommend nothing to you this day," replied Socrates, "more than I have always done, which is to take care of yourſelves. You cannot do yourſelves a greater ſervice, nor do me and my family a greater pleaſure." Crito having aſked him afterwards in what manner he thought fit to be buried: "As you pleaſe," ſaid Socrates, "if you can lay hold of me, and I not eſcape out of your hands." At the ſame time looking upon his friends with a ſmile: "I can never perſuade Crito that Socrates is he who converſes with you, and diſpoſes the ſeveral parts of his diſcourſe; for he always imagines that I am what he is going to ſee dead in a little while. He confounds me with my carcaſe, and therefore aſks me how I would be interred." In finiſhing theſe words he roſe up and went to bathe himſelf in a chamber adjoining. After he came out of the bath, his children were brought to him, for he had three, two very little, and the other grown up. He ſpoke to them for ſome time, gave his orders to the women who took care of them, and then diſmiſſed them. Being returned into his chamber he laid him down upon his bed.

The ſervant of the Eleven entered at the ſame inſtant, and having informed him, that the time for drinking the hemlock was come (which was at ſunſet) the ſervant was ſo much affected with ſorrow, that he turned his back and fell a weeping. "See," ſaid Socrates, "the good heart of this man! Since my impriſonment he has often come to ſee me, and to converſe with me. He is more worthy than all his fellows. How heartily the poor man weeps for me."

[a] Pag. 115—118.

This

This is a remarkable example, and might teach thoſe in an office of this kind how they ought to behave to all priſoners, but more eſpecially to perſons of merit, when they are ſo unhappy as to fall into their hands. The fatal cup was brought. Socrates aſked what it was neceſſary for him to do. "Nothing more," replied the ſervant, "than, as ſoon as you have drank off the draught, to walk about till you find your legs grow weary, and afterwards lie down upon your bed." He took the cup without any emotion or change in his colour or countenance, and regarding the man with a ſteady and aſſured look, "Well," ſaid he, "what ſay you of this drink; may one make a libation out of it?" Upon being told that there was only enough for one doſe: "At leaſt," continued he, "we may ſay our prayers to the gods, as it is our duty; and implore them to make our exit from this world, and our laſt ſtage happy; which is what I moſt ardently beg of them." After having ſpoken theſe words he kept ſilence for ſome time, and then drank off the whole draught with an amazing tranquillity, and a ſerenity of aſpect not to be expreſſed or conceived.

Till then his friends with great violence to themſelves had refrained from tears, but after he had drank the potion, they were no longer their own maſters, and wept abundantly. Apollodorus, who had been in tears during almoſt the whole converſation, began then to raiſe great cries, and to lament with ſuch exceſſive grief, as pierced the hearts of all who were preſent. Socrates alone remained unmoved, and even reproved his friends, though with his uſual mildneſs and good nature. "What are you doing?" ſaid he to them, "I admire at you. Ah! what is become of your virtue? Was it not for this I ſent away the women, that they might not fall into theſe weakneſſes? For I have always heard ſay, that we ought to die peaceably, and bleſſing the gods. Be at eaſe, I beg you, and ſhow more conſtancy and reſolution." Theſe words filled them with confuſion, and obliged them to reſtrain their tears.

In the mean time he kept walking to and fro, and when he found his legs grow weary, he laid down upon his bed, as he had been directed.

The poiſon then operated more and more. When Socrates found it began to gain upon the heart, uncovering his face, which had been covered without doubt to prevent any thing from diſturbing him in his laſt moments, "Crito," ſaid he, which were his laſt words, "we owe a cock to Æſculapius; diſcharge that vow for me, and pray don't forget it;" ſoon after which he breathed his laſt. Crito went to his body, and cloſed his mouth and eyes. Such was the end of Socrates: in the firſt year of the 95th Olympiad, and the ſeventieth of his age. Cicero * ſays, he could never read the deſcription of his death in Plato without tears.

Plato, and the reſt of Socrates's diſciples, apprehending the rage of his accuſers was not ſatiated by that victim, retired to Mægara to the houſe of Euclid; where they ſtaid till the ſtorm blew over. Euripides, however, to reproach the Athenians with the horrible crime they had committed, in condemning the beſt of men to die upon ſuch ſlight grounds, compoſed his tragedy, called *Palamedes*, in which, under the name of that hero, who was alſo deſtroyed by a black calumniation, he deplored the misfortune of his friend. When the actor came to repeat this verſe,

You doom the juſteſt of the Greeks to periſh;

the whole theatre, remembering Socrates in ſo diſtinct an image of him, melted into tears, and a decree paſſed to prohibit ſpeaking any more of him in public. Some believe Euripides was dead before Socrates, and reject this circumſtance.

However it were, the people of Athens did not open their eyes till ſome time after the death of Socrates. Their hatred being ſatisfied, their prejudices expired, and time having given them opportunity for reflection, the notorious injuſtice of the ſentence appeared in all

* *Quid dicam de Socrate, cujus morti illacrymari ſoleo Platonem egens?* De nat. Deot. l. iii. n. 82.

its

its horrors. Nothing was heard throughout the city but discourses in favour of Socrates. The academy, the Lycæum, private houses, public walks, and market places, seemed still to re-echo the sound of his loved voice. Here, said they, he formed our youth, and taught our children to love their country, and to honour their parents. In this place he gave us his admirable lessons, and sometimes made us seasonable reproaches, to engage us more warmly in the pursuit of virtue. Alas! how have we rewarded him for such important services? Athens was in universal mourning and consternation. The schools were shut up, and all exercises suspended. The accusers were called to account for the innocent blood they had caused to be shed. Melitus was condemned to die, and the rest banished. Plutarch observes, that all those, who had any share in this black calumny, were in such abomination amongst the citizens, that no one would give them fire, answer them any question, nor go into the same bath with them; and had the place cleansed where they had bathed, lest they should be polluted by touching it; which drove them into such despair, that many of them killed themselves.

[h] The Athenians, not contented with having punished his accusers, caused a statue of brass to be erected to him, of the workmanship of the celebrated Lysippus, and placed it in one of the most conspicuous parts of the city. Their respect and gratitude rose even to a religious veneration; they dedicated a chapel to him, as to a hero and a demi-god, which they called Σωκρατειον, that is to say, *the chapel of Socrates.*

SECT. VIII. *Reflections upon the Sentence passed upon Socrates by the Athenians, and upon Socrates himself.*

WE must be very much surprised, when on the one side we consider the extreme delicacy of the people of Athens, as to what regards the worship of the gods, which ran so high as to occasion their con-

[h] Diog. p. 116.

demning

demning the moſt eminent perſons upon the ſimple ſuſpicion of their failing in reſpect for them; and on the other, when we ſee the exceeding toleration, to call it no worſe, with which the ſame people hear comedies every day, in which all the gods are turned into ridicule, in a manner capable of inſpiring the higheſt contempt for them. All Ariſtophanes's pieces abound with pleaſantries, or rather buffooneries, of this kind; and if it is true that this poet did not know what it was to ſpare the greateſt men of the republic, it may be ſaid alſo as juſtly, he was ſtill leſs favourable to the gods.

Such were the daily entertainments in the theatre, which the people of Athens not only heard without pain, but with ſuch joy, pleaſure, and applauſe, that they rewarded the poet with public honours, who diverted them ſo agreeably. What was there in Socrates that came near this exceſſive licence? Never did any perſon of the pagan world ſpeak of the divinity, or of the adoration due to him, in ſo pure, ſo noble, and ſo reſpectful a manner. He did not declare againſt the gods publicly received and honoured by a religion more ancient than the city, he only avoided imputing to them the crimes and infamous actions, which the popular credulity aſcribed to them, and which were only proper to depreciate and decry them in the ſenſe of the people. He did not blame the ſacrifices, feſtivals, nor the other ceremonies of religion; he only taught, that all that pomp and outward ſhow could not be agreeable to the gods without uprightneſs of intention and purity of heart.

This wiſe, this illumined, this religious man, however, with all his veneration and noble ſentiments in regard to the divinity, is condemned as an impious perſon by the ſuffrages of almoſt a whole people, without his accuſers being able to inſtance one ſingle avowed fact, or to produce any proof with the leaſt appearance of probability.

From whence could ſo evident, ſo univerſal, and ſo determinate a contradiction ariſe amongſt the Athenians? A people, abounding in other reſpects with wit, taſte, and knowledge, muſt without doubt have had their

their reaſons, at leaſt in appearance, for a conduct ſo different, and ſentiments ſo oppoſite, to their general character. May we not ſay that the Athenians conſidered their gods in a double light? They confined their real religion to the public, ſolemn, and hereditary worſhip, as they had received it from their anceſtors, as it was eſtabliſhed by the laws of the ſtate, had been practiſed from immemorial time, and eſpecially confirmed by the oracles, augurs, offerings, and ſacrifices. It is by this ſtandard they regulated their piety; againſt which they could not ſuffer the leaſt attempt whatſoever: it was of this worſhip alone they were jealous; it was for theſe ancient ceremonies they were ſuch ardent zealots; and they believed, though without foundation, that Socrates was an enemy to them. But there was another kind of religion founded upon fable, poetical fictions, popular opinions, and foreign cuſtoms; for this they were little concerned, and abandoned it entirely to the poets, to the repreſentations of the theatre, and common converſation.

[c] What groſſneſs did they not attribute to Juno and Venus? No citizen would have been ſatisfied, that his wife or daughters ſhould have reſembled thoſe goddeſſes. Timotheus, the famous muſician, having repreſented Diana upon the ſtage of Athens, tranſported with folly, fury, and rage, one of the ſpectators conceived he could not make a greater imprecation againſt him, than to wiſh his daughter might become the likeneſs of that divinity. It is better, ſays Plutarch, to believe there are no gods, than to imagine them of this kind: open and declared impiety being leſs profane, if we may be allowed to ſay ſo, than ſo groſs and abſurd a ſuperſtition.

However it be, the ſentence of which we have related the circumſtances, will, through all ages, cover Athens with infamy and reproach, that all the ſplendor of its glorious actions, for which it is otherwiſe ſo juſtly renowned, can never obliterate, and ſhows, at the ſame time, what is to be expected from a people, gentle, humane, and beneficent at bottom, for ſuch the Athenians

[c] Plut. de ſuperſtit. p. 170.

really were, but warm, proud, haughty, inconſtant, wavering with every wind, and every impreſſion. It is therefore with reaſon, that their aſſemblies have been compared to a tempeſtuous ſea; as that element, like the people, though calm and peaceable of itſelf, is ſubject to be frequently agitated by a violence not its own.

As to Socrates, it muſt be allowed that the pagan world never produced any thing ſo great and perfect. When we obſerve to what a height he carries the ſublimity of his ſentiments, not only in reſpect to moral virtue, temperance, ſobriety, patience in adverſity, the love of poverty, and the forgiveneſs of wrongs; but what is far more conſiderable, in regard to the Divinity, his unity, omnipotence, creation of the world, and providence in the government of it: the immortality of the ſoul, its ultimate end and eternal deſtiny; the rewards of the good, and the puniſhment of the wicked; when we conſider this train of ſublime knowledge, we aſk our reaſon, whether it is a pagan who thinks and ſpeaks in this manner, and can ſcarce perſuade ourſelves, that from ſo dark and obſcure a fund as paganiſm ſhould ſhine forth ſuch living and ſuch glorious rays of light.

It is true, his reputation was not without alloy, and it has been affirmed, that the purity of his manners did not anſwer thoſe of his ſentiments. [d] This queſtion has been diſcuſſed among the learned, but my plan will not admit me to treat it in its extent. The reader may ſee Abbe Fraguier's diſſertation in defence of Socrates, againſt the reproaches made him on account of his conduct. The negative argument he makes uſe of in his juſtification ſeems a very ſtrong one. He obſerves, that neither Ariſtophanes, in his comedy of The Clouds, which is entirely againſt Socrates, nor his vile accuſers in his trial, have advanced one word that tends to impeach the purity of his manners: and it is not probable, that ſuch violent enemies as thoſe would have neglected one of the moſt likely methods to diſ-

[d] Memoires de l'Academie des Inſcript. Tom. IV. p. 372.

credit

credit him in the opinion of his judges, if there had been any foundation or appearance for the use of it.

I confess, however, that certain principles of Plato, his disciple, held by him in common with his master, upon the nudity of the combatants in the public games, from which, at the same time, he did not exclude the fair sex, and the behaviour of Socrates himself, who wrestled naked, man to man, with Alcibiades, give us no great idea of that philosopher's delicacy in point of modesty and bashfulness. [e] What shall we say of his visit to Theodota, a woman of Athens, of indifferent reputation, only to assure himself with his own eyes of her extraordinary beauty, which was much talked of, and of the precepts he gave her for the attraction of admirers, and the retaining them in her snares? Do such lessons consist much with a philosopher? I pass over many other things in silence.

I am the less surprised after this, that several of the fathers have censured him in regard to purity of manners, and that they have thought fit to apply to him, as well as to his disciple Plato, what St. Paul [f] says of the philosophers; that God, by a just judgment, has abandoned them to a reprobate sense, and to the most shameful lusts for their punishment; in that having clearly known there was but one true God, they had not honoured him as they ought, by publicly avowing their belief, and were not ashamed to associate him with an innumerable multitude of divinities, ridiculous and infamous even in their own opinions.

And in this, properly speaking, consists the crime of Socrates, who was not guilty in the eyes of the Athenians, but gave occasion for his being justly condemned by the eternal truth. It had illuminated his soul with the most pure and sublime lights, of which the pagan world was capable; for we are not ignorant, that all knowledge of God, even natural, cannot come but from himself alone. He held admirable principles with relation to the divinity. He agreeably rallied the

[e] Xenoph. Memorab. l. iii. p. 783—786.
[f] Rom. ch. i. ver. 17—32.

fables upon which the ridiculous myſteries of his age were founded. He often ſpoke, and in the moſt exalted terms, of the exiſtence of one only God, eternal, inviſible, creator of the univerſe, ſupreme director and arbiter of all events, avenger of crimes, and rewarder of virtues: but he *did not dare to give a public teſtimony of theſe great truths. He perfectly diſcerned the falſe and the ridiculous of the pagan ſyſtem, and nevertheleſs, as Seneca ſays of the wiſe man, and acted himſelf, he obſerved exactly all the cuſtoms and ceremonies, not as agreeable to the gods, but as enjoined by the laws. He †acknowledged at bottom one only divinity, and worſhipped, with the people, that multitude of infamous idols, which ancient ſuperſtition had heaped up during a long ſucceſſion of ages. He held peculiar opinions in the ſchools, but followed the multitude in the temples. As a philoſopher, he deſpiſed and deteſted the idols in ſecret; as a citizen of Athens and a ſenator, he paid them in public the ſame adoration with others; by ſo much the more to be condemned, ſays St. Auguſtin, as that worſhip, which was only external and diſſembled, ſeemed to the people to be the effect of ſincerity and conviction.

And it cannot be ſaid that Socrates altered his conduct at the end of his life, or that he then expreſſed a greater zeal for truth. In his defence before the people, he declared, that he had always received and honoured the ſame gods as the Athenians; and the laſt order he gave before he expired, was to ſacrifice, in his name, a cock to Æſculapius. Behold then this prince of the philoſophers declared by the Delphic oracle the wiſeſt of mankind, who, notwithſtanding his internal conviction of one only divinity, dies in the boſom of idolatry,

Quæ omnia (ait Seneca) ſapiens ſervabit tanquam legibus juſſa, non tanquam diis grata—Omnem iſtam ignobilem deorum turbam, quam longo ævo longo ſuperſtitio congeſſit, ſic, inquit, adorabimus, ut meminerimus cultum ejus magis ad morem, quam ad rem, pertinere—Sed iſte, quem philoſophia quaſi liberum fecerat, tamen, quia illuſtris ſenator erat, colebat quod reprehendebat, agebat quod arguebat, quod culpabat adorabat—eo damnabilis, quo illa quæ mendacitur agebat, ſic ageret, ut eum populus veraciter agere exiſtimaret. S. August. de civit. Dei. l. vi. c. 10.

† *Eorum ſapientes, quos philoſophos vocant, ſcholas habebant diſſentientes, et templa communia.* Id. lib. de ver. rel. c. 1.

and with the profeſſion of adoring all the gods of the pagan theology. Socrates is the more inexcuſable in this, that declaring himſelf a man expreſsly appointed by heaven to bear witneſs to the truth, he fails in the moſt eſſential duty of the glorious commiſſion he aſcribes to himſelf. For if there be any truth in religion, that we ought more particularly to avow, it is that which regards the unity of the Godhead, and the vanity of idol worſhip. In this his courage had been well placed; nor would it have been any great difficulty to Socrates, determined, beſides, as he was, to die. But, ſays *St. Auguſtin, theſe philoſophers were not deſigned by God to enlighten the world, nor to bring men over from the impious worſhip of falſe deities to the holy religion of the true God.

We cannot deny Socrates to have been the hero of the pagan world in regard to moral virtues. But to judge rightly of him, let us draw a parallel between this ſuppoſed hero and the martyrs of Chriſtianity, who often were young children and tender virgins, and yet were not afraid to ſhed the laſt drop of their blood, to defend and confirm the ſame truths which Socrates knew, without daring to aſſert in public: I mean, the unity of God, and the vanity of idols. Let us alſo compare the ſo much-boaſted death of this prince of philoſophers with that of our holy biſhops, who have done the Chriſtian religion ſo much honour by their ſublimity of genius, the extent of their knowledge, and the beauty and excellence of their writings; a ſaint Cyprian, a ſaint Auguſtin, and ſo many others who were all ſeen to die in the boſom of humility, fully convinced of their unworthineſs and nothingneſs, penetrated with a lively fear of the judgments of God, and expecting their ſalvation from his ſole goodneſs and condeſcending mercy. Philoſophy inſpires no ſuch ſentiments; they could proceed only from the grace of the Mediator, which, *we are taught to believe*, Socrates did not deſerve to know.

* *Non ſic iſta nati erant, ut populorum ſuorum opinionem ad verum cultum veri Dei à ſimulacrorum ſuperſtitione atque ab hujus mundi vanitate converterent.* S. Augustr. lib. de ver. rel. c. 2.

BOOK THE TENTH.

THE

ANCIENT HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

Manners and Cuſtoms of the Greeks.

THE moſt eſſential part of hiſtory, and which it concerns the reader moſt to know, is that which explains the character and manners as well of the people in general, as of the great perſons in particular of whom it treats; and this may be ſaid to be in ſome ſort the ſoul of hiſtory, of which the facts are only the body. I have endeavoured, as occaſion offered, to paint in their true colours the moſt illuſtrious perſonages of Greece; it remains for me to ſhow the genius and character of the people themſelves. I ſhall confine myſelf to thoſe of Lacedæmon and Athens, who always held the firſt rank amongſt the Greeks, and ſhall reduce what I have to ſay upon this ſubject to three heads; their political government, war, and religion.

Sigonius, Meurſius, Potter, and ſeveral others, who have written upon the Grecian antiquities, ſupply me with great lights, and are of equal uſe to me in the matters it remains for me to treat.

CHAP.

CHAP. I.

Of political Government.

THERE are three principal forms of government: *Monarchy*, in which a ſingle perſon reigns; *Ariſtocracy*, in which the eldeſt and wiſeſt govern; and *Democracy*, in which the ſupreme authority is lodged in the hands of the people. The moſt celebrated writers of antiquity, as Plato, Ariſtotle, Polybius, and Plutarch, give the preference to the firſt kind, as including the moſt advantages with the feweſt inconveniencies. But all agree, and it cannot be too often inculcated, that the end of all government, and the duty in every one in authority, in whatſoever manner it be, is to uſe his utmoſt endeavours to render thoſe under his command happy and juſt, by obtaining for them on the one ſide ſafety and tranquillity, with the advantages and conveniencies of life; and on the other, all the means and helps that may contribute to making them virtuous. As the pilot's end, ſays Cicero*, is to ſteer his veſſel happily into its port, the phyſician's to preſerve or reſtore health, the general's of an army to obtain victory, ſo a prince, and every man who governs others, ought to make the utility of the governed his view and motive, and to remember, that the ſupreme rule of all juſt government is the good of the public, [a] *Salus populi ſuprema lex eſto.* He adds, that the greateſt and moſt noble function in the world is to be the author of the happineſs of mankind.

Plato, in a hundred places, eſteems as nothing the moſt ſhining qualities and actions of thoſe who govern, if they do not tend to promote the two great ends I have mentioned, the virtue and happineſs of the people;

[a] Cic. de. leg. l. iii. n. 8.

* *Tenes-ne igitur, moderatorem illum reip. quo referre velimus omnia?—Ut gubernatori curſus ſecundus, medico ſalus, imperatori victoria, ſic huic moderatori reip. beata civium vita propoſita eſt, ut opibus firma, copiis locuples, gloria ampla, virtute honeſta ſit. Hujus enim operis maximi inter homines atque optimi illum eſſe perfectorem volo.* Ad. Attic. l. viii. Epiſt. 10.

and

and he refutes at large, in the firſt [b] book of his Republic, one Thraſymachus, who advanced, that ſubjects were born for the prince, and not the prince for his ſubjects; and that whatever promoted the intereſts of the prince and commonwealth, ought to be deemed juſt and lawful.

In the diſtinctions which have been made upon the ſeveral forms of government, it has been agreed, That would be the moſt perfect which ſhould unite in itſelf, by a happy mixture of inſtitutions, all the advantages, and exclude all the inconveniencies, of the reſt; and almoſt all the ancients have believed [c], that the Lacedæmonian government came neareſt to this idea of perfection.

ARTICLE I.

Of the Government of Sparta.

FROM the time that the Heraclides had re-entered Peloponneſus, Sparta was governed by two kings, who were always of the ſame two families, deſcended from Hercules by two different branches, as I have obſerved elſewhere. Whether from pride, or the abuſe of deſpotic power on the ſide of the kings, or the deſire of independence, and an immoderate love of liberty on that of the people, Sparta, in its beginnings, was always involved in commotions and revolts; which would infallibly have occaſioned its ruin, as had happened at Argos and Meſſene, two neighbouring cities, equally powerful with itſelf, if the wiſe foreſight of Lycurgus had not prevented fatal conſequences by the reformation he made in the ſtate. I have related it at large [d] in the life of that legiſlator, and ſhall only touch here upon what regards the government.

SECT. I. *Abridged Idea of the Spartan Government. Entire Submiſſion to the Laws in a Manner the Soul of it.*

LYCURGUS reſtored order and peace in Sparta by the eſtabliſhment of the ſenate. It conſiſted of twenty-eight ſenators, and the two kings preſided in it.

[b] Page 338—343. [c] Polyb. l. vi. p. 458, 459. [d] Vol. II.

This

This auguſt counſel, formed out of the wiſeſt and moſt experienced men in the nation, ſerved as a counterpoiſe to the two other authorities, that of the kings, and that of the people; and whenever the one was for overbearing the other, the ſenate interpoſed, by joining the weakeſt, and thereby held the balance between both. At length, to prevent this body itſelf from abuſing its power, which was very great, a kind of curb was annexed to it, by the nomination of five Ephori, who were elected out of the people, whoſe office laſted only one year, and who had authority, not only over the ſenators, but the kings themſelves.

The power of the kings was extremely limited, eſpecially in the city, and in time of peace. In war they had the command of the fleets and armies, and at that time greater authority. [e] However, they had even then a kind of inſpectors and commiſſioners aſſigned them, who ſerved as a neceſſary council, and were generally choſen for that office, from their being out of favour with them, in order that there ſhould be no connivance on their ſide, and the republic be the better ſerved. There was almoſt continually ſome ſecret miſunderſtanding between the two kings; whether it proceeded from a natural jealouſy between the two branches, or was the effect of the Spartan policy, to which their too great union might have given umbrage.

The Ephori had a greater authority at Sparta, than the Tribunes of the Roman people. They preſided in the election of the magiſtrates, and could call them to an account for their adminiſtration. Their power extended even to the perſons of their kings, and of the princes of the blood royal, whom they had a right to impriſon, which they actually uſed in regard to Pauſanias. When they ſat upon their ſeats in the tribunal, they did not riſe up when the kings entered, which was a mark of reſpect paid them by all the other magiſtrates, and ſeems to imply a kind of ſuperiority in the Ephori from their repreſenting the people; and it is obſerved

[e] Ariſt. de rep. l. i. p. 331.

of Ageſilaus [f], that when he was ſeated upon his throne to diſpenſe juſtice, and the Ephori came in, he never failed to riſe up to do them honour. It is very probable, that, before him, it was not uſual for the kings to behave in that manner, Plutarch relating this behaviour of Ageſilaus as peculiar to him.

All public buſineſs was propoſed and examined in the ſenate, and reſolutions paſſed accordingly in the ſame place. But the decrees of the ſenate were not of force, unleſs ratified by the people.

There muſt have been exceeding wiſdom in the laws eſtabliſhed by Lycurgus for the government of Sparta, becauſe, as long as they were exactly obſerved, no commotions or ſeditions of the people were ever known in the city, no change in the form of government was ever propoſed, no private perſon uſurped authority by violence, or made himſelf tyrant; the people never thought of depriving the two families, in which it had always been, of the ſovereignty, nor did any of the kings ever attempt to aſſume more power than the laws admitted. [g] This reflection, which both Xenophon and Polybius make, ſhows the idea they had of the wiſdom of Lycurgus, in point of his policy, and the opinion we ought to have of it. In effect, no other city of Greece had this advantage, and all of them experienced many changes and viciſſitudes, for want of the like laws to perpetuate their form of government.

The reaſon of this conſtancy and ſtability of the Lacedæmonians in their government and conduct is, that in Sparta the laws governed abſolutely, and with ſovereign authority; whereas the greateſt part of the other Grecian cities, abandoned to the caprice of private men, to deſpotic power, to an arbitrary and irregular ſway, experienced the truth of Plato's ſaying [h], That the city is miſerable, where the magiſtrates command the laws, and not the laws the magiſtrates.

[f] Plut. in Ageſil. p. 597. Polyb. l. vi, p. 456.

[g] Xenoph. in Ageſil. p. 651.

[h] Plut. l. iv. de leg. p. 715.

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The example of Argos and Meſſene, which I have already related, would alone ſuffice to ſhow how juſt and true that reflection is. [h] After their return from the Trojan war, the Greeks, diſtinguiſhed by the name of Dorians, eſtabliſhed themſelves in three cities of Peloponneſus, Lacedæmon, Argos, and Meſſene; and ſwore alliance, and protection of each other. Theſe three cities, governed alike by monarchical power, had the ſame advantages; except in the fertility of the lands where they were ſituated, in which the two latter carried it extremely. Argos and Meſſene however did not long preſerve their ſuperiority. The haughtineſs of the kings, and the diſobedience of the people, occaſioned their fall from the flouriſhing condition in which they had been at firſt; and their example proved, ſays Plutarch after Plato, that it was the peculiar favour of the gods, which gave the Spartans ſuch a man as Lycurgus, capable of preſcribing ſo wiſe and reaſonable a plan of government.

To ſupport it without change, particular care was taken to educate the youth according to the laws and manners of the country, in order that they might become a ſecond nature in them, by being early ingrafted into them, and confirmed by long habitude. The hard and ſober manner in which they were brought up, inſpired them during the reſt of their lives with a natural taſte for frugality and temperance, that diſtinguiſhed them from all other people, and wonderfully adapted them to ſupport the fatigues of war. [i] Plato obſerves, that this ſalutary cuſtom had baniſhed from Sparta, and all the territory in its dependence, drunkenneſs, debauchery, and all their conſequential diſorders; inſomuch that it was a crime puniſhable by law to drink wine to exceſs even in the Bacchanalia, which every where elſe were days of licence, whereon whole cities gave themſelves up to the laſt exceſſes.

They alſo accuſtomed the children from their earlieſt infancy to an entire ſubmiſſion to the laws, magiſtrates,

[h] Plat. l. iii. de leg. p. 683—685. Plut. in Lycurg. p. 43.
[i] Plat. l. i. de leg. p. 637.

and

and all in authority; and * their education, properly ſpeaking, was no more than an apprenticeſhip of obedience. It was for this reaſon Ageſilaus adviſed Xenophon to ſend his children to Sparta, as to an excellent ſchool †, where they might learn the greateſt and moſt noble of all ſciences, *to obey and to command*, for the one naturally leads on to the other. It was not only the mean, the poor, and the ordinary citizens, who were ſubjected in this manner to the laws, but the rich, the powerful, the magiſtrates, and even kings; and they did not diſtinguiſh themſelves from the others in any thing but a more exact obedience; convinced that ſuch behaviour was the ſureſt means to their being obeyed and reſpected themſelves by their inferiors.

[l] Hence came the ſo much-celebrated anſwers of Demaratus. Xerxes could not comprehend how the Lacedæmonians, who had no maſter to controul them, ſhould be capable to confront dangers and death. "They are free and independent of all men," replied Demaratus, "but the law is above them and commands them, and that law ordains that they muſt conquer or die." [m] Upon another occaſion, when ſomebody expreſſed their ſuprize, that being king he ſhould ſuffer himſelf to be baniſhed: "It is," ſays he, "becauſe at Sparta the laws are ſtronger than the kings."

[n] This appears evidently in the ready obedience of Ageſilaus to the orders of the Ephori, when recalled by them to the ſupport of his country; a delicate occaſion for a king and a conqueror; but to him it ſeemed more ‡ glorious to obey his country and the laws, than to command numerous armies, or even to conquer Aſia.

[l] Herod. l. vii. c. 145, 146. [m] Plut. in Apoph. Lacon. p. 220. [n] Idem. in Ageſil. p. 603, 604.

* Ὥστε τὴν παιδείαν εἶναι μελέτην εὐπειθείας. PLAT. in Lycurg. 58.

† Μαθησόμενος τῶν μαθημάτων τὸ καλλίστον, ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν. PLUT. in Ageſil. p. 606.

‡ *Multo glorioſius duxit, ſi inſtitutis patriæ paruiſſet, quam ſi bello ſuperaſſet Aſiam.* CORN. NEP. in Ageſil. c. iv.

SECT.

SECT. II. *Love of Poverty inſtituted at Sparta.*

TO this entire ſubmiſſion to the laws of the ſtate, Lycurgus added another principle of government no leſs admirable, which was to remove from Sparta all luxury, profuſion, and magnificence; to decry riches abſolutely, to make poverty honourable, and at the ſame time neceſſary, by ſubſtituting a ſpecies of iron money to gold and ſilver coin, which till then had been current. I have explained elſewhere the meaſures that were uſed to make ſo difficult an undertaking ſucceed, and ſhall confine myſelf here to examining what judgment ſhould be paſſed on it, as it affects a government.

The poverty to which Lycurgus reduced Sparta, and which ſeemed to prohibit all conqueſt, and to deprive it of all means to augment its force and grandeur, was well adapted to rendering it powerful and flouriſhing. Such a conſtitution of government, which till then had no example, nor has ſince been imitated by any ſtate, argues a great fund of prudence and policy in a legiſlator; and the medium conceived afterwards under Lyſander, in continuing individuals in their poverty, and reſtoring to the public the uſe of gold and ſilver coin, was it not a wiſe amendment of what was too ſtrained and exceſſive in that law of Lycurgus of which we are ſpeaking?

It ſeems, if we conſult only the common views of human prudence, that it is juſt to reaſon in this manner; but the event, which is an infallible evidence and arbiter in this place, obliges me to be of a quite different opinion. Whilſt Sparta remained poor, and perſiſted in the contempt of gold and ſilver, which continued for ſeveral ages, ſhe was powerful and glorious, and the commencement of her decline may be dated from the time when ſhe began to break through the ſevere prohibition of Lycurgus againſt the uſe of gold and ſilver money.

The education which he inſtituted for the young Lacedæmonians, the hard and ſober life which he recom-

mended with ſo much care the painful and violent exerciſes of the body preſcribed by him, the abſtraction from all other application and employment; in a word, all his laws and inſtitutions ſhow, that his view was to form a people of ſoldiers, ſolely devoted to arms and military functions. I do not pretend to juſtify abſolutely this ſcheme, which had its great inconveniences, and I have expreſſed my thoughts of it elſewhere. But admitting it good, we muſt confeſs that legiſlator ſhowed great wiſdom in the means he took for its execution.

The almoſt inevitable danger of a people ſolely trained up for war, who have always their arms in their hands, and what is moſt to be feared, is injuſtice, violence, ambition, the deſire of increaſing their power, of taking advantage of their neighbours' weakneſs, of oppreſſing them by force, of invading their lands under falſe pretexts, which the luſt of dominion never fails to ſuggeſt, and of extending their bounds as far as poſſible, all vices and extremes, which are horrid in private perſons, and the ordinary commerce of life, but which men have thought fit to applaud as grandeur and glory in the perſons of princes and conquerors.

The great care of Lycurgus was to defend his people againſt this dangerous temptation. Without mentioning the other means he made uſe of, he employed two which could not fail of producing their effect. The * firſt was to prohibit all navigation and war at ſea to his citizens. The ſituation of his city, and the fear leſt commerce, the uſual ſource of luxury and depravation, ſhould corrupt the purity of the Spartan manners, might have a ſhare in this decree. But his principal motive was to put it out of his citizens power to project conqueſts, which a people, ſhut up within the narrow bounds of a peninſula, could not carry very far, without being maſters at ſea.

The ſecond means, ſtill more efficacious, was to forbid all uſe of gold or ſilver money, and to introduce a ſpecies of iron coin in its ſtead, which was of great

* Απειργιλο δε αυτοις ναυταις ειναι η ναυμαχειν. PLUT. in inſtitut. Lacon. p. 239.

weight

weight and small value, and could only be current at home. How with such money should foreign troops be raised and paid, fleets fitted out, and numerous armies kept up either by land or sea?

So that the design of Lycurgus, in rendering his city warlike, and putting arms into their hands, was not, as [a] Polybius observes, and Plutarch after him, to make them illustrious conquerors, who might carry war into remote regions, and subject great numbers of people. His sole end was, that, shut up within the extent of the lands and dominion left them by their ancestors, they should have no thoughts, but of maintaining themselves in peace, and defending themselves successfully against such of their neighbours as should have the rashness to invade them; and for this they had occasion for neither gold nor silver, finding in their own country, and still more in their sober and temperate manner of life, all that was sufficient for the support of their armies, when they did not quit their own, or the lands of their neighbours.

Now, says Polybius, this plan once admitted, it must be allowed, that there is nothing more wise nor more happily conceived than the institutions of Lycurgus, for the maintaining a people in the possession of their liberty, and to secure to them the enjoyment of peace and tranquillity. In effect, let us imagine a little republic, like that of Sparta, of which all the citizens are inured to labour, accustomed to live on a little, warlike, courageous, intrepid; and that the fundamental principle of this small republic, is to do no wrong to any one, nor to disturb its neighbours, nor invade their lands or interests, but, on the contrary, to declare in favour of the oppressed against the injustice and violence of oppressors; is it not certain, that such a republic, surrounded by a great number of states of equal extent, would be generally respected by all the neighbouring people, would become the supreme arbiter of all their quarrels, and exercise an empire over them, by so much the more glorious and lasting, as it would be

[a] Polyb. l. vi, p. 491. Plut. in Lycurg. p. 59.

voluntary,

voluntary, and founded ſolely in the opinion thoſe neighbours would have of its virtue, juſtice, and valour?

[p] This was the end Lycurgus propoſed to himſelf. Convinced that the happineſs of a city, like that of a private perſon, depends upon virtue, and upon being well within itſelf, he regulated Sparta ſo as it might always ſuffice to its own happineſs, and act upon principles of wiſdom and equity. From thence aroſe that univerſal eſteem of the neighbouring people and even of ſtrangers for the Lacedæmonians, who aſked of them neither money, ſhips, nor troops; but only that they would lend them a Spartan to command their armies; and when they had obtained their requeſt, they paid him entire obedience, with every kind of honour and reſpect. In this manner the Sicilians obeyed Gylippus, the Chalcidians Braſidas, and all the Greeks of Aſia, Lyſander, Callicratidas, and Ageſilaus; * regarding the city of Sparta as a model for all others, in the arts of living and governing.

The epocha of the declenſion of Sparta begins with the open violation of Lycurgus's laws. I do not pretend that they had always been exactly obſerved till that time, which was far from the caſe; but the ſpirit and genius of thoſe laws had almoſt always prevailed with the majority of the perſons who governed. No ſooner had the ambition of reigning over all Greece inſpired them with the deſign of having naval armies and foreign troops, and that money was neceſſary for the ſupport of thoſe forces, Sparta, forgetting her ancient maxims, ſaw herſelf reduced to have recourſe to the Barbarians, which till then ſhe had deteſted, and baſely to make her court to the kings of Perſia, whom ſhe had formerly vanquiſhed with ſo much glory; and that only to draw from them ſome aids of money and troops againſt their own brethren, that is to ſay, againſt people born and ſettled in Greece like themſelves. Thus had they the imprudence and misfortune to recal with

[p] Plut. p 58.

* Προς συμπασαν την των Σπαρτιατων πολιν ωσπερ παιδα γωγον η διδασκαλον ευσχημονως βιν τ τεταγμενης πολιτειας αποδλεπουτες.

gold

gold and silver into Sparta, all the vices and crimes which the iron money banished; and to prepare the way for the changes which ensued, and were the cause of their ruin. And this infinitely exalts the wisdom of Lycurgus, in having foreseen, at such a distance what might strike at the happiness of his citizens, and provided salutary remedies against it in the form of government he established at Sparta. Another legislator, who had preceded him several ages, has a right to share this glory with him.

Sect. III. *Laws established by Minos in Crete the Model of those of Sparta.*

ALL the world knows that Lycurgus had formed the plan of most of his laws upon the model of those observed in the island of Crete, where he passed a considerable time for the better studying of them. It is proper I should give some idea of them here, having forgot to do it in the place where it would have been more natural; that is, when I spoke for the first time of Lycurgus and his institutions.

[r] Minos, whom fable calls the son of Jupiter, was the author of these laws. He lived about a hundred years before the Trojan war. He was a powerful, wise, and gentle prince, and still more estimable for his moral virtues than his military abilities. After having conquered the island of Crete, and several others in its neighbourhood, he applied himself to strengthen by wise laws the new state, of which he had possessed himself by force of arms. [s] The end which he proposed in the establishment of these laws, was to render his subjects happy by making them virtuous. He banished idleness and voluptuousness from his states, and with them, luxury and vicious pleasures, the fruitful sources of all vice. Well knowing, that liberty was justly regarded as the most precious and greatest good, and that it cannot subsist without a perfect union of the people, he endeavoured to establish a kind of

[r] A. M. 2720. Ant. J. C. 128. [s] Strab. l. x. p. 480.

equality

equality amongſt them; which is the tie and baſis of it, and very proper to remove all envy, jealouſy, hatred, and diſſenſion. He did not undertake to make any new diviſions of lands, nor to prohibit the uſe of gold and ſilver. He applied himſelf to the uniting of his ſubjects by other ties, which ſeemed to him neither leſs firm nor leſs reaſonable.

He decreed, that the children ſhould be all brought up and educated together by troops and bands; in order that they might learn early the ſame principles and maxims. Their life was hard and ſober. They were accuſtomed to be ſatisfied with little, to ſuffer heat and cold, to walk over ſteep and rugged places, to ſkirmiſh with each other in ſmall parties, to ſuffer courageouſly the blows they received, and to exerciſe themſelves in a kind of dance, in which they carried arms in their hands, and which was afterwards called the Pyrrhic; in order, ſays Strabo, that even to their diverſions, every thing might breathe, and form them for war. They were alſo made to learn certain airs of muſic, but of a manly, martial kind.

[a] They were not taught either to ride, or to wear heavy armour; but in return, they were made to excel in drawing the bow, which was their moſt uſual exerciſe. Crete is not a flat even country, nor fit for breeding of horſes, as is that of the Theſſalians, who paſſed for the beſt cavalry in Greece; but a rough, broken country, full of ſhelves and high lands, where heavy-armed troops could not exerciſe themſelves in the horſe-race. But as to archery and light-armed ſoldiers, fit to execute the devices and ſtratagems of war, the Cretans pretended to hold the foremoſt rank.

Minos thought proper to eſtabliſh in Crete a community of tables and meals. Beſides ſeveral other great advantages which he found in this inſtitution, as the introducing a kind of equality in his dominions, the rich and poor having the ſame diet, the accuſtoming his ſubjects to a frugal and ſober life, the cementing friendſhip and unity between them by the uſual gaiety and

[a] Plat. de leg. l. i. p. 623.

familiarity

familiarity of the table, he had alſo in view the cuſtom of war, in which the ſoldiers are obliged to eat together. [u] It was the public that ſupplied the expences of theſe tables. Out of the revenues of the ſtate a part was applied to the uſes of religion, and the ſalaries of the magiſtrates, and the reſt allotted for the public meals. So that the women, children, and men of all ages, were fed at the coſt, and in the name of the republic. In this Ariſtotle gives the preference to the meals of Crete before thoſe of Sparta, wherein private perſons were obliged to furniſh their proportion, and without it were not admitted into the aſſemblies; which was to exclude the poor.

[x] After eating, the old men diſcourſed upon the affairs of the ſtate. The converſation turned generally upon the hiſtory of the country, upon the actions and virtues of the great men of it, who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves either by their valour in war, or their wiſdom in peace; and the youth, who were preſent at theſe entertainments, were exhorted to propoſe thoſe great perſons to themſelves as their models, for the forming of their manners, and the regulation of their conduct.

[y] Minos, as well as Lycurgus, is reproached with having no other view in his laws than war; which is a very great fault in a legiſlator. It is true, this appears to have been his principal attention, becauſe he was convinced that the repoſe, liberty, and riches of his ſubjects, were under the protection, and in a manner under the guard of arms and military knowledge; the conquered being deprived of all thoſe advantages by the victor. But he ordained, that war ſhould be only made for the ſake of peace; and his laws are far from being confined to that ſole object.

Amongſt the Cretans, the cultivation of the mind was not entirely neglected, and care was taken to give the youth ſome tincture of learning. The works of [z] Homer, of much later date than the laws of Minos, were not unknown amongſt them, though they ſet ſmall va-

[u] Ariſt. de rep. l. ii. c. 10. [x] Athen. l. iv. p. 643.
[y] Plat. de leg. li. p. 626. [z] Ibid. l. ii. p. 680.

lue

lue upon, and made little uſe of foreign poets. [a] They were very curious in ſuch knowledge as is proper to form the manners; and, what is no ſmall praiſe, they piqued themſelves upon thinking much and ſpeaking little. [b] The poet Epimenides, who made a voyage to Athens in the time of Solon, and was in great eſtimation there, was of Crete, and by ſome placed in the number of the ſeven ſages.

One of Minos's inſtitutions, which Plato [c] admires the moſt, was to inſpire early into the youth a high reſpect for the maxims, cuſtoms, and laws of the ſtate, and not to ſuffer them to diſpute or call in queſtion the wiſdom of their inſtitution; but to conſider them not as preſcribed and impoſed by men, but as emanations of the divinity himſelf. Accordingly he had induſtriouſly apprized the people, that Jupiter himſelf had dictated them to him. He had the ſame attention in regard to the magiſtrates and aged perſons, whom he recommended to honour in a peculiar manner; and in order that nothing might prevent the reſpect due to them, he ordained, that if any defects were obſerved in them, they ſhould never be mentioned in the preſence of the youth: a wiſe precaution, and which would be very becoming in the ordinary practice of life.

The government of Crete was at firſt monarchical, of which Minos has left a perfect model to all ages. According to him, as a moſt great and excellent * man obſerves, the king can do every thing over the people, but the laws every thing over him. He has an abſolute power to do good, and his hands are tied up from doing evil. The laws intruſt the people in his hands as the moſt ſacred of depoſits, upon condition that he ſhall be their common father. The ſame laws require, that a ſingle man by his wiſdom and moderation ſhall conſtitute the felicity of an infinite number of ſubjects; and not that the ſubjects, by their miſery and abject

[a] Plat. de leg. l. i. p. 641. [b] Plut. in Solon. p. 84.
[c] De leg. l. i. p. 634.

* Monſieur de Fenelon, archbiſhop of Cambray.

ſlavery,

ſlavery, ſhall be ſubſtituted to gratify the pride and low paſſions of a ſingle man. According to him, the king ought to be abroad the defender of his country at the head of armies, and at home the judge of his people, to render them good, wiſe, and happy. It is not for himſelf that the gods have made him king, and he is only ſo for the ſervice of his people. He owes them his whole time, care, and affection; and is worthy of the throne, only as he forgets, and devotes himſelf to the public good. [d] Such is the idea Minos had of the ſovereignty, of which he was a living image in his own perſon, and which Heſiod has perfectly expreſſed in two words, by calling that prince, "the moſt royal of mortal kings," βασιλευτατον θνητων βασιληων; that is to ſay, that he poſſed in a ſupreme degree all royal virtues, and was a king in all things.

[e] It appears, that the authority of king was of no long duration, and that it gave place to a republican government, as Minos had intended. The ſenate, compoſed of thirty ſenators, formed the public council. In that aſſembly the public affairs were examined, and reſolutions taken; but they were of no force, till the people had given them their approbation, and confirmed them by their ſuffrages. The magiſtrates, to the number of ten, eſtabliſhed for maintaining good order in the ſtate, and therefore called * *Coſmi*, held the two other bodies of the ſtate in reſpect, and were the balance between them. In time of war the ſame perſons commanded the army. They were choſen by lot, but only out of certain families. Their office was for life, and they were not accountable to any for their adminiſtration. Out of this company the ſenators were elected.

The Cretans made the ſlaves and mercenaries cultivate their lands, who were obliged to pay them a certain annual ſum. They were called *Periæci*, apparently from their being people in the neighbourhood, whom Minos had ſubjected. As they inhabited an iſland, and conſequently a country ſeparate from all others, the

[d] Plat. in Min. p. 320. [e] Ariſt. de rep. l. ii. c. 10.
* κοσμος, ordo.

Cretans

Cretans had not so much to fear from these vassals as the Lacedæmonians from the Helots, who often joined the neighbouring people against them. [f] A custom anciently established in Crete, from whence it was adopted by the Romans, gives us reason to believe, that the vassals who manured the lands, were treated with great goodness and favour. In the feasts of Mercury, the masters waited on their slaves at table, and did them the same offices as they received from them the rest of the year; precious remains and traces of the primitive world, in which all men were equal, that seemed to inform the masters, that their servants were of the same condition with themselves, and that to treat them with cruelty or pride, was to renounce humanity.

[g] As a prince cannot do every thing alone, and is obliged to associate co-operators with himself, for whose conduct he is accountable, Minos charged his brother Rhadamanthus with a share in the administration of justice in the capital city; which is the most essential and indispensible function of sovereignty. He knew his probity, disinterestedness, ability, and constancy, and had taken pains to form him for so important an office. Another minister had the care of the rest of the cities, who made a circuit three times a year, to examine whether the laws established by the prince were duly observed, and the inferior magistrates and officers religiously acquitted themselves of their duty.

Crete, under so wise a government changed its aspect entirely, and seemed to have become the abode of virtue, probity, and justice; as we may judge, from what fable tells us of the honour Jupiter did these three brothers, in making them the judges of the other world; for every body knows, that fable is founded upon real history, though disguised under agreeable emblems and allegories, adapted to recommend truth by the ornaments of fancy.

[h] It was, according to fabulous tradition, a law established from all times, that men in departing out of this

[f] Athen. l. xiv. p. 639. [g] Plat. in Min. p. 320.
[h] Plat. in Gorg. p. 523—526. In Axioch. p. 371.

life

life ſhould be judged, in order to their receiving the reward or puniſhment due to their good or evil actions. In the reign of Saturn, and in the firſt years of that of Jupiter, this judgment was pronounced at the inſtant preceding death, which left room for very flagrant injuſtices. Princes, who had been cruel and tyrannical, appearing before their judges in all the pomp and ſplendor of their power, and producing witneſſes to depoſe in their favour; becauſe, as they were ſtill alive, they dreaded their anger; the judges, dazzled with this vain ſhow, and deceived by ſuch falſe evidence, declared theſe princes innocent, and diſmiſſed them with permiſſion to enter into the happy abodes of the juſt. The ſame may be ſaid in regard to the rich; but for the poor and helpleſs, calumny and malice purſued them even to this laſt tribunal, and found means to have them domed for ever as criminals.

Fable adds, that, upon reiterated complaints and warm remonſtrances made to Jupiter upon this account, he changed the form of theſe trials. The time for them was fixed to be the very moment after death. Rhadamanthus and Æacus, both ſons of Jove, were appointed judges; the firſt for the Aſiatics, the other for the Europeans; and Minos over them to decide ſupremely in caſes of doubt and obſcurity. Their tribunal is ſituated in a place called *The Field of Truth*, becauſe neither falſehood nor calumny can approach it. The greateſt prince muſt appear there, as ſoon as he has reſigned his laſt breath, deprived of all his grandeur, reduced to his naked ſelf, without defence or protection, ſilent and trembling for his own doom, after having made the whole world tremble for theirs. If he be found guilty of crimes, which are of a nature to be expiated, he is confined in Tartarus for a certain time only, and with aſſurance of being releaſed, as ſoon as he ſhall be ſufficiently purified. But if his crimes are unpardonable, ſuch as injuſtice, perjury, and the oppreſſion of his people, he is caſt into the ſame Tartarus, there to ſuffer eternal miſeries. The juſt, on the contrary, of whatſoever condition they are, are conducted

ducted into the bleſſed abodes of peace and joy, to partake of a felicity which ſhall have no end.

Who does not ſee that the poets, under the cover of theſe fictions, ingenious indeed, but little to the honour of the gods, intended to give us the model of an accompliſhed prince, whoſe firſt care is to render juſtice to his people; and to image the extraordinary happineſs Crete enjoyed under the wiſe government of Minos? This happineſs did not expire with him. [i] The laws he eſtabliſhed, ſubſiſted in all their vigour even in Plato's time; that is to ſay, more than nine hundred years after. [k] And they were conſidered as the effect of his long * converſations for many years with Jupiter, who had condeſcended to become his teacher, to enter into a † familiarity with him as with a friend, and to form him in the great art of reigning with a ſecret complacency, as a favourite diſciple and a tenderly-beloved ſon. It is in this manner Plato explains theſe words of Homer: [l] Διος μεγαλα ο αριστης; the moſt exalted praiſe, according to him, that can be given to a mortal, and which that poet aſcribes only to Minos.

Notwithſtanding ſo ſhining and ſolid a merit, the theatres of Athens reſounded with nothing ſo much as imprecations againſt the memory of Minos; and Socrates, in the dialogue of Plato I have already often cited, obſerves upon, and gives the reaſon for them: but firſt he makes a reflection well worthy of being weighed. "When either the praiſe or diſpraiſe of great men is in queſtion, it is infinitely proper," ſays he, "to treat them with circumſpection and wiſdom; becauſe upon that depends the idea men form to themſelves of virtue and vice, and the diſtinction they ought to make between the good and bad. For," adds he, "God conceives a juſt indignation, when a perſon is

[i] Plat. in Min. p. 321. [k] Idem. p. 319.
[l] Odyſſ. T. ver. 179.

* *Et Jovis arcanis Minos admiſſus.* HORAT.

† This poetical fiction is perhaps taken from the holy ſcriptures, which ſay of Moſes: "And the Lord ſpake unto Moſes, face to face, as a man ſpeaketh unto his friend." *Exod.* xxxiii. 11.

blamed

blamed who reſembles himſelf; and on the contrary another praiſed, who is the reverſe of him. We muſt not believe that nothing is ſacred but braſs and marble; (he ſpeaks of the ſtatues that were worſhipped:) the juſt man is the moſt ſacred, and the wicked the moſt deteſtable, of all beings in this world."

After this reflection, Socrates obſerves, that the ſource and cauſe of the Athenians hatred of Minos was the unjuſt and cruel tribute he impoſed upon them, in obliging them to ſend him, every nine years, ſeven young men and as many maids, to be devoured by the Minotaur; and he could not avoid reproaching that prince, with having drawn upon himſelf the abhorrence of a city like Athens abounding with learned men, and of having ſharpened the tongues of the poets againſt him, a dangerous and formidable race of men, from the poiſoned ſhafts they never fail to let fly againſt their enemies.

It appears from what I have repeated, that Plato imputes to Minos the impoſition of that cruel tribute. Apollodorus, Strabo, and Plutarch ſeem to be of the ſame opinion. *Monſieur the Abbe Banier alleges and proves, that they are miſtaken, and confound the firſt Minos, of whom we ſpeak, with a ſecond his grandſon, who reigned after him in Crete, and to avenge the death of his ſon Androgeus killed in Attica, declared war againſt the Athenians, and impoſed that tribute, to which Theſeus put an end by killing the Minotaur. It would indeed be difficult to reconcile ſo inhuman and barbarous a conduct with what all antiquity relates of the goodneſs, lenity, and equity of Minos, and the magnificent praiſes it beſtows upon the polity and inſtitutions of Crete.

It is true the Cretans degenerated very much from their ancient reputation, which at length they abſolutely loſt by an entire change of their manners, becoming avaricious, and ſelf-intereſted to a degree of thinking that no gain was baſe, enemies of labour and regularity of life, profeſſed liars and knaves; ſo that

* Mem. de l'Acad. des Inſcrip. Tom. III.

to *Cretiſe* became a proverb amongſt the Greeks, implying to lie and to deceive. Every body knows that * St. Paul cites againſt them as truth the teſtimony of one of their ancient poets, (it is believed of Epimenides) who paints them in colours much to their diſhonour; but this change of manners, in whatever time it might arrive, does not at all affect the probity of the ancient Cretans, nor the glory of Minos their king.

[m] The moſt certain proof of that legiſlator's wiſdom, as Plato obſerves, is the ſolid and laſting happineſs, which was the effect of the ſole imitation of his laws by Sparta. Lycurgus had regulated the government of that city upon the plan and idea of that of Crete, and it ſubſiſted in an uniform manner for many ages, without experiencing the viciſſitudes and revolutions ſo common in all the other ſtates of Greece.

ARTICLE II.

Of the Government of Athens.

THE government of Athens was neither ſo permanent and ſo uniform as that of Sparta, but ſuffered various alterations, according to the diverſity of times and conjunctures. Athens, after having long been governed by kings, and afterwards by archons, aſſumed entire liberty, which gave place however for ſome years to the tyrannic power of the Piſiſtratides, but was ſoon after re-eſtabliſhed, and ſubſiſted with ſplendor till the defeat in Sicily, and the taking of the city by the Lacedæmonians. Theſe ſubjected them to the Thirty Tyrants, whoſe authority was not of long duration, and gave place again to liberty, which continued amidſt various events during a long ſeries of years, till the Roman power had ſubdued Greece and reduced it into a province.

I ſhall conſider in this place only the popular government, and ſhall examine in particular five or ſix

[m] Plat. p. 320.

* Κρητες αει ψευσται, κακα θηρια, γαστερες αργαι. "The Cretans are always liars, evil beaſts, ſlow bellies," *Titus* i. 12.

heads:

heads: the foundation of the government according to Solon's eſtabliſhment, the different parts of which the republic conſiſted, the council or ſenate of the five hundred, the aſſemblies of the people, the different tribunals for the adminiſtration of juſtice, the revenues or finances of the republic. I ſhall be obliged to be more extenſive upon what regards the government of Athens, than I have been upon that of Sparta, becauſe the latter is almoſt ſufficiently known, from what has been ſaid of it in the life of Lycurgus[n].

SECT. I. *Foundation of the Government of Athens according to Solon's Plan.*

[o] SOLON was not the firſt who eſtabliſhed the popular government at Athens. Theſeus long before him had traced out the plan, and began the execution of it. After having united the twelve towns into one city, he divided the inhabitants into three bodies; that of the nobility, to whom the ſuperintendance in religious affairs, and all offices were confided; the labourers or huſbandmen; and the artiſans. He had propoſed the eſtabliſhment of a kind of equality between the three orders. For if the nobles were conſiderable by their honours and dignities, the huſbandmen had the advantage of their utility to the public, and the neceſſity there was for their labours; and the artiſans had the ſuperiority to both the other bodies in their number. Athens, to ſpeak properly, did not become a popular ſtate, till the eſtabliſhment of the nine Archons, whoſe authority continued only for one year, whereas before it was for ten; and it was not till many years after, that Solon, by the wiſdom of his laws, inſtituted and confirmed this form of government.

[p] Solon's great principle was to eſtabliſh as much as poſſible a kind of equality amongſt his citizens, which he regarded with reaſon as the foundation and eſſential point of liberty. He reſolved therefore to leave the public employments in the hands of the rich, as

[n] Vol. II. [o] Plut. in Theſ. p. 10, 11. [p] Plut. in Solon. p. 87.

they had been till then, but to give the poor alſo ſome ſhare in the government, from which they were excluded. For this reaſon he made an eſtimation of what each individual was worth. Thoſe who were found to have an annual revenue of five hundred meaſures, as well in grain as liquid things, were placed in the firſt claſs, and called the *Pentacoſiomedimni*, that is, thoſe who had a revenue of five hundred meaſures. The ſecond claſs was compoſed of ſuch as had three hundred, and could maintain a horſe for war; theſe were called *horſemen* or *knights*. Thoſe who had only two hundred, were in the third claſs, and were called * *Zugitæ*. Out of theſe three claſſes only the magiſtrates and commanders were choſen. All the other citizens, who were below theſe three claſſes, and had leſs revenues, were compriſed under the name of *Theti*, hirelings, or workmen labouring with their hands. Solon did not permit them to hold any office, and granted them only the right of giving their ſuffrages in the aſſemblies and trials of the people, which at firſt ſeemed a very ſlight privilege, but at length was found to be a very great advantage, as will appear in the ſequel. I do not know whether Solon foreſaw it, but he uſed to ſay[q], that the people were never more obedient and ſubmiſſive, than when they poſſeſſed neither too much nor too little liberty: which comes very near Galba's expreſſion[r], when to incline Piſo to treat the Roman people with goodneſs and lenity, he deſires him to remember, † that he was going to command men who were incapable of bearing either entire liberty or abſolute ſubjection.

[s] The people of Athens, being become more haughty after their victories over the Perſians, pretended to have a right to ſhare in all the public offices and the magiſtra-

[q] Ibid. p. 110. [r] Tacit. Hiſt. l. x. c. 16. [s] Plut. in Ariſtid. p. 332.

* It is believed they were ſo called from their being ranked between the knights and the Theti; as in the galleys, thoſe who rowed in the middle were termed Zugitæ; their place was between the Thalamitæ and Thranitæ.

† *Imperaturus es hominibus, qui nec totam ſervitutem pati poſſunt, nec totam libertatem.*

cy; and Ariſtides, to prevent the diſorders which too tenacious oppoſition might have occaſioned, thought proper to give way to them in this point. [t] It appears however from a paſſage in Xenophon, that the people contented themſelves with the offices from whence ſome profit aroſe, and left thoſe, which related more particularly to the government of the ſtate, in the hands of the rich.

[u] The citizens of the three firſt claſſes paid every year a certain ſum of money, to be laid up in the public treaſury; the firſt a * talent, the knights half a talent, and the Zugitæ ten † minæ.

As the proportion of revenue determined the order of the claſſes, as their revenues augmented, the people were allowed to riſe to a ſuperior claſs.

If [x] Plutarch may be believed, Solon formed two councils, which were a kind of double limitation to fix and temper the aſſemblies of the people. The firſt was the Areopagus: but it was much more ancient than his inſtitutions, and he only reformed it, and gave it new luſtre by augmenting its power. The ſecond was the council of the four hundred, that is, a hundred of each tribe; for Cecrops, the firſt king of the Athenians, had divided the people into four tribes. Cliſthenes long after him changed that order, and eſtabliſhed ten. It was in this council of the four hundred, all affairs were conſidered before they were propoſed to the aſſembly of the people, as we ſhall ſoon explain.

I do not mention here another diviſion of the people into three parties or factions, which till the time of Piſiſtratus were a continual ſource of troubles and ſeditions. One of theſe three parties was formed out of thoſe who inhabited the high lands, and favoured popular government; the other out of thoſe who lived in the plains, and they were for oligarchy; and the third out of the people upon the coaſt, and theſe held the mean between both.

[t] Xenoph. de rep. Athen. p. 691. [u] Pollux. l. viii. c. 10.
[x] In Solon. p. 88.

* One thouſand French crowns. † Five hundred livres.

It

It is neceſſary, for the better underſtanding what we have now ſaid, to enter into a more particular account of the Athenian people.

SECT. II. *Of the Inhabitants of Athens.*

[y] THERE were three ſorts of inhabitants of Athens: citizens, ſtrangers, and ſervants. In the account taken by Demetrius Phalereus in the 96th Olympiad, their number amounted to twenty-one thouſand citizens, ten thouſand ſtrangers, and * forty thouſand ſervants. The number of citizens was almoſt the ſame in the time of Cecrops, and leſs under Pericles.

1. *Of the Citizens.*

A citizen could only be ſuch by birth or adoption. To be a natural denizen of Athens, it was neceſſary to be born of a father and mother both free, and Athenians. [z] We have ſeen that Pericles reſtored this law to all its force, which had not been exactly obſerved, and which he himſelf ſome ſmall time after infringed. The people could confer the freedom of the city upon ſtrangers; and thoſe, whom they had ſo adopted, enjoyed almoſt the ſame rights and privileges as the natural citizens. The quality of citizen of Athens was ſometimes granted in honour and gratitude to thoſe who had rendered great ſervices to the ſtate; as to Hippocrates; and even kings have ſometimes canvaſſed that title for themſelves and their children. Evagoras, king of Cyprus, thought it much to his honour.

When the young men attained the age of twenty, they were inrolled upon the liſt of citizens, after having taken an oath; and it was only in virtue of that public and ſolemn act, that they became members of the ſtate. The form of this oath is exceedingly remarkable, which Stobæus and [a] Pollux have preſerved in the following words: "I will never diſhonour the

[y] A. M. 3690. Ant. J. C. 314. Athen. l. vi. p. 272.
[z] Vol. III. [a] Pollux. l. viii. c. 9.

* The text ſays, μυριάδες τετρακόσιαι, *four hundred thouſand*, which is a manifeſt error.

profeſſion

profeſſion of arms, nor ſave my life by a ſhameful flight. I will fight to my laſt breath for the religion and civil intereſts of the ſtate, in concert with the other citizens; and alone, if occaſion be. I will not bring my country into a worſe condition than I found it, but will uſe my utmoſt endeavours to make it more happy and flouriſhing. I will always ſubmit myſelf to the laws and magiſtrates, and to all that ſhall be ordained by the common conſent of the people. If any one ſhall violate, or make void the laws, I will not diſguiſe or conceal ſuch an attempt, but will oppoſe it either alone or in conjunction with my fellow-citizens; and I will conſtantly adhere to the religion of my forefathers. To all which I call to witneſs Agraulis, Enyalus, Mars, and Jupiter." I leave the reader to his own reflections upon this auguſt ceremony, well adapted to inſpire the love of their country into the hearts of the young citizens.

The whole people at firſt had been divided into four tribes, and afterwards into ten. Each tribe was ſubdivided into ſeveral parts, which were called Δημοι, *Pagi*. It was by theſe two titles the citizens were deſcribed in the public acts. *Melitus, e tribu Cecropide, e pago Pitthenſi.*

2. *Of the Strangers.*

I call thoſe by that name, who being of a foreign country, came to ſettle at Athens, or in Attica, whether for the ſake of commerce, or the exerciſing any trade. They were termed μετοικοι, *inquilini*. They had no ſhare in the government, nor votes in the aſſembly of the people, and could not be admitted into any office. They put themſelves under the protection of ſome citizen, as we find from a paſſage of * Terence, and upon that account were obliged to render him certain duties and ſervices, as the clients did at Rome to their patrons. They were held to obſerve all the laws of the republic, and to conform entirely to all its cuſtoms.

* *Thais patri ſe commendavit in clientelam et fidem: Nobis dedit ſeſe.* Eunuch. Act. v. Scen. ult.

They

They paid a yearly tribute to the ſtate of twelve * drachmas, and in default of payment were made ſlaves, and expoſed to ſale. [b] Xenocrates, the celebrated, but poor philoſopher, was very near experiencing this misfortune, and was carried to priſon; but Lycurgus, the orator, having paid the tax, releaſed him from the farmers of the public revenues; a kind of men who, in all times, have been very little ſenſible to merit, with the exception of an exceeding few of their number. That philoſopher, meeting ſome time after the ſons of his deliverer, told them, "I pay your father the favour he has done me with uſury, for all the world praiſes him upon my account."

3. *Of the Servants.*

There were two kinds of them. The one, who were free, and not able to get their bread by their work, were obliged by the bad ſtate of their affairs to go into ſervice, and their condition was eaſy, and not laborious. The ſervice of the other was forced and unavoidable; theſe were ſlaves, who had either been taken priſoners in war, or bought of ſuch as trafficked publicly in them. Part of their maſter's eſtate conſiſted in them, who diſpoſed abſolutely of them, but generally treated them with great humanity. [c] Demoſthenes obſerves, in one of his harangues, that the condition of ſervants was infinitely more gentle at Athens than any where elſe. There was in that city an aſylum and place of refuge for ſlaves, where the bones of Theſeus had been interred, and that aſylum ſubſiſted in Plutarch's time. How glorious was it for Theſeus, that his tomb ſhould do that twelve hundred years after his death, which he had done himſelf during his life, and continue the protector of the oppreſſed, as he had been.

[d] When the ſlaves were treated with too much rigour and inhumanity, they had their action againſt their maſters, who were obliged to ſell them to others, if the fact was ſufficiently proved. [e] They could ranſom

[b] Plut. in Flamin. p. 375. [c] Philip. 3. [d] Plut. de ſuperſtit. p. 166. [e] Plaut. in Caſin. * Six livres.

themſelves

themſelves even againſt their maſters' conſent, when they had laid up money enough for that purpoſe. For out of what they got by their labour, after having paid a certain proportion to their maſters, they kept the remainder for themſelves, and made a ſtock of it at their own diſpoſal. Private perſons, when they were ſatisfied with their ſervices, often gave theſe ſlaves their liberty; and the ſame grace was always granted them by the public, when the neceſſity of the times obliged the ſtate to arm and liſt them for the war among the citizens.

The humane and equitable uſage, with which the Athenians treated their ſervants and ſlaves, was an effect of the good temper natural to that people, and very remote from the auſtere and cruel ſeverity of the Lacedæmonians in regard to their Helots, which often brought their republic to the very brink of deſtruction. [f] Plutarch, with great reaſon, condemns this rigour. He thinks it proper to habituate one's ſelf always to mercy, even with regard to beaſts, were it only, ſays he, to learn by-that means to treat men well, and for the ſake of habituating humanity and benevolence. He relates upon this occaſion a very ſingular fact, and very proper to explain the character of the Athenians. After having finiſhed the temple called *Hecatonpedon*, they ſet all the beaſts of burden at liberty, that had been employed in the work, and aſſigned them fat paſturages as conſecrated animals. And it was ſaid, that one of theſe beaſts having come to offer itſelf at the work, and put itſelf at the head of thoſe that drew the carriages to the citadel, walking foremoſt as if to exhort and encourage them, the Athenians ordained by a decree, that the creature would be maintained at the public expence till its death.

SECT. III. *Of the Council or Senate of Five Hundred.*

IN conſequence of Solon's inſtitutions, the people of Athens had a great ſhare and authority in the government. Appeals might be brought to their tribunal in all cauſes; they had a right to cancel the old laws, and,

[f] Plut. in Catone, p. 338, 339.

eſtabliſh new ones; in a word, all important affairs, whether relating to war or peace, were decided in their aſſemblies. In order to their determinations being made with more wiſdom and maturity, Solon had inſtituted a council, compoſed of four hundred ſenators, a hundred out of each tribe, which were then four in number; they prepared and digeſted the affairs which were to be laid before the people, as we ſhall ſoon explain more at large. Cliſthenes, about a hundred years after Solon, having increaſed the number of tribes to ten, augmented alſo that of the ſenators to five hundred; each tribe ſupplying fifty. This was called the council, or ſenate, of the Five Hundred. They received their ſtipend out of the public treaſury.

They were choſen by lot, in which they made uſe of black and white beans, which were mingled and ſhaken in an urn, and each tribe gave in the names of thoſe who aſpired to that truſt, and had the revenue aſſigned by the laws to qualify them for it. None could be admitted under the age of thirty. After enquiry made into the manners and conduct of the candidate, he was made to take an oath, whereby he engaged to give at all times the beſt counſel he could to the people of Athens, and never to depart in the leaſt from the tenor of the laws.

This ſenate aſſembled every day, except upon the days appointed for feſtivals. Each tribe in its turn furniſhed thoſe who were to preſide in it, called * *Prytanes*, and this rank was decided by lot. This preſidency continued thirty-five days, which being reckoned ten times, amounts to the number of days, except four, of the lunar year followed at Athens. This time of the preſidency, or prytaniſm, was divided into five weeks with regard to the five tens of the *Prytanes*, who were to preſide in them, and every week ſeven of theſe ten Prytanes, drawn by lot, preſided, each their day, and were denominated Προεδροι, that is to ſay, *Preſidents*. He, † who was ſo for the day, preſided in the aſſembly of the ſenators and in that of the people. He was

* Πρυτανις. † He was called Επιστατης.

charged

charged with the public ſeal, as alſo with the keys of the citadel and treaſury.

The ſenators, before they aſſembled, offered a ſacrifice to Jupiter and Minerva, under the additional appellation of *goddeſs of good counſel**, to demand the prudence and underſtanding neceſſary in wiſe deliberations. The preſident propoſed the buſineſs, which was to be conſidered in the aſſembly. Every one gave his opinion in his turn, and always ſtanding. After a queſtion had been ſettled, it was drawn up in writing, and read with a loud voice. Each ſenator then gave his vote by ſcrutiny, in putting a bean into the urn. If the number of the white beans carried it, the queſtion paſſed, otherwiſe it was rejected. This ſort of decree was called Ψηφισμα, or Προβουλευμα, as much as to ſay preparatory reſolution. It was afterwards laid before the aſſembly of the people, where, if it was received and approved, it had the force of a law; if not, its authority ſubſiſted only one year. This ſhows with what wiſdom Solon eſtabliſhed this council, to inform and direct the people, to fix their inconſtancy, to prevent their temerity, and to aſſiſt their deliberations with a prudence and maturity not to be expected in a confuſed and tumultuous aſſembly, compoſed of a great number of citizens, moſt of them without education, capacity, or much zeal for the public good. The reciprocal dependency and natural intercourſe of the two bodies of the ſtate, which were obliged to lend each other their authority, and remained equally without force when without union and a good underſtanding, were beſides a method judiciouſly contrived for ſupporting a wiſe balance between the two bodies; the people not being able to inſtitute any thing without its being firſt propoſed and approved by the ſenate, nor the ſenate to paſs any decree into a law till it had been ratified by the people.

We may judge of the importance of this council by the matters which were treated in it; the ſame, without any exception, as were laid before the people; wars, taxes, maritime affairs, treaties of peace, alliances,

* Βελαιος, βελαια.

in

in a word, whatever related to government; without mentioning the account which they obliged the magistrates to give on quitting their offices, and their frequent decisions and judgments upon the most serious and important affairs.

SECT. IV. *Of the Areopagus.*

THIS council took its name from the place where it assembled, called * *the quarter*, or *hill of Mars*, because, according to some, Mars had been cited thither in judgment for a murder committed by him. It was believed to be as ancient as the nation. Cicero and Plutarch attribute the institution of it to Solon; but he only re-established it, by giving it more lustre and authority than it had had till then, and for that reason was looked upon as its founder. The number of the senators of the Areopagus was not fixed; at certain times they amounted to two or three hundred. Solon thought proper, that only those who had borne the office of archon should be honoured with that dignity.

This senate had the care of seeing the laws duly observed, of inspecting the manners of the people, and especially of judging in criminal cases. They held their sittings in an open place, and during the night. The former very probably to avoid being under the same roof with the criminals, and not to defile themselves by such a commerce with them; the latter, that they might not be softened by the sight of the guilty, and might judge according to justice and the laws. It was for the same reason the orators were not permitted to use their exordium or peroration, nor allowed to excite the passions, and were obliged to confine themselves solely to the subject matter of their cause. The severity of their judgments was exceedingly dreaded, particularly in regard to murder, and they were highly attentive to inspire their citizens with horror for that crime. They † con-

* Ἄρειος πάγος.

† *Nec mihi videntur Areopagitæ, cum damnaverunt puerum oculos coturnicum eruentem, aliud judicasse, quàm id signum esse perniciosissimæ mentis, multisque malo futuræ si adolevisset.* QUINTIL. l. v. c. 9.

demned

demned a child to be put to death for making it his paſtime to put out the eyes of quails; conceiving this ſanguinary inclination, as the mark of a very wicked diſpoſition, which might one day prove fatal to many, if he were ſuffered to grow up with impunity.

The affairs of religion, as blaſphemies againſt the gods, contempt of ſacred myſteries, different ſpecies of impiety, and the introduction of new ceremonies and new divinities, were alſo brought before this tribunal. [x] We read in Juſtin Martyr, that Plato, who in his travels in Egypt had acquired great lights concerning the unity of God, when he returned to Athens, took great care to diſſemble and conceal his ſentiments, for fear of being obliged to appear and give an account of them before the Areopagitæ; and we know that St. Paul was traduced before them, as teaching a new doctrine [y], and endeavouring to introduce new gods.

Theſe judges were in great reputation for their probity, equity, and prudence, and generally reſpected. Cicero, in writing to his friend Atticus, upon the fortitude, conſtancy, and wiſe ſeverity of the Roman ſenate, thinks he makes a great encomium upon it, in comparing it with the Areopagus. [z] *Senatus*, Ἀρεοπαγῖτα, *nil conſtantius, nil ſeverius, nil fortius.* Cicero muſt have conceived a very advantageous idea of it, to ſpeak of it as he does in the firſt book of his Offices. * He compares the famous battle of Salamin, in which Themiſtocles had ſo great a part, with the eſtabliſhment of the Areopagus, which he aſcribes to Solon; and makes no ſcruple to prefer, or at leaſt to equal the legiſlator's ſervice to that for which Athens was obliged to the

[x] Cohort. ad Græc. [y] Acts xvii. 18—20.

[z] Ad Attic. l. i. Ep. 13.

* *Quamvis Themiſtocles jure laudetur, et ſit ejus nomen, quàm Solonis, illuſtrius, citeturque Salamis clariſſimæ teſtis victoriæ, quæ anteponatur conſilio Solonis ei, quo primùm conſtituit Areopagitis; non minus præclarum hoc, quàm illud, judicandum eſt. Illud enim ſemel profuit, hoc ſemper proderit civitati: hoc conſilio leges Athenienſium, hoc majorum inſtituta ſervantur. Et Themiſtocles quidem nihil dixerit, in quo ipſe Areopagum juverit: at ille adjuvit Themiſtoclem. Eſt enim bellum geſtum conſilio Senatus ejus, qui a Solone erat conſtitutus.* Offic. l. i. n. 75.

general

general of its army. "For in reality," says he, "that victory was useful to the republic only for once, but the Areopagus will be so throughout all ages; as by the wisdom of that tribunal, the laws and ancient customs of the Athenian state are preserved. Themistocles did no service to the Areopagus, but the Areopagus abundantly contributed to the victory of Themistocles; because the republic was at that time directed by the wise counsels of that august senate."

It appears from this passage of Cicero, that the Areopagus had a great share in the government, and I do not doubt but it is consulted upon important affairs. Cicero here perhaps may have confounded the council of the Areopagus with that of the Five Hundred. It is certain, however, that the Areopagitæ were extremely active in the public affairs.

Pericles, who could never enter the Areopagus, because chance having always been against him, he had not passed through any of the employments necessary to his admission, attempted to weaken its authority, and attained his point: which is a great blot in his reputation.

SECT. V. *Of the Magistrates.*

OF these a great number were established for different functions. I shall speak only of the Archons, who are the most known. I have observed elsewhere that they succeeded the kings, and that their authority at first continued during life. It was at length limited to ten years, and reduced at last only to one. When Solon was commissioned to reform the government, he found them upon this foot, and to the number of nine. He did not abolish their office, but he very much diminished their power.

The first of these nine magistrates was called THE ARCHON, by way of eminence, and the year denominated from him: * *Under such an Archon such a battle*

* From whence he was also called Επωνυμος.

was

was fought. The second was called THE KING, which was the remains and footsteps of the authority to which they had succeeded. The third was THE POLEMARCH, who at first commanded the armies, and always retained the name, though he had not the same authority, of which he had so long preserved some part. For we have seen, in speaking of the battle of Marathon, that the polemarch had a right to vote in the council of war, as well as the ten generals then in command. The six other archons were called by the common name, THESMOTHETÆ, which implies that they had a particular superintendence over the laws, in order to their being duly observed. These nine archons had each of them a peculiar province, and were judges in certain affairs allotted to their cognizance. I do not think it necessary to enter into the particulars of their duty, nor into those of many other employments and offices, established for the administration of justice, for the levying of taxes and tributes, for the preservation of good order in the city, for supplying it with provisions, in a word, for every thing relating to commerce and civil society.

SECT. VI. *Of the Assemblies of the People.*

THESE were of two sorts, the one ordinary and fixed to certain days, and for these there was no kind of summons; the other extraordinary, according to the different occasions that arose, and the people were informed of it by express proclamation.

The place for the assembly was not fixed. Sometimes it was the public market-place, sometimes a part of the city near the citadel, called Πνξ, and sometimes the theatre of Bacchus.

The Prytanes generally assembled the people. Some days before the assembly papers were fixed up, wherein the business to be considered was set down.

All the citizens, poor as well as rich, had a right to give their suffrages. They were liable to a penalty, who failed of being present at the assembly, or who came

too late; and to induce their punctual attendance, a reward was annexed to it, at first of an obolus, which was the sixth part of a drachma, then of three oboli, which made about five pence French.

The assembly always began with sacrifices and prayers, in order for the obtaining from the gods the knowledge and understanding necessary to wise deliberations, and they never failed to add the most terrible imprecations against such as should wilfully advise any thing contrary to the public good.

The president proposed the affair upon which they were to deliberate. If it had been examined in the senate, and drawn up there as a question, it was read; after which those who would speak were invited to ascend the tribunal, that they might be the better heard by the people, and inform them in the matter proposed. The oldest general spoke first, and then the rest according to their seniority: when the orators had done speaking, and concluded that it was necessary to approve or reject the decree of the senate, the people proceeded to vote, and the most common method of doing it was by holding up their hands, to denote their approbation; which was called χειροτονειν. The assembly was sometime adjourned till another day, because it was too late for the number of those who lifted up their hands to be distinguished, and the plurality decided. After a resolution had been formed in this manner it was reduced to writing, and read by an officer to the people with a loud voice, who confirmed it again by holding up their hands as before; after which the decree had the force of a law. And this was called ψηφισμα, from the Greek word ψηφος, which signifies *a pebble* or *small stone*, because they were sometimes used in giving suffrages by scrutiny.

All the great affairs of the republic were discussed in these assemblies. It was in them new laws were proposed and old ones amended; the religion and worship of the gods examined; magistrates, generals, and officers created; their behaviour and conduct enquired into; peace or war concluded; deputies and ambassadors appointed;

treaties

treaties and alliances ratified; freedom of the city granted; rewards and honours decreed for those who had distinguished themselves in war, or rendered great services to the republic; and punishments ordained for those who had behaved themselves ill, or had violated the laws of the state, and were banished by ostracism. In fine, justice was administered, and judgment passed there, upon the most important affairs. We see, from this account, which is, however, very imperfect, how far the people's power extended; and with what truth it may be said, that the government of Athens, though qualified with aristocracy, and the authority of the elders, was, by its constitution, democratical and popular.

I shall take occasion to observe in the sequel, of what weight the talent of eloquence is in such a republic; and in what manner orators ought to be considered in it. It is not easy to conceive, how they could make themselves heard in so numerous an assembly, and where such a multitude of auditors were present. We may judge how great that was, from what has been said of it in two instances. The first relates to ostracism, and the other to the adoption of a stranger for a citizen. On each of these occasions, it was necessary that no less than six thousand citizens should be present in the assembly.

I reserve for another place the reflections, which naturally arise from what I have already related, and what it remains for me to say further upon the government of Athens.

Sect. VII. *Of Trials.*

THERE were different tribunals, according to the difference of the affairs to be adjudged, but appeals might be brought to the people from all decrees of other judges, and this it was that rendered their power so great and considerable. [a] All the allies, when they had any cause to try, were obliged to repair to Athens; where they often remained a considerable time, without being able to obtain audience, from the multiplicity of affairs to be adjudged. This law had

[a] Xenoph. de Rep. Athen. p. 664.

been

been impoſed upon them, in order to render them more dependent upon the people, and more ſubmiſſive to their authority; inſtead of which, had they ſent commiſſioners to the places, they would have been the ſole perſons, to whom the allies would have made their court and paid their homage.

The parties pleaded their cauſes either in perſon, or employed advocates to do it for them. The time allowed for the hearing was generally fixed, and a water clock, called in Greek κλεψυδρα, regulated its duration. The decree was paſſed by plurality of voices; and when the ſuffrages were equal, the judges inclined to the ſide of mercy, and acquitted the accuſed. It is remarkable that a friend was not obliged to give evidence againſt a friend.

All the citizens, even the pooreſt, and ſuch as had no eſtates, were admitted into the number of the judges, provided they had attained the age of thirty, and were known to be perſons of good morals. Whilſt they ſat in judgment, they held in their hands a kind of ſceptre, which was the mark of their dignity, and laid it down when they withdrew.

The judges' ſalary was different at different times. They had at firſt only an obolus a day, and afterwards three, where their fee remained fixed. It was but a ſmall matter in itſelf, but became in time a very great charge to the public, and exhauſted the treaſury without much enriching particulars. We may judge of this from what is related in Ariſtophanes's comedy of *The Waſps*, wherein that poet ridicules the paſſion of the Athenians for trying cauſes, and their eager deſire for the gain ariſing from it, which protracted and multiplied ſuits to infinity.

In this comedy, a young Athenian, who was to act the part I have mentioned, of turning the judges and trials of Athens into ridicule, from a ſtate of the revenues paid into the public treaſury, finds their amount to be two thouſand talents *. He then examines how much of that ſum falls to the ſhare of the judges, with

* About 280,000l. ſterling.

whom

whom Athens was overrun, at three oboli a head per day. This appears to be annually, including all of them, only a hundred and fifty talents *. The calculation is eafy. The judges were paid only ten months in the year, the other two being employed in feftivals, when all proceedings at law were prohibited. Now three oboli a day paid to fix thoufand men, make fifteen talents a month, and in conſequence one hundred and fifty in ten months. According to this calculation, the moſt aſſiduous judge gained only ſeventy-five livres (about three guineas) a year. "What then becomes of the remainder of the two thouſand talents?" cries the young Athenian. "What," replies his father, who was one of the judges, "it goes to thoſe——but let us not expoſe the ſhame of Athens; let us always be for the people." The young Athenian goes on to explain that the remainder went to ſuch as robbed the public treaſury; to the orators, who inceſſantly flattered the people; and to thoſe who were employed in the government and army. I have extracted this remark from the works of Father Brumoi the Jeſuit, with which I ſhall make very free when I come to ſpeak of public ſhows and dramatic repreſentations.

SECT. VIII. *Of the Amphictyons.*

THE famous council of the Amphictyons is introduced here, though not particular to the Athenians, but common to all Greece, becauſe it is often mentioned in the Grecian hiſtory, and I do not know whether I ſhall have a more natural occaſion to ſpeak of it.

The aſſembly of the Amphictyons was, in a manner, the holding of a general aſſembly of the ſtates of Greece. The eſtabliſhment of it is attributed to Amphictyon, king of Athens and ſon of Deucalion, who gave them his name. His principal view in the inſtitution of this council, was to unite, in the ſacred band of amity, the ſeveral people of Greece admitted into it, and to oblige

* About 7,ool ſterling.

them,

them, by that union, to undertake the defence of each other, and be mutually vigilant for the happineſs and tranquillity of their country. The Amphictyons were alſo created to be the protectors of the oracle of Delphos, and the guardians of the prodigious riches of that temple; and alſo to adjudge the differences which might ariſe between the Delphians, and thoſe who came to conſult the oracle. This council was held at Thermopolæ, and ſometimes at Delphos itſelf. It aſſembled regularly twice a year, in the ſpring and autumn, and more frequently when affairs required.

The number of people of cities which had a right to ſit in this aſſembly is not preciſely known, and varied, without doubt, at different times. When the Lacedæmonians, in order to paſs in it what decrees they thought fit, were for excluding the Theſſalians, Argives, and Thebans, [b] Themiſtocles, in the ſpeech he made to the Amphictyons to prevent that deſign from taking effect, ſeems to inſinuate, that there were only one-and-thirty cities at that time which had this right.

Each city ſent two deputies, and, in conſequence, had two votes in the council, and that without diſtinction, or the more powerful having any prerogative of honour or pre-eminence over the inferior ſtates in regard to the ſuffrages; the liberty upon which theſe people valued themſelves, requiring that every thing ſhould be equal amongſt them.

The Amphictyons had full power to diſcuſs and determine finally in all differences which might ariſe between the Amphictyonic cities, and to fine the culpable in ſuch manner as they thought fit. They could employ not only the rigour of the laws in the execution of their decrees, but even raiſe troops, if it were neceſſary, to compel ſuch as rebelled to ſubmit to them. The three ſacred wars undertaken by their order, of which I have ſpoken elſewhere, are an evident proof of this power.

Before they were inſtalled into this body, they took a very remarkable oath, of which *Æſchines has preſerv-

[b] Plut. in Themiſt. p. 122.
* Æſchin. in Orat. περι παραπρεσβειας.

ed

ed the form; it runs to this effect: "I swear that I will never destroy any of the cities honoured with the right of sitting in the Amphictyonic council, nor turn their running waters out of their course either in times of war or peace: if any people shall make such an attempt, I hereby engage to carry the war into their country, to demolish their cities, towns, and villages, and to treat them in all things as the most cruel enemies. Moreover, if, at any time, any person shall dare to be so impious to steal and take away any of the rich offerings, preserved in the temple of Apollo at Delphos, or abet any others in committing that crime, either by aiding or only counselling him therein, I will use my feet, hands, voice, in a word, all my powers and faculties, to avenge such sacrilege." That oath was attended with the most terrible imprecations and execrations. "That if any one infringes any thing contained in the oath I have now taken, whether private person, city, or people, may that person, city, or people, be deemed accursed; and in that acceptation, experience the whole vengeance of Apollo, Latona, Diana, and Minerva the foreknower. May their country produce none of the fruits of the earth, and their women, instead of generating children resembling their fathers, bring forth nothing but monsters: may their animals share in the same curse. May those sacrilegious men lose all suits at law; may they be conquered in war, have their houses demolished, and be themselves and their children put to the sword." I am not astonished, that after such terrible engagements, the holy war, undertaken by the order of the Amphictyons, should be carried on with so much ardour and fury. The religion of an oath was of great force with the ancients; and how much more regard ought to be had to it in the Christian world, which professes to believe, that the violation of it shall be punished with eternal torments; and yet how many are there amongst us, who make a trifle of breaking through the most solemn oaths?

The

The authority of the Amphictyons had always been of great weight in Greece, but it began to decline exceedingly from the moment they condescended to admit Philip of Macedon into their body. For that prince, enjoying by this means all their right and privileges, soon knew how to set himself above all law, and to abuse his power so far, as to preside by proxy both in this illustrious assembly, and in the Pythian games; of which games the Amphictyons were judges and Agonothetæ, in virtue of their office. This Demosthenes reproaches him with in his third Philippick; "When he does not deign," says he, "to honour us with his presence, he sends HIS SLAVES to preside over us." An odious, but emphatical term, and in the spirit of the Grecian liberty, by which the Athenian orator images the base and abject subjection of the greatest lords in Philip's court.

If the reader desires a further knowledge of what relates to the Amphictyons, the dissertations of Monsieur Valois[c] may be consulted, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres, wherein this subject is treated with great extent and erudition.

SECT. IX. *Of the Revenues of Athens.*

THE revenus*, according to the passage of Aristophanes which I have cited above, and in consequence as they stood in the time of the Peloponnesian war, amounted to two thousand talents, that is to say, to six millions of livres. They were generally reduced to four species.

1. The first relates to the revenues arising from agriculture, the sale of woods, the produce of mines, and other funds of a like nature, appertaining to the public. Amongst these may be included the duties upon the import and export of merchandise, and the taxes levied upon the inhabitants of the city, as well natives as strangers.

The history of Athens often mentions the silver mines of Laurium, which was a mountain situate between the

[c] Vol. III. * Τέλη.

Piræeum

Piræeum and Cape Sunium; and thoſe of Thrace, from whence many perſons extracted immenſe riches. *Xenophon, in a treatiſe wherein he ſtates this matter at large, demonſtrates, how much the public might gain by induſtriouſly working theſe mines, from the example of the many perſons they had enriched. [d] Hipponicus let his mines, and ſix hundred ſlaves, to an undertaker, who paid him an †obolus a day for each ſlave, clear of all charges, which amounted in the whole to a mina, about two pounds five ſhillings. Nicias, who was killed in Sicily, farmed out his mines, and a thouſand ſlaves in the ſame manner, and with the ſame profit in proportion to that number.

2. The ſecond ſpecies of revenue were the contributions paid the Athenians by the allies for the common expences of the war. At firſt, under Ariſtides, they amounted to only four hundred and ſixty talents ‡. Pericles augmented them almoſt a third, and raiſed them to ſix hundred, and ſome time after they were run up to thirteen hundred. Taxes, which in the beginning were moderate and neceſſary, became thus in a little time exceſſive and exorbitant, notwithſtanding all the proteſtations made the allies, and the moſt ſolemn engagements to the contrary.

3. A third ſort of revenue was the extraordinary capitation taxes, levied upon the inhabitants of the country, as well natives as ſtrangers, in preſſing occaſions and emergencies of the ſtate.

4. The fines laid upon perſons by the judges for different miſdemeanors, were applied to the uſes of the public, and laid up in the treaſury; except the tenth part of them, which was conſecrated to Minerva, and a fiftieth to the other divinities.

The moſt natural and legal application of theſe different revenues of the republic, was in paying the troops both by ſea and land, building and fitting out

[d] Pag. 925.

* *De ration, redituum.*

† Six oboli made a drachma, one hundred drachmas a mina, and ſixty mina a talent.

‡ A talent was worth a thouſand crowns.

fleets,

fleets, keeping up and repairing the public buildings, temples, walls, ports, and citadels. But the greateſt part of them, eſpecially after Pericles's time, was miſapplied to unneceſſary uſes, and often conſumed in frivolous expences; games, feaſts and ſhows, which coſt immenſe ſums, and were of no manner of utility to the ſtate.

SECT. X. *Of the Education of the Youth.*

I PLACE this article under the head of government, becauſe all celebrated legiſlators have with reaſon believed, that the education of youth was an eſſential part of it.

The exerciſes that ſerved for the forming of either the bodies or minds of the young Athenians (and as much may be ſaid of almoſt all the people of Greece) were dancing, muſic, hunting, fencing, riding, polite learning, and philoſophy. It may be obſerved that I ſpeak generally, and treat very ſlightly theſe ſeveral articles.

1. *Dancing. Muſic.*

Dancing is one of the exerciſes of the body, cultivated by the Greeks with great attention. It made a part of what the ancients called *the Gymnaſtic*, divided according to *Plato, into two kinds, *the Orcheſtric*, which takes its name from the dance, and *the Palæſtric*†, ſo called from a Greek word which ſignifies *wreſtling*. The exerciſes of the latter kind principally conduced to form the body for the fatigues of war, navigation, agriculture, and the other uſes of ſociety.

Dancing had another end, and taught ſuch rules of motion as were moſt proper to render the ſhape free and eaſy; to give the body a juſt proportion, and the whole perſon an unconſtrained, noble, and graceful air; in a word, an external politeneſs, if we may be allowed to uſe that expreſſion, which never fails to prejudice people in favour of thoſe who have been formed to it early.

*Ορχεισθαι. Saltare. †Παλη.

Muſic

Muſic was cultivated with no leſs application and ſucceſs. The ancients aſcribed wonderful effects to it. They believed it very proper to calm the paſſions, ſoften the manners, and even humanize people naturally ſavage and barbarous. [e] Polybius, a grave and ſerious hiſtorian, who is certainly worthy of belief, attributes the extreme difference between the two people of Arcadia, the one infinitely beloved and eſteemed for the elegance of their manners, their benevolent inclinations, humanity to ſtrangers, and piety to the gods; the other, on the contrary, generally reproached and hated for their malignity, brutality, and irreligion: Polybius, I ſay, aſcribes this difference to the ſtudy of muſic, (I mean, ſays he, the true and noble muſic) induſtriouſly cultivated by the one, and abſolutely neglected by the other people.

After this it is not ſurpriſing, that the Greeks conſidered muſic as an eſſential part in the education of youth. * Socrates himſelf, in a very advanced age, was not aſhamed to learn to play upon muſical inſtruments. Themiſtocles, however otherwiſe eſteemed † was thought to be wanting in point of merit, becauſe at an entertainment he could not touch the lyre like the reſt of the company. ‡ An ignorance in this reſpect was deemed a defect of education; on the contrary, a capacity in it did honour to the greateſt men. § Epaminondas was praiſed for dancing, and playing well upon the flute. We may obſerve in this place the different taſtes and genius of nations. The Romans were far from having the ſame opinion with the Greeks in regard to muſic and dancing, and ſet no value upon them. It is very likely, the wiſeſt and moſt knowing amongſt the latter, did not apply to them with any

[e] Polyb. p. 288—291.

* *Socrates, jam ſenex inſtitui lyra non erubeſcebat.* QUINTIL. l. i. c. 10.

† *Themiſtocles, cum in epulis recuſaſſet lyram, habitus eſt indoctior.* CIC. Tuſc. Quæſt. l. i. n. 4.

‡ *Summam eruditionem Græci ſitam cenſebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus—diſcebantque id omnes; nec qui neſciebat, ſatis excultus doctrina putabatur.* Ibid.

§ *In Epaminondæ virtutibus commemoratum eſt ſaltaſſe eum commode, ſcienterque tibiis cantaſſe Scilicet non eadem omnibus honeſta ſunt atque turpia, ſed omnia majorum inſtitutis judicantur.* CORN. NEP. in præfat. vit Epam.

great induſtry; and Philip's expreſſion to his ſon Alexander, who had ſhown too much ſkill in muſic at a feaſt, induces me to be of this opinion: "Are you not aſhamed," ſaid he, "to ſing ſo well."

For the reſt this eſteem for dancing and muſic had its foundation. Both the one and the other were employed in the moſt auguſt feaſts and ceremonies of religion, to expreſs their acknowledgment to the gods with the greater force and dignity, for the favours they had vouchſafed to confer upon them. They had generally the greateſt ſhare in their feaſts and entertainments, which ſeldom or ever began or ended without ſome odes being ſung in honour of the victors in the Olympic games, and on other the like occaſions. They had a part alſo in war; and we know that the Lacedæmonians marched to battle dancing, and to the ſound of flutes. [f] Plato, the moſt grave philoſopher of antiquity, conſidered both theſe arts, not as ſimple amuſements, but as they had a great ſhare in the ceremonies of religion, and military exerciſes. Hence we ſee him very intent, in his books of laws, to preſcribe rules upon dancing and muſic, and to keep them within the bounds of utility and decorum.

They did not continue long within theſe reſtrictions. The licence of the Grecian ſtage, on which dancing was in the higheſt vogue, and in a manner proſtituted to buffoons and the moſt contemptible people, who made no other uſe of it, than to ſuggeſt or ſupport the moſt vicious paſſions; this licence, I ſay, ſoon corrupted an art, which might have been of ſome advantage, had it been regulated by Plato's opinion. Muſic had a like deſtiny; and perhaps the corruption of this did not a little contribute to the depraving and perverting of dancing. Voluptuouſneſs and ſenſual pleaſure were the ſole arbiters conſulted in the uſes made of both, and the theatre became a ſchool of every kind of vice.

[g] Plutarch, in lamenting that the art of dancing was ſo much fallen from the merit which rendered it eſtimable to the great men of antiquity, does not omit to

[f] De leg. l. vii. [g] Sympoſ. l. ix. qu. 15. p. 748.

obſerve,

obſerve, that it was corrupted by a vicious kind of poetry, and a ſoft effeminate muſic, with which it was ill united, and which had taken place of the ancient poetry and muſic, that had ſomething noble, majeſtic, and even religious and heavenly in them. He adds, that being made ſubſervient to low taſte and ſenſuality, by their aid, it exerciſed a kind of tyrannical power in the theatres, which were become the public ſchools of criminal paſſions and groſs vices, wherein no regard was had to reaſon.

The reader, without my obſerving upon it to him, will make the application of this paſſage of Plutarch to the ſort of muſic which engroſſes our theatres at this day, and which, by its effeminate and wanton airs, has given the laſt wound to the little manly force and virtue that remained among us. Quintilian deſcribes the muſic of his times in theſe terms: [h] *Quæ nunc in ſcenis effeminata, et impudicis modis fracta, non ex parte minima, ſi quid in nobis virilis roboris manebat, excidit.*

2. *Of the other Exerciſes of the Body.*

The young Athenians, and in general all the Greeks, were very intent upon forming themſelves to all the exerciſes of the body, and to go through their leſſons regularly with the maſters of the Palæſtræ. They called the places allotted for theſe exerciſes Palæſtra, or Gymnaſia; which anſwers very near to our academies. Plato, in his books of laws, after having ſhown of what importance it was in war to cultivate the hands and feet, adds [i] that far from baniſhing from a well regulated republic the profeſſion of the Athletæ, on the contrary, prizes ought to be propoſed for all exerciſes, that conduce to the improvement of military virtue; ſuch are thoſe which render the body more active, and fitter for the race; more hard, robuſt, and ſupple, more capable of ſupporting great fatigues, and effecting great enterpriſes. We muſt remember, that there was no Athenian, who ought not to have been capable of handling the oar in the largeſt galleys. The citi-

[h] Quintil. l. i. c. 1. [i] Lib. viii. de leg. p. 832, 833.

zens themſelves did this office, which was not left to ſlaves and criminals as in theſe days. They were all deſtined to the trade of war, and often obliged to wear arms of iron from head to foot of a great weight. For this reaſon Plato, and all the ancients, looked upon the exerciſes of the body as highly uſeful, and even abſolutely neceſſary to the good of the public, and therefore this philoſopher excludes only thoſe from them, which are incapable of ſervice in war.

[k] There were alſo maſters, who taught the youth to ride, and to handle their arms or fence; and others whoſe buſineſs it was to inſtruct them in all that was neceſſary to be known, in order to excel in the military art, and become good commanders. The whole ſcience of the latter conſiſted in what the ancients called the Tactic, that is to ſay, the art of drawing up troops in battle, and of making military evolutions. That ſcience was uſeful, but did not ſuffice. [l] Xenophon ſhows its defect, in producing a young man lately come from ſuch a ſchool, in which he imagined he had learnt every thing, though in reality he had only acquired a fooliſh eſteem for himſelf, attended with perfect ignorance. He gives him, by the mouth of Socrates, admirable precepts upon the buſineſs of a ſoldier, and very proper to form an excellent officer.

Hunting was alſo conſidered by the ancients as a fit exerciſe for forming youth to the ſtratagems and fatigues of war. It is for this reaſon Xenophon, who was no leſs a great general than a great philoſopher, [m] did not think it below him to write a treatiſe expreſſly upon hunting, in which he deſcends to the loweſt particular; and obſerves upon the conſiderable advantages conſequential of it, from being inured to ſuffer hunger, thirſt, heat, cold, without being diſcouraged either by the length of the courſe, the difficulty of the clifts and thickets, through which it is often neceſſary to preſs, or the ſmall ſucceſs of the long and painful fatigues, which they often undergo to no purpoſe. He

[k] Plut. in Lachete, p. 181. [l] Memorab. l. iii. p. 761, &c.
[m] De venatione.

adds,

adds, that this innocent pleasure removes others equally shameful and criminal; and that a wise and moderate man would not however abandon himself so much to it as to neglect the care of his domestic affairs. [n] The same author, in the Cyropædia, frequently praises hunting, which he looks upon as a real exercise of war, and shows, in the example of his young hero, the good use that may be made of it.

3. *Of the Exercise of the Mind.*

Athens, to speak properly, was the school and abode of polite learning, arts, and sciences. The study of poesy, eloquence, philosophy, and mathematics, was in great vogue there, and much cultivated by the youth.

The young people were sent first to learn grammar under masters, who taught them regularly, and upon proper principles, their own language; by which they attained a knowledge of its whole beauty, energy, number, and cadence. [o] Hence proceeded the universal fine taste of Athens, where, as history informs us, a simple herb-woman distinguished Theophrastus to be a stranger, from the affectation of a single word in expressing himself. And from the same cause the orators were greatly apprehensive of letting fall the least injudicious expression, for fear of offending so refined and delicate an audience. It was very common for the young people to get the tragedies represented upon the stage by heart. We have seen, that after the defeat of the Athenians, before Syracuse, many of them, who had been taken prisoners and made slaves, softened their slavery by reciting the works of Euripides to their masters, who, extremely delighted with hearing such sublime verses, treated them from thenceforth with kindness and humanity. The compositions of the other poets had no doubt the same effect, and Plutarch tells us, that Alcibiades, when very young, having entered a school in which there was not a Homer,

[n] Cyrop. l. i. p. 5, 6, & l. ii. p. 59, 60.
[o] Cic. in Brut. n. 172. Quintil. l. viii. c. 1. Plut. in Peric. p. 156.

gave

gave the master a box on the ear as an ignorant fellow, [p] and one who dishonoured his profession.

As for eloquence, it is no wonder that it was particularly studied at Athens. It was that opened the way to the highest offices, reigned absolute in the assemblies, decided the most important affairs of the state, and gave an almost unlimited power to those who had the talent of speaking in an eminent degree.

This therefore was the great employment of the young citizens of Athens, especially of those who aspired to the highest employments. To the study of rhetoric they annexed that of philosophy: I comprise under the latter, all the sciences which are either parts of, or relate to it. The persons, known to antiquity under the name of sophist, had acquired a great reputation at Athens, especially in the time of Socrates. These teachers, who were as presumptuous as avaricious, set themselves up for universal scholars. Their whole art lay in philosophy and eloquence, both of which they corrupted by the false taste and wrong principles they instilled into their disciples. I have observed in the life of Socrates, that philosopher's endeavours and success in discrediting them.

CHAP. II.

OF WAR.

SECT. I. *People of Greece in all Times very warlike, especially the Lacedæmonians and Athenians.*

NO people of antiquity (I except the Romans) could dispute the glory of arms and military virtue with the Greeks. During the Trojan war Greece signalized her valour in battle, and acquired immortal fame by the bravery of the captains she sent thither. This expedition was however, properly speaking, no more than the cradle of her infant glory; and the great exploits,

[p] In Altib. p. 194.

by

by which ſhe diſtinguiſhed herſelf there, were only her firſt eſſays, and apprenticeſhip in the art of war.

There were in Greece at that time ſeveral ſmall republics, neighbours to one another by their ſituation, but extremely remote in their cuſtoms, laws, characters, and particularly in their intereſts. This difference of manners and intereſts was a continual ſource and occaſion of diviſions amongſt them. Every city, little ſatisfied with its own dominion, was ſtudious to aggrandize itſelf at the expence of its next neighbours, according as they lay moſt commodious for it. Hence all theſe little ſtates, either out of ambition, and to extend their conqueſts, or the neceſſity of a juſt defence, were always under arms, and by that continual exerciſe of war, formed in the univerſal people a martial ſpirit, and an intrepidity of courage which made them invincible in the field; as appeared in the ſequel, when the whole united forces of the Eaſt came to invade Greece, and made her ſenſible what ſhe was, and of what capable.

Two cities diſtinguiſhed themſelves above the reſt, and held indiſputably the firſt rank; theſe were Sparta and Athens: in conſequence of which thoſe cities, either ſucceſſively or together, had the empire of Greece, and maintained themſelves through a long ſeries of time in a power, which the ſole ſuperiority of merit, univerſally acknowledged by all the other ſtates, had acquired them. This merit conſiſted principally in their military knowledge and martial virtue; of which they had given the moſt glorious proofs in the war againſt the Perſians. Thebes diſputed this honour with them for ſome years, by ſurpriſing actions of valour, which had ſomething of prodigy in them; but this was but a ſhort-lived blaze, which, after having ſhone out with exceeding ſplendor, ſoon diſappeared, and left that city in its original obſcurity. Sparta and Athens will therefore be the only objects of our reflections as to what relates to war, and we ſhall join them together, in order to be the better able to diſtinguiſh their characters, as well in what they reſemble, as in what they differ from, each other.

SECT.

SECT. II. *Origin and Cauſe of the Valour and military Virtue by which the Lacedæmonians and Athenians always diſtinguiſhed themſelves.*

ALL the laws of Sparta, and inſtitutions of Lycurgus, ſeem to have no other object than war, and tended ſolely to the making the ſubjects of that republic a body of ſoldiers. All other employments, all other exerciſes were prohibited amongſt them. Arts, polite learning, ſciences, trades, even huſbandry itſelf, had no ſhare in their applications, and ſeemed in their eyes unworthy of them. From their earlieſt infancy no other taſte was inſtilled into them but for arms; and indeed the Spartan education was wonderfully well adapted to that end. To go barefoot, to lie hard, to ſhift with little meat and drink, to ſuffer heat and cold, to exerciſe continually hunting, wreſtling, running on foot and horſeback, to be inured to blows and wounds ſo as to vent neither complaint nor groan; theſe were the rudiments of the Spartan youth with regard to war, and enabled them one day to ſupport all its fatigues, and to confront all its dangers.

The habit of obeying, contracted from the moſt early years, reſpect for the magiſtrates and elders, a perfect ſubmiſſion to the laws, from which no age nor condition was exempt, prepared them amazingly for military diſcipline, which is in a manner the ſoul of war, and the principle of ſucceſs in all great enterpriſes.

Now one of theſe laws was to conquer or die, and never to ſurrender to the enemy. Leonidas, with his three hundred Spartans, was an illuſtrious example of this, and his intrepid valour, extolled in all ages with the higheſt applauſes, and propoſed as a model to all poſterity, had given the ſame ſpirit to the nation, and traced them out the plan they were to follow. The diſgrace and infamy annexed to the violation of this law, and to ſuch as quitted their arms in battle, confirmed the obſervance of it, and rendered it in a manner inviolable.

violable. The mothers recommended to their ſons, when they ſet out for the field, to return either with or upon their bucklers. They did not weep for thoſe who died with their arms in their hands, but for thoſe who preſerved themſelves by flight. Can we be ſurpriſed, after this, that a ſmall body of ſuch ſoldiers, with ſuch principles, ſhould put an innumerable army of Barbarians to a ſtand?

The Athenians were not bred up ſo roughly as the people of Sparta, but had no leſs valour. The taſte of the two people was quite different in regard to education and employment; but they attained the ſame end, though by different means. The Spartans knew only how to uſe their arms, and were no more than ſoldiers; but amongſt the Athenians (and we muſt ſay as much of the other people of Greece) arts, trades, huſbandry, commerce, and navigation, were held in honour, and thought no diſgrace to any one. Theſe occupations were no obſtacles to the valour and knowledge neceſſary in war; they diſqualified none for riſing to the greateſt commands and the firſt dignities of the republic. Plutarch obſerves, that Solon, ſeeing the territory of Attica was barren, applied himſelf to turning the induſtry of his citizens upon arts, trades and commerce, in order to ſupply his country thereby, with what it wanted on the ſide of fertility. This taſte became one of the maxims of the government and fundamental laws of the ſtate, and perpetuated itſelf among the people, but without leſſening in the leaſt their ardour for war.

The ancient glory of the nation, which had always diſtinguiſhed itſelf by military bravery, was a powerful motive for not degenerating from the reputation of their anceſtors. The famous battle of Marathon, wherein they had ſuſtained alone the ſhock of the Barbarians, and gained a ſignal victory over them, infinitely heightened their courage; and the battle of Salamin, in the ſucceſs of which they had the greateſt ſhare, raiſed them to the higheſt pitch of glory, and rendered them capable of the greateſt enterpriſes.

A noble emulation not to give place in point of merit to Sparta, the rival of Athens, and a lively jealouſy of their glory, which during the war with the Perſians contained itſelf within due bounds, were another ſtrong incentive to the Athenians, who every day made new efforts to excel themſelves, and ſuſtain their reputation.

The rewards and honours granted to thoſe who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves in battle; the monuments erected in memory of the citizens who had died in the defence of their country, the funeral orations publicly pronounced in the midſt of the moſt auguſt religious ceremonies, to render their names immortal; all conſpired infinitely to eternize the valour of both nations, and particularly of the Athenians, and to make fortitude a kind of law and indiſpenſable neceſſity to them.

[p] Athens had a law by which it was ordained, that thoſe who had been maimed in war, ſhould be maintained at the expence of the public. The ſame grace was granted to the fathers and mothers, as well as the children of ſuch as had fallen in battle and left their families poor and not in a condition to ſubſiſt themſelves. The republic, like a good mother, generouſly took them into her care, and with great regard to them ſupplied all the duties, and procured all the relief, they could have expected from thoſe whoſe loſs they deplored.

This exalted the courage of the Athenians, and rendered their troops invincible, though not very numerous. In the battle of Platæa, where the army of the Barbarians, commanded by Mardonius, conſiſted of no leſs than three hundred thouſand men, and the united forces of the Greeks of only one hundred and eight thouſand two hundred men, there were in the latter only ten thouſand Lacedæmonians, of which one half were Spartans, that is to ſay inhabitants of Sparta, and eight thouſand Athenians. It is true, each Spartan brought with him ſeven Helots, which made in all thirty-five thouſand men; but they were ſcarce ever reckoned as ſoldiers.

[p] Plut. in Solon. p. 96. Ibid. in Menex. p. 248, 249. Diog. Laert. in Solon. p. 37.

This

This ſhining merit in point of martial valour, generally acknowledged by the other ſtates and people, did not ſuppreſs in their minds all ſentiments of envy and jealouſy; as appeared once in relation to the Lacedæmonians. The allies, who were very much ſuperior to them in number, were in pain to ſee themſelves ſubjected to their orders, and murmured againſt it in ſecret. Ageſilaus, king of Sparta, without ſeeming to have any knowledge of their diſguſt, aſſembled the whole army, and after having made all the allies ſit down on one ſide, and the Lacedæmonians by themſelves on the other, he cauſed proclamation to be made by a herald, that all ſmiths, maſons, carpenters, and ſo on, through the other trades, ſhould riſe up. Almoſt all the allies did ſo, and not one of the Lacedæmonians, to whom all trades were prohibited. Ageſilaus then ſmiling, "You ſee," ſaid he, "how many more ſoldiers Sparta furniſhes than all the reſt of the allies together;" thereby intimating, that to be a good ſoldier, it was neceſſary to be only a ſoldier; that trades diverted the artizan from applying himſelf wholly to the profeſſion of arms and the ſcience of war, and prevented his ſucceeding ſo well in it, as thoſe who made it their ſole buſineſs and exerciſe. But Ageſilaus ſpoke and acted in that manner from the prejudice of his opinion in favour of the Lacedæmonian education; for indeed thoſe, whom he was for having conſidered only as ſimple artizans, had well demonſtrated in the glorious victories they had obtained over the Perſians, and even Sparta itſelf, that they were by no means inferior to the Lacedæmonians, entirely ſoldiers as they were, either in valour or military knowledge.

SECT. III. *Different Kind of Troops of which the Armies of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians were compoſed.*

THE armies both of Sparta and Athens were compoſed of four ſorts of troops: citizens, allies, mercenaries, and ſlaves. The ſoldiers were ſometimes marked in the hand, to diſtinguiſh them from the ſlaves, who

who had that character impreſſed upon their forehead. Interpreters believe, that in alluſion to this double manner of marking, it is ſaid in the Revelations, that all were obliged "[q] to receive the mark of the beaſt in their right hand, or in their foreheads;" and that St. Paul ſays of himſelf, "[r] I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jeſus."

The citizens of Lacedæmonia were of two ſorts, either thoſe who inhabited Sparta itſelf, and who for that reaſon were called Spartans, or thoſe who lived in the country. In Lycurgus's time the Spartans amounted to nine thouſand, and the others to thirty thouſand. This number ſeems to have been ſomewhat diminiſhed in the time of Xerxes, as Demaratus, ſpeaking to him of the Lacedæmonian troops, computes only eight thouſand Spartan. The latter were the flower of the nation, and we may judge of the value they ſet upon them, by the anxiety the republic expreſſed for three or four hundred, beſieged by the Athenians in the ſmall iſland of Sphacteria, where they were taken priſoners. The Lacedæmonians generally ſpared the troops of their country very much, and ſent only a few of them into the armies. When a Lacedæmonian general was aſked how many Spartans there were in the army; he anſwered, "as many as are neceſſary to repulſe the enemy." They ſerved the ſtate at their own expence, and it was not till after a length of time that they received pay from the public.

The greateſt number of the troops in the two republics were compoſed of the *Allies*, who were paid by the cities which ſent them.

The foreign troops in the pay of the republic, to the aid of which they were called in, were ſtyled *Mercenaries*.

The Spartans never marched without Helots, and we have ſeen that in the battle of Platæa every citizen had ſeven. I do not believe this number was fixed, nor do I well comprehend for what ſervice they were deſigned. It would have been very ill policy to have put arms

[q] Rev. xiii. 16. [r] Gal. vi. 17.

into

into the hands of ſo great a number of ſlaves, generally much diſcontented with their maſters harſh treatment of them, and who in conſequence had every thing to fear from them in battle. Herodotus, however, in the paſſage I have cited from him, repreſents them carrying arms in the field as light-armed ſoldiers.

The infantry conſiſted of two kinds of ſoldiers. The one were heavy-armed and carried great bucklers, lances, half-pikes, and ſcymitars. The other were light-armed, that is to ſay, with bows and ſlings. They were commonly placed in the front of the battle, or upon the wings as a firſt line to ſhoot their arrows, and fling their javelins and ſtones at the enemy; and when they had diſcharged, they retired through the intervals behind the battalions as a ſecond line, and continued their volleys.

[s] Thucydides, in deſcribing the battle of Mantinæa, divides the Lacedæmonian troops in this manner. There were ſeven regiments, of four companies each, without including the Squirites, to the number of ſix hundred; theſe were horſemen, of whom I ſhall ſoon ſpeak further. The company conſiſted, according to the Greek interpreter, of a hundred and twenty-eight men, and was ſubdivided into four platoons, each of thirty-two men. So that a regiment amounted to five hundred and twelve men, and the ſeven made together three thouſand five hundred fourſcore and four. Each platoon had four men in front, and eight in depth, for that was the uſual depth of the files, which the officers might change according to occaſion.

The Lacedæmonians did not actually begin to uſe cavalry till after the war with Meſſene, where they perceived their want of it. [t] They raiſed their horſe principally in a ſmall city not far from Lacedæmon, called *Sciros*, from whence theſe troops were denominated *Scirites*, or *Squirites*. They were always on the extremity of the left wing, and this was their poſt by right.

Cavalry was ſtill more rare amongſt the Athenians; the ſituation of Attica, broken with abundance of

[s] Thucyd. l. v. p. 390. [t] Ibid.

mountains,

mountains, was the cauſe of this. It did not amount, after the war with the Perſians, which was the time when the proſperity of Greece was at the higheſt, to more than three hundred horſe; but increaſed afterwards to twelve hundred; a ſmall body for ſo powerful a republic.

I have already obſerved, that amongſt the ancients, as well Greeks as Romans, no mention is made of the ſtirrup, which is very ſurpriſing. They threw themſelves nimbly on horſeback.

——*Corparo ſaltu*
Subjiciunt in equos.——— Æn. l. xi. ver. 287.
And with a leap ſit ſteady on the horſe.

Sometimes the horſe, broke early to that kind of manage, would ſtoop down before, to give his maſter the opportunity of mounting with more eaſe;

Inde inclinatus collum, ſubmiſſus et armos
De more, inflexis præbebat ſcandere terga
Cruribus. Sil. Ital. de equo Cœlii Equ. Rom.

Thoſe, whom age or weakneſs rendered heavy, made uſe of a ſervant in mounting on horſeback; in which they imitated the Perſians, with whom it was the common cuſtom. Gracchus cauſed fine ſtones to be placed on each ſide of the great roads of Italy at certain diſtances from one another, to help travellers to get on horſeback without the aſſiſtance of any body*.

I am ſurpriſed that the Athenians, expert as they were in the art of war, did not diſtinguiſh that the cavalry was the moſt eſſential part of an army, eſpecially in battles; and that ſome of their generals did not turn their attention that way, as Themiſtocles did in regard to maritime affairs. Xenophon was well capable of rendering them a like ſervice in reſpect to the cavalry, of the importance of which he was perfectly apprized. He wrote two treatiſes upon this ſubject; one of which re-

* Αναβολιως μη διομενοις. This word Αναβολευς, ſignifies a ſervant, who helped his maſter to mount on horſeback.

gards

gards the care it is neceſſary to take of horſes, and how to underſtand and break them; to which he adds the exerciſe of the ſquadron; both well worth the reading of all who profeſs arms. In the latter he ſtates the means of placing the cavalry in honour, and lays down rules upon the art military in general, which might be of very great uſe to all thoſe who are deſigned for the trade of war.

I have wondered, in running over this ſecond treatiſe, to ſee with what care Xenophon, a ſoldier and a pagan, recommends the practice of religion, a veneration of the gods, and the neceſſity of imploring their aid upon all occaſions. He repeats this maxim in thirteen different places of a tract in other reſpects brief enough; and rightly judging that theſe inſinuations might give ſome people offence, he makes a kind of apology for them, and concludes the piece with a reflection, which I ſhall repeat entire in this place. "If any one," ſays he, "wonders that I inſiſt ſo much here upon the neceſſity of not forming any enterpriſe, without firſt endeavouring to render the divinity favourable and propitious, let him reflect, that there are in war a thouſand unforeſeen and obſcure conjunctures, wherein the generals, vigilant to take advantages, and lay ambuſcades for each other, from the uncertainty of an enemy's motions, can take no other council than that of the gods. Nothing is doubtful or obſcure with them. They unfold the future to whomſoever they pleaſe, on the inſpection of the entrails of beaſts, by the ſinging of birds, by viſions or in dreams. Now we may preſume that the gods are more inclined to illuminate the minds of ſuch as conſult them not only in urgent neceſſities, but who at all times, and when no dangers threaten them, render them all the homage and adoration of which they are capable."

It became this great man to give the moſt important of inſtructions to his ſon Gryllus, to whom he addreſſes the treatiſe we mention, and who, according to the common opinion, was appointed to diſcipline the Athenian cavalry.

SECT.

SECT. IV. *Of maritime Affairs, Fleets, and naval Forces.*

IF the Athenians were inferior to the Lacedæmonians in reſpect to cavalry, they carried it infinitely againſt them in naval affairs, and we have ſeen their abilities that way make them maſters at ſea, and give them a great ſuperiority to all the other ſtates of Greece. As this ſubject is very neceſſary to the underſtanding many paſſages in this hiſtory, I ſhall treat it more extenſively than other matters, and ſhall make great uſe of what the learned father Don Bernard de Montfaucon has ſaid of it in his books upon antiquity.

The principal parts of a ſhip were the prow or head, the poop or ſtern, and the middle, called in Latin *carina*, the hulk or waiſt.

The PROW was the part in the front of the waiſt or belly of the ſhip; it was generally adorned with paintings and different ſculptures of gods, men, or animals. The beak, called *roſtrum*, lay lower, and level with the water: it was a piece of timber which projected from the prow, covered at the point with braſs, and ſometimes with iron. The Greeks termed it ἔμβολον.

The other end of the ſhip, oppoſite to the prow, was called the Poop. There the pilot ſat and held the helm, which was a longer and larger oar than the reſt.

The WAIST was the hollow of the veſſel, or the hold.

The ſhips were of two kinds. The one was rowed with oars, which were ſhips of war, the other carried ſails, and were veſſels of burden, intended for commerce and tranſports. Both of them ſometimes made uſe of oars and ſails together, but that very rarely. The ſhips of war are alſo very often called long ſhips by authors, and by that name diſtinguiſhed from veſſels of burden.

The long ſhips were further divided into two ſpecies; thoſe which were called *actuariæ naves*, and were very light veſſels, like our brigantines; and thoſe called only long ſhips. The firſt were uſually termed *open ſhips*, becauſe

becauſe they had no decks. Of theſe light veſſels there were ſome larger than ordinary, of which ſome had twenty, ſome thirty, and others forty oars, half on one ſide and half on the other, all on the ſame line.

The long ſhips, which were uſed in war, were of two ſorts. Some had only one rank of oars on each ſide; the others two, three, four, five, or a greater number, to forty; but theſe laſt were rather for ſhow than uſe.

The long ſhips of one rank of oars were called *aphracti*; that is to ſay, uncovered, and had no decks: this diſtinguiſhed them from the *cataphracti*, which had decks. They had only ſmall pieces to ſtand on, at the head and ſtern, in the time of action.

The ſhips moſt commonly uſed in the battles of the ancients, were thoſe which carried from three to five ranks or benches of oars, and were called *triremes* and *quinqueremes*.

It is a great queſtion, and has given occaſion for abundance of learned diſſertations, how theſe benches of oars were diſpoſed. Some will have it, that they were placed at length, like the ranks of oars in the modern galleys. Others maintain, that the ranges of the biremes, triremes, quinqueremes, and ſo on to the number of forty in ſome veſſels, were one above another. To ſupport this laſt opinion, innumerable paſſages are cited from ancient authors, which ſeem to leave no manner of doubt in it, and are conſiderably corroborated by the column of Trajan, which repreſents theſe ranks one above another. Father Montfaucon, however, avers, that all the perſons of greateſt ſkill in naval affairs, whom he had conſulted, declared, that the thing conceived in that manner, ſeemed to them utterly impoſſible. But ſuch a way of reaſoning is a weak proof againſt the experience of ſo many ages, confirmed by ſo many authors. It is true, that in admitting theſe ranks of oars to be diſpoſed perpendicularly one above another, it is not eaſy to comprehend how they could be worked; but in the biremes and triremes of the column of Trajan, the lower ranks are placed obliquely, and, as it were, riſing by degrees.

In

In ancient times the ships with several ranks of oars were not known: they made use of long ships, in which the rowers, of whatever number they were, worked all upon the same line. [a] Such was the fleet which the Greeks sent against Troy. It was composed of twelve hundred sail, of which the galleys of Bœotia had each a hundred and twenty men, and those of Philoctetes fifty; and this no doubt intends the greatest and smallest vessels. Their galleys had no decks, but were built like common boats; which is still practised, says Thucydides, by the pirates, to prevent their being so soon discovered at a distance.

[b] The Corinthians are said to have been the first who changed the form of ships, and, instead of simple galleys, made vessels with three ranks, in order to add, by the multiplicity of oars, to the swiftness and impetuosity of their motion. Their city, advantageously situated between two seas, lay well for commerce, and served as a staple for merchandise. From their example, the inhabitants of Corcyra, and the tyrants of Sicily, equipped also many galleys of three benches, a little before the war against the Persians. It was about the same time the Athenians, at the warm instances of Themistocles, who foresaw the war which soon broke out, built ships of the same form, the whole deck not being yet in use; and from thenceforth they applied themselves to naval affairs with incredible ardour and success.

The beak of the prow *(rostrum)* was that part of the vessel of which most use was made in sea-fights. [c] Ariston of Corinth persuaded the Syracusans, when their city was besieged by the Athenians, to make their prows lower and shorter; which advice gained them the victory. For the prows of the Athenian vessels being very high and very weak, their beaks struck only the parts above water, and for that reason did little damage to the enemy's ships; whereas the Syracusans, whose prows were strong and low, and their beaks level with the water, at a single blow often sunk the triremes of the Athenians.

[a] Thucyd. l. i. p. 8. [b] Thucyd. l. i. p. 10. [c] Diod. l. xiii. p. 141.

Two

Two sorts of people served on board these galleys. The one were employed in steering and working the ship, who were the rowers, *remiges*, and the mariners, *nautæ*. The rest were soldiers intended for the fight, and are meant in Greek by the word ἐπιβάται. This distinction was not understood in the early times, when the same persons rowed, fought, and did all the necessary work of the ship; which was also not wholly disused in later days. For [d] Thucydides, in describing the arrival of the Athenian fleet at the small island of Sphacteria, observes, that only the rowers of the lowest bench remained in the ships, and that the rest went on shore with their arms.

1. The condition of the rowers was very hard and laborious. I have already said, that the rowers, as well as mariners, were all citizens and freemen, and not slaves or strangers as in these days. The rowers were distinguished by their several stages. The lower rank were called *Thalamitæ*, the middle *Zugitæ*, and the highest *Thranitæ*. Thucydides remarks, that the latter had greater pay than the rest, because they worked with longer and heavier oars than those of the lower benches. * It seems that the crew, in order to act in concert, and with better effect, were sometimes guided by the singing of a man, and sometimes by the sound of an instrument; and this grateful harmony served not only to regulate the motion of their oars, but to diminish and sooth the pains of their labour.

It is a question amongst the learned, whether there was a man to every oar in these great ships, or several, as in the galleys of these days. What Thucydides observes on the pay of the Thranitæ, seems to imply that they worked single. For if others had shared the work with them, wherefore had they greater pay given them than those who managed an oar alone, as the latter had as much, and perhaps more, of the labour than they?

[d] Thucyd. l. iv. p. 275.

* *Musicam natura ipsa videtur ad tolerandos facilius labores veluti muneri nobis dedisse. Siquidem et remiges cantus hortatur; nec solum in iis operibus, in quibus plurium conatus præcunte aliqua jucunda voce eonspirat, sed etiam singulorum fatigatio quamlibet se rudi modulatione solatur.* QUINTIL. l. i. c. 10.

Father

Father Montfaucon believes, that in the veſſels of five ranks there might be ſeveral men to one oar.

He who took care of the whole crew, and commanded the veſſel, was called *nauclerus*, and was the principal officer. The ſecond was the pilot, *gubernator*; his place was in the poop, where he held the helm in his hand, and ſteered the veſſel. His ſkill conſiſted in knowing the coaſts, ports, rocks, ſhoals, and eſpecially the winds and ſtars; for before the invention of the compaſs, the pilot had nothing to direct him during the night but the ſtars.

2. The ſoldiers, who fought in the ſhips, were armed almoſt in the ſame manner with the land forces. [e] The Athenians, at the battle of Salamin, had a hundred and fourſcore veſſels, and in each of them eighteen fighting men, four of whom were archers, and the reſt heavy-armed troops. The officer who commanded theſe ſoldiers was called τριηραρχος, and the commander of the whole fleet ναυαρχος, or στρατηγος.

We cannot exactly ſay the number of ſoldiers, mariners, and rowers, that ſerved on board each ſhip; but it generally amounted to two hundred, more or leſs, as appears from Herodotus's eſtimate of the Perſian fleet in the time of Xerxes, and in other places where he mentions that of the Greeks. I mean here the great veſſels, the triremes, which were the ſpecies moſt in uſe.

The pay of thoſe who ſerved in theſe ſhips varied very much at different times. When young Cyrus arrived in Aſia [f], it was only three oboli, which was half a drachma, or fivepence; and the * treaty between the Perſians and Lacedæmonians was concluded upon this foot; which gives reaſon to believe, that the uſual pay was three oboli. Cyrus, at Lyſander's requeſt, added a fourth, which made ſixpence halfpenny a day. [g] It was often raiſed to a whole drachma, about ten-pence

[e] Plut. in Themiſt. p. 119. [f] Xenoph. Hiſt. li. p. 441. [g] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 431.

* This treaty ſtipulated, that the Perſian, ſhould pay thirty minæ a month for each ſhip, which was half a talent; the whole amounted to three oboli a day for every man that ſerved on board.

French.

French. In the fleet fitted out againſt Sicily the Athenians gave a drachma a day to the troops. The ſum of ſixty talents [h] *, which the people of Egeſta advanced the Athenians monthly for the maintaining of ſixty ſhips, ſhows that the pay of each veſſel for a month amounted to a talent, that is to ſay, to three thouſand livres; which ſuppoſes, that each ſhip's company conſiſted of two hundred men, each of whom received a drachma or ten-pence a day. As the officers' pay was higher, the republic perhaps either furniſhed the overplus, or it was deducted out of the total of the ſum advanced for a veſſel, by abating ſomething in the pay of the private men.

The ſame may be ſaid of the land troops as has been ſaid of the ſeamen, except that the horſe had double their pay. It appears that the ordinary pay of the foot was three oboli a day, and that it was augmented according to times and occaſions. [i] Thimbron, the Lacedæmonian, when he marched againſt Tiſſaphernes, promiſed a darick a month to each ſoldier, two to a captain, and four to the colonels. Now a darick a month is four oboli a day. Young Cyrus, to animate his troops, whom a too long march had diſcouraged, inſtead of one darick, promiſed one and a half to each ſoldier, which amounted to a drachma, or ten-pence French a day.

It may be aſked how the Lacedæmonians, whoſe iron coin, the only ſpecie current amongſt them, would go no where elſe, could maintain armies by ſea and land, and where they found money for their ſubſiſtence. It is not to be doubted, but they raiſed it, as the Athenians did, by contributions from their allies, and ſtill more from the cities to which they gave liberty and protection, or from thoſe they had conquered from their enemies. Their ſecond fund for paying their fleet and armies was the aids they drew from the king of Perſia, as we have ſeen on ſeveral occaſions.

[h] Thucyd. l. vi. p. 415. [i] Xenoph. Expedit. Cyr. l. vii.

* About 8400l. ſterling.

SECT.

SECT. V. *Peculiar Character of the Athenians.*

PLUTARCH furniſhes us with almoſt all the matter upon this head. Every body knows how well he ſucceeds in copying nature in his portraits, and how proper a perſon he was to trace the character of a people, whoſe genius and manners he had ſtudied with ſo profound an attention.

"[k] I. *The people of Athens," ſays Plutarch, "were eaſily provoked to anger, and as eaſily induced to reſume their ſentiments of benevolence and compaſſion." Hiſtory ſupplies us with an infinitude of examples of this kind. The ſentence of death paſſed againſt the inhabitants of Mytilene, and revoked the next day: the condemnation of the ten generals, and that of Socrates, both followed with an immediate repentance and the moſt lively grief.

"II. †They were better pleaſed with penetrating, and almoſt gueſſing an affair of themſelves, than to give themſelves leiſure to be informed in it thoroughly, and in all its extent."

Nothing is more ſurpriſing than this circumſtance in their character, which it is very hard to conceive, and ſeems almoſt incredible. Artificers, huſbandmen, ſoldiers, mariners, are generally a dull, heavy kind of people, and very groſs in their conceptions; but the people of Athens were of a quite different turn. They had naturally an amazing penetration, vivacity, and even delicacy of wit.

I have already mentioned what happened to Theophraſtus. ‡He was cheapening ſomething of an old woman at Athens that ſold herbs: "No, Mr. Stranger," ſaid ſhe, "you ſhall have it for no leſs." He was ſtrangely ſurpriſed to ſee himſelf treated as a ſtranger,

[k] Plut. in præcept. reip. ger. p. 793.

* Ο δημος Αθηναιων ευκινητος εστι προς οργην, συμπαθητος προς ελεον.

† Μαλλον οξεως υπονοειν, η διδασκεσθαι και θησχιαν βουλομενος.

‡ *Cum Theophraſtus percontaretur ex aniculâ quadam, quanti aliquid venderet, et reſpondiſſet illa, atque addidiſſet: hoſpes, non ſate minoris; tulit moleſtè, ſe non effugere hoſpitis ſpeciem, cum ætatem ageret Athenis, optimeque loqueretur.* Cic. de Clar. Orat. n. 12.

who

who had paſſed almoſt his whole life at Athens, and who piqued himſelf upon excelling all others in the elegance of his language. It was, however, from that ſhe knew he was not of her country. We have ſaid, that the Athenian ſoldiers knew the fine paſſages of Euripides by heart. Theſe artificers and ſoldiers, from aſſiſting at the public deliberations, were beſides verſed in the affairs of ſtate, and underſtood every thing at half a word. We may judge of this from the orations of Demoſthenes, whoſe ſtyle we know is ardent, brief, and conciſe.

"III. * As they naturally inclined to relieve perſons of a low condition and mean circumſtances, ſo were they fond of converſations ſeaſoned with pleaſantry, and proper to make people laugh."

[1] They aſſiſted perſons of a mean condition, becauſe from ſuch they had nothing to apprehend in regard to their liberty, and ſaw in them the characters of equality and reſemblance with themſelves. They loved pleaſantry, and ſhewed in that they were men; but men abounding with humanity and indulgence, who underſtood raillery, who were not prone to take offence, nor over delicate in point of the reſpect to be paid them. One day, when the aſſembly was fully formed, and the people had already taken their places and ſat down, Cleon, after having made them wait his coming a great while, appeared at laſt with a wreath of flowers upon his head, and deſired the people to adjourn their deliberations to the next day. "For to-day," ſaid he, "I have buſineſs. I have been ſacrificing to the gods, and am to entertain ſome ſtrangers, my friends, at ſupper." The Athenians, ſetting up a laugh, roſe and broke up the aſſembly. At Carthage ſuch a pleaſantry would have coſt any man his life, that had preſumed to vent it, and to take ſuch a liberty with a † proud, haughty, jealous, moroſe people, of a genius

[1] Xenoph. de Athen. Rep. p. 691.

* Ωσπερ των ανδρων τοις αδοξοις κ ταπεινοις βοηθειν προθυμοτερος, ουτως των λογων τας παιγνιωδεις κ γελοιας ασπαζεται κ προτιμα.

† Πικρον, σκυθρωπον, προς παιδιαν κ χαριν ανηδυτον κ σκληρον.

averſe

averſe to complacency, and leſs inclined to humour. Upon another occaſion the orator Stratocles, having informed the people of a victory, and in conſequence cauſed ſacrifices to be offered, three days after news came of the defeat of the army. As the people expreſſed their diſcontent and reſentment upon the falſe information, he aſked them, "of what they had to complain, and what harm he had done them, in making them paſs three days more agreeably than they would elſe have done?"

"IV. * They were pleaſed with hearing themſelves praiſed, and could not bear to be railed at, or criticiſed. The leaſt acquaintance with Ariſtophanes and Demoſthenes will ſhew, with what addreſs and effect they employed praiſes and criticiſm with regard to the people of Athens.

[m] When the republic enjoyed peace and tranquillity, ſays the ſame Plutarch in another place, the Athenian people diverted themſelves with the orators who flattered them: but in important affairs, and emergencies of the ſtate, they became ſerious, and gave the preference to thoſe, whoſe cuſtom it had been to oppoſe their unjuſt deſires; ſuch as Pericles, Phocion, and Demoſthenes.

"V. † They kept thoſe who governed them in awe, and ſhewed their humanity even to their enemies."

The people of Athens made good uſe of the talents of thoſe who diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their eloquence and prudence; but they were full of ſuſpicion, and kept themſelves always on their guard againſt their ſuperiority of genius and ability: they took pleaſure in reſtraining their courage, and leſſening their glory and reputation. This may be judged from the oſtraciſm, which was inſtituted only as a curb on thoſe, whoſe merit and popularity ran too high, and which ſpared

[m] Plut. in Phocian, p. 746.

* Τοις μεν επαινοσιν αυτον μαλιστα χαιρει, τοις δε σκωπτουσιν ηκιστα δυσχεραινει.

† Φοβερος εστιν αχρι των αρχοντων, ειτα φιλανθρωπος αχρι των πολεμιων.

neither

neither the greateſt nor the moſt worthy perſons. The hatred of tyranny and tyrants, which was in a manner innate in the Athenians, made them extremely jealous and apprehenſive for their liberty, with regard to thoſe who governed.

As to what relates to their enemies, they did not treat them with rigour; they did not make an inſolent uſe of victory, nor exerciſe any cruelty towards the vanquiſhed. The amneſty decreed after the tyranny of the Thirty, ſhows that they could forget the injuries which had been done them.

To theſe different characteriſtics which Plutarch unites in the ſame paſſage of his works, ſome others may be added, extracted principally from the ſame author.

"VI. It was from this * fund of humanity and benevolence, of which I have now ſpoken, and which was natural to the Athenians, that they were ſo attentive to the rules of politeneſs, and ſo delicate in point of juſt behaviour; qualities one would not expect to find among the common people. [n] In the war againſt Philip of Macedon, having intercepted one of his couriers, they read all the letters he carried, except that of Olympias his wife, which they returned ſealed up and unopened, out of regard to conjugal love and ſecrecy, the rights of which are ſacred, and ought to be reſpected even amongſt enemies. The ſame Athenians having decreed, that a ſtrict ſearch ſhould be made after the preſents diſtributed by Harpalus amongſt the orators, would not ſuffer the houſe of Callicles, who was lately married, to be viſited, out of reſpect for his bride, not long brought home. Such behaviour is not very common, and upon like occaſions people do not ſtand much upon forms and politeneſs.

"VII. The taſte of the Athenians for all arts and ſciences is too well known to require dwelling long upon it in this place. Beſides which, I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak of it with ſome extent elſewhere. But

[n] Plut. in Demetr. p. 898.

* Πατριον αυτοις ἡ συμφυλον ην το φιλανθρωπον. In Pelop. p. 280.

we cannot see without admiration a people composed for the most part, as I have said before, of artisans, husbandmen, soldiers, and mariners, carry delicacy of taste in every kind to so high a degree of perfection, which seems the peculiar attribute of a more exalted condition and a noble education.

" VIII. It is no less wonderful, that this people * should have such great views, and rose so high in their pretensions. In the war Alcibiades made them undertake, filled with vast projects and unbounded hopes, they did not confine themselves to the taking of Syracuse, or the conquest of Sicily, but had already added Italy, Peloponnesus, Lybia, the Carthaginian states, and the empire of the sea to the Pillars of Hercules. Their enterprise failed, but they had formed it; and the taking of Syracuse, which seemed no great difficulty, might have enabled them to put it in execution.

" IX. The same people, so great, and, one may say, so haughty in their projects, had nothing of that character in other respects. In what regarded the expence of the table, dress, furniture, private buildings, and, in a word, private life, they were frugal, simple, modest, and poor; but sumptuous and magnificent in all things public, and capable of doing honour to the state. Their victories, conquests, wealth, and continual communication with the people of Asia Minor, introduced neither luxury, gluttony, pomp, nor vain profusion among them. ° Xenophon observes, that a citizen could not be distinguished from a slave by his dress. The richest inhabitants, and the most famous generals, were not ashamed to go to market themselves.

It was very glorious for Athens to have produced and formed so many excellent persons in the arts of war and government; in philosophy, eloquence, poesy, painting, sculpture, and architecture: of having furnished alone more great men in every kind than any other city of the world; if perhaps we except Rome,

° De Rep. Athen. p. 693.

* Μεγα φρονει μεγαλων οργειαι. PLUT.

which

which * had imbibed learning and arts from her, and knew how to apply her leſſons to the beſt advantage; of having been in ſome ſort the ſchool, and tutor of almoſt the whole univerſe; of having ſerved, and ſtill continuing to ſerve, as the model for nations, which pique themſelves moſt upon the excellency of taſte; in a word, of having taught the language, and preſcribed the laws of all that regards the talents and productions of the mind. The part of this hiſtory, wherein I ſhall treat the ſciences and learned men, that rendered Greece illuſtrious, with the arts alſo, and thoſe who excelled in them, will ſet this in a clear light.

" X. I ſhall conclude this deſcription of the Athenians with one more attribute, which cannot be denied them, and appears evidently in all their actions and enterpriſes; and that is, their ardent love of liberty. This was their darling paſſion and great principle of policy. We ſee them, from the commencement of the war with the Perſians, ſacrifice every thing to the liberty of Greece. They abandoned, without the leaſt regret, their lands, eſtates, city, and houſes, and removed to their ſhips, in order to fight the common enemy, whoſe view was to enſlave them. What could be more glorious for Athens, than, when all the allies were trembling at the vaſt offers made her by the king of Perſia, to anſwer his ambaſſador by the mouth of [p] Ariſtides, that all the gold and ſilver in the world was not capable of tempting them to ſell their own, or the liberty of Greece? It was from ſuch generous ſentiments that the Athenians not only became the bulwark of Greece, but preſerved the reſt of Europe, and all the weſtern world, from the invaſion of the Perſians.

Theſe great qualities were mingled with great defects, often the very reverſe of them, ſuch as we may

[p] Plut. in Ariſtid. p. 324.

* *Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes*
Intulit agreſti Latio. HORAT. Epiſt. I. l. 2.

Greece taken, took her ſavage victors hearts,
And poliſh'd ruſtic Latium with her arts.

imagine in a fluctuating, light, inconſtant, capricious people, as the Athenians.

SECT. VI. *Common Character of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians.*

I CANNOT refuſe giving a place here to what Mr. Boſſuit ſays upon the character of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. The paſſage is long, but will not appear ſo, and includes all that is wanting to a perfect knowledge of the genius of both thoſe people.

Amongſt all the republics of which Greece was compoſed, Athens and Lacedæmon were undoubtedly the principal. No people could have more wit than the Athenians, nor more ſolid ſenſe than the Lacedæmonians. Athens affected pleaſure; the Lacedæmonian way of life was hard and laborious. Both loved glory and liberty; but the liberty of Athens tended to licence; and controlled by ſevere laws at Lacedæmon, the more reſtrained it was at home, the more ardent it was to extend itſelf in rule abroad. Athens was alſo for reigning, but upon another principle, in which intereſt had a ſhare with glory. Her citizens excelled in the art of navigation, and the ſovereignty at ſea had enriched her. To continue in the ſole poſſeſſion of all commerce, there was nothing ſhe would not have ſubjected to her power; and her riches, which inſpired this paſſion, ſupplied her with the means of gratifying it. On the contrary, at Lacedæmon money was in contempt. As all the laws tended to make the latter a military republic, the glory of arms was the ſole object that engroſſed her citizens. From thence ſhe naturally affected dominion: and the more ſhe was above intereſt, the more ſhe abandoned herſelf to ambition.

Lacedæmon, from her regular life, was ſteady and determinate in her maxims and meaſures. Athens was more lively and active, and the people too much maſters. Their laws and philoſophy had indeed the moſt happy effects upon ſuch exquiſite natural parts as theirs,

theirs, but reaſon alone was not capable of keeping them within due bounds. [s] A wiſe Athenian, who knew admirably the genius of his country, informs us, that fear was neceſſary to thoſe too ardent and free ſpirits; and that it was impoſſible to govern them, after the victory at Salamin had removed their fears of the Perſians.

Two things then ruined them, the glory of their great actions, and the ſuppoſed ſecurity of their preſent condition. The magiſtrates were no longer heard, and as Perſia was afflicted with exceſſive ſlavery, ſo Athens, ſays Plato, experienced all the evils of exceſſive liberty.

Thoſe two great republics, ſo contrary in their manners and conduct, interfered with each other in the deſign they had each formed of ſubjecting all Greece; ſo that they were always enemies, more from the contrariety of their intereſts, than the incompatibility of their humours.

The Grecian cities were againſt ſubmitting to the dominion of either the one or the other; for, beſides the deſire of preſerving their liberty, they found the empire of thoſe two republics too grievous to bear. That of the Lacedæmonians was ſevere. That people were obſerved to have ſomething almoſt brutal in their character. [t] A government too rigid, and a life too laborious, rendered their tempers too haughty, auſtere, and imperious in power: beſides which they could never expect to live in peace under the influence of a city, which being formed for war, could not ſupport itſelf, but by continuing perpetually in arms. [u] So that the Lacedæmonians were capable of attaining to command, and all the world were afraid they ſhould do ſo.

[x] The Athenians were naturally obliging and agreeable. Nothing was more delightful to behold than their city, in which feaſts and games were perpetual, where wit, liberty, and the various paſſions of men

[s] Plat. l. iii. de Leg.
[t] Ariſtot. Polit. l. i. p. 4.
[u] Xenoph. de Rep. Lacon.
[x] Plat. de Rep. l. viii.

daily

daily exhibited new objects: but the inequality of their conduct disgusted their allies, and was still more insupportable to their own subjects. It was impossible for them not to experience the extravagance and caprice of a flattered people, that is to say, according to Plato, something more dangerous than the same excesses in a prince vitiated by flattery.

These two cities did not permit Greece to continue in repose. We have seen the Peloponnesian and other wars, which were always occasioned, or fomented, by the jealousy of Lacedæmon and Athens. But the same jealousies which involved Greece in troubles, supported it in some measure, and prevented its falling into the dependance of either the one or the other of those republics.

The Persians soon perceived this condition of Greece, and accordingly the whole mystery of their politics consisted in keeping up those jealousies, and fomenting those divisions. Lacedæmon, which was the most ambitious, was the first that gave them occasion to enter into the quarrels of the Greeks. They engaged in them from the sole view of making themselves masters of the whole nation; and industrious to weaken the Greeks by their own arms, they waited only the opportunity to crush them all together. [y] The states of Greece in their wars already regarded only the king of Persia, whom they called the Great King, or *the king*, by way of eminence, as if they had already been of the number of his subjects. But it was impossible that the ancient spirit of Greece should not revive, when they were upon the point of falling into slavery, and the hands of the Barbarians.

The petty kings of Greece undertook to oppose this great king, and to ruin his empire. [z] With a small army, but bred in the discipline we have related, Agesilaus king of Sparta, made the Persians tremble in Asia Minor, and showed it was not impossible to subvert their power. The divisions of Greece alone put a stop

[y] Plat. l. 3. de leg. Isocrat. Panegyr. [z] Polyb. l. 3.

to

to his conquests. The famous retreat of the ten thousand, who after the death of young Cyrus, made their way in a hostile manner through the whole Persian empire, and returned into their own country; that action, I say, demonstrated to Greece more than ever, that their soldiery was invincible, and superior to all opposers; and that only their domestic divisions could subject them to an enemy too weak to resist their united force.

We shall see in the series of this history, by what methods Philip king of Macedon, taking advantage of these divisions, came at length, between address and force, to make himself little less than the sovereign of Greece, and to oblige the whole nation to march under his colours against the common enemy. What he had only planned, his son Alexander brought to perfection; and showed the wondering world, how much ability and valour avail against the most numerous armies and the most formidable preparations.

END OF VOL. IV.

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